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Abstract 
This thesis proposes to answer a single question: do the stylistic features of cognition operate 
independently of cognitive contents? The question itself has a history, and the way it has been framed, and 
the types of answers it has attracted have been related to ideological and political interests. Chapter 1 
reviews four social psychological theories of the relationship between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs - authoritarianism, extremism theory, context theory, and value pluralism theory. It argues that 
these (empiricist) accounts have been bedeviled by a tension between theoretical universalism and political 
critique, and have fostered the view that cognitive traits are stable, general, and pervasive properties of 
individual psychology. Chapter 2 focuses on the construct of intolerance of ambiguity, and shows how -
in the manner of Danziger's (1985) "methodological circle" -universalistic assumptions have become 
incorporated into measurement instruments; and how all evidence of individual variability in cognitive 
style has been accommodated by interactionist models of personality, leaving the empiricist view intact. 
Roy Bhaskar's critical realism is used as an alternative to a empiricist psychology, and Michael Billig's 
rhetorical psychology is used as an alternative to universalistic theories of cognitive style. A measurement 
procedure is developed which can assess cross-content variability in ambiguity tolerance. Three studies 
are performed in order to justify a move towards an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive style. Study 
l evaluates the hypothesized generality of ambiguity tolerance on a sample of university students. Factor 
analysis and correlational matrices show that ambiguity tolerance toward different authorities is domain 
specific, and that different factors are related to each other positively, negatively, and orthogonally. Study 
2 employs the same sample, and uses polynomial regression analysis to show that the relationship between 
ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism is highly variable across content domain. Study 3 
replicates these central fmdings with another student sample and with different scale contents. The results 
of all three studies arc contrary to the predictions of the social psychological accounts of cognitive style. 
They show that expressions of cognitive style are context- and content-dependent, and suggest that the 
empiricist "thing-like" ontology be replaced with a praxis- and concept-dependent ontology. 
Chapter 6 draws on the traditions of discourse analysis, rhetoric, and dialogics to introduce an anti-
universalistic conception of cognitive style. It proposes a new psychological ontology, and adopts the 
methodology of rhetorical psychology to show the emergent (i.e., indexical, variable, and performative) 
nature of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity in dialogical contexts of "joint action". An interview with 
Koos Vermeulen -leader of the nco-fascist, World Apartheid Movement- is analyzed to show both 
variability in ambiguity tolerance, and the organization of intolerance of ambiguity into the rhetoric of the 
far Right. The Bakhtinian understanding of utterance and speech genre is used to explain the manifest 
expressions of "cognitive style", and is proposed as the (critical realist) generative structures which 
underlie manifest ambiguity tolerance. The thesis concludes by arguing that critical realism can sustain 
a sound epistemology, a critical psychology, and a rhetorical account of cognitive style. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, sect. 115) 
The cognitive style literature was sparked by a vicious transatlantic debate concerning the 
rationality of fascism. In 1938, the Nazi psychologist E. R. Jaensch had published his Der 
Gegentypus (The Anti-type), in which he claimed that liberalism was essentially an irrational 
ideology which attracted to itself pathological individuals. For Jaensch, 
Social liberalism is paralleled by immutable other forms of liberalism. all of them 
mentally rooted in the S-type: liberalism of knowledge, of perception, of art, etc. (p. 
44) ... The lytic S-type has no firm tie to reality (p. 37, emphasis added). 
According to Jaensch, individuals who were predisposed to adopt a liberal ideology would also 
manifest an irrational style of cognition. This cognitive style pervaded all aspects of an 
individual's life and was characterized by instability in judgement and extreme evaluative 
variability. Hence, liberalism was irrational. 
This argument was not taken lightly by psychologists who had fled the Nazi tyranny, and who 
had accepted the task of studying fascism "in the search for more effective ways to prevent or 
reduce the virulence of the next outbreak" (Horkheimer & Flowerman, 1950, p. v). In response 
to Jaensch's reasoning, a flrst requirement of the social sciences was to "prove" the irrational 
nature of fascism. Evidence was at hand. On the basis of a large research project conducted in 



























Theoretical perspectives 2 
wrong. It was the authoritarian J-type, and not the S-type, who was irrational. The argument was 
an inverted mirror image of Jaensch's. The J-type demonstrated a: 
... subtle but profound distortion of reality ... [which] turns out to be maladaptive in the 
end (p. 135, emphasis added) ... [because] clinging to the familiar and precise detail can 
go hand in hand with ignoring most of the remaining aspects of the stimulus 
configuration, resulting in an altogether haphazard type of approach to reality (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949, p. 141). 
In this instance, irrationality was manifest, not in instability and evaluative variability, but in a 
cognitive style which clung to the familiar and consistently employed rigid and firmly bounded 
categorization. This, Frenkel-Brunswik termed intolerance of ambiguity, the cognitive style which 
forms the focus of this thesis. 
Although they disagreed on the fundamental issue of which cognitive style was irrational, Jaensch 
and Frenkel-Brunswik were in agreement about much. It is the unspoken agreement between the 
two parties which formed the background to their exchange, and which provided the underlying 
conditions which made their dialogue possible. Furthermore, these background assumptions have 
continued to shape the thinking of cognitive style within the discipline of psychology. The 
assumptions are twofold: first, that political issues can be approached scientifically; and second, 
that this science should be empiricist. The first assumption meant that political and moral issues 
could be transformed into matters of rationality. The concern with the goodness or badness of 
liberalism and fascism was transformed into a matter of the irrational nature of these ideologies. 
This was a useful rhetorical devise as it allowed the researcher to make political arguments based 
on "value-free" fact, and thus avoid accusations of bias. The second assumption maintained that 
universally true knowledge statements regarding the causal relationship between ideological 
opinion and cognitive irrationality could be established by Humean criteria - namely, the 
observation of "constant conjunctions" between ideological opinion and cognitive style. 
Today the literature is far more diverse, technically sophisticated, and rhetorically subtle, but 
these two assumptions remain entrenched as the background against which knowledge statements 
may be advanced. This is evident not only from the fact that the cognitive style literature has 
largely remained committed to the single task of fmding the true nature of the relationship 
between cognitive style and ideological content, or because the literature has continued to adopt 
correlational methods which support theory by the criterion of predictive validity. Nor is it that 
constructs of cognitive style continue to fall along bipolar continuum, ranging from 'rational' 
styles of flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, and complexity on the one hand, to 'irrational' styles 
of rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, and simplicity on the other. The main feature of this 


















Theoretical perspectives 3 
the object of analysis: the self-contained individual. 
This object was fundamental to the debate between Jaensch and Frenkel-Brunswik, for it provided 
the ontological foundation upon which both their political and scientific claims could be based. 
Although Jaensch spoke of a stileinheit (unity of style) and Frenkel-Brunswik referred to 
generalized traits, they were talking about essentially the same phenomenon: that individuals had 
a characteristic cognitive style which coloured all aspects of their life, and that this trait varied 
across the population of individuals (according to the normal curve). If one was intolerant of 
ambiguity, this was manifest in all aspects of cognition, behaviour, and affect, and you differed 
in all these aspects from individuals who were differentially intolerant of ambiguity than yourself. 
It is not difficult to see how this object underpinned political and scientific practice. For, if 
cognitive style was not generalized over different domains of individual life, but instead, 
individuals manifested rational styles in certain contexts and within particular content domains, 
but irrational styles in others, then there would be no grounds by which to argue that irrational 
personality functioning predisposed individuals towards accepting specific ideological beliefs. 
Instead, these ideological contents could be endorsed by both rational and irrational cognitive 
styles. The generalized individual was the site where pervasive psychological irrationality and 
political opinion met. Similarly, this assumption justified the scientific practice which sought 
constant conjunctions between observations of ideological opinion and cognitive style. Once 
again, if it was not assumed that cognitive style was a generalized individual phenomenon, then 
the researcher could never be sure that the instance of cognitive style measured on a particular 
occasion was indeed the aspect of cognitive irrationality which was supposedly associated with 
the ideological opinion. There would be no grounds by which to draw causal inferences from the 
observation of constant conjunctions because these would be rendered unstable. 
Despite its scientific and objective veneer, the literature continues to be marked by the radical 
differences of opinion which characterised the debate between Frenkel-Brunswik and Jaensch. In 
this thesis I attribute this unsatisfactory state of affairs to the empiricist nature of the scientific 
endeavour. I argue that empiricism has encouraged the adoption of a false epistemology (i.e., 
Humean causality, objectivity, and representationism) and a false ontology (i.e., the self-
contained individual), both of which have been sustained by assumptions which have been 
incorporated into the methods and measures by which cognitive style has been studied. This state 
of affairs is unsatisfactory, not because value judgements have tainted science, but because the 
psychological study of cognitive style has believed itself to be scientific and objective while, in 
practice, it has been thoroughly value-driven. 
Theoretical perspectives 4 
This thesis aims to initiate a process of rethinking cognitive style. This involves a critique of 
empiricist accounts at methodological, epistemological, and ontological levels. In the end, I aim 
to advance a rhetorical account of cognitive style which rests on less questionable assumptions 
than current psychological models, and which can accommodate the manifest individual, cultural, 
and historical variability in cognitive style. The account which is presented here is based upon 
recent developments in critical realist (Bhaskar, 1986, 1989a, 1989b) and social constructionist 
(Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1983; Shatter, 1993a) philosophies of science, which have sought an 
alternative to dominant empiricist models of psychology. Although there are many different foci 
and differences of emphasis among these approaches to psychology (including varieties of 
realisms, discourse analyses, rhetorics, and tectonics etc.), they are unified in their rejection of 
empiricism, and recommend a radical shift in the object and methodology of social psychology. 
The remainder of the introduction has two aims. As has already been noted, the cognitive style 
literature has basically been an attempt to provide an individualistic account of political beliefs. 
The first consideration, then, aims to set the cognitive style literature within its historical, 
political, and theoretical context by discussing the reasons why individualistic accounts of political 
beliefs have become so influential in psychology. Second, the chapter concludes by identifying 
the major assumptions which underlie the empiricist account of cognitive style. These 
assumptions are the focus of attention in the work which follows, and this discussion thus acts 
as an introduction to the thesis. In addition to considering the content of the thesis, I discuss the 
style in which the present rethinking will be undertaken. 
Four good reasons for individualism 
Although cognitivist models of cognitive style have grown in popularity since the 1960's, from 
its inception, cognitive style has most commonly been theorized as a personality trait, even within 
the cognitivist tradition. While the individualistic conceptions of cognition clearly have deep roots 
in the popularity of empiricist models of psychology, there are a number of more specific reasons 
for the particular, personality-based tint to contemporary theory. These reasons are tied to the 
initial and, for a long period, virtually sole aim of psychological theories of cognitive style: to 
develop causal explanations of ideological beliefs. Personality theory could l) provide an 
ontological base for ideological beliefs, 2) account for the failure of sociological models of 
ideology, 3) be supported with certain forms of empirical evidence, and 4) be used to sustain 
moraUpolitical arguments. 
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Ontology 
Perhaps, as Eckhardt (1991) concludes his extensive review, authoritarianism, compulsion, 
conservatism, dogmatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity are "different parts of the same 
forest" (p. 121). With a few exceptions (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Goertzel, 1987; Heaven & 
Connors, 1988; Kerlinger, 1984; Ray, 1985), researchers have found this matrix of ideological 
beliefs to be systematically intercorrelated. The seemingly diverse array of religious, militaristic, 
nationalistic, and political and economic attitudinal statements cohere empirically as a single first-
order or second-order factor (Collins & Hayes, 1993; Comrey & Newmeyer, 1965; Eckhardt, 
1991; McClosky, 1958; Wilson, 1973; Wilson & Schutte, 1973; Yellig & Wearing, 1974). In 
addition, this vector of attitudes appears to enjoy similar cognitive, affective, behavioral, moral, 
and ideological correlates. Accordingly, ideological beliefs have been argued to be structured 
along a bipolar Left-Right dimension, from radicalism to conservatism. 
A large body of theory has suggested that ideological beliefs are systematically organized by 
individual personality functioning. While psychologists have recognised the influence of peer, 
parental, and cohort pressures in determining ideological beliefs, personality has been a favoured 
explanation since the pioneering work of Lentz (1930, 1939). Personality theory provides a 
particularly powerful account of ideological beliefs because it can not only explain individual 
differences in beliefs, but may provide a firm ontological basis for ideology. Ontologically, 
... one views liberalism-conservatism from the viewpoint of personality theory - as an 
individualistic mix of differing cognitive, affective and conative tendencies that find 
expression and become labelled 'liberal and conservative' (Loye, 1977, p. 155). 
According to this argument, the systematization of ideology along the Left-Right continuum is 
simply due to the fact that individual personality is distributed along this continuum. The social 
phenomena of ideology is thereby theorized to be a reflection of "this left-right system within us" 
(Loye, 1977, p. 220). 
This ontology is appealing for it has the potential to explain the apparent social and cultural 
universality of the Left-Right ideological dimension (cf. Loye, 1977; Tomkins~ 1963). By 
locating this dimension within the individual, it is possible to argue that its universality is a 
function of the psychological properties of individuals comprising all societies throughout history. 
Thus, in addition to explaining individual predisposition to particular ideologies, personality may 
provide an ontological base for ideological beliefs, which can account for the systematization of 
ideological beliefs along a Left-Right continuwn, as well as the apparent historical and cultural 
universality of this continuum. 
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The ontological starus of personality has become so pervasive in psychology that it permeates the 
language psychologists use when referring to ideological beliefs. Stone (1983), for example, 
laments the fact that psychologists use a single set of terms - conservatism versus radicalism 
- to refer to both ideological beliefs and personality traits. This state of affairs, he argues, 
allows psychologists to forego the responsibility of theorizing causality between personality and 
ideology because they are assumed be equivalent. The ontological starus of personality is evident 
in assumptions which assert "an isomorphism between psychology and ideology ... [and] imply a 
particular theory concerning the relation of personality to political attitudes, namely the 
externalization model" (Stone, 1983, p. 215). The language of psychology asserts that ideological 
beliefs are isomorphic with, and nothing more than the externalization of personality, their 
ontological base. 
Consider Wilson's (1973) theory of conservatism. According to Wilson, conservatism is 
essentially a personality trait which reflects a basic psychological need for certainty and order. 
This personality trait fmds expression in (and is inferred from) a range of personal characteristics 
which censor the ambiguities of the world. The conservative, for example, manifests a rigid and 
unambiguous cognitive and affective style which demands black-and-white evaluations of objects 
and events. Conservatism at the ideological level is isomorphic with conservatism of personality. 
Ideological beliefs such as those which maintain that a unitary truth rests with a supreme 
authority (e.g., God or state) reflect this need for certainty and intolerance of ambiguity within 
personality. As such, political beliefs are assumed to arise through the externalisation of 
personality dynamics as individuals with conservative personalities take and make conservative 
ideological orientations. 
An important consequence follows. Theories of ideological beliefs reduce to theorizing the 
determinants of individual Left-Right personality differences. These have been argued to be 
derived from hereditary factors (Eysenck, 1954; Eaves & Eysenck, 1974), social learning 
(Altemeyer, 1981; Tomkins, 1963), and psychodynamics (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
& Sanford, 1950; Rokeach, 1960). This is important because it highlights the object of 
personality theory, the ontology of ideological beliefs. Personality theory is not concerned with 
individual people, but with the universal properties of psychology across populations. This global 
psychology has certain properties, and functions according to certain laws, which, when made 
explicit, will explain why certain individuals are liberal and others conservative. The processes 
causing individual differences in radicalism-conservatism may explain why we have ideological 
systems of radicalism and conservatism within society. This global object does not mean that 
individuals are unimportant or that personality theory is not individualistic. On the contrary, 
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individuals are the units of analysis and individual differences are fundamental to establishing 
theory of the functioning of the global psychology. 
The poverty of universal sociological models 
Given the difficulties in theorizing the causal links between personality and ideology, and the 
unsubstantiated assumptions of isomorphism and externalization, one may wonder why an 
individualistic theory is invoked at all. Why do we need to rely on the notion of a fascist 
personality to explain the awakening of a fascist state? It may well be that personality theory can 
account for the cause, organization and universality of the ideological left-right dimension, but 
only at costs to theoretical parsimony. The determinants of ideological beliefs must first be 
reduced to dynamics which produce individual personality differences, then a rather unwieldy 
theoretical apparatus needs to be erected to account for causality on the ideological level. Surely 
a non-reductionist, and far more parsimonious, explanation of a social phenomena such as 
fascism can be achieved only by theory at a "positional" or "ideological" level of analysis (Doise, 
1986). 
One reason for the wide acceptance of personality-based accounts of ideological beliefs was the 
realization that sociological models, which explained ideology in terms of universal socio-
historical processes, were flawed. Both Hegel (1931) and Marx & Engels (1970) have offered 
historical accounts of social change in terms of dialectical shifts between radicalism and 
conservatism. They both regarded the Left-Right continuum as an attribute of the social order, 
and not the individuals comprising that order. Hegel, for example, argued that the social "spirit" 
shifted between the "essential moments" of conservatism and radicalism: 
In the course of history, the preservation of a people, a state, and the preservation of the 
ordered spheres of life, is one essential moment ... the other moment, however, is that the 
stable persistence of the spirit of a people is broken because it is exhausted and 
overworked ... the world spirit proceeds ... tied to a demotion, demolition, destruction of 
the preceding mode of activity... It is precisely here that the great collisions occur 
between the prevalent, recognised duties, laws, and rights and, on the other hand, 
possibilities which are opposed to the system (Kaufman, 1965, p. 269). 
Conservatism, with its recognition of laws, duties, and rights, was rooted in the dialectics of 
history, not in the processes underlying personality differences. Where Wilson (1973) talks of 
conservatism as a personality-based need for certainty and order, Hegel sees it as one pole of the 
socio-historical dialectic between order and anarchy. 
Marx & Engels ( 1970) criticised Hegel for his idealism, and denounced him for offering a 
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mechanical account of the dialectic, and for reifying the social "spirit". Instead, Marx sought to 
theorize the dialectic in terms of the real foundation of history and social change: i.e., human 
activity, which provided the basis of consciousness. Historical materialism identified the material 
base to the dialectic between Left and Right in the history of class struggle- "the history of all 
hitherto existing society has been the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels, 1967, p. 79). 
The Marxian account suggested that ideological orientation into Left and Right was a function 
of class stratification and exploitation which had existed throughout the history of class-based 
society. At the height of oppression, the theory maintained, magnified class contradictions would 
precipitate radicalism and revolution. Thus, although Marx rejected Hegel's idealism, he 
remained committed to theorizing universal, supra-historical principles of history which produced 
shifts in consciousness between radical and conservative moments. 
Historical materialism, however, could not account for the failure of Marxian predictions 
regarding the immanence of a communist revolution in Germany. The capitalist order, so it 
seemed, was more resilient than Marx had anticipated. Change did not appear to follow the 
universal principles of material historical dialectics. As Marx had predicted, capitalist had 
expropriated capitalist; economic differences between capitalist and worker had amplified; yet, 
monopoly capitalism appeared as a stable social form. It was precisely this failure which 
prompted a turn to personality theory. Psychological dynamics were advanced to fill the "gap in 
Marx" (cf. Billig, 1982; Jay, 1973). The Frankfurt School attempted to explain first the failure 
of the socialist revolution, and then the rise of German fascism, in terms of individual psychology 
(cf. Samelson, 1986, 1993). They argued that irrational psychological dynamics contributed to 
the stability of monopoly capitalism by preventing magnified social contradictions from entering 
consciousness (Fromm, 1941; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944; Reich, 1946). 
In this way, individual psychological processes were imported into sociological models of 
ideological beliefs. This culminated with the publication of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno 
et al. , 1950), a text which has set the tone and direction for future psychological studies of 
ideological beliefs. While clinging to the Marxian thesis that "ideology and mentality are largely 
fomented by the objective spirit of our society" (Adorno, 1950a, p. 752; Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1948b), Adorno acknowledged that their data (especially quantitative) "permit at least the 
assumption that personality could be regarded as one determinant of ideology" (Adorno, 1950b, 
p. 655). Adorno et al. (1950) thus achieved more than filling the gap in Marx- they laid the 
foundation for a reductionist account of ideology. Just how their data could permit such 
reductionist conclusions is important because, since this work has been appropriated by 
mainstream psychology, it has lost its Marxian base, disregarded sociological accounts of 
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ideology altogether, and has focused almost entirely on individual differences and psychological 
dynamics. Ideology has come to be seen as determined by personality, which lies "behind 
behaviour and within the individual" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 5). Ironically, in shifting from 
purely sociological to purely psychological accounts of ideological beliefs, psychologists have 
dropped one set of universal theory for another. 
Empiricist evidence for personality 
The assumption that personality is a major determinant of ideology was warranted by the type 
of empirical evidence which Adorno et al. ( 1950) offered to support their theory of a fascist 
personality. According to Brown ( 1965), Adorno et al. ( 1950) had uncovered an ever widening 
circle of covariation between a set of beliefs which were clearly ideological, and other seemingly 
unrelated beliefs of a more personal nature. The F scale, for instance, was a coherent, single 
measure, comprised of attitudinal items which reflected the nine diverse subtraits argued to 
underlie authoritarianism. Brown found the correlations between this superficially heterogenous 
set of opinions remarkable, and suggested that it reflected "some kind of psychological unity" at 
the root of the unitary personality syndrome of authoritarianism (p. 489). What was even more 
remarkable, however, was that the scale correlated strongly with ethnocentrism while including 
no overt references to minority groups. This fmding suggested that ideological opinions were only 
one manifestation of a broader underlying personality dimension. At the centre of this circle of 
covariation was the individual (generalized personality), located between opinions and behaviours 
reflecting personality, and those reflecting ideology. 
Personality-based accounts of ideology continue to employ similar reasoning (cf. Altemeyer, 
1981: McClosky, 1958; Stone, 1986; Wilson, 1973). To confirm that personality predisposes 
individuals to accepting certain ideologies, researchers have demonstrated that ideological beliefs 
correlate with a vector of personality traits, which also correlate with each other. The covariation 
among traits establishes a psychological unity, while their correlation with ideological beliefs 
establishes causality. Eckhardt's review of the radicalism-conservatism literature is characteristic 
of such reasoning. Eckhardt (1991) summarises conservatism in terms of the following five 
facets: 
Affectively, the conservative tends to be optimistic, leadership-orientated, conformist, 
disciplined, extroversive, and misanthropic. Behaviorally, the conservative tends to 
support capitalism and go to a conventional church. Cognitively, the conservative tends 
to be dogmatic, positivistic, rigid, intolerant of ambiguity, and to hold hereditary theories 
of human behaviour. Ideologically, the conservative tends to be capitalistic, militaristic, 
Theoretical perspectives 
nationalistic, and prejudiced. Morally, the conservative is authoritarian, bureaucratic, 
censorious, religious, punitive, conformist, and law-and-order-orientated (p. 108). 
10 
At the nexus of this matrix of covariances is the individual. If ideological beliefs comprise a 
small segment of a wider matrix of personal cognitive, behavioral, and affective correlates, one 
has good reason to suspect that these beliefs are but one manifestation of a broader underlying 
personality syndrome. This is especially true if ideological beliefs are associated with "non-
ideological" attributes such as the style of cognition and affect. 
The present work investigates the plausibility of knowledge claims of the sort that individuals 
holding certain beliefs are certain types of people (i.e., they possess characteristic personality 
traits), and that their personality type determines their ideological persuasion. The discussion is, 
however, limited to a consideration of cognitive personality traits. This focus reflects the degree 
to which cognitive traits have been emphasized above other traits in the literature. There are two 
main reasons for this accent. Firstly, cognitive traits such as rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity 
are particularly useful for explaining the failure of sociological models of change. If change has 
not followed Marxian predictions, for example, it may be that cognitive traits like intolerance of 
ambiguity - which entailed rigid and impermeable categorization - have prevented social 
contradictions from entering consciousness, thereby contributing to the stability of the system. 
Secondly, cognitive traits seem to conform, to a stronger degree than other traits, to the definition 
of personality traits as "(a) organized internal dispositions [which display] (b) stability or 
consistency over time" (Knutson, 1973, p. 30). Many proposed traits have been found to be 
unstable and inconsistent over time and situation (Mischel, 1968, 1973, 1979), and thus do not 
qualify as genuine personality traits. Cognitive personality traits, in contrast, have been argued 
to be stable and consistent: 
Activities which are substantially associated with aspects of intelligence and with problem 
solving behaviour - like achievement behaviours, cognitive styles, response speed -
tend to be most consistent (Mischel, 1968, p. 177). 
Cognitive traits are thus compatible with a research approach which seeks to ground an 
explanation of ideological beliefs in individual psychology. For, if the "left-right system within 
us" produces stable and consistent individual differences in ideological orientation, then these 
traits, themselves, must be stable and consistent over time and situation. 
Moral/political orientation of the literature 
The individual is central to psychological accounts of ideology, for it is the individual 
(generalized personality) which is the locus where cognitive style and content meet. Thus, 
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Eysenck & Coulter (1972) found that individuals who endorse authoritarian beliefs manifest a 
range of (irrational) cognitive traits. 
Cognitively, authoritarians were less educated and less intelligent than average, but more 
rigid and concrete in their thinking even when they were more intelligent than average. 
They were more intolerant of ambiguity, were more superstitious, suggestible, and 
autistic, while democratic personalities showed 'greater creativity, imagination, and 
ability for empathy' (in Eckhardt, 1991 , p. 1 09). 
Although this extract illustrates the pivotal role of the individual in psychological accounts of 
ideology, the single most striking feature of such knowledge claims is their political nature. 
Finding that proponents of certain beliefs are rigid, concrete, and intolerant of ambiguity, and 
that proponents of other beliefs are creative and imaginative, is to question the rationality of the 
former beliefs. Such statements suggests that certain beliefs could only be derived through an 
irrational cognitive process under the influence, perhaps, of defensive personality functioning. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the dimensions of cognition under consideration reflect so 
closely the rationalism-empiricism debate which has dominated philosophical concerns with 
epistemology. At the heart of the matter is the issue of truth. Which cognitive approach is less 
distorting of reality? Is it the empiricist approach, which seeks to hold rationality in check by the 
authority of the world external to the individual; or is it the rationalist approach, which offers 
reason as a buffer between the individual and the "potentially excessive pressure of the 
immediacy of the senses" (Tomkins, 1963, p. 401; Eysenck, 1954)? The debate between Jaensch 
(1938) and Frenkel-Brunswik, (1949) was marked by similar (lay) epistemological concerns. 
Where Jaensch recommended a firm tie to immediate empirical reality, Frenkel-Brunswik 
advocated a more rationalist orientation which does not cling to the familiar and precise detail 
of immediate experience. 
The moral/political functions of the literature highlights a further reason why the individual gains 
prominence in psychological accounts of ideology. Psychologists have used the individual as the 
nexus between belief content and form, and ultimately, rationality. By so doing, researchers have 
been able to criticise ideological beliefs in terms of rationality. Moral issues have been 
transformed into epistemological ones. A concern with the morality of fascism, for example, is 
recast as an issue of the irrationality of fascism. By focusing, then, on the irrationality of 
individual fascists, the original moral concern is rendered amenable to scientific investigation. 
Yet, psychologists have achieved more than this. By employing concepts from the language of 
psychopathology, they have medicalized the issue of ideological morality (cf. Rose, 1988). Not 
only is individual functioning underlying certain cognitive styles deemed to be irrational, but also 
pathological. 
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Overall, though, this shift in rhetorical warrant has not eliminated controversy. On the contrary, 
scientific evidence emanating from different ideological quarters has demonstrated irrational 
cognitive functioning among conservatives (Adorno et al., 1950), communists and fascists 
(Eysenck, 1954), liberals (Jaensch, 1938), radicals (Rothman & Lichter, 1982), extremists 
(Rokeach, 1960; Taylor, 1960), and among moderates (Sidanius, 1984, 1985). 
The Wittgensteinian picture which has held captive psychological thinking of cognitive style is 
self-contained individualism, and the language that has repeated this picture is empiricism. By 
rethinking cognitive style, this thesis aims to propose an alternative to the dominant individualistic 
conceptions of cognitive style. To achieve these aims two central features of empiricist science 
- the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific progress, and Humean causality - are discussed 
critically, and the individualistic conception of cognitive style is investigated empirically. 
Overview of the thesis 
This thesis draws from critical realist and social constructionist insights to rethink the empiricist 
assumptions which underlie contemporary psychological accounts of cognitive style. These 
assumptions are well illustrated throughout the recent special edition of the European Journal of 
Personality, which debated the meaning of the Factor V of the "Big Five" model of personality. 
This debate is salient to the present work since Factor V, Openness to Experience, is a recent 
incarnation of the personality dimension underlying cognitive traits. A single extract will serve 
the purpose of illustration: 
.. .individual differences become represented in languages as single words (e.g., trait 
adjectives, nouns) if over time language-group members need to discuss them so 
frequently that extreme economy in their description becomes necessary (Trapnell, 1994, 
p. 288). 
The short extract captures the defining empiricist features of contemporary personality theory. 
First, Trapnell assumes the reality of the self-contained individual; individual differences are seen 
as real things which become depicted in language. Secondly, he assumes that language represents 
or directly reflects this underlying reality. The two assumptions, together, imply that individual 
differences are an ontological strata which are readily accessible (mirrored) in language, and can 
thus be represented accurately (economically) in theory. 
These two assumptions provide the theoretical basis for empiricism since they justify the 
hypothetico-deductive, Humean epistemology. They posit the stable, atomistic ontology which 
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is "ultimately knowable" by empiricist science (Bhaskar, 1986, 1989b). Thus, although Trapnell 
continues by questioning whether it is minds or hearts which "our English-speaking ancestors" 
found most significant to Openness in people, and whose features were accordingly deposited in 
language, he is committed to the notion of an unchanging continuum of individual differences in 
Openness that is reflected in language. Generally speaking, personality theorists echo the early 
Humean sentiment, that individual differences reflect a "basic human nature [which] is the same 
world-wide" and across history (Cattell, 1995, p. 208). This is precisely the stable, atomistic, 
"thing-like" ontology of the natural sciences which psychologists have adopted (cf. Bhaskar, 
1989b; Rose, 1988; Seve, 1975). This ontology underpins a hypothetico-deductive science 
because it can sustain the unitary evolutionary ideal of linear scientific development. The 
assumptions of stability may ground a science which aims to develop stable and universal laws 
of the objective world (including human psychology). Scientific activity then becomes a matter 
of testing hypotheses (e.g., whether the heart or mind is central to Openness) in order to map out 
the unitary system of underlying causality (cf. Greenwood, 1991, pp. 1-13). Knowledge, 
therefore, should progress toward truth. 
In addition, this ontology underlies a Humean epistemology - the means by which truth will be 
found. In order to establish and measure dimensions of personality, researchers have relied 
primarily on "objective" measures, and correlational and factor analytic procedures. Such 
research practice, however, must assume that individual differences in "language usage" (e.g., 
selecting adjectives on objective measures) reflect constant and stable personality traits of the 
atoms (self-contained individuals), rather than other factors (e.g., situational or methodologically-
driven responses). Thus, in addition to assuming that, over time, dimensions of individual 
differences have become deposited in language, personality theorists have also assumed that 
individual differences along each dimension of personality are reflected (mirrored) in differences 
in language usage of individuals with different personalities. This assumption is the touchstone 
of research which establishes correlations - Humean "constant conjunctions" - between 
measures of personality and measures of ideological opinions. For, without it, the conjunction 
of events recorded at a particular instance is rendered unstable and ephemeral. Consequently, the 
assumed stable, atomistic ontology allows psychologists to seek universal laws of ideological 
beliefs in the processes which bring about individual personality differences. 
Recent critiques of empiricism have highlighted a number of fundamental difficulties with both 
the hypothetico-deductive model and with Humean causality. First, the hypothetico-deductive 
model itself was not derived by scientific means (through a hypothetico-deductive process) and 
appears to have a axiomatic and metaphysical status. Moreover, it has been argued to be 
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epistemologically naive in insisting on representationism (Bhaskar, 1989b; Rorty, 1979) for it 
thereby disregards the theory-bound nature of discovery and observation (Feyerabend, 1975; 
Kuhn, 1970; Danziger, 1990). Secondly, critics have found it necessary to transcend the ontology 
implicit in the "constant conjunctions" account of scientific laws, for it appears as though there 
are no such regularities in the world outside the closed systems of experimental activity (Bhaskar, 
1975, 1986, 1989b; Chalmers, 1988). 
Despite the trenchant critique which has been lodged against empiricism, it continues to maintain 
its position as the dominant model within psychology, and particularly within the cognitive style 
literature. In my view, this continued dominance is based on an "ex post facto fact fallacy" 
(Shotter, 1993a). According to Shotter, this fallacy involves mistaking features of talk about some 
'thing' "for the features of the supposed 'thing' itself" (p. 83), and thereby becoming "entrapped" 
in a system which is self-sustaining due to the circularity between initial (prior) interpretations 
and (later) truth statements. In the present case, empiricist ways of talking about cognitive style 
have portrayed cognitive style as a property of individual psychology. Psychologists have, in 
turn, sought to represent cognitive style as just that. Psychological practice thus assumes the self-
contained individual to be a reality, and the empiricist assumptions are reproduced by each 
"truth" generated by the practice. We have become "entrapped" by a standpoint which functions 
to maintain the system of thought (ibid). In other words, by talking about cognitive style in 
empiricist language - in terms of individual differences and representationism - and correlating 
personality differences in cognitive style with ideological conservatism, psychologists have 
established an account of ideological beliefs which, while it may be systematic, is not necessarily 
accurate or true (as it assumes itself to be). 
Each of the following chapters questions the empiricist assumptions which underlie the cognitive 
style literature. Although Chapter 2 is explicitly a review of the literature which has sought to 
theorize the relationship between cognitive style and ideological conservatism, it aims to question 
the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific progress which has informed the literature. The 
chapter argues that the historical development of theory from approximately 1950 to 1990 cannot 
be seen as a gradual progression toward more accurate theory. Instead, the literature has been 
influenced by historico-political change, and has been marked by numerous ambiguities, cul-de-
sac's, and regressions over its history. These, I argue, may be understood in terms of two 
incompatible discourses -empiricist theoretical universalism and political critique -which have 
influenced scientific attempts to establish the "true" relationship between irrational cognitive 
styles and ideological beliefs. 
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If Chapter 2 aimed to demonstrate the theory-bound nature of scientific theorizing, Chapter 3 
aims to show the theory-bound nature of observation. Here the focus is narrowed to an interest 
in the development of the concept of intolerance of ambiguity and the construction of measures 
to operationalize the construct. The chapter shows how ontological assumptions have been 
incorporated into measurement procedures, which have, in turn, infiltrated the definition of the 
construct. Specifically, I argue that self-contained individualism has been (re)produced by 
measures which have assumed intolerance of ambiguity to be a formal, asocial, and non-
evaluative property of individual psychology, which is stable across situation and context. 
Although the chapter attempts a review of empirical studies which have sought to examine the 
plausibility of the generalized trait thesis of intolerance of ambiguity, it recognises the inherently 
theory-bound nature of current measurement techniques - i.e., the ex post facto fact nature of 
the fmdings- and must reach tentative conclusions. 
Chapter 4 approaches the assumptions of individual stability and consistency of intolerance of 
ambiguity head on. A new measure of intolerance of ambiguity is developed which does not 
incorporate the generalized trait assumptions which have underscored the previous practice of 
attributing a single ambiguity tolerance score to each individual. Rather, the Attitudinal 
Ambiguity Tolerance (AA T) scale measures ambiguity tolerance over a number of content 
dimensions and then examines whether these are indeed indicative of a unitary personality trait. 
The results suggest that individual expressions of ambiguity tolerance may vary widely across 
different content domains, and that the content and style of cognition are inextricably intertwined. 
Chapter 5 continues the empirical work with the AA T scale. Here the purpose is the explore the 
nature of the relationship between cognitive style and ideological opinions across different content 
domains (i.e., religious, political, familial domains). The results of two separate studies are 
contrary to the predictions of all personality-based accounts of the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and ideological conservatism. The relationship was found to vary substantially across 
different content domain, and the nature of the relationship appeared to be associated with the 
meaning that the ideological contents had for the subjects in the context of the study. In other 
words, rather than personality dynamics underlying the relationship between cognitive style and 
ideological opinions, the relationship appeared to originate in differential meaning that the 
different contents had in the ideologically charged context where the study took place. 
These fmdings point to an alternative conceptualization of cognitive style which rejects empiricist 
attempts to locate cognitive style within individual psychological processes. Accordingly, Chapter 
6 proposes a rhetorical account of ambiguity tolerance. In contrast to all psychological theory to 
date, intolerance of ambiguity is portrayed as a feature of cognition which emerges in dialogical 
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contexts of "joint action" (Shotter, 1993a). Cognitive style is seen as variable across different 
utterances of a single speaker but, nonetheless, organized into generic ways of speaking. This 
chapter undertakes a detailed analysis of a single case - an interview with Koos Vermeulen, 
leader of the World Apartheid Movement- in order to illustrate the dynamics of cognitive style 
in dialogical contexts. This research focus completes the move from an empiricist science to a 
critical realist science which is "exclusively explanatory" (Bhaskar, 1989a). 'Intolerance of 
ambiguity' is lent new meaning as its ontology is reconceptualized- from being a property of 
individual psychology, to an emergent feature of talk. 
Finally, a word on the style in which the thesis is written. The style is adapted to a rhetorical 
interest. A curious feature of contemporary social psychology is the degree of isolation that exists 
between groups of practitioners with different theoretical orientations. The cognitive style 
literature is no exception. Thus, despite the trenchant critique which Billig (1985a}, for example, 
has levelled against personality-based models of cognitive style, journals like Personality and 
Individual Differences continue to publish papers which do no more than correlate established 
personality measures of intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Furnham, 1994). In part, the isolationism 
stems from the nature of the dialogue between the two schools, which is confmed mostly to 
metatheoretical and methodological snipes and hostile book reviews. 
This isolationism informs the style of rethinking cognitive style in this thesis. Although I am 
'writing from' a background of social constructionism and critical realism, the approach I take 
here is eclectic. The rethinking aims, in the end, to offer an alternative to the empiricist accounts 
of cognitive style which have dominated the literature. In approaching this aim, however, I only 
partially take a constructionist perspective. While each of the chapters which follow have broader 
critical aims, the thesis starts out from 'within' the empiricist tradition. The conventions are 
followed: review of the literature, discussion of measurement techniques, sampling, design, 
operationalization and quantification, and so forth. It is only by the fmal chapters that the 
rethinking has progressed to that stage where I can take up properly a social constructionist 
position. Here the focus changes quite dramatically. A new object of analysis is offered and a 
different account of cognitive style is proposed, along with a change in methodology. 
My path is such because of the nature of my task. "Rethinking cognitive style in psychology" is 
an intentionally ambiguous title. On the one hand, I am attempting to rethink the psychology of 
cognitive style. However, this rethinking is done within the discipline of psychology and must 
necessarily reflect the heteroglotic forces in the language of psychology. Rethinking requires 
reflecting on the language of the discipline. 
Chapter 2 
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Eventually social psychological theories will be computer programs in which dozens of parameters 
reflecting measures of the stimulus set will be entered. In addition subjective culture data from 
samples of individuals, similar to the individuals whose behaviour we wish to predict, will be 
stored on magnetic tapes... Specific behaviours will then be predicted with specific 
probabilities ... it will permit planners to make statements of the type: "If law X passes, with 
characteristics A, B, and C, 80 per cent (sic) of this population will do K, and 20 per cent will 
do L; 30 per cent of this other population will do K and 40 per cent will do L ... " 
(Triandis, 1978; Presidential address to the Division of 
Personality and Social Psychology of the AP A) 
Since the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, researchers in the field have subscribed 
to an empiricist model of science. They have adopted a Humean understanding of causality and, 
by assuming the world to consist of some fixed totality of mind- or discourse-independent objects, 
have posited a criterion of truth which suggests that theories should progressively become 
isomorphic with reality. Triandis' utopia of a universally predictive social psychology could 
thereby be attained. Accordingly, the authoritarianism literature is marked by correlational 
methods which, it has been hoped, would identify the true relationship between cognitive style 
and ideological beliefs. Due to its implicit representationism- i.e., identity between theory and 
reality (or signifier and signified) - the empiricist model anticipates a cumulative, linear model 
of scientific development; as more research is undertaken with improved measurement 
techniques, psychological theory is expected to progressively reflect the nature of reality. 
However, like so many other fields of research in social psychology, interest in the study of 
authoritarianism has waxed and waned over the decades. The theory has been modified as 
researchers have argued about the politics and science of authoritarianism, and generated 
discrepant findings. These modifications have in turn been modified, recast, and sometimes even 
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rejected in favour of the original theory. So today, there is no single theory of the relationship 
between cognitive style and ideological beliefs, but four, which live an uneasy cohabitation, being 
employed by different researchers to explain the "same" phenomenon. The development of theory 
reflects the non-linear, non-cumulative nature of scientific progress so famously described by 
post-positivist philosophers of science (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos & Musgrave, 
1970). Samelson (1986) thus concludes his historical analysis of the authoritarianism literature 
by suggesting that "any claim for the progressive accumulation of knowledge in the social 
sciences will not fmd The Azilhoritarian Personality and its fate to be a very compelling 
illustration" {p. 194). 
This has a number of central implications for a review of the literature. The empiricist views 
theoretical difference as error since multiple theories cannot all accurately explain the singular 
fixed reality. At its core, psychological science should be evolutionary, as truth gradually 
emerges from "the fires of logical and empirical testing" (Kimble, 1989, p. 498). The error 
underlying theoretical difference may then be attributed to ideological bias (Tetlock, 1994), 
extraneous social factors such as competition or social differentiation (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; 
Lemaine, 1984), or methodological imperfections which prohibit complete understanding of 
reality. Accordingly, the reviewer's task is to peel away the layers of non-epistemic influence, 
distil the scientific truths, weigh and balance the facts, and fmally, reach a well justified 
conclusion regarding the validity of any theoretical claims. In other words, an empiricist review 
should strive toward a single coherent account of the nature of the world. 1 
The post-positivist epistemology has recently been expanded to include post-structuralist 
(Foucault, 1970, 1972; Machado, 1992), social constructionist (Gergen, 1985), and critical realist 
(Bhaskar, 1986, 1989a, 1989b, Isaac, 1990; Manicas & Secord, 1983) accounts of scientific 
development. These diverse epistemologies are unified in theorizing an essential non-identity 
between theory and reality, and they anticipate a fragmented and discontinuous course of 
scientific development. Critical realists, for instance, distinguish between two layers of reality: 
the intransitive and transitive realms, which reflect the ontological and epistemological worlds 
respectively (Bhaskar, 1986, 1989a, 1989b). 2 Intransitive objects exist outside the scientific 
process, while transitive objects are produced within science as a function of scientific practice. 
"Objects" of knowledge (e.g., authoritarianism, madness) and facts about these objects are not 
part of the natural world, but are developed within the transitive realm (Bhaskar, 1989b, chap. 
1 See Duckitt's (1992) review of the "social psychology of prejudice" literature for an admirable attempt 
at this type of review. 
2 Similarly, Harre (1979) differentiates between the "practical" and "expressive" orders of reality. 
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4). As such. these objects (and "facts" about them) are social in character, and strucmred by 
norms, social dynamics, and discourse (cf. Danziger, 1990; Foucault, 1965; Merton, 1973). 
Knowledge claims, therefore, can never be said to be progressing toward truth, as an 
isomorphism between theory and reality is rendered illusory. Accordingly, a review cannot hope 
to distil the theoretical truth which reflects brute reality, for as the normative/discursive world 
of science changes, so too will the facts and objects of discovery (and vice versa). 
It appears as though just this has happened: The theory of authoritarianism has undergone radical, 
discontinuous transformation in response to changed objective socio-political circumstances. As 
the original theory (which reproached the Right) had appealed to the anti-fascist movement of the 
late 1940's and early 1950's, so Rokeach's (1960) extremism theory found favour in the West 
during the Cold War. So radical was this theoretical inversion that Rokeach managed to tum the 
theory of the authoritarian personality against its original authors, proclaiming the Left to be just 
as irrational as the Right. Consequently, the 1960's and 1970's witnessed a non-theoretical period 
of research activity, dedicated to methodological critiques, attempting to muster support for one 
or the other theory. However, no consensual truth emerged from these fires. 
It is less than surprising that the 1980's, the decade that witnessed the end of the Cold War, 
spawned new interest in re-theorising the authoritarian personalty and the relationship between 
ideological beliefs and cognitive style. Two new theories were advanced. In direct contrast to 
Rokeach, Sidanius' (l978a, 1984, 1985) context theory predicts extremists to be less intolerant 
of ambiguity and more cognitively sophisticated than moderates. Tetlock's (1983a, 1984) value 
pluralism theory advances predictions similar to Rokeach, but for different reasons. Against this 
recent background, moreover, are still to be found a tireless band, working within the ambit of 
the original theories of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988a; Duckitt, 1989; Stone et 
al., 1993) and extremism (e.g., Eysenck, 1981; Heaven & Connors, 1988). 
The historical and political nature of this theory building process is immediately apparent, and 
has been discussed elsewhere: 
Although [authoritarianism] is a scientific concept conceived to explain human behaviour, 
it is immediately concerned with politics. This close connection led, in many respects, 
to the development of the concept which cannot be fully understood in a purely scientific 
context but which requires political understanding too ... The concept has changed in 
accordance with international affairs, declaring after fascism had been defeated, 
communism to be the major enemy of western societies (Oesterreich, 1985, p. 101). 
As the ideological milieu has changed, so theories have been shaped into forms appropriate to 
the epoch. Historical change is reflected in two feamres of the theory. Firstly, the nature of the 
relationship between ideological beliefs and cognitive traits has varied, identifying different 
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ideologies with authoritarian irrationality. Associated with this change has been a shifting 
conceprualization of the individual and the underlying dynamics linking individual cognition to 
ideology. 
Changes in the authoritarianism literature have been strongly influenced by social and political 
transformation (Samelson, 1986, 1993). Thus, rather than merely evaluating the various srudies 
which have found support for one or other theory, this review attempts to contexrualize the theory 
building process. The four theories are discussed in terms of rhetorical and discursive features 
of the transitive dimension which have provided the framework for theoretical development. The 
review constirutes a historical (as opposed to scientific) analysis of the concept of 
authoritarianism. 
This focus recommends the analysis of - rather than empiricist attempts to overcome - the 
ambiguities, contradictions, and differences which have characterized the body of theory (cf. 
Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Parker, 1989a, 1992). The rhetoric of inquiry and the new 
sociology of science have identified a number of counter themes or discourses which may be 
drawn on in research and theory development (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Prelli, 1989). In addition 
to Merton's (1973) description of scientific norms, for example, Prelli (1989) discusses a second 
set of "counter-norms"- interestedness opposing disinterestedness, and particularism balancing 
universalism etc. - which guide scientific practice. Accordingly, quite different accounts of the 
world may be derived by scientists drawing on different themes to guide their investigative 
practice. Psychological theory is thus not merely a description of reality, but is a (partially) 
constructive activity where different accounts compete for recognition as truth. Theory building 
is a rhetorical enterprise (Billig, 1994a; Nelson & Megill, 1986; Simons, 1989, 1990), and as 
such, must present itself as a coherent, non-contradictory system (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1969). Any possible contradictions must be justified and resolved by rhetorical techniques such 
as making special cases and using disclaimers. The aim of a rhetoric of inquiry, therefore, is to 
analyze conflicting discourses within a body of theory in order to srudy "how scholars 
legitimately invoke different reasons persuasively in different contexts" (Nelson & Megill, 1986, 
p. 35). 
Recognizing the rhetorical character of the theory building process provides important insights 
into the narure of theoretical contradictions and inconsistencies. These will not be resolved and 
eliminated by gaining more accurate understanding of the object of srudy or by lifting ideological 
blinkers. Dilemmatic counter themes are inevitable (Billig, 1987a; Billig et al., 1988). However, 
since incompatibilities exist only in relation to a particular "field of application" (Perelman & 
Theoretical perspectives 21 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 202), as the context of theory building changes and the theory 
addresses itself to new issues, so the nature of the contradictions will change. Billig (1982), for 
example, has shown that attempts by dissonance theory to incorporate individual variability were 
never achieved. On the contrary, it was with the "diminishing role of consistency in 
contemporary society" that interest shifted to attribution theory, and the basic tensions between 
individual consistency and variability were re-formed along new lines (p. 166). 
This chapter reviews the authoritarianism literature with the aim of demonstrating its rhetorical, 
non-empiricist nature. The conceptual structure underlying the pervasive inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in the literature is discussed. It is argued that theoretical development has taken place 
within the parameters of two mutually compatible, but conflicting themes, which have unfolded 
in different ways over the changing historico-political context of theory development. The 
following section introduces the counter themes of political critique and theoretical universalism 
from a conceptual perspective. The "logic" of their overlaps and incompatibilities is explained 
on an abstract level. This provides the framework for the review that follows. The historical 
development of the literature is discussed in terms of the way in which the tensions between 
theoretical universalism and political critique have been re-formed in different circumstances. It 
will be argued that theory development reflects changed socio-political conditions rather than the 
insights which psychologists have gained into the phenomenon under investigation. 
Personality: Universalism and political critique 
Universalism is a theoretical principle associated with, and sustammg an empmctst 
epistemology. 3 The appeal to universal law-like truths originated in empiricist attempts to devise 
a standard whereby the fallible empirical record of particular instances could approach the 
certainty of a priori knowledge. General truths, based on rational deductions, had long been 
acknowledged as the criterion of certain knowledge. The logical fact that a triangle has angles 
equal to two right angles, for instance, applies to all triangles in all contexts. The problem for 
an empirical science was to attain such certainty through observation. The empiricists thus 
laboured to develop methods whereby general, universal statements could be derived from 
particular experiences (Priest, 1990; Woolhouse, 1988). Popper (1968), for instance, warns 
against the metaphysical assumption of the uniformity of nature. He argues, instead, that 
universalism should remain only a methodological rule which enjoins scientists to seek 
3 See Danziger (1990, 1992) for a discussion of the empiricist roots of academic psychology. 
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exceptionless universal laws of nature. 
A Humean conception of cause was employed as a methodological criterion, which, when 
coupled with universal theoretical propositions and assumptions of representationism, could guide 
knowledge acquisition in the direction of truth. The empiricist nature of psychological research 
is well summarized by Sampson (1983): 
Universal laws refer only to empirically observed regularities, not to logical or necessary 
connections between events. Laws express nonnecessary connections between events, the 
truth or falsity of which must be empirically determined. The purpose of theories is to 
provide the set of universal laws employed in explaining the phenomena of interest (p. 
74). 
This empiricist epistemology has become formalized in the hypothetico-deductive method of 
hypothesis testing and falsification. 
Psychologists, however, have often subscribed to an ontological universalism by treating 'reality' 
- "the phenomenon of interest"- as static and invariant (cf. Markova, 1991). The vision that 
Triandis (1978) holds for social psychology as a science, for example, is contingent upon stability 
in psychological processes and relationships "across time and place" (p. 1). Ontological 
assumptions of universalism enter psychological practice in two main ways. First, ontological 
universalism is implicit in empiricism, the guiding epistemology of the science of 
authoritarianism. By grounding universal truth claims in empirical regularities of events generated 
in closed systems, and assuming that theory can represent reality, "the ideology of empiricism" 
regards the world as "flat, uniform and unstructured: it consists of atomistic events or states of 
affairs which are constantly conjoined, so occurring in closed systems" (Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 8; 
Chalmers, 1988).4 Second, the methods and investigatory practices which psychologists have 
employed to study authoritarianism have embodied assumptions which treat their object of 
investigation (the self-contained individual) as static and invariant. According to the logic of 
Danziger's (1985) "methodological circle", the methodology which has been used to investigate 
authoritarianism has limited "the kind of reality that can be represented in the products of 
scientific investigation" (Danziger, 1992, p. 310). Most obviously, by taking a single score to 
represent an individual's cognitive style or authoritarianism, the personality traits are portrayed 
as generalized and invariant. The empiricist, methodomorphic stance of psychological science 
precludes, beforehand, the possibility of reflexivity, variability, and historical change in the 
object of study. 
4 Empiricism is essentially a philosophy of epistemology. Its ontological assumptions are derivative from 
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The meaning of 'personality' in academic psychology can only understood in terms of theoretical 
universalism. Allport (1981) captures the essence of this understanding of personality by 
describing psychology as the "science of the mind-in-general" (p. 65). The mind-in-general is the 
ahistorical and asocial ontology to which "the goals and procedures of the natural sciences" are 
appropriate (p. 64). Empiricist procedures dictate that the study of personality focuses on 
individual differences, and proceeds by establishing sets of "commonalities and comparabilities 
across individuals" (ibid). By correlational methods, "one produces sets of variances between the 
rated individuals" (Danziger, 1990, p. 161). Since "individuals [are] to be known only through 
their standing in a group" (ibid, p. 165), the science of personality is rendered a bus queue 
science, where no interest is taken in the individual except as a number in a quantitative series. 
This practice entails an atomistic and individualistic conception of social structure (Bhaskar, 
1986, 1989a, 1989b; Porpora, 1989), and has ensured that individual stability has remained 
assumed. The actual stability and consistency of real individuals is not the focus of personality 
research. Quite the opposite, the assumptions of individual consistency and stability are essential 
to investigative practice, for if individuals are not consistent it makes no sense to know them 
relative to others. Herein lies the irony of an empiricist psychology: for all its attendant 
individualism, the individuals it studies are rendered "shadowy, disembodied fictions" (Billig, 
1994a, p. 323). 
The mind-in-general, therefore, is not the individual mind, but is the acephalus mass (of 
psychology) which inhabits the globe, and which, by some process of differentiation (e.g., 
hereditary, psychodynamics, or learning), splits up into generalized atomistic segments of 
individual differences. The individual carries only a slice of the continuum of characteristics 
which the mind-in-general may manifest; slhe is either liberal or conservative. The mind-in-
general is the "thing-like" (Shotter, 1990), "essence-as-substance" (Seve, 1975) which is the 
object of personality studies. It "appears as both a-historical and a-social: it pre-exists the 
attempts to study it" (Rose, 1988, p. 180). Consequently, authoritarianism has been seen as a 
pervasive and stable personality trait, of which global norms may be established (e.g., Meloen, 
1993). This socially and contextually invariant trait pervades individual psychology so fully that 
it fmds expression in both the structure and content of cognition as well as in emotional life 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948b, 1949; Sartre, 1946). The Left-Right system 
which Loye (1977) suggests is within us, is a property of the mind-in-general. 
This universalistic conception of the individual provides the rationale for an empiTIClSt 
programme which has critical intent. If a direct, isomorphic relationship can be established 
between an 'irrational' cognitive style and specific ideological beliefs, then these beliefs can be 
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reproached on scientific grounds - i.e., that they are "inaccurate", "unsystematic", or 
"inefficient". It may be argued that the ideology is an expression of a generalized psychological 
irrationality. This is achieved by Humean criteria. Correlational methods are employed to map 
the mind-in-general - the (normal) distribution of individual personality differences - onto a 
distribution of ideological beliefs. By then showing certain personality types to be irrational, the 
associated ideology may be discredited. This is a powerful rhetorical strategy for instead of using 
a "biased" moral or political warrant, scientific criteria are employed in political critique. 
By assuming ontological universalism, and employing correlational methods to establish a 
relationship between ideological beliefs and personality, studies of authoritarianism may be used 
to immediate political ends. All that is required is to show that certain personality traits are more 
irrational than others. This has been achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, merely labelling 
certain individuals cognitively simple, inflexible, rigid, intolerant of ambiguity, closedminded, 
dogmatic etc. has the effect of attributing irrationality to these persons. This is a modem semantic 
effect which derives from "excess meaning" associated with the differance which arises out of 
the relation of these terms with their opposites - complexity, flexibility, openminded etc. - in 
the age of reason ( cf. Derrida, 1973). Secondly, experimental studies have "demonstrated" that 
some types of cognition are 'better' (i.e., more efficient, accurate, or systematic) than others 
(e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948a; Rokeach, 1948). Finally, irrationality has been theorized at a 
personality level, for example, in terms of psychodynamic defence. Studies of authoritarianism 
may thus function as scientific ideology critique. While not as overt as the exchange between 
Jaensch (1938) and Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), political critique is to be found throughout the 
literature (cf. Tetlock, 1994; Tetlock, Peterson & Berry, 1993). 
In the language of post-structuralism, theoretical universalism can be seen as a component of an 
empiricist discourse (Parker, 1992). This discourse is a relatively coherent system of meanings 
which paint a picture of a fixed, ahistorical and asocial reality which can become known through 
objective scientific methods. Within the psychology of personality, its objects are constant and 
stable individuals and a unidimensional and atomistic society, and its subjects are the 
knowledgable scientist and shadowy and silent research participants and people in general. In 
addition, the empiricist discourse has had numerous institutional and ideological effects 
(Danziger, 1990; Horkheimer, 1947; Parker & Shotter, 1990; Sampson, 1983). In the 
authoritarianism literature the object of empiricist psychology is used to more immediate political 
ends. A direct relationship between ideological beliefs and cognitive irrationality may be 
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Although universalism and critique appear to enjoy a symbiotic relationship, both feeding off the 
body of the self-contained individual, there are a number of deep tensions between them. These 
arise from difficulties with the assumptions of ontological universalism. While the assumption of 
ontological universalism sustains critique, it also arrests all possibility of critique. This occurs 
on two levels. Rhetorically, if critique is too candid, it will be brushed aside, from within an 
empiricist discourse, as "biased", and discarded as unscientific. The implicit political effects of 
theory may be used to criticise its scientific value. For example, in response to Stone's (1980) 
contention that the "myth of left-wing authoritarianism" is perpetuated by a "centrist bias", 
Eysenck (1981) argues that Stone's lack of objectivity underlies his insistence that 
authoritarianism is only to be found on the Right. 
However, there is a deeper, and hitherto unacknowledged incompatibility between theoretical 
universalism and political critique. This originates in attempts to establish an isomorphic 
relationship between personality and beliefs. There is a fundamental incongruity between these 
"isomorphic elements". On the one hand, the ontology of personality (the mind-in-general) is an 
ahistorical and asocial entity; while on the other, ideological beliefs are inherently and 
inescapably historical, social, and non-material (relational). Whereas the mind-in-general can be 
theorized and measured as a static entity, specific beliefs arise in particular societies at particular 
moments in history. The liberal ideas of the Enlightenment are, for instance, conservative by 
today's standards (Eatwell, 1989a). While methodological procedures may screen out any other 
ontological conceptions of personality, the historical and social nature of ideological beliefs are 
ubiquitous. Difficulties arise when attempts are made to map a static reality (personality) onto 
a reality in flux (beliefs). For example, will an authoritarian of 1790 reject laissezjaire ideas and 
one of 1990 endorse them? If so, how is it possible to associate laissezjaire ideas with 
psychological irrationality? 
These difficulties surface throughout the authoritarianism literature, where both universal and 
particular themes are to be found. Adorno et al. (1950) were, for instance, engaged in both the 
political critique of a particular set of (fascist) beliefs within a specific cultural-historical space, 
and were engaged in a scientific enterprise which demanded theoretical universalism. 
Consequently, a tension in evident in their work: 
... by using the term 'potential fascist' the study clearly belongs to a particular time and 
place. However, the theory gravitated towards the concept of authoritarianism, which is 
less specific, for patterns of authority can be found in non-fascist societies (Billig, 1982, 
pp. 114-115). 
While they satisfied the requirements of a scientific psychology, the universal strands negated the 
critical potential of the work. Not long after they demonstrated authoritarian traits to be 
Theoretical perspectives 26 
associated with fascist beliefs, others found these same traits to be related also to communist 
beliefs (Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1954). Appeals to scientific universalism 
undermined the critique of fascism to such an extent that the critics were themselves subject to 
a similar critique. With changed sociopolitical conditions, the "law" of ideological irrationality 
could be expanded to encompass the Left. 
Theorists have since aimed toward theoretical universalism, but not without reservation. Instead 
of mapping a personality dimension directly onto (changing) political beliefs, personality has been 
associated with social processes such as conformity, submissiveness and obedience. By so doing, 
an isomorphic relationship may be established between two ahistorical elements - personality 
and social psychological process - effectively removing specific beliefs from the equation. 5 This 
introduces a second component of universal psychological theories of ideology: in addition to its 
ahistorical and asocial nature, ideology must be purged of content and must, instead, be 
conceptualized as a process. 
To deal with the problem of a Marxist authoritarian, Altemeyer (1981, 1988a) undertakes such 
a purging operation. Although he is specifically concerned with the right-wing authoritarian, he 
suggests that it is not the beliefs as such with which personality is associated, but conformity 
dynamics. By defining 'right-wing' in terms of conformity, belief content is relegated to the 
status of an epiphenomenon. Altemeyer offers a tripartite conception of the authoritarian in terms 
of authoritarian aggression, submissiveness and conventionalism. Consequently, his definition of 
the "Right" in his theory of authoritarianism captures not only fascists (right-wing beliefs), but 
also communists (left-wing beliefs): 
... to the degree that such violence is committed in behalf of a society's established 
traditions and authorities it can be called right-wing. In this sense, the mistreatment of 
Soviet dissidents is no less right-wing than is Guatemalan repression (Altemeyer, 1988b, 
p. 32). 
Here specific beliefs are linked to an irrational personality only by implication. Instead, it is the 
processes of conformity and submission which are associated with personality and deserve to be 
labelled right-wing and authoritarian. 
Similar theorizing has been offered by Sidanius (1985; Sidanius & Lau, 1989), and is sanctioned 
by the most recent approaches to the topic (Stone et al., 1993). While theoretical universalism 
may be achieved in this manner, the potential for political critique is severely compromised as 
empiricist science succumbs to a vicious relativism. For, depending on whether the beliefs are 
s While it is highly questionable that social psychological processes are ahistorical, this has generally been 
assumed by researchers and theorists (Gergen, 1973; Sampson, 1983). 
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adhered to through an irrational psychological process, any particular system of beliefs may now 
be considered irrational. A number of disquieting political implications follow. In a society in 
which the superior authorities and established traditions sanction anti-racism and democracy, 
submissive and conforming individuals fighting for these goals may be considered authoritarian 
and irrational, while the non-conforming bigots are the enlightened non-authoritarians. Since few 
contemporary researchers would concur with these conclusions the literature is fraught with 
ambiguity, special cases, and disclaimers, as theorists have attempted to balance universal and 
critical goals. 
The following discussion examines the way in which the overlaps, tensions, and inconsistencies 
between theoretical universalism and political critique, and the accompanying image of the 
individual, have shifted and been reconstrued in relation to changing historical circumstances 
within which authoritarianism has been theorized and studied. The discussion will focus on the 
personality-based theories of the relationship between the style and content of cognition -
authoritarianism, extremism theory, context theory and value pluralism theory. 
Ideology and cognitive style: A review 
Although the study of individual differences in psychology has traditionally been concerned with 
a wide range of personality traits, scathing critiques of trait theory (Mischel, 1968, 1973, 1979), 
and a general disregard for psychodynamic theory in mainstream academic psychology ( cf. 
Parker, 1992, chap. 6), has shifted the focus to cognition, which "seems to have much better 
temporal and cross-situational stability and influence than most social traits" (Mischel, 1973, p. 
267). In accord with this shift, and with the theme of this dissertation, the discussion will be 
restricted to the relationship between cognitive personality traits and ideological beliefs. This 
review is thus concerned with psychological accounts of the relationship between the style and 
content of cognition. This focus does not violate the theories under discussion for, although they 
are essentially personality theories, they prioritize the structural or stylistic aspects of personality 
and cognition. 
The authoritarian personality 
The Authoritarian Personality was first and foremost a critical treatise which sought "not merely 
Theoretical perspectives 28 
to describe prejudice, but to explain it in order to help in its eradication" (Horkheimer & 
Flowerman, 1950, p. vii). Adorno et al. (1950) set out with a prior value system in a programme 
of "action research" (Sanford, 1981) which aimed to encourage practical change toward a tolerant 
society. In contrast to the "disinterestedness" of empiricist science, action research "must embody 
a normative social theory which approves and disapproves of certain social states" (Billig, 1977, 
p. 402). From the outset, then, political critique was the foremost concern of The Authoritarian 
Personality, and the psychological investigation was guided by a moral condemnation of fascism. 
Political critique was achieved by welding fascist beliefs to an irrational cognitive style. This was 
accomplished by means of psychodynamic theory which, in addition to maintaining a necessary 
relation between the style and content of cognition, provided an aetiology for cognitive 
irrationality. Adorno et al. ( 1950) drew on the logic of Freud's ( 1931) psychodynamic typology 
to explain the evolution of different individual types. Authoritarian irrationality, they argued, 
originated in erotic-obsessional psychic conflict. This conflict was manifest in a syndrome of nine 
co-varying traits - conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-
intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, 
projectivity, and sexual repression (Adorno et al., 1950, chap. 7; Duckitt, 1991a; Forbes, 1985) 
- which took their form as defences against the underlying psychodynamic discord. Since these 
defence mechanisms operated at the levels of both content and structure, the theory averred a 
necessary and direct link between the content and the structure of beliefs. 6 Personality theory 
thus provided the link between cognitive style and content, and could explain the irrational nature 
of certain beliefs with reference to the non-functional psychodynamic defences which sustained 
them. 
The theory of authoritarianism proposed a positive linear relationship between conservatism and 
cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. Adorno et al. (1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948b) 
argued that individuals raised in authoritarian families failed to develop an integrated ego; they 
were unable to integrate strong id impulses with a punitive superego. Both the form and content 
of authoritarian cognition originated in ego-weakness and the accompanying conflict between 
erotic and obsessional drives. This underlying emotional ambivalence was overcompensated for 
by a rigid and unambiguous cognitive style (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948b, 1949, 1951). In addition, 
ego-weakness predisposed the authoritarian to a conservative political ideology which allowed 
satisfaction of the psychological desire to submit to authority as well as to displace hostility to 
6 Freudian defences operate simultaneously on the levels of content and structure. Blocking, for example, 
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minorities and deviants. As such, the ego-weakness underlying this rigid and unambiguous 
cognitive style was also directly associated with the acceptance of a conservative, undemocratic 
ideology. The necessary relationship between cognitive style and content bridged the divide 
between a moral condemnation of fascism and ethnocentrism and an appropriate theory of their 
irrationality. 
The authoritarian cognitive style was originally conceived as one that was rigid and intolerant of 
ambiguity. 7 The authoritarian resorted to "black and white solutions" and tended toward 
"premature closure of evaluative aspects often at the neglect of reality" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, 
p. 115). It was the Manichean style of fascism and ethnocentrism, where the categories 'like' and 
'unlike' and associated evaluations of 'good' and 'bad' were finnly and unambiguously defmed 
(Sartre, 1946). In contrast, the non-authoritarian manifested an ambivalent cognitive style 
characterized by "a great deal of qualifying phrases and other devices characteristic of an 
approach that is judicious" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 463). In addition to its irrational aetiology, 
an authoritarian cognitive style was argued to be irrational also in its effects: it violated the 
complexity of reality. 
A striking congruence is thus apparent between the value orientation of the theorists and their 
account of a necessary relation between certain ideological beliefs and individual irrationality. 
Like the accounts of its theoretical predecessors (Brown, 1942; Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford, 
1945; Fromm, 1941; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944; Maslow, 1943; Reich, 1946; Sartre, 1946), 
the denunciation of fascism was an overt concern of The Authoritarian Personality. The most 
significant advance on the earlier theorizing was the empirical confirmation of the relationship 
between fascism and irrational personality traits. With financial support from the American 
Jewish Committee, Adorno et al. (1950) initiated an extensive programme of empirical research 
of the relationship between personality and ideological beliefs. They aimed to identify attitudinal 
clusters associated with fascism, which reflected the theorized personality syndrome of 
authoritarianism. Accordingly, they attempted to show that a rigid, unambiguous cognitive style 
was related to a vector of conservative political attitudes. 
The most fecund product of this work was the F scale, which has become the standard measure 
of the authoritarian personality (Meloen, 1993; Sanford, 1973). To assess "implicit 
antidemocratic trends" at the level of personality, the scale was comprised of ideological opinions 
7 Adorno et al. (1950) used the terms rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity interchangeably. 
Methodological imperatives have provoked attempts to distinguish between the two (e.g., Altemeyer, 
1981). 
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which reflected the underlying personality syndrome. 8 For example, one of the nine authoritarian 
traits, anti-intraception, was argued to be manifest in an opposition to subjective and imaginative 
experience. Quite simply, the underlying erotic-compulsive conflict of the authoritarian prohibited 
subjective meandering. Accordingly, this trait was measured by the statement: "Nowadays more 
and more people are prying into matters which should remain personal and private". 
In constructing the scale, however, Adorno et al. (1950) were careful not to include another set 
of ideological opinions which was also theorized to reflect the underlying personality syndrome. 
All overt references to minority groups and political and economic issues were excluded from 
the scale (Brown, 1965; Forbes, 1985). Consequently, one of the most remarkable discoveries 
of the whole research program was that the "superficially heterogeneous set of opinions" 
reflecting the nine different traits of the F scale were held together by "some kind of 
psychological unity", and correlated with ethnocentrism (r=. 75) and political and economic 
conservatism (r=.57) (Brown, 1965, p. 489). It appeared as though Adorno et al. had managed 
to construct a coherent and powerfully predictive measure of the authoritarian personality. 
However, the F scale embodies the assumption of a necessary relationship between the style and 
content of cognition. It was constructed according to the assumption that authoritarianism is a 
right-wing phenomenon which is associated with cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. 
The scale was validated against the anti-semitism scale, as an indirect measure of susceptibility 
to fascism. Thus, although it was comprised of ideological opinions which reflected the nine traits 
of the underlying personality syndrome, these were, by definition, conservative in content. 
Moreover, as a measure of the full syndrome, it has been assumed that the scale measured also 
the stylistic features of authoritarianism. The conservative contents of the F scale have thus been 
used as a measure of cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Harvey & Caldwell, 
1959; Maier & Lavrakas, 1984). Consequently, the F scale strongly reflects a radical value 
orientation: it assumes a necessary relation between an irrational cognitive style and conservative 
ideological content. 
A number of serious repercussions were to result from the psychometric practice of measuring 
personality by means of ideological content. As The Authoritarian Personality was being prepared 
for publication, major ideological shifts were taking place in the United States. By 1950, 
Horkheimer and Flowerman could proclaim that "the world scarcely remembers the mechanized 
8 These attitudinal statements were drawn from fascist talk and writing, including interview data, fascist 
publications, and the propaganda of anti-semitic American "radio-agitators". 
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persecution and extermination of millions of human beings only a short span of years away" (p. 
v). Instead. the embryonic cold war was whipping up the masses. purging academic institutions 
of "egghead" Marxists, and inciting new ideological ideas. These changes were reflected in the 
"end of ideology" thesis (cf. Bell. 1960; Waxman, 1968). One of these theorists. Edward Shils 
(1954), changed his earlier (1948) acclaim of The Authoritarian Personality to criticism. Where 
Adorno et al. (1950) had uncovered fundamental differences between the cognitive style and 
rationality of radicals and conservatives, Shils suggested that these antipodes were equally more 
authoritarian than moderate, non-ideological democrats. 
By assuming a necessary relation between the content, style, and rationality of ideology, Shils 
(1954) employed reasoning similar to that of Adorno et al. (1950). The stylistic similarities 
between fascist and communist regimes were advanced to verify the irrationality of their contents. 
Shils (1958, see also Shils, 1968) captures the essential differences between ideological (fascist 
and communist) and non-ideological (democratic) politics: 
Ideological politics makes the most radical and uncompromising distinction between good 
and evil, left and right, friend and foe. national and unnational, American and un-
American (1958, p. 452). 
Ignoring for the moment the "radical and uncompromising distinction" which Shils himself makes 
between ideological and non-ideological politics, this extract expresses the essence of the new 
critical turn. The Left and Right were argued to share a common, irrational, Manichean cognitive 
style, and were thus denounced as equally irrational/pathological: 
The ideological orientation so frequently draws to itself madmen full of hatred and fear 
-the paranoids (Shils, 1958, p. 464). 
What was evident to Shils' "detached eye" (1954, p. 32), was that the Left was championed by 
individuals just as authoritarian as those on the Right. 
Hans Eysenck had noticed this same "fact", and initiated an empirical programme which 
"confirmed" these suggestions. Instead of the authoritarian-egalitarian dimension, Eysenck (1954) 
advanced a continuum of personality traits, ranging from toughmindedness to tendermindedness. 
which are a "projection on to the field of social attitudes" of a extroverted or introverted 
personality type respectively (p. 174). Like authoritarianism. toughmindedness is a personality 
disposition which favours a rigid empiricist approach to reality, and which is intolerant of 
ambiguity. Although Eysenck waivers between a personality theory rooted in hereditary or 
psychodynamics (see Eysenck, 1954; Eaves & Eysenck, 1974), his personality T-factor was also 
assumed to be intimately related to ideological content: 
... not a single attitude statement can be found which measures the T-factor without any 
admixture of Radical or Conservative content (Eysenck, 1954, p. 170). 
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Eysenck offered two strands of evidence in support of his theory: he found the T-factor to be 
linearly independent of radicalism-conservatism; and he reports that fascists and communists had 
more toughminded scores than a control group of politically uninvolved soldiers (Eysenck. 1954, 
1975; Eysenck & Coutler, 1972).9 Presumably, there were a number of ideological opinions 
(which supposedly reflected personality) which were shared by communists and fascists of the 
early 1950's. These are not difficult to fmd. Both communists and fascists rejected religious 
authority in favour of political authority, and valued collectivism over individualism. Both of 
these type of opinions permeate Eysenck's T scale. It is not surprising, therefore, that Eysenck's 
T scale has been found to be composed of two factors, religiosity and humanitarianism (Rokeach 
& Hanley. 1956; DeFronzo, 1972; Eckhardt, 1991). 10 By assuming a necessary relationship 
between the style and content of cognition, it was possible- by selecting the "correct" opinions 
as a measure of an irrational personality trait - to sustain very different critical accounts. 
Why had Adorno et al. (1950) not seen the similarities between communists and fascists? Quite 
simply, they were not looking for any. Their allegiance to Marxist theory and renunciation of 
Nazi fascism dictated an interest in eradicating anti-semitism. ethnocentrism. and political and 
economic conservatism- issues on which communist and fascist opinion diverged. Since, they 
theorized a direct relationship between the content and structure of cognition. Adorno et al. 
( 1950) assumed that attitudinal differences between communists and fascists would be related to 
different personality traits. This assumption is evident also in their research design. since the nine 
trait syndrome was derived by comparing the interview protocols of only extreme scorers: 
"Linearity of social attitudes was, therefore, assumed, and the middle group was consequently 
excluded" (Taylor, 1960, p. 3). Had extremists been compared to moderates, Taylor continues, 
they would have been found to be similar rather than different. 
The political orientation at the heart of the programme of action research permeated all aspects 
of The Authoritarian Personality. The central strut of political critique - a necessary, isomorphic 
relationship between the irrational style and the fascist content of cognition - was assumed 
throughout the work. Not only was it reflected in theory, but also in the psychometric and 
methodological practice. This assumption could, however, be employed also as a critique of 
9 The dubious procedures which Eysenck (1954) employed to verify his theory have received the harshest 
criticism. See the exchange between Eysenck (1956a, 1956b) and others (Christie, 1956a, 1956b; Hanley 
& Rokeach, 1956; Rokeach & Hanley, 1956). 
10 Although Eysenck's (1954) methodology prevent the conclusion of orthogonality between 
toughmindedness and radicalism-conservatism, some evidence suggests that it is possible to separate the 
beliefs which extremists share from those where they diverge (Eysenck, 1975; Goertzel, 1987; Heaven 
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radicalism by researchers like Eysenck and John Ray who had strong conservative inclinations 
(see Billig, 1979, 1985b). With changing historical conditions it was possible to use this same 
assumption as evidence for the irrationality of Marxism. All that was required was to identify 
ideological contents which the Left and Right shared, and use these contents as a measure of 
authoritarianism. 
Most of the criticism levelled against The Authoritarian Personality was framed in terms of bias. 
The "response set" debate insinuated that it was the tendency for yes-saying which produced the 
correlation between the F scale and conservatism (Altemeyer, 1981; Brown, 1965; Duckitt, 1990, 
1992; Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967; McKinney, 1973; Ray, 1976; Titus, 1968; Titus & Hollander, 
1957). Since yes-saying was considered a personality trait associated with authoritarianism 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Jackson & Messick, 1957), this critique was not as cutting as that which 
proposed that the correlation between the F scale and conservatism was spurious, derived from 
shared content in the measures of personality and ideology (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Shils, 
1954; Rokeach, 1956a, 1960; Ray, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1989). At the heart of this spurious 
relationship, it was argued, was a value orientation which opposed conservatism, and which 
included conservative contents into a measure of irrational personality traits. Consequently, Ray 
(1987, p. 559) brands Adorno et al. as racists (against conservatives and fascists?)! 11 
The common response to these criticisms has been to construct new measures of 
authoritarianism. 12 Three strategies have been taken by researchers to address the problem of 
scale bias. Some, like Altemeyer (1981, 1988a), Wilson (1973), Rigby and Rump (1982; Rigby, 
1982), and Kohn (1974), have continued in the same vein as Adorno et al. (1950), by simply 
defining authoritarianism as a right-wing phenomenon.U In contrast, Ray (1982a, 1983, 1985) 
has emphasized the need for an unbiased measure of authoritarianism, and has offered his 
Directiveness scale as such a measure (Ray, 197 6). He contends that it is a true personality 
measure which, being orthogonal to conservatism (Ray, 1979, 1982b, 1985; Heaven, 1981) and 
ethnocentrism (Ray, 1976, 1980a, 1981; Heaven, 1980), is ideologically unbiased. 14 
Nonetheless, the construct validity of Ray's directiveness scale has also been criticised for its 
ideological bias in absolving racism and conservatism from moral censure (Duckitt, 1983; 
Heaven, 1987; Rigby, 1987 a, 1987b). 
11 See Stanley Fish ( 1994) for a series of good arguments against such a conception of racism. 
12 See Ray ( 1984a) for a catalog of 37 such measures. 
13 There is, however, no fixed meaning to 'right-wing'. Seep. 26 for Altemeyer's inventive definition. 
14 See Heaven (1981) and Heaven & Rajab (1980) for contradictory findings. 
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Although critical of each other, both approaches rest on a common assumption. They pre-defme 
(theoretically and operationally) authoritarianism in terms of content, and thereby assume a 
necessary relation or necessary independence between cognitive style and ideological content. 
This has been most unfruitful since debates between validity and definition are circular and 
intractable de facto - i.e., arguments about facts (e.g., is authoritarianism independent of 
beliefs?) reduce to arguments about definition (e.g., is authoritarianism to be defmed as being 
orthogonal to beliefs). 1s The "unbiased" measures of authoritarianism, rather than being more 
valid than "biased" measures, merely defme authoritarianism in a different manner. Moreover, 
political values are manifest in both definitions of authoritarianism. 
Adorno et al. (1950) and their critics are thus united by similar assumptions: their research 
programmes proceed from a value orientation which theorizes a necessary relation (or 
independence) between cognitive personality traits and ideological content. This is reflected in 
all measures which employ ideological contents to assess personality. By selecting the "correct" 
contents, any theory could possibly be supported since some ideological contents are shared by 
communists and fascists, while others are not. In addition, being historical, precisely which 
ideological beliefs are shared by opposing ideologies is variable. For example, in a longitudinal 
study (1963-1974) of British voting patterns, Himmelweit, Humphreys, Jaeger & Katz (1981) 
found that the legalization of homosexuality among consenting adults "ceases to be part of the 
liberal belief system and becomes part of the consensus of society" (p. 201). If a necessary 
relation exists between the style and content of cognition, then, in different time periods, similar 
styles should be associated with the acceptance of homosexuality in relatively extremist and 
moderate circles. Similarly, in moving from a component of fascism in the 1940's, through the 
green movement, to a liberal ideology (cf. Dixon, Foster, Durrheim & Wilbraham, 1994; 
Groning & Wolschke-Bulrnahn, 1987), ecologism should be associated with a similar (rational 
of irrational) cognitive style in both fascism and liberalism. Thus, while political critique may 
be achieved by positing a necessary relation between style and content, this critique may only be 
sustained within particular historical and cultural contexts, contravening the empiricist ambition 
toward theoretical universalism. The universal and static mind-in-general cannot be mapped onto 
historically and culturally specific beliefs. 
A fmal strategy to address the bias of the F scale has been to defme and measure authoritarianism 
in terms of its stylistic features and not in terms of ideological content. It may be true that this 
simply constitutes another preferred defmition of authoritarianism. However, the focus on stylistic 
1
' This is evident in the exchange between Duckitt ( 1983, 1984) and Ray ( 1984b). 
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aspects of authoritarianism has the methodological/rhetorical benefit of circumventing the 
criticism of spurious relationships that may arise between content-based measures of both 
authoritarianism and conservatism. In addition, by divorcing style from content, universal theories 
of the relation between personality and ideology may be advanced. This approach was adopted 
by Milton Rokeach ( 1956a, 1960), and has since become the backbone of investigations into a 
II general theory of authoritarianism II. 
Extremism theory16 
Extremism theory postulates a curvilinear relationship between cognitive personality traits and 
ideological beliefs. By arguing that communists and fascists are equally less tolerant of ambiguity 
than moderates, Shils and Eysenck may qualify as extremism theorists. However, their work 
offers no theoretical advances over that of Adorno et al. (1950) since their predictions rely on 
the same fundamental hypothesis of a necessary relation between the style and content of 
cognition. 17 Only with Rokeach can one detect theoretical and methodological attempts to sever 
cognitive style from content. Rokeach (1956a, 1960) argues that cognitive style is related to the 
dynamics of extremism, and thereby only indirectly related to specific ideological contents. The 
actual beliefs associated with any cognitive style are reduced to an epiphenomenal status. 
Personality thus acquires a new theoretical function: it acts as a dynamic whereby cognitive style 
may be mapped onto the (universal) psychological processes underlying extremism. 
Consequently, Rokeach may offer an II ahistorical II, II general theory of authoritarianism II 
(Rokeach, 1960, p. 9; 1956a, p. 3), since an authoritarian cognitive style may now be associated 
with a wide range of beliefs (e.g., political, religious, and academic), within any historical 
period. 
To achieve a general theory, Rokeach divorces cognitive style from cognitive content: 
A first requirement is the need to make a sharp distinction in theory - and to translate 
this distinction into empirical research - between the structure and content of ideological 
systems ... to formulate systematically the structural properties of a person's ideology quite 
apart from its specific content (Rokeach, 1956a, p. 3). 
By defining and measuring the content and style of beliefs separately, Rokeach escapes the 
circularity between defining authoritarianism in terms of particular contents, and validating 
measurement instruments which operationalize authoritarianism in those terms. Any relationship 
16 Also known as ideologue theory. 
17 Although Rokeach's theory is often grouped together with accounts advanced by Shils and Eysenck, the 
present distinction is congruent with that made by Stone & Smith (1993). 
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between independent measures of belief structure and content would be uncontaminated by 
content commonalities between the measure of cognitive style and the measure of ideological 
beliefs. 
For Rokeach ( 1954, 1956a, 1956b, 1960), the primary characteristic of an authoritarian cognitive 
structure is dogmatism, defmed as: 
(a) a relatively closed cognitive system of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) 
organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in tum, (c) 
provides a framework for patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others 
(Rokeach, 1954, p. 203). 
Dogmatism embraces the notion of a rigid cognitive structure which is intolerant of ambiguity 
between beliefs and people which are respected and those which are rejected. A dogmatic 
cognitive style was accordingly characterized as being closedminded. All belief systems, Rokeach 
adds, can either be open or closed with regard to other beliefs and people. Freudianism, for 
example, could supply the last word on personality theory, or it could be accommodating of other 
accounts. 
A dogmatic cognitive style was theorized to serve defensive psychodynamic functions for 
individuals whose early development had engendered a set of "pre-ideological" beliefs which 
encouraged overidentification with an absolute authority (Rokeach, 1956a, 1960). Essentially, a 
dogmatic cognitive structure allows an individual to overcome contradictions within his/her belief 
system in the most simple manner: by accepting the word of an absolute authority (e.g., Freud, 
the cause, the party, or God). The cognitive manifestations of such a strategy include isolation 
between different beliefs (rigid categorization and intolerance of ambiguity) and denial (Rokeach, 
l956a, l956b, 1960). 
Instead of positing a necessary relation between personality and belief content, Rokeach argues 
that dogmatic cognitive traits will be associated with the extremism of beliefs. Underlying the 
relationship between dogmatism and extremism is the psychological process of commitment 
(Rokeach, 1956a). 18 Since extreme ideologies demand commitment to an ultimate source of 
truth, they satisfy the defences of an underlying dogmatic personality. Consequently, dogmatic 
individuals will be attracted to extreme ideological positions - both fascist and communist-
and to other closed systems such as catholicism. This allows Rokeach to transcend the cultural 
and historical particularities and biases which result from associating an irrational cognitive style 
18 Rokeach (1960) also uses the terms "reliance on authority", "yielding", and "conformance" to depict 
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with specific beliefs. By mapping cognitive irrationality onto a psychological process which 
predisposes individuals to extreme ideologies, Rokeach may aspire to a truly universal theory, 
for all societies contain extreme ideologies of one kind or another. Moreover, such a theory is 
not biased in the same manner as the theory of authoritarianism since it does not castigate any 
particular ideological contents, but the historically variable contents which characterize extremism 
in different societies. 
These conclusions are reflected in Rokeach's (1956a, 1960) theory of prejudice. It is not anti-
semitism and racism which concerns Rokeach, so much as a general theory of intolerance. In 
accordance with its defensive functions, a dogmatic cognitive structure acts: 
... as a framework for organizing attitudes of intolerance ... toward people in general 
according to the beliefs that they accept or reject (Rokeach, 1956a, p. 10). 
Any system of beliefs which sustains its truths by faith in an absolute authority, Rokeach argues, 
also organizes the world unambiguously into individuals who share its beliefs and those who do 
not. This, in turn, leads to intolerance of others accepting different beliefs. Such intolerance is 
evident in the use of "opinionated language" - that is. statements which reject a belief. but 
which simultaneously involve rejection of individuals holding such a belief. Whereas racial 
prejudice is a specific kind of opinionated rejection employed by conservatives, opinionation is 
a general theory of intolerance. Extremist dogmatism ensures that similar levels of intolerance 
would be found among the extreme Left and Right. In this way. a universal theory undermines 
any critical potential beyond an appeal to moderatism. A general theory of intolerance condemns 
not only intolerance of Blacks and Jews, but also Jungians by Freudians, and even racists by 
Blacks! 
To test his theory, Rokeach (1956a, 1960) designed the Dogmatism scale to measure general 
authoritarianism, and the Opinionation scale to measure general intolerance. He hypothesized a 
curvilinear relationship between the two, with high levels of dogmatism associated with both left 
opinionation (rejecting individuals who proclaim leftist ideals) and right opinionation. 
Furthermore, as a measure of general authoritarianism, the Dogmatism scale was hypothesized 
to be linearly independent of ethnocentrism (conservative intolerance) and radicalism-
conservatism, but to correlate with the F scale, which measured authoritarianism over and above 
its conservative bias. Finally. to test the central dynamic of his theory, Rokeach hypothesized that 
the greater the group pressures toward commitment to an ideology, the greater will be the 
dogmatism and opinionation. 
Rokeach's (1956a, 1960; Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956) empirical work provides a wide range of 
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support for all three hypotheses. When arranged on a continuum from Left to Right, extreme 
groups on both sides scored highest on dogmatism (cf. Rokeach, 1960, p. 114). In addition, 
extremists on both the Left and Right demonstrated higher levels of opinionation against their 
ideological opponents, and expressed higher levels of ideological commitment. Dogmatism thus 
appears to be linearly independent of ideological beliefs, but associated with extremism. Since 
ideological commitment mediated this relationship, Rokeach (1956a) argued that dogmatism was 
associated with extremist ideologies because these demanded commitment to an absolute 
authority, and not because of their specific ideological contents. 
Ensuing research has supported many of the basic predictions of dogmatism theory. 19 
Dogmatism, opinionation, and ideological commitment seem to covary in theoretically expected 
ways. In support of the relationship between dogmatism and commitment, DiRenzo (1967) found 
political elites to be significantly more dogmatic than their relatively uncommitted followers. High 
levels of dogmatism have also been found amongst individuals with strong religious commitment 
(Feather, 1967; Juan & Haley, 1970; Kilkpatric, Sutker & Sutker, 1970). Some convincing 
evidence has also suggested that political extremism on both the Left and Right is associated with 
intolerance of others characteristic of opinionation (McClosky & Chong, 1985).20 
These findings provide support for the predictions of extremism theory as they suggest that the 
relationship between dogmatism and beliefs is mediated by the psychological process of 
commitment. They thus imply that the style and content of cognition are independent of each 
other. However, a growing body of research has not found support for this fundamental 
proposition. In his review of studies "thought to be representative" of those investigating the 
relationship between dogmatism and political beliefs, Stone (1980) cites the work of Barker 
(1963), DiRenzo (1967), Hanson (1968, 1969, 1970), Knutson (1974), and Smithers & Lobley 
(1978). All these studies show dogmatism to be linearly associated with conservatism, as 
predicted by the theory of authoritarianism. Stone (1980) concludes by reaffirming Brown's 
(1965) earlier sentiment: 
There may be similarities in personality between communists and fascists, but existing 
evidence strongly suggests that authoritarianism is a personality and attitudinal syndrome 
characteristic of right-wingers (p. 14). 
The variable, commitment, cannot account for these findings as this would imply that 
conservatives are more committed to their beliefs than liberals. 
19 See Ehrlich & Lee (1969) and Vacchiano et al. (1969) for reviews of the dogmatism literature. 
20 Stone (1993) portrays this relationship as a fact: "Extremism theory works opinionation" (p. 170). 
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Oddly enough, Rokeach's (1956a, 1960) original research had also yielded a small but consistent 
association between conservatism and dogmatism. His explanation of these fmdings tends to 
undermine his theory of an independence between the style and content of cognition: 
Whatever the motivations may be which lead one to embrace antihumanitarian ideologies 
may also lead one to develop what we have called a dogmatic belief-disbelief system 
(1956a, p. 39). 
This argument is precisely the same as that used by Adorno et al. (1950) to posit a necessary 
relation between cognitive style and content. It suggests that personality may predispose 
individuals both to dogmatic cognition and antihumanitarian ideological contents. As such, it 
contradicts Rokeach 's theory of general authoritarianism since it suggests that a dogmatic 
cognitive style is more likely associated with conservatism, which is "intrinsically" more 
antidemocratic in content than liberalism. 
These disconfirming fmdings have been attributed to biases in the Dogmatism scale (Billig, 1976; 
Stone, 1980). Indeed, Parrott & Brown (1972) have demonstrated that college students classified 
the items of the Dogmatism scale overwhelmingly as conservative. It thus appears as though 
Rokeach had not managed to satisfy his "first requirement" of measuring the content and structure 
of beliefs independently. Like the F scale, the Dogmatism scale assesses personality by means 
of ideological opinions. Further evidence for Rokeach's latent assumption of a necessary relation 
between the style and content of cognition is given in his rationale for item selection: 
It was necessary to assume that the [Dogmatism] scale would be employed as a research 
tool primarily in countries where at the very least the word 'democracy' ... has positive 
valence (Rokeach, 1956a, p. 6). 
This assumption was necessary because Rokeach had used the concept of democracy as a "sky 
hook" from which the scale could be ideologically balanced between the Left and Right. 
Similarly, the Opinionation scale measured left and right opinionation, but not centrist 
opinionation. 
As such, Rokeach failed to meet his first requirement at both an empirical and theoretical level. 
Not only does he measure cognitive style in terms of content, but he also theorizes that certain 
contents are necessarily non-dogmatic. By measuring dogmatism in terms of anti-democratic 
opinions, Rokeach, much like the end of ideology theorists, implies that a centrist, liberal 
democratic ideology is a priori non-dogmatic. He thus assumes that there is something irrational 
about the cognitive functioning of individuals supporting ideologies which deviate from a centrist 
liberalism. 
These assumptions compromise Rokeach's aim toward a general, ahistorical theory of 
authoritarianism, but allay some of the disturbing political implications of dogmatism theory. To 
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achieve universalism. cognitive style must be theorized independently of belief content since a 
universal theory cannot be concerned with the dynamic nature of beliefs and cannot restrict itself 
only to countries which valorize democracy (cf. Rokeach. 1956b). However, once cognitive 
content and style are theoretically divorced from each other, there can be no rationale by which 
to defme certain ideological contents as more dogmatic than others. All ideological contents -
including democratic and anti-racist beliefs - may now be associated with cognitive irrationality. 
Since this is a conclusion which Rokeach rejects, he vacillates between a universal theory and 
one which can sustain political critique in the form of a "centrist bias" (Stone, 1980). Rokeach's 
ambiguity is evident in the fact that his theory has been interpreted as suggesting an independence 
between dogmatism and specific ideological contents (e.g., Jones, 1973), and as suggesting a 
necessary relation between the two (e.g., Steininger, Durso & Pasquariello, 1972). 
This same tension is manifest in the way in which Rokeach defmes and identifies extremists. 
Sidanius (1978a. 1984, 1985) has criticized Rokeach for defming extremism in terms of 
ideological content. While certainly true. Sidanius does not capture Rokeach's ambivalence. 
Rokeach balances rather precariously between an a priori defmition of extremism in terms of 
content (i.e .• fascism. communism and catholicism), and a more relativistic defmition in terms 
of deviance to the "left-of-centre" and "right-of-centre" (Rokeach, 1956a). A relativistic defmition 
is not restricted to a particular socio-historical location and can aspire to theoretical universalism. 
While Rokeach aims toward a universal theory, his relativist defmition of extremism has a centre 
defined in terms of democratic content. It is located in a particular socio-historical juncture and 
ideological deviance from this centre is associated with specific contents. 
Rokeach's ambiguity has meant that his theory is near irrefutable because any set of data can be 
interpreted either in terms of a relative or content-based defmition of extremism. Kilkpatric, 
Sutker & Sutker (1970), for example, felt that they had contradicted Rokeach's theory by fmding 
protestants and Jews to be more dogmatic than catholics in a Southern American sample. 
However. by drawing on the relativistic defmition of extremism, it also is possible to argue that 
the fmdings are consistent with Rokeach's theory since protestantism in the Southern states is 
relatively more extremist than catholicism. 
Although Rokeach had failed to disentangle cognitive style and content in his hope to achieve a 
universal theory of their relationship, it may be premature to accept Stone's (1980) conclusion 
that authoritarian cognition is characteristic only of right-wingers. Firstly, despite recognising the 
"ideological biases" of the Dogmatism scale (p. 8}, Stone reviews studies which have used this 
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Secondly, the cited studies are not as representative as they may have been (Eysenck, 1981). 
While other studies have supported Stone's conclusion that a dogmatic style is linearly associated 
with conservatism (Bailes & Guller, 1970; Hanson, 1983; Karabanick & Wilson, 1969; Neuman, 
1981; Tetlock, 1983a; Thompson & Michel, 1972), a number of studies have shown structural 
variables to be associated with beliefs in the curvilinear manner predicted by extremism theory 
(De Vries & Walker, 1987; DiPalma & McClosky, 1970; Linville, 1982; McClosky & Chong, 
1985; Taylor, 1960), and still another has found no relationship between cognitive style and 
sociopolitical beliefs (Warr, Schroder & Blackman, 1969). In other words, Rokeach's failure to 
disentangle cognitive style and content does not necessarily mean that other attempts at theorizing 
and measurement could not: 1) clearly separate style from content, and demonstrate their 
independence, or 2) demonstrate a relationship between the two which is contrary to the 
predictions of Adorno et al. (1950). 
During the 1980's, interest in theorizing the relationship between cognitive style and sociopolitical 
beliefs was revived. Unlike the earlier work which theorized cognitive irrationality in an 
ideological milieu which offered clear and unambiguous conceptions of good and bad, fascism 
was now long dead and the Cold War was drawing to a close. The need for an extensive 
ideological critique was no longer as pressing as it had been. Consequently, theory could proceed 
toward universalism unimpeded by a critical imperative. It is only during this period that 
Rokeach's "first requirements" have been satisfied. Sidanius has managed to distinguish the style 
of cognition from cognitive content both theoretically and methodologically. 
Context theory 
There is a noticeable rift in the literature between Rokeach and Sidanius. Whereas the earlier 
work had been overtly political, Sidanius is distinctly apolitical. His prime concern is not to 
critique the great political movements of the twentieth century, but to build a model of the 
relationship between cognition and beliefs. Consequently, Sidanius' conception of irrationality 
is more prosaic and individualistic. While Adorno et al. (1950) and Rokeach were concerned with 
the aetiology of individual irrationality and its relationship to ideology, they were primarily 
interested in the ideological sites where this surfaced - that is, the ideological constellations of 
fascism and communism, and ideological beliefs such as racism and anti-semitism. Sidanius, on 
the other hand, has little to say about specific ideologies. Instead, his interest lies in the 
relationship between individual cognition and extremism in the purely relative sense. Since any 
set of beliefs may relatively extremist (i.e., deviant) in different contexts, the only critical 
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potential which may be derived from context theory concerns the rationality of individual 
processes associated with either conformity to or deviance from social norms. 
Context theory advances a hypothesis exactly opposite to that of extremism theory: rather than 
being more dogmatic, extremists are expected to be more tolerant of ambiguity, more flexible, 
and more cognitively complex than moderates (Sidanius, 1978a, 1984, 1985; Sidanius & 
Ekehammar, 1976, 1977; Sidanius & Lau, 1989). Sidanius sees the good side of extremism. In 
fact, according to Sidanius, German Nazism and Soviet communism were not extreme ideologies, 
but mass ideological movements. 21 It is precisely their status as conformity responses which 
accounts for their irrationality. Instead of relying on individual reason, adherents of these 
ideologies were swept along by mass opinion. Accordingly, the predictions of context theory 
resonate with the findings of the relative deprivation literature, which has shown political activists 
and extremists to be more highly educated and politically sophisticated than moderates ( cf. 
Caplan, 1970; Forward & Williams, 1970; Sears & McConahay, 1973). 
Sidanius (1984, 1985, 1988b) proposes a "conformity-type" model of social attitudes. In contrast 
to the "dissonance-type" models advanced by Adorno et al. (1950) and Rokeach, individuals are 
not portrayed as attempting to reduce conflict between contradictory ideological beliefs, and it 
is not to any ideological authority that the individual looks to reduce incongruity between 
opposing versions of reality. Rather, individuals are seen as normative beings who seek approval 
by maintaining the modal beliefs of any social context. Personality is of significance to this theory 
as certain traits allow the individual to resist the "modal pressure" aroused through non-
conformity (Sidanius, 1984), and enable participation in extreme (non-normative) ideologies. 
Thus, instead of ego-defensive functions at the heart of extremist and authoritarian irrationality, 
context theory associates irrationality with the instrumental motives toward acceptance and 
approval (Sidanius & Lau, 1989). 
A number of traits are expected to be associated with ideological deviance. Initially, extremists 
are expected to possess certain characteristics which allow them to adopt deviant and unpopular 
positions. These include a melange of concepts from cognitive theory and psychodynamics -
field independence, ego strength, high stress tolerance, tolerance of ambiguity, and self-
confidence (Sidanius, 1985, 1988a). "Intellectually 'weaker' citizens (sic) are much more likely 
to gravitate toward the ideological middle and safer ground" (Sidanius, 1985, p. 639). Further 
11 Underlying this shift is a subtle change from an "outsiders" perspective, which views fascists as callous 
and irrational extremists, to the "insiders" perspective which sees the fascists of the second world war as 
bureaucrats swept along by mass opinion (cf. Arend, 1963). 
Theoretical perspectives 43 
cognitive implications are expected to evolve once an extreme ideology has been adopted. Since 
extreme beliefs require intellectually convincing defensive arguments, extremists are expected to 
expend greater effort in active search of political information and display greater cognitive skills 
than the average citizen (Sidanius 1984, 1988b). Consequently, extremists are theorized to be 
cognitively sophisticated and "more genuinely interested in sociopolitical affairs" than moderates 
(Sidanius, 1985, p. 638). 
Distinct "dispositional" and "experiential" correlates of extremism are thus evident in Sidanius' 
reasoning (cf. Duckitt, 1992; Kelman & Barkley, 1963). Dispositional traits refer to personality 
attributes (e.g., tolerance of ambiguity, ego strength) which provide the individual with a stable 
and general psychological capacity (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, p. 266). Dispositional traits may 
promote or hinder participation in the environment. Environmental experiences, in turn, feed 
back and produce changes in the individual. Once an extreme ideological position has been 
adopted, for example, the individual must engage normative opposition, which promotes flexible 
rhetorical abilities and cognitive sophistication. 
Sidanius has achieved Rokeach's "first requirements" toward theoretical universalism by drawing 
sharp theoretical and methodological distinctions between the content and the style of cognition. 
He defines extremism in a purely relative sense - as deviance from modal beliefs - and thereby 
purges "ideology" of all reference to content. 
The nature of the interface between political ideology, personality and cogrut1ve 
style ... [does] not lie in the specific contents of any particular ideology, but rather in the 
degree to which a given ideology deviates from the norms of a specific culture at a 
specific time (Sidanius and Lau, 1989, p. 87). 
By severing cognitive style from content, a universal theory of their relationship may be 
achieved. Since all ideological contexts have normative and deviant beliefs, the predictions of 
context theory are, ironically, a-contextual and ahistorical. The theory is equally applicable to 
ideological extremism in Maoist China of 1970 as it is to America of 1990 (Sidanius, 1984, 1985; 
Sidanius & Lau, 1989). 
This shift overcomes the tension evident in Rokeach's ambiguous definition of extremism- in 
terms of both content and deviance. Now, moderate liberal democrats could conceivably be as 
dogmatic as totalitarian extremists, but within different contexts. The essential difference between 
the two theories lies in their conceptualization of centrist beliefs. Rokeach's political centre is 
liberal democratic, whereas Sidanius' contains no fixed content; extremism is "contentless" 
(Sidanius, 1978a, p. 217). As such, Sidanius is better equipped to build a universalistic theory 
for there is now no necessary link between either the content and style of a particular belief 
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(Adorno et al.), or the content and extremeness of the belief (Rokeach). Sidanius, in other words, 
does not employ a specific content as a "sky hook" from which to defme the irrationality or the 
deviance of beliefs. His model "has the major theoretical advantages in that it avoids the time and 
culture boundedness of conventional studies of belief systems" (Ward, 1986, p. 142). 
Sidanius also measures cognitive style independently of beliefs. One of the "greatest strengths" 
of his empirical work is his use of "active, direct and multiple tests of cognitive processing" 
(Ward, 1986, p. 142). Many of the indices of cognitive functioning investigated by Sidanius are 
derived from experimental procedures which require subjects to think about and process 
information. 22 Cognitive style is not assessed by beliefs and opinions as it is in the F scale and 
Dogmatism scale. Sidanius thereby circumvents any possible spurious relationships that may arise 
from measuring both cognitive style and content by means of opinions. He parries any criticism 
of ideological bias. Sidanius' research may thus provide a new perspective on the issue of 
whether or not extremists on the Left and Right demonstrate similar styles of cognitive 
process mg. 
To test his predictions, Sidanius (1978a, 1978b, 1985, 1988b, Sidanius & Lau, 1989) has 
examined linear and curvilinear trends between conservatism and various different indices of 
cognitive style. In accordance with recent empirical evidence (Durrheim & Foster, 1995; 
Robertson & Cochrane, 1973; Sidanius, 1978a, 1984; Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1976; Sidanius, 
Ekehammar & Ross, 1979), Sidanius treats conservatism as a multidimensional construct. 
Interpreting the overall pattern of linear and curvilinear associations between a number of 
different measures of cognitive style and different dimensions of conservatism, over different 
studies, is a rather formidable task (but see Appendix A for an attempt). Generally speaking, the 
results of Sidanius' research have not provided convincing support for the predictions of context 
theory. In part, this is due to methodological problems, including sampling and measurement 
validity (Ward, 1986, 1988; Ray, 1988). Of more concern, though, is that of the large number 
of associations that have been observed between different measures of cognitive style and 
conservatism, very few have supported the predictions of context theory. It would seem 
premature to conclude that context theory specifies the relationship between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs. 
There has, however, been some support for context theory. In addition to the relative deprivation 
literature and some of Sidanius' fmdings, other research has found moderates to demonstrate less 
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cognitive complexity than extremists (Nidorf & Argabrite, 1970; Rydell, 1966; Tesser & Leone, 
1977). Also, Sidanius' (1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) more recent interest in the relationship 
between political sophistication and extremism has yielded clearer support for his predictions. 
This change in emphasis from dispositional to experiential constructs of cognitive style may 
provide the key to resolving the contradictory predictions advanced by extremism theory and 
context theory, and reconcile some of the conflicting research fmdings. Perhaps, at a dispositional 
level, extremists (or conservatives) are predisposed to their respective ideologies by personality 
traits such as intolerance of ambiguity. However, once extreme ideologies are adopted, 
experiential factors (e.g., the need to justify an extremist position) may lead to strategies of 
information gathering, which could produce increased levels of knowledge and rhetorical 
sophistication in these domains. 
The construct of political sophistication is at present inchoate and needs to be clearly 
distinguished from dispositional constructs of cognitive style. It may then be possible to 
demonstrate that opposing theories are equally valid for different domains of cognitive style. As 
extremism theory may "work opinionation" (Stone, 1993), context theory may work 
sophistication. Opinionation and sophistication may be two different cognitive consequences of 
subscribing to extreme ideologies. Such fmdings, however, would not resolve the issue at hand, 
since psychological interest in the relationship between ideological beliefs and cognitive 
personality traits has been about disposition. Do the irrational traits of rigidity and intolerance 
of ambiguity predispose individuals to conservative beliefs, or to extreme beliefs of all kinds? 
Despite a lack of definitive evidence, Sidanius suggests that intolerance of ambiguity is associated 
with modal beliefs of all kinds. 
This conclusion rests on clear theoretical and methodological distinctions between the style and 
content of cognition. In contrast to Rokeach and Adorno et al. (1950), Sidanius does not measure 
cognitive personality traits by means of ideological contents, or attempt to establish an isomorphic 
relationship between cognitive style and particular ideological beliefs. Instead, he maps the stable 
and consistent continuum of individual differences (the "mind-in-general") onto a psychological 
process of conformity-deviance, thereby extricating ideological beliefs from the equation. Because 
all societies over all historical epochs have beliefs which vary in their deviance, context theory 
is truly universal in its predictions. However, since any particular set of beliefs may be associated 
with "intellectual weakness" and irrationality, this universalism raises a number of critical 
problems. For example, the theory predicts that racist extremism, typical of contemporary nee-
fascism, is sustained by self-confident, cognitively complex, and politically sophisticated 
individuals who are tolerant of ambiguity. This is a conclusion which Sidanius rejects, but which 
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the universalism of his theory allows. 
Sidanius avoids these implications by making a special case of racist beliefs. He argues that 
racism is related to different psychological functions than all other beliefs. In contrast to the 
instrumental functions which sustain conformity to religious, economic and political, and other 
ideological beliefs, Sidanius (1984, 1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) argues that ego-defensive 
functions underlie racist beliefs. He thus anticipates a linear relationship between racism and 
cognitive style - ensuring the irrationality of racism - but a curvilinear relationship between 
political and economic conservatism and cognitive style. Explicit reasons why racism secures 
exemption from instrumental functions are, however, not clearly spelled out. Sidanius & Lau 
( 1989) merely claim that "empirical evidence" has demonstrated ego-defensive functions to 
underlie racist beliefs. However, empirical evidence has also suggested that political and 
economic beliefs may serve ego-defensive functions (Adorno et al., 1950), and that expressions 
(and denial) of prejudice are influenced by impression management (Billig, 1988a, 1991; van 
Dijk, 1984, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Moreover, Sidanius (1978b), himself, has found 
a curvilinear relationship between racism and cognitive complexity (see Appendix A)! 
While Sidanius may have achieved Rokeach's flrst requirements, he too has not managed to 
escape the theoretical conundrum or provide a definitive model of the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs. In part, this is due to a lack of theoretical and operational 
clarity in distinguishing between dispositional and experiential constructs of cognitive style. The 
main difficulties with context theory, however, are attributable to ambiguity between Sidanius' 
empirical findings, theoretical predictions, and (unacknowledged) political values. The theory 
makes explicit predictions, and cannot adequately account for the complex and varied pattern of 
relationships that Sidanius has uncovered. This ambiguity is compounded by introducing a 
different theory to explain the relationship between racist beliefs and cognitive style in a post hoc, 
unparsimonious, and theoretically bereft manner. As with any universal theory which divorces 
cognitive style from content, disquieting political implications need to be avoided. However, by 
reneging on a relative defmition of racist extremism, Sidanius undermines the most fundamental 
assumption of context theory: the independence between cognitive style and content. 
Despite the thoroughgoing universalism of his theory, Sidanius has not managed to escape the 
necessity to lay political critique. On the contrary, context theory, like its predecessors, reflects 
the values of its historical and cultural milieu. Firstly, Sidanius ensures that his theory would not 
justify racism. Secondly, the conformity-type model of cognitive irrationality reproduces 
contemporary notions of the healthy individual: the go-getter, non-conformist achiever who is 
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"free to choose", and can break free of the irrational bonds of society is heralded as an ideal (cf. 
Rose, 1989, part 4). It also reaffinns old ideas of the irrationality of the masses (LeBon, 1896; 
Moscovici, 1985a). A further fearure of Sidanius' work which reflects contemporary trends is 
his multidimensional understanding of conservatism and cognitive style. Even though he does not 
theorize individual variability, he accepts the possibility that personality traits are not unitary 
entities which pervade and colour all aspects of life. Nevertheless, Sidanius remains committed 
to a personality-based account of social attitudes. This is not the case with Phillip Tetlock, whose 
recent value pluralism theory has overturned traditional conceptions of cognitive style. 
Value Pluralism Theory 
Tetlock (1983a, 1984, 1986; Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) 
has taken the theorizing of Rokeach and Adorno et al. (1950) in the opposite direction to 
Sidanius. He has rejected personality as the interface between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs, has rejected a decontextualized account, and has reasserted an intimacy between the style 
and content of beliefs. He maintains that the cognitive style employed in any ideological thinking 
is determined by the beliefs under consideration and the ideological system within which they are 
being thought. This permits him to generate propositions regarding intra-individual variability in 
cognitive style, in addition to theorizing the relationship between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs. 
Tetlock's general, value conflict theory of cognitive style assumes that ideological values are 
often in conflict with each other, and, being cognitive misers, individuals prefer simple solutions 
to the trade-off between conflicting values. His predictions stem from Abelson's (1959) account 
of the manner in which individuals resolve cognitive dilemmas. When conflicting values are of 
unequal strength, simple cognitive styles are manifest as individuals "bolster" the dominant value 
and "deny" the lesser. However, when conflicting values are of approximately equal strength, 
individuals must tum to the more demanding strategies of "differentiation, integration, and 
transcendence" to achieve value trade-offs and reduce dissonance. Tetlock (1986) has provided 
experimental support for these assumptions. He found that students thought about ideological 
policy issues in more complex ways and were less confident in the correctness of their stand, 
when (a) the policy issue placed two equally important values into conflict. and (b) the two values 
were highly important. 
Since different political issues implicate values which vary in both their relative and absolute 
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importance, the value conflict model provides a platform for predicting cross-content variability 
in cognitive style. A conservative may, for example, display a more complex cognitive style 
when deciding whether to raise personal tax in favour of the defence budget, than when deciding 
whether to raise tax for improved public health services. The former issue involves two equal, 
highly important conservative values, whereas the latter may be resolved simply by bolstering 
one value and denying the other. Thus, "Content and strucrure are closely intertwined" (Tetlock, 
1986, p. 824). 
Tetlock annexes Rokeach's (1973, 1979) two-value model of ideology to the value conflict theory 
in order to derive predictions regarding the nature of the relationship between radicalism-
conservatism and cognitive style. According to this more specific, value pluralism theory, the 
major ideological movements of the twentieth century vary in the importance they attach to the 
basic, and often incompatible values of individual freedom and equality. Rokeach suggests that 
socialism values both freedom and equality whereas fascism values neither. Communism values 
equality by not freedom, while capitalism values freedom but not equality. The decreased 
cognitive complexity of extremists, therefore, lies not in their unique psychological properties, 
but in the nature of the ideologies which they defend. Extremist ideologies of the twentieth 
cenrury tend to be monistic - preferring to bolster one value at the expense of others - in 
comparison with moderate ideologies which are pluralistic - that is, they recognise conflict 
between prioritized values. 
Although Tetlock's conception of cognitive style has no psychodynamic overtones, his 
understanding of cognitive complexity is descriptively similar to tolerance of ambiguity. As a 
feature of monistic thinking, cognitive simplicity is intolerant of ambiguity since it denies conflict 
between incompatible cognitive elements and rigidly holds to only one side of an issue. In 
measuring cognitive complexity-simplicity, Tetlock must himself adopt a pluralist cognitive style 
for he must satisfy two conflicting values. On the one hand, cognitive style must be associated 
with particular ideological contents in order to assess variability over different content issues. On 
the other hand, however, cognitive style cannot be assessed by means of ideological contents (as 
the F and D scales had done) because personality functioning, the theoretical link between 
opinions and cognitive style, has been rejected. These two aims have been achieved by using the 
integrative complexity coding system to measure cognitive style. This coding scheme, originally 
developed to score the Paragraph Completion Test (Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967), assesses 
cognitive differentiation and integration as exercised in acrual discourse. Thus, while cognitive 
complexity may be measured without scaling ideological opinions, it remains associated with the 
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Tetlock has employed the integrative complexity coding system to investigate the relationship 
between cognitive complexity and political beliefs of United States senators (Tetlock, 1983a), 
members of the British House of Commons (Tetlock, 1984), American supreme court judges 
(Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985), and Soviet traditionalists and reformers (Tetlock & 
Boettger, 1989). Unlike Sidanius, who offers a relativistic conception of extremism, Tetlock must 
sample genuine fascists, socialists, communists, and capitalists to capture ideological thinking 
which reflects their differential value trade-offs. This is well illustrated in the study of American 
senators, the results of which supported the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950). Tetlock (1983a) 
explained that no true socialists and communists were included in the sample, and the linear 
relationship reflected the decrease in complexity from political moderates to extreme 
conservatives which the value pluralism model predicts (see also Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). 
The distribution of ideological beliefs of the members of the British House of Commons, in 
contrast, does range from extreme radical to extreme conservative. By coding interview data of 
these members (N = 89), Tetlock ( 1984) found convincing support for his theory. Moderate 
socialists interpreted policy issues in a more complex manner than moderate conservatives, who, 
in turn, were more complex than extreme conservatives and extreme socialists. These results are 
inexplicable by authoritarianism and extremism theory, but are congruent with the predictions of 
value pluralism theory. 
These findings, however, have not provided definitive support for value pluralism theory. Like 
all the quasi-experimental and correlational research in this area, Tetlock's work succumbs to a 
number of points of ambiguity (cf. Cook & Campbell, 1979). First, in interpreting cause and 
effect: 
On the one hand, the value pluralism of a person's ideology may shape how he or she 
typically thinks about policy issues ... On the other hand, one's cognitive style may shape 
the value content of one's ideology. Individuals who dislike ambiguity and cognitive 
inconsistency may be more attracted to monistic than pluralistic ideologies (Tetlock, 
1984, p. 373). 
Tetlock has addressed this problem by investigating ideology-by-issue interactions in cognitive 
style. Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant (1985) have shown that the relationship between cognitive 
complexity and radicalism-conservatism of supreme court judges varies in an interactive manner, 
depending on whether they are considering economic or civil rights cases. Such fmdings 
contradict all personality-based accounts which advocate cross-domain stability in cognitive style. 
By questioning the generality and stability of personality traits, ideology-by-issue interactions 
challenge the causal priority of personality. 
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Ideology-by-issue interactions do not resolve a second set of ambiguities associated with quasi-
experimental designs. It cannot be certain that it is differences in ideological monism-pluralism, 
rather than some other factor, which accounts for the observed differences in cognitive 
complexity between ideological groups. It may, for example, be the "consistency" which 
minorities must communicate to be influential (Moscovici, 1976), which underlies their relative 
"cognitive simplicity". This problem is especially crucial since Tetlock does not theorize or 
attempt to measure the monism-pluralism of ideological groups. He merely offers the construct 
as a mediating variable to account for his results. 
In addition to these methodological difficulties, there are a number of theoretical problems with 
Tetlock's theory. Firstly, Tetlock does not expand sufficiently on the nature of monism-pluralism, 
and the manner in which it accounts for a necessary relation between cognitive style and 
ideological content. In contrast to the detailed theorizing of authoritarianism by Adorno et al. 
( 1950) and Rokeach, Tetlock does not explain the aetiology of monism-pluralism on an 
ideological level; for example, why capitalism is monistic and socialism pluralistic. Nor does he 
discuss the manner in which ideological monism translates to individual monism- e.g., how 
'being a capitalist' produces simple styles of individual cognition- or how monism generalizes 
from the equality-freedom issue to other ideological issues. Instead, he leaves monism-pluralism 
untheorized and refers his readers to Rokeach ( 1973, 1979). This is wholly unsatisfactory because 
he generalizes Rokeach's two-value model to a theory of ideological style applicable to many 
different content domains, and shifts Rokeach's theory from a social to individual level of 
analysis, without explanation. 
It seems as though Tetlock wants to suggest that monism-pluralism is a property of an ideological 
group which is immediately transferred to the thought processes of individual group members; 
fascists and communists are monistic, while socialists are pluralistic. This is evident from the 
methodological status of monism-pluralism. An isomorphism between individual monism-
pluralism and ideological orientation is evident in a methodology which classifies individuals by 
ideological orientation and then assumes corresponding levels of monism-pluralism. However, 
since it has proved so difficult to define ideological groupings by a single linear continuum 
(Eatwell & O'Sullivan, 1989; Wright, 1987), the isomorphism between ideological orientation 
and the linear monism-pluralism continuum appears overly simplistic. What, moreover, is the 
nature of monism-pluralism? Can we expect different theoretical predictions with the increased 
complexity of the New Right (cf. Eatwell & O'Sullivan, 1989; Haste, 1992)? Are fascists 
monistic in all contexts? How does the property of a vague and diffuse ideological group (e.g., 
capitalists) enter the consciousness of individual members? Will monism-pluralism be equally 
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prevalent among followers and ideological elites, or are we to expect differences between lived 
and intellectual ideology (Billig et al., 1988; Converse, 1964; Mannheim, 1960)? All these issues 
derive from a single source: an unarticulated notion of monism-pluralism which evades 
specification and measurement. 
Finally, the value pluralism model and value conflict theory are somewhat at odds with each 
other. The general theory argues that cognitive style is variable within the individual as it is 
determined by different levels of value conflict aroused by various issues. In contrast, the value 
pluralism model suggests that ideologies may be classified as monistic or pluralistic. If individuals 
are variable, however, how is it possible to classify ideologies as monistic and pluralistic? Surely 
any ideological group will reflect the variability of its individual group members. In sum, Tetlock 
allows a personality-based conception to slip in through the back door by classifying individuals 
according to their ideological orientation and assuming that they reflect the monism-pluralism of 
their ideological group. 
The full set of theoretical ambiguities discussed above reflects a strain between the particular and 
universal strands of Tetlock's theory. By arguing for individual variability, Tetlock is clearly 
opening the way for an anti-universalistic account of cognitive style, sensitive to content 
influences. However, universal assumptions enter the theory at a number of sites. First, Tetlock 
uses Abelson's (1959) congruity theory without taking cognisance of the criticisms directed at its 
universal aspirations. Individuals, Billig (1982, chap. 7; 1987) argues, do not always strive to 
resolve belief dilemmas, but may be unaware of, ignore, dismiss, or sometimes even invoke 
incongruity. Second, although Tetlock recognises cross-content variability in cognitive style, he 
ignores the impact of context. This slant stems from adopting a Rokeachian conception of 
"terminal" values, and will be discussed in detail later. Third, he treats monism-pluralism as a 
property of ideological groups without specifying possibilities for change over time or within 
group differences. This is related to the final, and most serious universal thread of his theory. 
He allows the ontology of the mind-in-general to slip in through a back door by focusing on 
individual differences in monism-pluralism as determined by ideological orientation. 
These ambiguities do not originate in the tension between political critique and theoretical 
universalism which has plagued earlier theorizing. Tetlock is distinctly and self-consciously 
apolitical. He escapes the conundrum by disregarding a politicized psychology in favour of a 
"value-neutral value pluralism theory which simply attempts to explain the functional relationship 
between value conflict and cognitive coping responses" (Tetlock, 1994, p. 524). This value-
neutral approach sits well with a recognition of individual variability in cognitive style since there 
Theoretical perspectives 52 
no longer exist grounds by which to label some individuals (or ideologies) less rational than 
others. Tetlock (1994; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock et al., 1993) argues that both simple 
and complex cognitive styles may be functional in different contexts. Thus, the only critical 
potential Tetlock may muster is to identify non-functional or inappropriate situational responses. 
Why then, does Tetlock revert to personality theory and individual differences when his 
recognition of variability favours an a-political science? The problem with a particularist approach 
to theory is that it simply does not constitute "science". If everyone is variable, not only is it 
impossible to derive predictions about the irrationality of their ideological orientation, but, for 
an individualistic science, it is impossible to derive predictions about anything. In other words, 
particularism cannot sustain the empiricist science to which Tetlock is committed. To achieve its 
goals of causal explanation (Hempel, 1965), an empiricist science requires a stable, atomistic 
ontology from which to base its predictions (Bhaskar, 1989b). Thus, despite arguing for 
individual variability in cognitive style, Tetlock later attempts to identify the personality correlates 
of cognitive complexity, and sketch "the types of people who are prone to integratively simple 
versus complex ways" (Tetlock et al., 1993, p. 501). While this is a far cry from the notion that 
cognitive complexity continually varies as we think about different issues, it is "science", able 
to explain both the functional and dysfunctional situational behaviour patterns of integratively 
simple and complex individuals. 
Despite the thoroughgoing ambiguities in his theory and his regress to the ontology of the mind-
in-general, Tetlock's theorizing offers some significant developments over the earlier work. Most 
importantly, he recognises individual variability in cognitive style. This informs the manner in 
which he measures cognitive complexity: as a feature of actual discourse rather than a reified 
property of individual psychology. He thus provides theoretical and methodological alternatives 
to a personality-based approach to cognitive style. However, these insights are compromised by 
Tetlock's continued support for an empiricist psychology and its attendant theoretical 
universalism. 
Conclusion: Against Universalism 
At this stage, all I would like to do is reaffli'Ill Samelson's conclusion that the authoritarianism 
literature does not instill confidence in the postulate of a linear growth of scientific knowledge. 
The theory has changed in relation to shifting historico-political circumstances. Where Adorno 
et al. (1950) unearthed irrational cognitive styles on the Right, with the growing threat of 
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communism fostered by the Cold War, Shils, Eysenck, and Rokeach sought cognitive irrationality 
in the political extremes, both Left and Right. As the Cold War was drawing to a close, the 
1980's witnessed a significant change in theory. An overriding concern with the critique of any 
particular ideological constellation is not to be found in the work of Sidanius and Tetlock. 
Research had become marked by "value-free empirical data-crunching" (Samelson, 1993) and a 
"political-controversy-avoiding bias" (Etheredge, 1994}, with irrational individuals or situational 
responses the only possible object of critique. 
What I have attempted to do, is make explicit the conceptual structure underlying theoretical 
change. If theory development has not been linear, approaching truth, neither has it merely been 
historically relative, mirroring changed socio-political conditions. On the contrary, I want to 
argue that the conceptual structure of authoritarianism mediates the gap between historical change 
and theory development (truth). Specifically, the potential for theoretical change is given by the 
mutually compatible and conflicting themes of political critique and theoretical universalism. Only 
when changed historical circumstances demand one value to be bolstered over the other, is it 
possible to re-solve tensions between universalism and political critique and develop new models 
of reality within the bounds of the conceptual structure. In the final chapter I will return to the 
issue of theory development, once sufficient progress has been made for an alternative model of 
theoretical change to be proposed. To conclude this chapter, I consider some reasons why 
theoretical universalism may not be a particularly fruitful avenue to pursue in rethinking cognitive 
style. 
All four theories discussed above have subscribed, to varying extents, to a universalistic account 
of cognitive style. They have endorsed an empiricist ontology of the mind-in-general by 
developing law-like psychological and ideological principles on the basis of individual differences 
in cognitive style. 
This empiricist ontology introduces two psychological assumptions: 1) that psychological laws 
are asocial and ahistorical, and 2) that individual psychological traits are stable and general, 
independent of content and context. These assumptions are linked theoretically to an empiricist 
philosophy of science, and are evident in psychological (scientific) practice. The first originates 
in attempts to establish universal psychological laws, which presume that "mankind is much the 
same at all times and places" (Hume, cited in Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 72). In research practice this 
assumption is evident in synchronic studies which seek the relationship between cognitive style 
and ideological content (cf. Gergen, 1973). The second assumption derives from the manner in 
which (Humean) causality is established. By seeking constant conjunctions at the level of an event 
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- as in a significant correlation between single measures of cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs - studies tend to screen out all possible intra-individual variability across context and 
content. Thus, at the level of the individual, theoretical universalism assumes a stable, atomized, 
and generalized psychology - with the (mistaken) properties of a natural scientific ontology -
from which causal predictions may be established (Bhaskar, 1989a, 1989b). These two 
assumptions imply that cognitive style is a stable property of individual psychology, and that the 
continuum of individual differences in cognitive style is an ahistorical property of human 
psychology in general. 
As has been argued, these two related assumptions of empiricist psychology have resulted in 
thoroughgoing tensions in the authoritarianism literature. On the one hand, the assumption of a 
generalized psychology has allowed researchers to ground political critique by arguing that certain 
ideological beliefs are causally related to irrational cognitive styles. However, the assumed trans-
historical stability of this relationship has proved problematic as belief systems have changed, 
associating different beliefs with cognitive irrationality. Consequently, theorists have approached 
universalism by purging their accounts of all references to specific beliefs. This, in turn, has 
thwarted any attempt at political critique, because any particular set of beliefs could be associated 
with cognitive irrationality. 
In retrospect, it appears as though attempts to ground political cnuque in an empiricist 
psychology have been spurious because the empiricist philosophy of science and its attendant 
ontology, "which promised truth through method and a unification of science", "now lies in 
disarray" (Gergen, preface to Sampson, 1983, p. v). Two levels of trenchant critique have 
brought about this state of affairs. The first concerns the validity of an empiricist ontology. 
Bhaskar (1975, 1986, 1989b) has argued that an empiricist ontology is derivative from its 
epistemology; empiricism defmes being in terms of knowledge. Within the body of theory 
discussed above, this epistemic fallacy - based on Humean causality and representationism -
has fostered a conception of trans-historical, cross-context, and cross-content stability of 
psychological traits. However, on the basis of his transcendental argument (to be discussed later), 
Bhaskar argues that the ontology of the social sciences is characterized by, "social relationship 
dependence of social structures, their praxis- and concept-dependence, and their relatively greater 
material time-space specificity or substantial geo-historicity (1989b, p. 185). 
This sentiment has been echoed by psychologists: 
While classical science demands that everything be studied as if it were matter in motion 
according to an absent God's pre-established laws, persons seem able on occasions to act 




inevitably involves the judgement of other people (Shatter, 1974, p. 218, emphasis in 
original). 
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Similarly, Sampson (1983) has rejected the idea that human psychology functions according to 
universal laws because the "laws" of human behaviour are historical in nature. Humans act on 
conceptions of law, not by law. The essence of these critiques is that a human ontology is 
inherently praxis- and concept-dependent, being social, contextual, historical, and most 
importantly, relational (see also Gergen, 1973; Harre, 1983; Manicas & Secord, 1983). Instead 
of trying to determine universal laws based on the properties of psychology, these critics suggest 
the appropriate object of study is the conception of laws: the socially shared understandings by 
which humans make sense of the world and guide their behaviour (Gergen, 1985; Moscovici, 
1988; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1984, 1993a). 
The discipline of psychology must take seriously this criticism, not as an alternative, but because, 
according to Seve (1975) and others, "homo psychologicus", the natural object of scientific 
psychology, "does not exist" (Bhaskar, 1989a; Billig, 1991; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Starn, 
1992). The mind-in-general is a "fantasized real" (Parker, 1992). Accordingly, the notion of a 
characteristic trait-like cognitive style, rooted either in personality or an ideological group, is 
untenable because human phenomena cannot be regarded as "thing-like" properties. 
The second difficulty with theoretical universalism concerns its moral/political character. If by 
conservatism, one means resistance to change (cf. Wilson, 1973), then psychological theory, 
based on the ontology of the mind-in-general, tends to be conservative in its effects. Lucien Seve 
( 1975) demonstrates the ideological nature of personality theory: 
... the division of labour is not the result of individual differences, but on the contrary, 
individual differences result from the division of labour (p. 27). 
Whereas the latter proposition compels social critique, a negation of the former requires a 
psychology of individual differences. These two ends are mutually exclusive, for by focusing on 
individual differences in political beliefs, "the collectivity is spared complicity" and social 
transformation is thwarted (Sampson, 1977, p. 779; 1981; Henriques, 1984). 
Whatever the immediate political orientation of a personality-based theory of ideological 
irrationality, its broader political effects tend to be conservative. Even though the authors of The 
Authoritarian Personality harboured radical intent, by developing a theory of individual 
differences, they imply that by taking care of the irrational individuals - through a "personal 
and psychological" education - they could facilitate the eradication of prejudice (Horkheimer 
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& Flowerman, 1950). 23 Such reasoning is based on a universalist ontology of an ahistorical 
continuum of individual differences (the mind-in-general), and individualistic conception of social 
structure (Bhaskar, 1989a; Porpora, 1989). However, instead of inducing social change and a 
corresponding shift in the (emergent) kinds of psychology which would develop ( cf. Volosinov, 
1987a), they advocate correcting the irrational elements of the one extreme of the ahistorical 
mind-in-general (cf. Henriques, 1984). 
For very good ontological and critical reasons, it would appear that an empiricist account of 
cognitive style, with its attendant theoretical universalism, needs to be rejected. A number of 
alternatives have recently been opened with the "tum to discourse" and "return of rhetoric" in 
social psychology. These promise to take seriously the relational, praxis- and concept-dependence 
of human ontology, and have offered new methods for studying psychological phenomena (e.g., 
Billig, 1987; Markova & Foppa, 1990; Shotter, 1993a). In addition, some strands of theory 
within this new paradigm have argued for a politically grounded, critical psychology (Parker, 
1992). These alternatives may offer ways of resolving both the ontological and critical difficulties 
which have bedeviled the authoritarianism literature. It is toward such an account of cognitive 
style that the present thesis aims to contribute. 
However, before embarking on this substantive task, it is essential first to explore the necessity 
for an anti-universalistic account of cognitive style. It is necessary to examine the empirical (as 
opposed to theoretical) validity of the universalistic ontology of the mind-in-general. The 
argument presented here has rested on theoretical claims that the psychological ontology is 
fantasized, and ultimately false. However, psychologists have argued that cognitive traits "seem 
to have much better temporal and cross-situational stability and influence than most social traits" 
(Mischel, 1973, p. 267; 1968, 1979). Such claims suggest that, for all intents an purposes, a 
universal ontology is appropriate for the study of cognitive style. Thus, before progressing 
toward an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive style, it is first necessary to explore the 
empirical requirement for such an approach. 
23 To be fair to Horkheimer and Adorno, both of whom have argued for a society established on "objective 
reason" (Horkheimer, 1947; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944), it must be remembered that 11ze Authoritarian 
Personality was tempered for an American audience (cf. Jay, 1973). Nonetheless, a latent individualism 
is evident in their philosophy which decentred the role of the proletariat, resulting in the loss of any 











Measurement and theory of intolerance of 
ambiguity 
... the visible [is] already enriched and saturated with all the complexity of thought and cognition. 
(Bakhtin, 1986) 
The hypothetico-deductive model of science is sustained by a Popperian account of scientific 
advance: Progress occurs, "especially when we are disappointed in our expectations ... as a result 
of a clash between our theories and our observations" (Popper, 1963, p. 222). Since knowledge 
must pass through the "fires of logical and empirical testing", falsification ensures that science 
will advance toward truth (Kimble, 1989, p. 498). However, by recognising the theory-bound 
nature of observation, post-positivist philosophy of science has seriously questioned the degree 
to which observation may guide theory to truth (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Rorty, 1979). 
Theory is insulated from crucial test, for "the scientist seems rather to be struggling with facts, 
trying to force them into conformity with a theory he (sic) does not doubt" (Kuhn, 1977, p. 193). 
According to Bhaskar (1986, 1989b), scientists need not even force facts into theory, since the 
ideology of empiricism ensures that the facts which emerge from scientific investigations 
(re)produce an empiricist ontology, and ensures that theory does not exceed certain bounds. The 
problem is that empiricism "tacitly or explicitly" defmes reality "in terms of some specific human 
attribute, such as sense-experience" (Bhaskar, 1989b, p. vii). Ontology and epistemology are thus 
bound in a circular relationship which ensures that only certain theories can be sustained, 
regardless of falsification. Ironically, this means that, rather than functioning to advance scientific 
progress, observation may hinder scientific development/change. This occurs, especially when 
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there has been a "fixation of the position from which states of affairs are to be viewed" 
(Rommerveit, 1990, p. 94). Bhaskar therefore seeks to "reclaim reality". He adopts the role of 
a philosophical underlabourer, and assumes the Lockian project of "removing some of the rubbish 
that lies in the way to knowledge" (Lock cited in Bhaskar, 1989b, p. vii). This chapter assumes 
a similar task: to clear the ground so that it is possible to evaluate claims within psychology that 
"cognitive style is most consistent". 
One problem with the empiricist model is that very often our conception of the world and our 
measurement of it mirror each other to the point that we become entrapped in what Danziger 
(1985) has called the "methodological circle". Methodology is not ontologically neutral, but 
"limits the kind of reality that can be represented in the products of scientific investigation" 
(Danziger, 1992, p. 310). This point is quite obvious; any procedure which is employed for 
observation (e.g., a race attitude scale), is finite (e.g., 10-item) and screens out much of what 
could be measured. Less obvious, though, is that measuring racism itself assumes that racism is 
quantifiable, can be recorded on an interval measurement scale, and subjected to parametric 
statistical tests ( cf. Danziger, 1985). 
Danziger's general argument has undesirable implications for psychology because, firstly, an 
empiricist methodology/technology has been institutionalized; and secondly, by defining reality 
in terms of sense experience, psychological phenomena have been defmed in terms of the 
measurement technologies by which they are observed. 1 Consequently, rather than observation 
guiding theory to truth, methodological orthodoxy (therefore "methodolatry") has limited the kind 
of ontology available for study. Reality has been institutionalized. Danziger (1985, 1990, 1992) 
thus reiterates Bhaskar's critique of empiricism, and argues that any fundamental change in 
theory would require a fundamental change in methodology: a change which would release 
psychological phenomena from their empiricist form. 
The methodological circle is evident in the literature under consideration. Consider the way in 
which measurement has incorporated ontological assumptions concerning the nature of cognitive 
style. Allport (1954), for example, defmes cognitive style in universalistic terms, as a property 
of individual psychology: "the style of thinking that is characteristic of prejudice, is a reflection 
by and large of the prejudiced persons way of thinking about anything" (p. 377). Cognitive style 
is theorized as a stable individual trait which is generalized over content and context. Prejudice 
1 Since empiricism defines being in terms of knowledge (i.e., commits the epistemic fallacy), Danziger's 
critique, like Bhaskar's, is aimed at the ontic fallacy- the ontologization of knowledge. 
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is argued to be only one manifestation of the deeper underlying "way of thinking about anything" . 
Rather than being tested by research, these ontological assumptions have been built into measures 
of cognitive style. Rokeach (1956b), for instance, set about devising a measure of cognitive style 
which could be used to test Allport's theory. By the process of an "emptying operation", Rokeach 
developed a measure which could be applied to "thinking about anything". The stability and 
generality of cognitive style which Allport theorizes is thus incorporated into Rokeach's 
measurement instrument. By seeking individual differences in dogmatism and assigning each 
individual a single score to represent their characteristic cognitive style, measurement assumes 
cognitive traits to be stable properties of individual psychology. 
Regardless of the outcome of any particular study which fmds that prejudice is related to or 
unrelated to cognitive style, the underlying ontology upon which conceptions of cognitive style 
rest is never brought into question. That cognitive style is a stable property of individual 
psychology remain axiomatic. Thus, although we may become disappointed in our expectations, 
as Popper suggests, we don't necessarily become disillusioned about our reality. This is why the 
discipline could for years continue producing knowledge claims about an object which has 
recently been argued to be "fantasized" and "ultimately false" (Parker, 1992; Starn, 1990). 
Moreover, it is for this reason that a Bhaskaresque underlabouring is required to reclaim reality. 
The assumption of individual stability and consistency in cognitive style is evident in the 
personality-based conceptions of cognitive style discussed in the previous chapter. The research 
undertaken to test these theories has embodied a theory of its own: by assigning a single score 
of cognitive style to each subject in order to denote his or her position along a continuum of 
personality types, such methodology assumes individual consistency. Since this thesis aims toward 
an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive style, it would be inappropriate to follow the 
conventional practice of reviewing all studies which have sought to confirm one or other of the 
theories discussed in the previous chapter. It is first necessary to establish whether cognitive style 
can be measured as a generalized trait. 
We are, however, immediately confronted with a difficulty. The stability and generality of 
cognitive style is an empirical matter which must be evaluated by observation. However, 
following Danziger, it is necessity to be suspicious of possible ontological presuppositions built 
into measurement techniques. The chapter deals with this dilemma by first making explicit some 
of the ontological assumptions which have been embodied by measures of cognitive style. This 
is done by tracing the development of the construct of intolerance of ambiguity from its original 
formulation, and documenting the manner in which ontological assumptions have been 
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incorporated into different measurement procedures. This provides a platform from which to 
evaluate the different measurement procedures and reach a decision regarding the generality of 
intolerance of ambiguity. The review concludes that the available data does not warrant a firm 
verdict, and all evidence of individual variability has been assimilated by interactionist models 
of personality, leaving the trait thesis intact. Thus, the case of the generality of intolerance of 
ambiguity remains open. Finally, the chapter introduces an anti-universalistic conception of 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity which manages to bypass some of the empiricist assumptions 
which have bedeviled the literature. 
Before embarking on this long, and at times tedious, detour, the chapter begins with a broader 
discussion of theoretical conceptions of cognitive style and intolerance of ambiguity. This 
discussion serves to introduce the theoretical understandings which have informed different 
measurement practices. 
Cognitive style and intolerance of ambiguity 
Cognitive style 
Different conceptions of cognitive style have been applied to a wide diversity of psychological 
" issues, including cognitive dissonance and attitude change (Harvey, 1963b), intelligence (Lee, 
1991), field dependence (Witkin et al., 1962), stress (Suedfeld, 1979), creativity (Barron, 1953), 
innovation (Kirton, 1985), and political decision making (Tetlock, 1979; Suedfeld & Rank, 
1976). The different conceptions of cognitive style have included tolerance-intolerance of 
ambiguity (Adorno et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), rigidity-flexibility (Rokeach, 1948), 
concreteness-abstractness (Lee, 1991; O'Connor, 1952; Rokeach, 195la), complexity-simplicity 
(MacNeil, 1974; Sidanius, 1984, 1985; Tetlock, 1983a, 1984), and a number of dimensions of 
cognitive structure (Scott, 1963, 1969; Scott, Osgood & Peterson, 1979). Sometimes these 
constructs are used interchangeably, but often rigid distinctions are drawn between them. 
The diversity of application and the variety of constructs frustrate attempts to treat the literature 
as a unitary field of study. Two general orientations can, however, be identified which have 
prevailed over two historical periods. Early studies of rigidity (Kounin, 1941; Lewin, 1935; 
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cognitive style a feature of mental pathology, feeble-mindedness, and schizophrenia. Although 
the generality of cognitive traits was debated ( cf. Kounin, 1941 ; Werner, 1946), they were 
commonly viewed as constitutional or as induced by organic pathology; they were associated with 
the "capacity level of the total personality" (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941, p. 1). Since this 
capacity level was related to psychopathology and madness, "normal" individuals were introduced 
into research designs only as comparison groups. The historical break occurs with the work of 
Rokeach (1948) and Frenkel-Brunswik (1948a, 1948b, 1949), who for the first time treated 
cognitive style as a theoretical construct relevant to "normal" populations. 
While this early work is not directly relevant to the present discussion, the assumption of the 
generality of cognitive style as well as its associated irrationality has influenced later 
conceptualization and measurement. Rigid and concrete cognitive styles have continued to be 
associated with irrationality, manifest not by absurd behaviour within the mental institution, but 
in prejudiced beliefs, "rigid categorizations", and other "faulty generalizations" (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1948a, 1948b, 1949). Also, a medical model has been inherited, where non-functional 
cognitive styles have been associated with psychopathology- intolerance of ambiguity was seen 
as a attribute of a "compulsive character" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). 
Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) landmark paper identified two different theoretical understandings of 
cognitive style. The first approach originated in the traditions of Gestalt psychology and the 
psychology of cognition, and aimed to specify the "whole" character of the individual as reflected 
in typical ways of perception (e.g., Jaensch, 1938). In addition to theorizing the manner in which 
characteristic modes of perception reflected pervasive properties of cognition, a branch of this 
"perception-centred" approach also attempted to specify situational determinants (e.g., fear and 
conformity) of cognitive style (e.g., Murray, 1933). The second approach was strongly 
influenced by personality theory and was less concerned with situational determinants. While both 
orientations treated cognitive traits as relatively enduring characteristics of the individual, 
perception-centred theorists viewed these traits as "constitutional", and regarded them as "factors 
in the brain field" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 122). In contrast, personality-centred theorists 
argued that cognitive traits originated in emotional life and underlying psychological motivation. 
Frenkel-Brunswik (1948a, 1948b, 1949, 1951; Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford, 1945) promoted the 
personality-centred approach, and was responsible for integrating the fmdings of the two schools 
into a coherent theoretical framework. She used Fenichel' s ( 1945) concept of "emotional 
ambivalence" to explain the trait-like nature of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. A deep-
seated "love- and hate-cathexis toward the same object" was manifest in the inability to "face 
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ambivalences toward others", and a generalized tendency toward emotional, perceptual, and 
cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 115; 1951). Prejudice 
and its wide range of perceptual and cognitive correlates were seen as surface manifestations of 
the "ego defences" (Freud, 1937) by which authoritarians screened out threatening emotional 
ambivalence. Underlying emotional ambivalence was thus manifest as an absence of ambivalence 
-i.e., intolerance of ambiguity. 
Although Frenkel-Brunswik was instrumental in theorizing the trait-like conception cognitive 
style, psychodynamic theory could accommodate individual variability. By proposing a 
psychodynamic typology of individual differences, Freud (1931) had established a foundation for 
conceptualizing cognitive style as a generalized personality trait. He argued that psychodynamic 
development produced distinct libidinal types, one of which was characterized by emotional 
ambivalence and ego-weakness which originated in conflict between id and superego impulses. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to this rather atypical paper, Freudian theory is renown for respecting 
psychic contents when interpreting and explaining overt stylistic pathology (Fenichel, 1945). 
Unlike earlier theories of psychopathology which treated content as an epiphenomenon (Hamilton, 
1974; eg., Kraepelin, 1919), Freud stressed a dynamic relation between the content of psychic 
conflict and associated stylistic defences; psychodynamic defences were seen to be activated only 
in the presence of threatening situations and cognitive contents. Thus, although Frenkel-Brunswik 
chose to theorize a trait-like conception of intolerance of ambiguity, she recognised possible 
individual variability, and consequently stressed the importance of empirical studies which 
investigated the generality of these traits. 
A second conception of cognitive style has developed relatively independently of the 
psychodynamic model, and has informed the work of Sidanius and Tetlock. This cognitive-
centred orientation dismisses the concept of emotional ambivalence, divests cognitive style of any 
reference to motivation, and theorizes cognitive style independently of cognitive content. This 
approach has its roots in the early perception-centred theory, and it views cognitive traits as 
pervasive features of an individual's constitution. Cognitive style is considered a formal, 
structural property of cognition which underlies all information processing (Harvey, 1963a; 
Harvey, Hunt & Schroder, 1961; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967; Streufert & Streufert, 
1978; Scott, 1963, 1969; Scott, Osgood & Peterson, 1979). Consequently, individual stability 
has largely been assumed by this school, and only by the late 1960's was possible variability 
recognised. 
Cognitive-centred theory offers a phenomenological account of cognition which owes its 
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intellectual heritage to Lewin's (1935, 1936) field theory, Kelly's (1955) theory of personal 
constructs, and incongruity and dissonance theories (Festinger, 1957; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 
1955). The self is theorized in terms of a duality: 1) as a conceptual system of meanings, 
contents, and beliefs, which 2) possesses a variety of learned structural properties such as 
concreteness-abstractness and complexity-simplicity. The metaphors used to describe the second 
component of the self are telling. By separating cognitive contents from style/structure, and 
suggesting that cognitive style shapes the processing of diverse information (meaningful contents) 
much like DOS allows the processing of different data (Stone, 1971), cognitive style is viewed 
as a formal, stable, and generalized property of individual psychology. Cognitive structure acts 
as a "filtering system" which develops independently of the emotive drives and beliefs of the 
individual (Harvey, 1963b; Hunt, 1963b, 1971; Schroder et al., 1967). 
According to this theory, cognitive style is a learned variable which develops through experience, 
training, or conditioning (Harvey & Schroder, 1963), and which is unrelated to emotional 
development (Suedfeld, 1971). Harvey et al. (1961; Harvey & Schroder, 1963; Schroder, 1971) 
proposed a four stage model of cognitive style development which endows the individual with 
stable "dispositional organizational tendencies" of cognition (Schroder, 1971, p. 268). According 
to this model, stylistic cognitive traits are derived from cognitive development which attains a 
particular level through a process of "arrestation" (Harvey et al., 1961; Schroder, 1971). Unlike 
personality-centred theory, this account cannot establish a necessary relationship between the style 
and content of cognition because the psychodynamic motivational links are disregarded. 
By theorizing an independence between the style and content of cognition, the cognitive-centred 
orientation proposes a universalistic conceptualization of cognitive style. As DOS provides an 
environment which may process a variety of software, cognitive style is a pervasive feature of 
individual psychology which structures any belief which the individual may entertain. Cognitive 
style, much like the construct of intelligence, is viewed as a formal property of individual 
psychology (in the brain field) which has attained arrestation at a certain level. This implies a 
generalized cognitive style since all the various contents which an individual encounters are 
processed by the same structure. 
Despite the important theoretical differences which exist between the cognitive-centred and 
personality-centred approaches to cognitive style, they are similar in many respects. 
Descriptively, researchers in the two schools frequently refer to the same cognitive traits (e.g., 
concrete thinking). Where they refer to different traits, these are often logically compatible. 
Intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive complexity, for example, both entail the use of a few, 
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broad, rigidly defmed cognitive categories. Additionally, the bipolar cognitive traits have similar 
evaluative connotations. Rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, and cognitive simplicity are all 
viewed as relatively non-functional in comparison with their opposites. Finally, both orientations 
originate from a similar history in psychology, and are unified in their metatheoretical alignment. 
Both have been defmed in opposition to behaviourist psychology, and promote a S-0-R model 
of the relation between environmental stimuli (S) and behavioral response (R). Non-functional 
irrationality stems from psychological properties (0), and is manifest in the disjunction between 
external and internal reality. Whereas Frenkel-Brunswik explains the disjunction in terms of 
psychodynamic defences, cognitive-centred theorists explain it in terms of structural resistance 
to cognitive change (i.e., "resistance to accommodation"). 
Although most of the recent research has been concerned with constructs derived from the 
cognitive-centred, learning perspective, the present review will focus on intolerance of ambiguity, 
a construct associated with psychodynamic formulations of cognitive style. The reasons are 
twofold: first, on purely practical grounds, the cognitive style literature is too large to be 
considered in any detail in a single chapter; second, intolerance of ambiguity is a construct with 
potential to negotiate a way out of the universalistic conceptions of cognitive style. Unlike the 
traits of information processing, intolerance of ambiguity is not a formal property of individual 
cognition. Originally, the concept was necessarily associated with particular, emotionally 
threatening contents. As such, the assumption of generality is not as firmly tied to intolerance of 
ambiguity. 
Intolerance of ambiguity 
Intolerance of ambiguity is a concept that has been widely used by social psychologists for over 
40 years, but whose meaning remains unclear. Originally coined by Frenkel-Brunswik (1948a, 
1948b, 1949, 1951, 1954), intolerance of ambiguity was seen as "one of the basic variables in 
both the emotional and the cognitive orientation of a person toward life" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1949. p. 113). Not only did intolerance of ambiguity impact on the perceptual, emotional, and 
cognitive aspects of individual functioning, but it was seen as relevant to the individual's 
orientation toward life. The construct was associated with personal and social identity as well as 
political beliefs. 
Being a concept which straddles such a wide range of individual and social functioning, 
intolerance of ambiguity has been notoriously difficult to defme (cf. Altemeyer, 1981; Chown, 
Measurement and theory 65 
1959; Millon, 1957). Researchers have typically seized upon and operationalized one or another 
of the criteria outlined by Frenkel-Brunswik, correlated this with some criterion, and proclaimed 
to have verified or falsified the idea that intolerance of ambiguity is basic to an individual's 
orientation toward life. It is not surprising, therefore, that a multitude of contradictory fmdings 
have been generated, and that, much like the theory of authoritarianism, researchers have wearied 
themselves and have eventually forsaken the concept of intolerance of ambiguity altogether. Thus, 
the conclusion today remains the same as that reached by the last major conceptual analysis of 
the construct: "Frenkel-Brunswik's theory of intolerance of ambiguity has never been adequately 
put to the test" (Bochner, 1965, p. 400). 
In an attempt to rectify this situation, Bochner (1965) outlined the full set of primary defming 
characteristics of intolerance of ambiguity. These included: (a) rigid dichotomizing into fixed 
categories - "need for categorization", (b) seeking for certainty and avoiding ambiguity -
"need for certainty", (c) inability to allow for the co-existence of positive and negative features 
in the same object, such as good and bad traits in the same person, (d) acceptance of attitude 
statements representing a rigid white-black view of life, (e) a preference for the familiar over the 
unfamiliar, (f) a positive rejecting of the different or unusual, (g) resistance to reversal of 
apparent fluctuating stimuli, (h) the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a 
perceptually ambiguous situation, and (i) premature closure. 
Bochner's critique berated the logical errors in the operational definitions of intolerance of 
ambiguity and the poor psychometric properties of these measures. He found examples of logical 
errors in test construction in the work of Hamilton (1957) and Draguns and Multari (1961). 
These studies had operationalized intolerance of ambiguity by assessing subjects' reactions to 
ambiguous stimuli. Hamilton (1957), for example, presented subjects with a series of 12 drawings 
which differed in ambiguity. Three were clearly cars, three were clearly houses, and three were 
indefinite, containing features of both houses and cars. Subjects were required to sort the pictures 
into three categories: (a) house, (b) car, (c) either house or car (i.e., can't decide). Intolerance 
of ambiguity was indexed by the number of responses in the "can't decide" category, with fewer 
items in this category indicating greater intolerance of ambiguity. Bochner objected to this 
definition since it satisfied some of the nine defming characteristics of intolerance of ambiguity, 
but contradicted others. Fewer "can't decide" responses suggested a need for closure and 
categorization and was thus consistent with the characteristics (a), (h), and (i) above. It however 
contradicted (b), the need for certainty, which would require more "can't decide" responses from 
individuals who would not commit themselves to a position unless absolutely certain. In addition 
to these logical errors, Bochner (1965) criticized the poor psychometric properties of these 
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measures. Many of the tests had "markedly skewed distributions and distorted means", properties 
which do not satisfy Pearsonian assumptions, and which "bias the results towards obtaining 
insignificant (sic) correlation coefficients" (Bochner, 1965, pp. 396-397). 
Bochner's critique is legitimate, and other measures of cognitive style have also been criticised 
for their logically incompatible definitions (Neuman, 1981), and for their poor psychometric 
properties (Christie, 1993). However, the most fundamental confusion has arisen due to 
misinterpreting the nature of Frenkel-Brunswik's research programme, and not her definition of 
intolerance of ambiguity. In another context, Hopf (1993) points out that Frenkel-Brunswik's 
research: 
... must be pictured as a combination of theoretically guided research and exploratory, 
descriptive analysis ... [which] served to verify previous hypotheses and to develop new 
ones (p. 123). 
Hopf continues by suggesting that Hyman & Sheatsley's (1954) celebrated critique of The 
Authoritarian Personality "misses the point" of the exploratory nature of the study (see also 
Samelson, 1993, p. 35). Bochner (1965) also misses this point, and as a result, instead of 
clarifying intolerance of ambiguity, he contributes to the fundamental sources of conceptual and 
theoretical confusion. 
This confusion is evident in his nine defining characteristics of intolerance of ambiguity. All nine 
are treated as having equal theoretical and empirical status; however, some were derived from 
the exploratory and descriptive prong of Frenkel-Brunswik's research programme, while others 
were developed to test theory in a more deductive manner. Frenkel-Brunswik (1948b) derived 
the primary defining characteristics of intolerance of ambiguity from theoretically guided 
comparison (description) of prejudiced and non-prejudiced children. By means of clinical 
interviews with 120 "extremely prejudiced and unprejudiced" children (selected from a sample 
of 1500) and their parents she established that some subjects were able to tolerate emotional 
ambiguities better than others. These emotional ambiguities were revealed in the manner in which 
the subjects spoke about their parents, authorities, and values. Intolerance of ambiguity was 
argued to be a central characteristic of prejudiced talk, and was defmed in terms of "attitudinal 
variables", concerning: 
... the recognition. by one and the same individual, of any actual coexistence of positive 
and negative features in the same object (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 115). 
Originally, therefore, intolerance of ambiguity was seen as an evaluative attitudinal variable, 
manifest in the level of ambivalence which subjects displayed in their talk about social "objects". 
Individuals who were classified as rigid and intolerant of ambiguity evaluated "middle-class 
values, parents, outgroups, and people in general" either by "total acceptance" or "total rejection" 
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rather than displaying "a conscious coexistence of acceptance or rejection" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1951, p. 395). 
Intolerance of ambiguity was primarily an emotive variable which was related to underlying 
psychodynamic conflict, and which was manifest in the evaluative-cognitive phenomena of "total 
acceptance" or "total rejection". It was a Manichean orientation which was identified in an 
individual's conception of values, social groups, authorities, and other people. It certainly was 
associated with a cognitive style which was predisposed to a black-white categorization of good 
and bad traits. However, the original description (definition) of intolerance of ambiguity referred 
not to "objects", "solutions", and "stimuli" as Bochner reports, but to values, groups and 
authorities. Moreover, evaluation was central to Frenkel-Brunswik's definition. Bochner, 
however, includes among his nine primary characteristics such non-evaluative criteria as (g) 
resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli and (h) the early selection and maintenance 
of one solution in a perceptually ambiguous situation. 
It is not difficult to trace the origin of these asocial and non-evaluative definitions of intolerance 
of ambiguity. They were derived from the deductive aspects of Frenkel-Brunswik's research 
programme, and from other research which attempted to test her theory. Frenkel-Brunswik 
theorized that the social manifestations of intolerance of ambiguity originated in a generalized 
personality trait. Consequently, her "prime concern" was to: 
... study the generality or lack of generality of the personality patterns involved, that is, 
the readiness to spread from one area of manifestation to another (Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1949, p. 112). 
In order to achieve this objective, the "attitudinal variable" had to be translated into 
operationalizable constructs relevant to diverse realms of individual functioning. Since intolerance 
of ambiguity had been identified as a social and evaluative phenomenon characteristic of 
ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, the obvious way to examine its generalizability was to 
construct asocial and non-evaluative measures and to test whether these were associated with the 
social and evaluative expressions of intolerance of ambiguity. These measures typically included 
Gestalt fluctuating stimuli (Jones, 1955), and solutions to ambiguous arithmetic problems 
(Rokeach, 1948). Unfortunately, since researchers had not distinguished sharply enough between 
the descriptive and deductive aspects of Frenkel-Brunswik's research programme, these asocial 
and non-evaluative defmitions of intolerance of ambiguity gradually became accepted as the 
defming characteristics. 
This is clear from Bochner's ( 1965) own definition of intolerance of ambiguity. Bochner collected 
39 "rocks" of varied size, angularity, porosity, colour, and texture from Waikiki beach. He then 
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asked subjects to put the rocks into "as many or as few categories as [they] thought necessary" 
(p. 398). Intolerance of ambiguity was indexed by the use of more categories and longer 
categorization time. What relationship does this asocial and non-evaluative task have with 
ethnocentrism? Bochner does not say. More telling, however, is the fact that ethnocentric 
individuals, and those intolerant of ambiguity, derived their certainty from dichotomous 
categorizations into good and bad (ingroup and outgroup), and not from employing numerous 
categories (Adorno et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949).2 Thus, rather than clarifying the 
definition of intolerance of ambiguity, Bochner ( 1965) has contributed to the ambiguity of the 
construct. This resulted from confusing the descriptive and deductive aspects of Frenkel-
Brunswik's work, thereby assuming intolerance of ambiguity to be a generalized individual trait 
(from ethnocentrism to rock classification), and consequently defining the construct in an asocial 
and non-evaluative manner. 
Here we stumble upon the methodological circle. As discussed in the previous chapter, in 
attempting to construct universal theories of the relationship between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs, theorists gravitated toward splitting the style of cognition from cognitive 
content. Similarly, to investigate the generalized nature of intolerance of ambiguity, researchers 
appropriated the concept in an asocial and non-evaluative manner, divorced it of content, and 
treated intolerance of ambiguity as a formal property of individual functioning. Both the theory 
and the measures employed to test it assume a universalistic ontology. Intolerance of ambiguity 
was reduced to a formal individual property which can be conceptualized and measured 
independently of emotions, social context. and cognitive content. Intolerance of ambiguity was 
assumed to be a pervasive property of individual functioning that influenced not only the 
evaluation of social groups, values and authorities, but also cognitive operations with rocks and 
arithmetic tasks. Frenkel-Brunswik never conceptualized intolerance of ambiguity in such a 
manner. Her "prime concern" was to investigate its generality. 
Generalized intolerance of ambiguity? 
Most of the research which has investigated the generality of intolerance of ambiguity has 
employed asocial and non-evaluative measures. These studies have taken two forms. A first group 
2 A further methodological problem with Bochner's study is that the number of categories employed and 
the time taken to categorize are dependent upon each other. Therefore, besides a generalized personality 
trait linking the two indices of intolerance of ambiguity, a positive correlation is expected, since those who 
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of researchers has assumed ethnocentrism and authoritarianism to be social manifestations of the 
personality trait of intolerance of ambiguity, and have sought associations between these measures 
and other asocial and non-evaluative expressions. A second group has examined the association 
between different operational measures of the more personal expressions of intolerance of 
ambiguity. The former approach will be reviewed first. The discussion will be structured 
according to the manner in which intolerance of ambiguity has been measured. Intolerance of 
ambiguity has been operationalized by (a) gauging reactions to ambiguous stimuli, (b) scaling 
procedures, and (c) assessing evaluative categorization. Finally, studies which have sought 
correlations between these three operational techniques will be discussed. 
Reactions to ambiguous stimuli 
Intolerance of ambiguity has been associated with performance at ambiguous tasks and liking of 
ambiguous situations. Accordingly, many studies, like that of Bochner (1965), have measured 
the trait by gauging individual reactions to ambiguous stimuli. This experimental paradigm was 
instituted by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), as part of her deductive empirical programme. She 
commenced with the question: "are those incapable of conflicting emotions- or of conflicting 
value judgements - generally incapable of seeing things in two or more different ways?" (p. 
120). To answer this question, she divided her subjects according to their manifest ethnocentrism 
- their "tendency to dichotomize in the social field on the basis of external characteristics" (p. 
123) - and then assessed their performance on a number of tasks, "free from emotional and 
social content" (p. 126). She presented the subjects with a series of pictures which started with 
a dog, but which gradually transformed into a cat. Subjects were asked to identify each of the 
pictures. Although Frenkel-Brunswik did not report inferential statistics (or sample size), she 
found that the prejudiced group "were reluctant to give up the original object about which they 
had felt relatively certain" (p. 128). She concluded that these and other similar fmdings suggested 
that intolerance of ambiguity was a generalized personality trait, related to a need for certainty. 
The trait could be traced from its social and evaluative manifestations to other asocial and non-
evaluative performance. 
A number of different techniques have been employed to assess intolerance of ambiguity by 
gauging reactions to ambiguous stimuli. Three of these have been most commonly pursued. The 
Rorschach test and the autokinetic illusion, like Frenkel-Brunswik's cat-to-dog test, have been 
used to evaluate performance at ambiguous perceptual tasks. The Azzageddi test records both 
performance at, and liking of ambiguous auditory stimuli. 
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Eriksen & Eisenetein (1953) presented 33 "randomly selected undergraduate students" with 50 
Rorschach concepts which were selected so as to represent all Rorschach scoring categories. The 
experimental procedure consisted of pointing out various Rorschach concepts, and asking: "Could 
this be a __ ?". Intolerance of ambiguity was indexed by the number of 'no' responses offered 
by subjects. These responses were argued to reflect a need for certainty in the face of ambiguity. 
Intolerance of ambiguity was found to be unrelated to ethnic prejudice as measured by a modified 
version of the California E scale (r = .19, N = 33). 
The Azzageddi test is comprised of auditory stimuli which take the form of passages of spoken 
communication containing meaningful and coherent statements which are intermingled to form 
contradictory and irreconcilable statements and ideas, much like a schizophrenic 'word-salad'. 
After listening to each of eight such passages, subjects are required to recall as many statements 
as possible. The total number of statements out of a possible 112 which are recalled correctly 
acted as a criterion of tolerance of ambiguity. In addition, subjects are required to rate, on six-
point scales, (a) the degree of ambiguity present in the passages, and (b) their personal liking or 
disliking of the passages. Davids and Eriksen (1957) used a sample of 48 naval cadets to examine 
the relationship between the Azzageddi test and the 30-item California F scale. They found 
nonsignificant associations (a = .10) between the F scale and the number of statements recalled 
(r = -.10), the liking of the passages (x2 = 1.02), and the degree of perceived ambiguity (x2 = 
.87). 
These negative findings echoed the results of two earlier studies performed by Davids. Using 20 
male undergraduates, Davids (1955) found the F scale to correlate non-significantly (a = .10) 
with the Rorschach test (r = .10) and with recall on the Azzageddi test (r = -.01). 
Authoritarianism was also unrelated to liking of the ambiguous passages (x2 = . 81) and their 
rated ambiguity (x2 = 0). In order to explain these fmdings- which contradicted the predictions 
of Adorno et al. (1950)- Davids (1956) replicated the study with sample of 22 undergraduates 
which were "well-matched" with the earlier sample. In this instance, though, the study was 
performed under "ego-involving" conditions. Here, Davids was drawing on Brown's (1953; also 
Christie, 1993) (psychodynamic) hypothesis that the relationship between authoritarianism and 
cognitive style is conditional on ego-involvement. To achieve ego-involvement, Davids 
interviewed subjects individually under the guise of selecting suitable candidates as prospective 
employees. The interviews were conducted in the psychologist's office and a "formal and serious 
attitude" was maintained throughout. In contrast to Brown's hypothesis, authoritarianism was not 
significantly (a = .10) associated with the Rorschach test (r = .30) or with recall to the 
Azzageddi test (r = . 1 0). Once again, authoritarianism was unrelated to liking of the ambiguous 
Measurement and theory 71 
passages (x2 = . 7 4) or their rated ambiguity (x2 = . 19). Although the stronger associations under 
ego-involving conditions were suggestive, Davids concluded that his fmdings failed to confirm 
the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950). 
In a later review of his work, Davids (1963) concluded that "subjects who are high on 
authoritarianism were not found to be high on rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity" (p. 160). 
This conclusion seems to be true of most studies which have operationalized intolerance of 
ambiguity by gauging reactions to ambiguous stimuli. 3 Martin ( 1954), using different measures 
of intolerance of ambiguity at both interpersonal and personality levels, also failed to verify the 
predictions of Adorno et al. (1950). Caution, however, needs to be exercised in interpreting these 
findings. In both of Davids' studies, the indices of intolerance of ambiguity were not significantly 
associated with each other. This suggests that these tests either do not both measure intolerance 
of ambiguity, or that auditory and perceptual intolerance of ambiguity are independent. In 
addition, the small, heterogenous, and unrepresentative samples employed do not instill 
confidence in the findings. 
In contrast to Davids' findings, reactions to the ambiguity of the autokinetic illusion have 
typically been associated with authoritarianism. Block & Block (1951) hypothesized that, due to 
their need to structure ambiguous situations, high-scoring ethnocentric subjects would achieve 
stable norms in the autokinetic illusion faster than low-scoring subjects (cf. Frenkel-Brunswik, 
l948b). The Blocks found that those subjects who did not achieve a stable norm in 100 trials (N 
= 18) were less ethnocentric than those who did achieve a stable norm (N = 47) (F = 5.58, p 
< . 0 l). Millon (1957) replicated this study, but used the California F scale rather than the E 
scale. He found a "clear-cut" relationship between authoritarianism and the speed at which 
subjects established norms (F = 10.77, p < .001, N = 69). Taft (1956) informed subjects (N 
= 36) that the autokinetic effect was an illusion, and scored intolerance of ambiguity by 
measuring the degree to which subjects then reported seeing no movement. Intolerance of 
ambiguity was associated with a Bogardus-type measure of ethnocentrism (p < .05). In a series 
of studies, Harvey and his associates also found authoritarianism to be associated with different 
kinds of performance at the autokinetic illusion which reflect a need to structure novel stimuli 
(see Harvey, 1963b). Indeed, Harvey & Rutherford (1958) reported correlations of . 90 and . 95 
between the F scale and speed with which subjects saw the light moving under conditions where 
they were either praised or attacked for their performance. Altemeyer (1981), however, reports 
how he twice failed to replicate these impressive fmdings under either "praise" or "attack" 
conditions. 
3 But see Siegel (1954) and McAllister & Anderson (1991) for an opposing opinion. 
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In sum. research which has operationalized intolerance of ambiguity by gauging performance at, 
or liking of ambiguous stimuli has not yielded consistent support for the relationship between 
authoritarianism and intolerance of ambiguity. These fmdings suggest that intolerance of 
ambiguity may not be generalized from its social expression (i.e., ethnocentrism and 
authoritarianism) to other areas of personal functioning. Studies which have employed the 
autokinetic illusion have had more success than those which have used the Rorschach and the 
Azzageddi tests. Even with the autokinetic illusion, though, results have been equivocal. Besides 
the negative fmdings reported by Altemeyer, researchers have typically employed different 
aspects of performance as indices of intolerance of ambiguity. This makes assessment of the 
fmdings difficult because it has commonly been found that different indices of performance are 
unrelated to each other (Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958), and that those which are related to 
authoritarianism change from study to study (cf. Millon, 1957; Taft, 1956). 
The difficulty in interpreting these findings highlights one of the most fundamental problems 
associated with experimental measures of intolerance of ambiguity: scores on each measure are 
specific to the task at hand. Moreover, the lack of association between many of these measures 
(Kenny and Ginsberg, 1958), suggests that the task-specific nature of the measures outweigh any 
commonalities they have in assessing the personality trait of intolerance of ambiguity. It is for 
this reason that researchers turned to scaling intolerance of ambiguity. 
Scaling procedures 
The first scale designed to measure intolerance of ambiguity was developed by Walk (1950), and 
published by O'Connor (1952). This eight-item measure was scored on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale which included both positively and negatively worded items. The items were designed to 
reflect uncertain and ambiguous situations and events.4 O'Connor (1952) found the Walk scale 
to be positively associated with California E scale among 57 undergraduates (r = .55, p < .05). 
Similarly, Kenny and Ginsberg (1958) found that the Walk scale correlated significantly with a 
12-item measure of authoritarian submission among a heterogenous sample of 76 volunteer female 
adults (r = .57, p < .05). Kelman & Barklay (1963) investigated the relationship between the 
Walk scale and the California F scale among a sample of 282 "Negro college freshmen". The 
significant correlation (r = .43, p < .001) among this homogenous sample was attributed to 
4 Examples of items include: "There is more than one right way to do anything" and, "The best leaders 
give specific enough instructions so that those under them have nothing to worry about". 
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dispositional factors rather than differential opportunities to expand breadth of perspective as may 
have been present among heterogenous samples. 
These consistent fmdings suggest that social and evaluative expressions of intolerance of 
ambiguity may be traced down to a basic personality trait. In none of the three studies, however, 
was scale reliability reported. This is a crucial omission, for if intolerance of ambiguity is a 
generalized personality trait, the scale items should cohere in a unidimensional manner. When 
reliability was eventually investigated, the Walk scale was found "to have virtually no internal 
consistency (KR-20 = .08, N = 128)" (Ehrlich, 1965, p. 591). Ehrlich also reported the inter-
item correlation matrix of the Walk scale for a second sample (N = 88). These correlations were 
"consistently low, predominantly non-significant, and in one third of the cases negative" (p. 591). 
Clearly, the Walk scale is not homogenous and cannot therefore be viewed as a measure of a 
generalized trait of intolerance of ambiguity. What then can account for the consistently 
significant correlations between the Walk scale and measures of authoritarianism? Ehrlich (1965), 
preempting later critique of scaling measures of intolerance of ambiguity, suggested that "the 
content of some of the [Walk] scale items does bear a striking similarity to various items in the 
F and E scales" (p. 593). Thus, scale artifacts rather than dispositional factors may have been 
responsible for the correlations between the Walk scale and the F and E scales. Perhaps 
conservative individuals endorsed the conservative items of both the Walk scale and the F and 
E scales. 
Three other scales measuring intolerance of ambiguity have been developed, and have been 
shown to possess improved psychometric properties. The Budner ( 1962) scale, Rydell-Rosen 
scale (Rydell & Rosen, 1966; MacDonald, 1970), and Norton (1975) scale are all measures of 
intolerance of ambiguity which possess adequate stability and internal consistency coefficients. 
The Budner scale and Norton scale are scored by a Likert-type format, whereas the Rydell-Rosen 
scale contains dichotomous true-false response categories. All three measures include strikingly 
similar content, which is also comparable to that encompassed by the Walk scale. The scales are 
composed of items which refer to personal reactions to ambiguous and uncertain situations and 
events.5 Due to these commonalities, and the fact that the Budner scale has most often been 
employed as a research instrument, only the Budner scale will be considered here. 
Following the deductive facet of Frenkel-Brunswik's research, Budner (1962) defmed intolerance 
of ambiguity as "the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as sources of threat" (p. 29). He 
'The Budner scale is reported in Appendix C, Section 3, items 11-26. 
Measurement and theory 74 
proposed three such ambiguous situations - completely new situations, complex situations, and 
contradictory situations - and argued that individuals will react to such situations at either a 
phenomenological (evaluation or feeling) or an operative (behavioral) level. Budner developed 
his measure of intolerance of ambiguity so that each item tapped a particular mode of response 
to a particular type of ambiguous situation. He then examined the validity and reliability of the 
scale on 17 diverse samples. The mean coefficient alpha for the scale over all samples was rather 
low (a = .49), but the test-retest coefficient for one sample (N = 15) was adequate (r11 = .85). 
Using a sample of 171 medical students, Sohal & DeForge (1992) have recently reported an alpha 
coefficient of .64, and a test-retest correlation of .64 for the scale. 
Budner (1962) established the criterion-related validity of his scale by fmding significant 
correlations between it and three other measures of intolerance of ambiguity: the Walk scale, the 
Coulter scale (in Eysenck, 1954), and an unpublished Princeton scale. Budner scores also 
correlated significantly with three independent ratings of intolerance of ambiguity, made by a 
clinical psychologist, a teacher, and a sociology student, on the basis of a one page autobiography 
(N = 15). Further validity criteria have been reported by Sidanius (1988a), who concluded that 
the Budner scale possesses "the most consistent degree of construct validity" of all measures of 
intolerance of ambiguity (p. 312). 
Budner (1962) examined the relationship between his measure of intolerance of ambiguity and 
the Christie et al. (1958) balanced F scale, on nine different samples (35 ~ N ~ 79). All 
associations were in the expected direction, and six of the nine reached significance (a = .05). 
Judging by the average correlation between authoritarianism and intolerance of ambiguity (r = 
.32) over all nine samples, Budner (1962) concluded that "these are two complex, overlapping 
constructs" (p. 41). Subsequent research has largely supported this conclusion. The Budner scale 
has been found to correlate significantly with: (1) two different balanced F scales (r = .28, p < 
.005, N = 113) (Vannoy, 1965) and (r = .51 p < .05, N = 134) (Ray, 1980a), (2) Kohn's 
(1974) rebellion-authoritarianism scale (r = .67, p < .01, N = 62), (3) dogmatism among two 
samples of psychology students (r = .21, p < .01, N = 177), (r = .20, p < .01, N = 157) 
(Feather, 1971), among a pro-religious sample (r = .38, p < .05, N = 27) (Feather, 1967), and 
a "well-balanced" English sample (Kirton, 1981), and (4) the Rigby-Rump attitude toward 
authority inventory (r = .32, p < .05, N = 178) (Rigby & Rump, 1982). Although the strength 
of these correlations are weak to moderate, on balance, the Budner scale does appear to be 
consistently associated with social expressions of intolerance of ambiguity. 
Sidanius (1978a, 1985) has investigated the relationship between the Budner scale and racism and 
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authoritarian aggression among a sample of 195 Swedish high school srudents. 6 His work 
constirutes an advance over previous studies as he has addressed one of the major criticisms of 
the scale: the low internal consistency of the scale suggests item heterogeneity and scale 
multidimensionality. Instead of treating intolerance of ambiguity as a unidimensional construct, 
Sidanius (1978b) has uncovered seven underlying factors of intolerance of ambiguity (see also 
Furnham, 1994). Sidanius (1978a) found that the total Budner scale correlated significantly with 
racism (r = .28, p < .01) and authoritarian aggression (r = .19, p < .05). In addition, 
authoritarian aggression was associated with Budner Factor 1 [intolerance of uncertainty] (r = 
.34, p < .0002) and Factor 2 [uninterpreted factor] (r = -.16, p < .05). Racism was correlated 
with Budner Factor 6 [intolerance of ambiguity] (r = .31, p < .01) and Factor 7 [need for the 
familiar] (r = .25, p < .01).7 
Sidanius' fmdings leave one rather bewildered. It appears as though there is some relationship 
between intolerance of ambiguity and racism and authoritarianism, but only for portions of the 
Budner scale. Moreover, there is little consistency regarding which Budner factors are related 
to racism and which are related to authoritarianism. Why are different Budner factors associated 
with different expressions of social intolerance? A close reading of Sidanius' work suggests that 
he views these factors as sub traits of the more general trait of intolerance of ambiguity. However, 
unlike authoritarianism, which is also comprised of subtraits (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 1989; 
Stone et al., 1993), Sidanius offers no theoretical reason why these factors should be considered 
together in the form of a scale, and why they then do not hang together as a unidimensional 
personality trait. The vague theoretical starus of intolerance of ambiguity raises doubts concerning 
the validity of the Budner scale. 
While the scale or at least parts of it, may be measuring something, we do not know 
precisely what it does measure (Ward, 1988, p. 317). 
Not much confidence can be given to the names that Sidanius has given to the factors. Even a 
cursory inspection of the scale content will convince one that just about any item could be 
classified under any of the naming categories. 
Overall, the Budner scale has consistently been found to correlate with various measures of 
authoritarianism, dogmatism and ethnocentrism. Since the Budner scale was developed as a 
personality measure along the deductive lines of Frenkel-Brunswik's research, these fmdings 
suggest that intolerance of ambiguity is a generalized personality trait which may be traced from 
a personality disposition which fmds uncertain, complex and novel situations threatening, to 
6 Both of these papers refer to the same study. 
7 No reliability statistics were reponed for the measures of racism and authoritarian aggression. 
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social expressions of authoritarianism. ethnocentrism and dogmatism. Ironically. Sidanius • 
research may have provided sufficient data to reject such a conclusion. The reasoning linking 
authoritarianism and ethnocentrism to intolerance of ambiguity rests on the assumption that 
intolerance of ambiguity is a generalized personality trait which extends from personal to social 
manifestations. Sidanius has convincingly demonstrated that intolerance of ambiguity. as 
measured by the Budner scale. is not generalized even over different personal domains. Rather 
than being held together by personality. the "need for the familiar" and the "need for certainty" 
must be considered independently (and have different correlates). In the light of the specificity 
of different aspects of intolerance of ambiguity. what may account for the significant correlations 
between the Budner scale and measures of authoritarianism. prejudice. and dogmatism; what 
could explain the apparent generality of the trait from the personal to social domains? 
Ray suggests that "to at least some extent the [Budner] scale measures conservatism or caution 
as much as anything else" (1984c. p. 284; see also Ray. 1988; Tetlock. 1993). In other words, 
the observed associations between the Budner scale and measures of authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism may not have anything to do with personality. but may be tautologous, accruing 
due to commonalities in conservative scale content. This objection was not addressed by the 
replies of either Sidanius (1988a) or Ward (1988). 8 Ideological content bias is, however, a 
legitimate critique given that the items of the Budner scale refer to laws. rules, and political 
values (e.g., "The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better"). Since no 
personality theory has been advanced which can explain the complexities of Sidanius' fmdings, 
this must be considered the most parsimonious explanation of the association between the Budner 
scale and measures of authoritarianism and intolerance of ambiguity. Different factors of the 
Budner scale correlate with different measures of ideological attitudes because there are content 
commonalities between these measures. 
The scaling and experimental procedures which have been used to measure intolerance of 
ambiguity face opposite difficulties. Where the experimental procedures are devoid of content, 
the scales include content which tends to be confounded with the criterion measures with which 
they are correlated. Thus, the experimental procedures seem to assess behaviour which is task 
specific, whereas the scales assess responses which are ideologically specific. Consequently, the 
latter correlate with measures of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism while the former do not. 
Both procedures are, however, unified in their reliance on the assumption that intolerance of 
8 Perhaps this omission occurred because of the need to address other serious errors in Ray's (1988) 
critique. 
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ambiguity is a generalized and pervasive personality trait. Where Frenkel-Brunswik defmed 
intolerance of ambiguity as a social and evaluative construct, these measures assess it in an 
asocial and non-evaluative manner, relevant to diverse aspects of individual functioning. A few 
researchers have rejected this assumption, and have limited their defmition of intolerance of 
ambiguity to the original evaluative features of the construct. 
Evaluative categorization 
On the basis of her descriptive research, Frenkel-Brunswik defmed intolerance of ambiguity as 
the inability to recognise the coexistence of positive and negative features in the same object. 
These "objects" included authorities, social groups, and values. As such, intolerance of ambiguity 
entailed the categorization (e.g., ingroup-outgroup), and unambivalent evaluation (good versus 
bad) of social "objects". Three studies have considered evaluative categorization central to the 
det1nition of intolerance of ambiguity. These studies have been concerned with possible 
ambivalence in categorization- that is, the attribution of both positive and negative traits to a 
single category. As such, these studies operationalize intolerance of ambiguity in a manner 
consistent with Frenkel-Brunswik's description of the construct at an operative level. Although 
they examine the generality of intolerance of ambiguity, this is conceptualized as a much 
narrower trait than that outlined by Bochner, Budner, and others. 
Steiner (1954) defined intolerance of ambiguity as the extent to which an individual perceiver 
assumes that traits of similar evaluative connotations will co-occur. Two concepts underlie this 
definition. "Trait contingency" refers to the probability with which a perceiver expects the co-
occurrence of two traits. "Trait discrepancy" refers to the distance separating two traits along an 
evaluative dimension. Steiner hypothesized that greater trait discrepancy will be associated with 
lower trait contingency among all individuals. The less similar two traits are (eg., passionate & 
quick-tempered versus lazy & quick-tempered), the less likely they will be expected to co-occur 
in a single individual. Additionally, Steiner hypothesized that this relationship will be stronger 
among high-scoring ethnocentrics than among low-scorers. In preliminary research, 30 students 
rated the desirability of 32 traits on a ten-point scale. Eighteen test items were derived from the 
mean ratings. Each test item consisted of two couplets, one with approximately equal ratings 
(AB) and one with unequal ratings (AC). Fifty two students then participated in a study where 
they responded to the test items by crossing out the pair of traits which seemed less likely to 
occur together. Intolerance of ambiguity was scored by the number of times the AC (discrepant) 
pair had been crossed out. Each subject also completed the California E scale, and was assigned 
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to a high-scoring or a low-scoring group if they fell in the quartiles of the distribution of E 
scores. As hypothesized, the high-scorers (M = 8.69) crossed out significantly more AC pairs 
than the low-scorers (M = 6.85) (t = 5.15, p < .03). 
Kenny & Ginsberg (1958) correlated Steiner's measure of intolerance of ambiguity with a 
measure of authoritarian submission among their heterogenous volunteer sample of 76 adults. The 
correlation between the two measures was not significant (r = -.07). Steiner & Johnson (1963) 
argued that this correlation was attenuated by the sample heterogeneity, and they once again 
replicated their study with a homogenous sample of 75 adults. They found intolerance of 
ambiguity to be significantly correlated with the California F scale (r = .26, p < .01). Steiner 
& Johnson (1963) went on to argue that, given intolerance of trait inconsistency, authoritarian 
rigidity was explicable in terms of their subjects' difficulty in accepting new information which 
conflicted with previous impressions. 
Steiner's studies are the only ones which have examined whether the fundamental evaluative 
aspect of intolerance of ambiguity is generalized beyond its expression in ethnocentrism and 
authoritarianism. While his findings suggest that it is, this conclusion must be treated as tentative 
because his results are open to alternative interpretations. They may, for example, have been 
influenced by the experimental "demand" to appear rational and consistent in a scientific context 
(Orne, 1962). This explanation gains credence if one accepts that authoritarian conformity and 
submission would engender more rational and consistent responses among authoritarians. The 
potential for this demand to influence results is increased by requiring subjects to evaluate the 
hypothetical possibility of trait co-occurrence, rather than the co-occurrence of traits in people 
that the subjects are familiar with. 
Nonetheless, Steiner's work does overcome some of the most basic difficulties associated with 
the experimental and psychometric measures. His measure of intolerance of ambiguity approaches 
Frenkel-Brunswik's empirically derived definition (not her hypothesized theoretical definition) 
as it includes the evaluation of social "objects". Consequently, the "task at hand" which reflects 
intolerance of trait inconsistency parallels the unambivalent rejection of outgroups characteristic 
of ethnocentrism. As such, Steiner does not need to infer intolerance of ambiguity from 
performance at an unrelated task such as the Rorschach test. If his measure is task specific, it is 
specific to the appropriate task. Moreover, unlike the content of the scales measuring intolerance 
of ambiguity. Steiner's measure is not ideologically loaded as he assesses performance rather than 
beliefs. Any associations arising between this performance and ethnocentric beliefs will thus not 
be confounded by scale artifact. 
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The review of studies which have attempted to assess whether a general trait of intolerance of 
ambiguity can be traced from its social expression in ethnocentrism to other manifestations has 
proved suggestive. Methodological difficulties have, however, made an unequivocal interpretation 
of fmdings impossible. The profound inconsistency and lack of significant associations between 
ethnocentrism and measures of intolerance of ambiguity which gauge reactions to ambiguous 
stimuli implies that intolerance of ambiguity cannot be tracked down to non-evaluative 
performance at specific asocial tasks. The weak and potentially artefactual relations between 
ethnocentrism and scales of intolerance of ambiguity also cannot confirm the hypothesized 
relationship between social expressions of intolerance of ambiguity and a basic personality 
disposition which fmds ambiguity threatening. Finally, although Steiner's studies suggest that 
ethnocentrism may be associated with assumptions of trait consistency, they are open to alternate 
interpretation. 
Now that the conceptual and operational status of the different measures of intolerance of 
ambiguity have been distinguished, we may further explore the generality of intolerance of 
ambiguity by investigating the interrelationships between these different measures. If someone, 
for example, expresses an unambivalent evaluation of individuals, will this also be reflected in 
rigidity and/or cognitive simplicity. These studies may clarify the generality of intolerance of 
ambiguity from one aspect of individual functioning to another. Accordingly, the review will 
broaden its scope to include constructs of cognitive style derived from the cognitive-centred, 
social learning orientation. 
Associations between measures of intolerance of ambiguity 
Earlier it was argued that, despite their differences, there are numerous descriptive, logical, 
theoretical, and evaluative similarities between different constructs of cognitive style. Cognitive 
complexity, for instance, is defmed in terms of differentiation, the variety of aspects of an issue 
that a person recognises, and integration, the conceptual connections between the differentiated 
characteristics (MacNeil, 1974; Schroder et al., 1967; Tetlock, l983a). While the construct of 
cognitive complexity has been developed and used mainly by cognitive-centred researchers, it 
possesses a number of phenotypical commonalities with the psychodynamic constructs of rigidity 
and intolerance of ambiguity. By relying on rigidly defmed, simple evaluative rules, the 
authoritarian is also expected to display low levels of differentiation and integration. 
Our concern here is whether or not the diverse measures of cognitive style are empirically 
Measurement and theory 80 
related. The discussion is necessarily a broad sweep since all the different measures cannot be 
considered in much detail. 9 The review will commence with a comparison of evaluative and non-
evaluative measures of intolerance of ambiguity, and will gradually broaden its scope to 
incorporate the relations between intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity, and cognitive complexity. 
In an effort to establish the generality of cognitive style, Kenny & Ginsberg (1958) correlated 13 
different measures among their heterogenous sample (N = 76). They included Steiner's measure 
of intolerance of trait inconsistency along with other measures of intolerance of ambiguity and 
cognitive functioning. Intolerance of trait inconsistency was unrelated to all other measures of 
cognitive style, including the Walk scale and three different indices of performance at the 
autokinetic illusion. Moreover, Kenny and Ginsberg ( 1958) found that only four of the 66 
correlations were significant (a = .01) and concluded that their results "offer little support for 
a general construct of intolerance of ambiguity" (p. 304). Although these results may have been 
attenuated by the sample heterogeneity, Vannoy's (1965) fmding that intolerance of trait 
inconsistency was orthogonal to the Budner scale (r = 0) among a homogenous sample of 113 
male psychology students, support this conclusion. 
It has already been reported that the Rorschach test and the Azzageddi test do not correlate with 
each other. Studies which have found significant associations between different measures of 
intolerance of ambiguity have typically employed either (a) experimental procedures involving 
similar tasks which have contents purged of social meaning, or (b) scales with similar contents. 
In addition to the rock sorting task described above, Bochner (1965), asked subjects (N = 67) 
to sort 68 photographs of people into as many categories as they thought necessary. The 
photographs consisted of a variety of unknown people. Bochner found that the number of 
categories employed in the rock sorting task correlated significantly with the number of categories 
employed on the picture sorting task (r = .62). In their study of the generality of categorizing 
behaviour, Sloane, Gorlow, & Jackson (1963) asked subjects (N = 60) to sort six different sets 
of objects into categories. The objects included pictures of unknown people, other pictures, 
drawings, and descriptions of fictitious people. All six sorting tasks were significantly 
intercorrelated and all loaded heavily on a single principal component. Both Bochner ( 1965) and 
Sloane et al. ( 1963) interpreted their fmdings as suggesting that categorization behaviour 
indicative of intolerance of ambiguity is generalized across content domain. One wonders, 
however, whether different meaningless contents may be sufficient to establish generality. A 
9 See Streufert & Streufert ( 1978) for a complete review of the constructs and operational definitions of 
cognitive style. 
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response set could have produced the significant intercorrelations. What, for example, would 
have occurred if subjects were asked to categorize a list of "communist dictators" and a list of 
"American presidents" both during and after the Cold War? 
Although Adorno et al. ( 1950) used the terms rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity 
interchangeably, subsequent research has distinguished between them. However, just like the 
measures of intolerance of ambiguity, measures of rigidity have generally not been associated 
with each other (Applezweig, 1954; Forster, Vinacke & Digman, 1955; Goodstein, 1953; Levitt, 
1956). Since performance at rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity tasks have typically been "task 
specific", it is doubtful whether consistent significant correlations can be generated between 
measures of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. In addition to Kenny & Ginsberg's (1958) 
negative results, Coulter (in Eysenck, 1954) found that the cat-to-dog test and a scale measuring 
intolerance of ambiguity were uncorrelated with three different measures of rigidity. On the other 
hand, MacDonald ( 1970) found the Rydell-Rosen scale to correlate significantly with the Gough-
Sanford measure of rigidity (r = .41, p < .01, N = 787), and Eckhardt & Newcomb (1969) 
found that Coulter's measures of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity were significantly related 
(r = .67, p < .01, N = 46). Although more research is needed to draw firm conclusions, the 
empirical evidence does not provide strong support for an association between operationally 
distinct measures of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. 
Finally, a number of studies have attempted to establish associations between intolerance of 
ambiguity and the more formal constructs of cognitive style derived from the cognitive-centred 
approach. Once again, these measures of cognitive functioning have not been consistently 
associated with each other. While some studies have uncovered significant correlations between 
the different measures (Allard & Carlson, 1963; Barron, 1953; Bieri & Blacker, 1956; Koening 
& King, 1962; Russell & Sandilands, 1973), generally speaking, they have either not correlated 
with each other (Hageseth, 1983; Sechrest & Jackson, 1961; Suedfeld, Tomkins & Tucker, 1969; 
Vannoy, 1965; Wyer, 1964), or have correlated weakly (Sidanius, 1976, 1978b, 1985; Sidanius 
& Ekehammar, 1976). Even more concerning is the fact that different indices of the same aspect 
of cognitive functioning have not been associated. Sidanius (1978b, 1985), for example, found 
non-significant correlations between each of two different measures of cognitive complexity and 
three different measures of cognitive flexibility (see Appendix A). 
O'Connor (1952) correlated the Walk Scale with indices of abstract reasoning ability (i.e., the 
ability to solve a number of "familiar", "symbolic", and "tricky" syllogisms). She found that 
intolerance of ambiguity was unrelated to the ability to reason abstractly; correlations varied from 
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-.12 for the tricky material to .04 for the symbolic material (N = 57). Similarly, Vannoy (1965) 
found that Budner scores were orthogonal to 15 different measures of cognitive complexity (N 
= 113). Tom, Cooper & McGraw (1984) also found the Budner scale to be unrelated to the 
paragraph completion test of cognitive complexity (r = .08, N = 25). The Budner scale has, 
however, been shown to correlate with syllogism performance for a group of student atheists (r 
= -. 72, p < .01, N = 10), but not for a group of religious students (r = .25, N = 27) (Feather, 
1967). Raphael, Moss & Cross (1978) also report that the Budner scale correlated significantly 
with a measure of cognitive complexity (r = -.37, p < .001, N = 97). Sidanius (1985) 
correlated the Budner scale plus its seven factors with six different measures of cognitive 
functioning (N = 195 high school students). Only eight of the 48 correlations were significant 
(a = .05). Interestingly, all significant correlations were with either the total Budner score or 
with Factor 1. Less interesting were the results of his earlier study. Sidanius ( 1978a) correlated 
six measures of cognitive functioning with the total Budner scale plus its six factors (N = 46 
university students). Although seven of the 42 correlations were significant (a = .05), there was 
no consistent pattern of intercorrelations. Echoing the conclusions of Kenny & Ginsberg (1958), 
Vannoy (1965), and Sloane et al. (1963), Sidanius (1978a) observes that: 
... a singular, unitary trait of cognitive functioning underlying cognitive behaviour is quite 
difficult to establish, even within the same content domain (p. 528). 
While this does appear to be the majority opinion, what may account for the significant 
associations between intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive functioning? Unlike the spurious 
relationships that arise between measures of intolerance of ambiguity which employ similar tasks, 
or scales with similar contents, correlations between intolerance of ambiguity and the cognitive-
centred indices of cognitive functioning typically employ substantially different measurement 
procedures. The interpretation of these fmdings is complicated by the fact that there are no 
consistent differences between the studies which have found intolerance of ambiguity to correlate 
significantly with cognitive functioning and studies which have not. Often similar measures and 
procedures have been employed by both groups. One possibility is that intelligence may underlie 
the significant associations. Intelligence has been shown to correlate with measures of intolerance 
of ambiguity (Davids, 1955; Davids & Eriksen, 1957), including the Budner scale (Raphael et 
al., 1978), with rigidity (Levin, 1956), and with cognitive complexity (Schroder et al., 1967; 
Scott et al. , 1979). Moreover, two of the studies which have found significant associations 
between intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive functioning (Raphael et al., 1978; Sidanius, 1985) 
have employed heterogenous samples where the covariate of intelligence may have impacted on 
the results. Consequently, it could be argued that intolerance of ambiguity is independent of 
rigidity and cognitive complexity, and that some spurious relationships have accrued by not 
controlling for variance in intelligence. 
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The opposite position is taken by Scott et al. (1979). They argue that higher intercorrelations 
would have been uncovered if researchers had used more reliable measures which were not based 
on the assumed generality of cognitive style, and which were sensitive to individual variance 
across content domain. 10 Scott (1963, 1966, 1969; Scott et al., 1979) has meticulously 
developed a multidimensional model of "cognitive structure" and has deduced a number of 
reliable measures of different aspects of the model. Instead of offering global predictions of the 
generality of cognitive style, Scott makes theoretically-grounded predictions regarding the 
intercorrelations among different facets of cognitive structure. 
Among these different facets, Scott (1966, 1969, Scott et al., 1979) has identified "object 
ambivalence", a construct which incorporates both the evaluative and social characteristics of 
Frenkel-Brunswik:'s definition of intolerance of ambiguity. Object ambivalence is assessed by 
requesting subjects to select any number of adjectives (from a list with equal numbers of positive 
and negative adjectives) which describe certain objects (e.g., nations). In contrast to Frenkel-
Brunswik:'s hypothesis of generality, Scott et al. (1979, p. 163) found object ambivalence to be 
associated with only certain other components of cognitive structure (i.e., object complexity and 
dimensionality, affective-evaluative consistency, affective balance, and object evaluation and 
liking), but not with a variety of other structural properties. According to Scott (1969), these 
relationships occur because they are "tautologous". In other words, there are functional and 
structural relationships between certain structural dimensions of cognition, but not between others 
(Scott, 1969; Scott et al., 1979). Therefore, although object ambivalence is not generalized across 
all aspects of cognition, it does appear to be closely related to other aspects of cognitive 
structure. 
In addition to distinguishing between different aspects of cognitive structure, Scott questions the 
assumption of generality by emphasizing individual variability in cognitive style across content 
domain. Scott et al. (1979) report that object ambivalence has one of the lowest cross-content 
stabilities. They compared shared within-domain variance over three measures of ambivalence 
with between-domain variance (over four content domains) for an American (N = 88) and a 
Japanese (N = 80) student sample. For both the United States and Japanese samples, shared 
variance within domains (r = .315 and r = .175 respectively) was larger than between-domain 
shared variance (r = .083 and r = .058). 
10 Scott has computed the reliability coefficients from the average intercorrelations of the studies examining 
the generality of equivalence range (Sloane et al., 1963), cognitive complexity (Vannoy, 1965), and 
intolerance of ambiguity (Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958). Despite the task similarity of many of the measures, 
the composite reliabilities were .53, negative, and .23 respectively. 
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It is appropriate to leave Scott, temporarily, with the final say regarding the generality of 
intolerance of ambiguity. Although he does not employ the term tolerance of ambiguity, his 
structural construct of object ambivalence approaches the descriptive definition offered by 
Frenkel-Brunswik; it involves ambivalent categorization and evaluation of social contents. 
Contrary to Frenkel-Brunswik's early theorizing, intolerance of ambiguity does not appear to be 
a generalized personality trait. Ambiguity tolerance varies over content domain, and cognitive 
"traits" do not pervade all aspects of cognitive structure. The present work follows Scott et al. 
( 1979) in rejecting the assumption of generality which underlies the theory, and has been 
incorporated into the measures of cognitive style. According to Scott et al. (1979), the literature 
has assumed that: 
... a person has a characteristic mode of organizing or utilizing information that pervades 
all mental activity. . . The adoption of such monolithic concepts is congruent with major 
historical trends within psychology, resulting in substantial methodological 
simplification ... The use of projective tests such as the Rorschach and the TAT to assess 
personality characteristics presumes that people cognize ambiguous pictures and ink blots 
in a manner equivalent to that employed for interpersonal relations (pp. 141-142). 
Scott. however, lacks a coherent theory of individual variability in cognitive style. His social 
learning theory has no way of explaining the relationship between cognitive style and content 
which does not reduce to differential experience. An individual is presumed to have a 
characteristic cognitive style within certain contexts and over certain contents, depending on his 
or her history of "experience" within those contexts and content domains. 11 Thus, although Scott 
can accommodate intra-individual variability, this is grounded in a theory of individual difference 
and relies on a universalistic ontology of the mind-in-general (albeit a more complex one). 
While such theorizing may explain variability across content and context, it encounters 
fundamental problems in explaining the general trend - as evident in Steiner's studies as well 
as those of Tetlock, Sidanius, Rokeach etc. - for ideological contents to be associated with 
cognitive style in a non-random manner. If individual cognitive style varies over content domain 
as a function of "experience" within that domain, why should certain contents be consistently 
associated with particular cognitive styles; because individuals supporting those contents are more 
11 Altemeyer's ( 1981, 1988a) influential learning theory account of authoritarianism also bases 'character' 
change on experience. He argues for a broad education, especially in the humanities, to change 
authoritarian character by expanding their base of experience. While these individualistic conclusions are 
supported with correlational evidence, on a wider social level they have been falsified in the most dramatic 
way. The so-called educated, civilized, and cultured nations of Europe demonstrated their "barbarity" 
during the Great war, where in addition to its "warlike and barbarous ... relations with non-European 
peoples ... these destructive characteristics were turned toward other European countries who were supposed 
to be similar bearers of 'civilization'" (Angus, 1994, p. 83). 
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or less experienced in them? What is required is a theory of individual variability over content 
and context that can also explain why certain contents are linked to certain cognitive styles within 
particular contexts. Such a theory would have to reject the individual as the locus of explanation. 
An individualistic theory may explain either individual stability or variability, but has difficulties 
in reconciling individual variability with the fmding that the cognitive style of collectives of 
individuals is related to cognitive contents in a non-random manner. If one proposes to explain 
individual variability in terms of differential experience over content domain, to account for a 
non-random relationship between cognitive style and content, a socially-based theory is needed 
to explain why certain ideological orientations are less/differentially experienced than others. This 
is necessary because one can no longer rely on personality-based explanations, for example, in 
terms of psychodynamic defences. 
Theorizing individual variability in cognitive style 
A number of theories have been advanced to explain individual variability in cognitive style. The 
most comprehensive accounts have used psychological states and processes as mediating 
influences to explain individual variability. These theories have been developed in association 
with the body of literature which sought to establish the generality of cognitive style, and were 
typically generated to explain anomalous empirical fmdings. More recently, a small body of 
literature has advanced explanations of individual variability in terms of social processes and 
dynamics. 
This section aims to review these theories and evaluate them in terms of their universal 
aspirations. Thus far it has been argued that, in the manner of the "methodological circle", an 
individualist and empiricist account of cognitive style has been sustained by ontological 
assumptions which have become embodied in measurement instruments. Here the order of 
explanation is reversed. It is argued that, despite recognising variability in cognitive style, 
theorists have continued to endorse an empiricist ontology by accommodating observed variability 
in interactionist models of personality. Finally, Billig's account of a rhetorical psychology is 
introduced and employed to sketch an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive style. 
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Personal dynamics 
Extensions of the basic principles of psychodynamics and learning theory have been employed 
to explain intra-individual variability in cognitive style in terms of the dynamics and processes 
of individual psychology. These explanations have not been as concerned with the influence of 
content as they have with context, but their fundamental premises can be applied to both forms 
of variability. 
Psychodynamic theories explain variability in cognitive style by means of two separate, but 
related, dynamics: ego-threat and commitment. Ego-threat is the basic psychodynamic construct 
which underlies the authoritarian syndrome, and which was used to explain the necessary 
relationship between cognitive style and content (Adorno et al., 1950; Forbes, 1985; Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1948b). 12 By drawing on the Freudian notion that psychodynamic defences are 
elicited only in the presence of specific threatening contents, 13 Brown ( 1953) argued that 
variability in authoritarian traits would be manifest, and that the relationship between 
ethnocentrism and cognitive style would only be found under ego-threatening conditions (see also 
Christie, 1993; Neuringer 1964; Pally, 1955). Sidanius (1988a; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) has 
recently offered a similar line of argument by suggesting that individual cognitive style will vary 
across content domain according to the psychological functions served by beliefs in that domain. 
Cognitive style is thus theorized to vary across context and content domain as a function of the 
ego-threat associated with that domain for a particular individual. Non-threatening contents (e.g., 
countries of the world) will be associated with different cognitive styles than threatening contents 
(e.g., personal health), depending on context (e.g., if one is sick or well). White, Alter & Rardin 
(1965; also Rokeach, l951b), for instance, demonstrated that subjects who scored high on both 
the dogmatism scale and the F scale differed in their usage of conceptual categories on high 
syndrome relevant stimuli (social acts), but not on low syndrome relevant stimuli (occupational 
names). 
The concept of commitment is closely related to that of ego-threat. Rokeach ( 1956a, 1960) argued 
that ego-weakness would be associated with the desire to submit to, and commit oneself to an 
absolute authority. By locating the fount of this commitment in personality dynamics, Rokeach 
theorized a general tendency toward commitment across different contents. However, the causal 
primacy of ego-threat and commitment is reversed by experiential theories of cognitive style, 
12 See pp. 28-29 of this thesis for a discussion of the psychodynamic account of the relationship between 
cognitive style and content. 
13 See p. 62 of this chapter. 
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such as that offered by Sidanius. 14 These theories can accommodate individual variability over 
different contents by arguing that experience in a particular domain engenders commitment to that 
domain, resulting in particular cognitive styles (rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity) when the 
domain (and ego involvement) is threatened. One reason why the cognitive style of political elites 
differs from that of their followers, may be that, having devoted their lives to political matters, 
they are more committed to their beliefs (as would be predicted by dissonance theory). In 
addition to being more knowledgable and sophisticated (Converse, 1964), elites may thus also 
be more dogmatic in defending their beliefs (cf. DiRenzo, 1967). 
Social learning theorists have suggested that individual variability in cognitive style is attributable 
to either different levels of experience an individual has had, or stress that an individual 
encounters in a particular situation or content domain. Stress and experience are argued to 
influence the structure of personal constructs (Kelly, 1955) or field space (Lewin, 1936), and 
thereby lead to differences in information processing (Crockett, 1965; Schroder et al., 1967; 
Scott et al., 1979). Extended experience within certain content domains is argued to increase the 
complexity (differentiation & integration) of the individual's personal constructs or field space. 
Crockett (1965), for example, has advanced the "frequency of interaction" and the "significance 
of domain" hypotheses to explain cross-content variability in cognitive style. In support of these 
hypotheses, Supnick ( 1964) demonstrated that descriptions of liked individuals were more 
complex than descriptions of disliked individuals, and that more constructs were used to describe 
peers than older people. 
The second explanation of individual variability advanced by social learning theorists is that 
environmental conditions of threat, interest, and complexity influence information processing by 
arousing individual stress. Schroder et al. (1967) have observed that cognitive complexity 
decreases under conditions of very low and very high levels of envirorunental stressors (see also 
Streufert & Driver, 1966; Streufert & Schroder, 1965; Streufert & Streufert, 1978; Suedfeld, 
1964; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock & Rameriez, 1977). While this theory has 
typically been applied to situational differences in stress, it is equally applicable to content 
induced stress. Scott et al. (1979), for example, demonstrated that more complex cognitive 
contents are associated with higher levels of "object ambivalence". 
There is much overlap between the constructs which have been advanced by psychodynamic 
theory and social learning theory to explain variability in cognitive style: between experience and 
14 Sidanius' experiential account of cognitive style is discussed on pp. 42-43 & 45 of this thesis. 
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commitment, and between ego-threat and stress. A situation or content domain in which an 
individual has little experience will often also be one to which the individual is relatively 
uncommitted. In addition, novel situations and contents may be stress invoking, and these may 
also be ego-threatening if the individual is expected to perform well in these situations. Panic is 
an example of extreme cognitive rigidity and inflexibility which occurs under ego-threatening and 
stressful situations in which the individual has little experience and is highly committed to a 
certain outcome (e.g., escaping the flames). Further investigation must be undertaken to 
disentangle the multiplicity of personal dynamics which influence cognitive style. 
There is, however, one important difference between psychodynamic and social learning theories. 
If one assumes, ceteris paribus, that "experience" across different contents will be randomly 
distributed for a collective of people, then theories of individual variability which are based on 
learning and experience cannot account for a non-random association between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs. Under this assumption, individuals who have experience in politics should 
display more complex styles than the inexperienced, but no differences are to be expected 
between liberals and conservatives. Any relationship between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs would imply that one group is more experienced in their ideology than the other. In 
contrast, psychodynamic accounts, which rely on the construct of ego-threat, may theorize both 
individual variability across differentially threatening contents, and a necessary relationship 
between the style and content of cognition. They can propose a relationship between cognitive 
style and ideological beliefs because they advance a personality-based predisposition for particular 
contents. While the cognitive style of high-scoring authoritarians may vary as a function of threat, 
when threatened in a political field, they are theorized to display both conservative beliefs and 
cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. Thus, psychodynamic theories of personality can 
account for both individual variability in cognitive style and a relationship between the style and 
content of beliefs over a collective. In contrast, learning theories of individual variability need 
to include an account of why individuals of certain ideological orientations are less experienced, 
in order to accommodate observed relationships between the cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs. 
Social dynamics 
Individualistic accounts of variability in cognitive style are attached to well established 
psychological theories. Although the idea that social processes influence cognitive style may be 
traced back to LeBon's (1896) crowd theory, social accounts of individual variability have only 
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recently gained the attention of researchers. The literature consists of a few studies which have 
pointed to one or two social dynamics which influence cognitive style. In addition to the lack of 
systematic theory, cognitive complexity is the only construct which has been investigated. 
The study of variability in cognitive style over different, naturally occurring social contexts and 
across different contents has been aided by the development of the integrative complexity coding 
scheme. 15 Archival research which has used this coding scheme has shown that social aspects 
of a situation, such as role demands (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976) and group pressure (Tetlock, 
1979), may be important determinants of cognitive complexity. These results have been 
interpreted in terms of underlying social processes - i.e., practical demands of administrative 
responsibilities (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976) and the groupthink phenomenon (Tetlock, 1979) -
which impact on individual cognition. Their "between-subjects", quasi-experimental designs are, 
however, open to alternate, more individualistic interpretations. 
A few studies have examined intra-individual changes in cognitive style across situation by 
employing "within-subjects" designs. These have demonstrated individual variability which is 
inexplicable by individualistic theory. Porter & Suedfeld (1981) traced the cognitive complexity 
of the personal correspondence of five eminent British novelists over their lifetimes, in an effort 
to explore possible individual and social determinants of cognitive complexity. They found that 
complexity increased with age, but decreased markedly during the last five years of life, and with 
illness. Complexity was also negatively related to war, but positively related to civil unrest. 
These latter results proved contrary to the hypothesis that social conditions influence cognitive 
complexity by arousing stress, because both war and civil unrest are stressful. Porter & Suedfeld 
( 1981) suggested that "information flow" in the environment was the determining factor; whereas 
wars were associated with decreased information flow, civil unrest generated increased 
information flow. Rather than theorizing cognitive complexity as a consequence of the mediating 
influence of individual psychological functioning, it was interpreted in terms of the prevailing 
social conditions (see also Weigert, 1991). 
Tetlock (1981) tested the hypothesis that the cognitive complexity of presidential rhetoric would 
increase gradually after election into office. This hypothesis was derived from a social learning 
account of cognitive complexity, which predicts gradual cognitive adjustment in response to 
experience with new practical demands. In contrast, Tetlock found that the complexity of 
u The integrative complexity coding scheme (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Tetlock & Hannum, 1983) was 
developed by extending the method of coding cognitive complexity in the paragraph completion test 
(Schroder et al., 1967). 
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American presidential rhetoric increased suddenly after their assuming office (see also Tetlock, 
Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock, Hannum & Micheletti, 1984). 
He used impression management theory to account for these fmdings. Minority leaders, he 
argued, must employ clear-cut rhetoric to convince mass publics to "throw the rascals out" by 
impressing others with their political determination and will (Tetlock, 1981). Once these leaders 
have gained power, however, they must employ more complex arguments to be seen as "acting 
responsibly" .16 Such reasoning would fmd support in Moscovici's (1976, 1985b) theory of 
minority influence. Moscovici argues minority influence is fostered by a behavioral style of 
"consistency", which "projects an internal state of mind ... into the environment" (1985b, p. 28). 
Tetlock and colleagues (Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock, Boettger & Skitka, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) 
have also used the integrative complexity coding scheme in experimental situations to examine 
the effect of accountability on cognitive complexity. In sum, integrative complexity was found 
to increase under conditions where individuals anticipated accounting for their beliefs to an 
unknown audience. Subjects appeared to engage in preemptive self -criticism, anticipating potential 
criticism which a later audience might raise. 
Unfortunately, there has been comparatively very little interest in the social determinants of 
cognitive style, and no powerful explanatory, and well researched theories have been developed. 
However, one can distinguish between two types of social influences: first, environmental 
conditions such as information flow in society at large; and second, social processes, including 
impression management, accountability, and groupthink. While the former open up completely 
new avenues of research, the latter still focus on the individual psychological processes and 
dynamics responsible for variability. Nonetheless, these studies are important for the present 
work since they suggest that variability in cognitive style may be related to the different rhetorical 
functions demanded of an individual in different roles and situations. 
Although Tetlock's research constitutes a major advance over personality models of cognitive 
style, he has not broken with the assumption of self-contained individualism. His explanation of 
variability is restricted to external factors which impact on the universal psychological processes 
of dissonance theory, and he continues to endorse personality theory. He assumes that individuals 
16 If this argument is correct, and "acting responsibly" is also associated with a political moderatism, 
impression management could explain the results which suppon extremism theory. Impression management 
theory could, therefore, account for a non-random relation between cognitive style and content in addition 
to explaining individual variability. 
--------------
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are cognitive misers, who "can be motivated to think in integratively complex ways" (Tetlock, 
1993, p. 402), but who nonetheless have "thresholds for the activation of coping responses" -
i.e., traits (ibid, p. 403). 
Critique 
The discussion has highlighted a number of personal and social determinants of cognitive style 
which have been identified in the literature. The srudies reported here all demonstrate that 
individuals display different cognitive styles over different contexts and content domains. As 
such, they contradict Mischel's (1973, 1979) claim that cognitive style tends to be "most 
consistent". Also, they suggest that the common practice of measuring an individual's cognitive 
style by means of a scale or experimental procedure - which assign an individual a single score 
to represent his/her characteristic cognitive style- may produce highly misleading results. 
These fmdings, however, have not had a noticeable impact on the authoritarianism literarure, and 
even Tetlock, the ardent advocate of individual variability, has continued to srudy cognitive 
complexity as a personality trait (Tetlock et al., 1993). Thus, individual variability in cognitive 
style remains equivocal: 
Today we know that integrative complexity possesses some attributes of a relatively stable 
individual difference variable (moderate consistency across time, situation, and issues) 
and some attributes of a relatively context-specific variable (predictable variation as a 
function of situational and issue variables) (Tedock, 1993, pp. 384-385). 
There are a number of reasons for this equivocation. Firstly, in comparison with the large body 
of research associated with the authoritarianism literature, which has assumed cognitive style to 
be a generalized personality trait, the srudies which have demonstrated individual variability 
remain few and obscure. Secondly, some research has provided evidence for the possibility that 
cognitive traits are partially generalized over different, circumscribed content domains and aspects 
of cognitive strucrure (Steiner, 1954; Steiner & Johnson, 1963; Scott et al., 1979). 
Most importantly, all evidence of individual variability has been accommodated into 
individualistic theory, under "interactionist models" of personality (Argyle, 1976; Ekehammar, 
1974; Mischel, 1968). Tetlock (1993), for instance, concludes that "Lewin's classic formula, 
Behaviour = f(Person, Environment), summarizes a good deal of what we have learned about 
determinants of integrative complexity during the past twenty years" {p. 384). Interactionism, 
however, has tended to reinforce, rather then undermine the personality status of cognitive style, 
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for these models presuppose consistent individual differences which are then influenced by 
siruation. By "separating" variance attributable to individuals and siruations in ANOVA-type 
designs, "most empirical work [on interactionism] has been limited to the mechanistic interactions 
of two independent variables, i.e., a personal characteristic and a situational manipulation, on 
individual behaviour as the dependent variable" (Krahe, 1990. p. 67). As Sampson (1981) has 
observed, interactionism: 
... has not advanced beyond the value biases contained within a purely cogmnvtst 
perspective itself: (l) A subjectivist reduction still remains primary in most interactionist 
views; the subject is the active element, the object a more passive and unchanging thing 
'out there'. (2) Inquiry is rarely if ever addressed to the manner by which objects or 
situations are themselves constituted or cast (pp. 733-734). 
Interactionist models maintain a dualism between the individual, and social or situational 
influences of cognitive style, but favour the individual's psychological processes as the active 
elements in this relationship. 
This self-contained individualism and regress to a trait-like conception of cognitive style is clearly 
evident in the accounts of individual variability offered by the learning theorists and by Tetlock. 
Learning theorists such as Schroder et al. (1967) argue that an individual's cognitive strucrure 
is a pre-formed psychological property which functions differentially depending on the 
individual's experience with, or the complexity of, the external siruation. The individual remains 
as a separate and distinct unit of analysis and object of knowledge. The laws, principles, and 
properties of this object may thus be legitimately srudied independently of context. Tetlock, for 
example, proposes that the universal psychological process of congruity is the "active element" 
which, in combination with ideological orientation, (somehow) produces characteristic cognitive 
styles. However, when individuals fmd themselves in siruations where they need to manage their 
impression or account for their beliefs, they may employ different styles of cognition. 
Accordingly, Tetlock reinforces a dualism between the individual and siruation, views the 
individual as the active processor of a passive external world, and is thus able to consider the 
trait-like and situation-specific properties of cognitive style independently (in different papers: 
compare Tetlock, 1986 with Tetlock et al., 1993). 
It is precisely these dualism, the divides between the individual, the siruation, and the cognitive 
content, which underlies the objectivism of an empiricist epistemology (Barwise, 1988; Gergen, 
1985). The core theoretical difference between an empiricist and anti-universalist psychology, 
therefore, lies in the distinction between what is inside and outside the individual. Whereas 
empiricism reinforces this distinction by defming (internal) meaning/representation in terms of 
external truth conditions, an anti-universalistic psychology collapses the distinction by socializing 
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and contexrualizing individuality and consciousness. The discipline of psychology has been forced 
to accommodate the inherently contextual and content-bound nature of psychological phenomenon 
(Gergen & Semin, 1990; Markova & Foppa, 1990). This has a number of implications for the 
conceptualization and measurement of cognitive style. 
These implications can be illustrated by comparing Tetlock's understanding of cognitive style with 
the anti-universalistic conception derived from Billig's rhetorical psychology. To a certain degree, 
these are "incommensurable paradigms", and at this stage the discussion will be restricted to 
some of the major implications that a shift to a rhetorical psychology has for the conceprualization 
of cognitive style. The deeper theoretical differences between the two paradigms, and a more 
detailed account of rhetorical psychology will be developed in Chapter 6. 
Billig adopts a completely new object of study when he "shifts the focus of social psychology 
itself away from the uncovering of mental structures within the individual. .. toward social factors, 
especially those relating to language" (1991, p. 14). By focusing on language, Billig is able to 
overcome the dualism and cognitive bias denounced by Sampson (also Gergen, 1985; Henriques 
et al., 1984). He neither assumes that cognitive style is a property of individual psychology, nor 
aims to identify and decode the laws of cognition as the empiricist tradition has recommended. 
Instead of splitting subject and object- viewing individual psychology as the pre-formed "active 
element" and contents and contexts as passive and unchanging things "out there"- Billig argues 
that social norms, like situations: 
... cannot merely exist as constraints existing outside individuals. For social norms to 
function as social pressures, they must be internalized, and thereby form part of the 
individual's cognitive beliefs (1991, p. 127). 
Cognitive/ideological contents and situations are, at once, both internal and external to the 
individual. 
Billig cannot, therefore, study the individual which has been abstracted from his/her milieu. 
Instead, by proposing language as the object of analysis, he is able to negotiate the indexical 
nature of social psychological phenomena, and the constructive (performative) nature of language 
use (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). According to this 
view, cognitive style is an immediately social and contextual phenomenon, and individuals are 
expected to display variability in cognitive style as they use language to perform different 
functions in different contexts. In addition, Billig situates language use in a rhetorical context: 
"the context of opinion-giving is the context of argumentation" (1991, p. 17; Billig, 1987a). Since 
individuals are persuading and criticizing others when they use language, the context of opinion 
giving - which is also the context of cognitive style - is inherently evaluative and emotive. 
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Unlike Tetlock's account of cognitive style which originated in information processing theory, 
but in accordance with Frenkel-Brunswik's early description of intolerance of ambiguity, Billig 
stresses the emotive/evaluative aspects of cognitive style. 17 In contrast to Frenkel-Brunswik, 
however, these emotive aspects do not derive from deep psychological processes, but are 
emergent from dialogical social relations. 
Billig's conception of cognitive style also has descriptive parallels with Frenkel-Brunswik's 
description of intolerance of ambiguity; the notion of evaluative categorization is central to both 
accounts. Billig (1982) uses the term balance-as-consistency to characterise the Manichean 
thinking that has traditionally been attributed to the authoritarian, and balance-as-counterweight 
to depict the flexible and ambivalent style of the tolerant person. Where balance-as-consistency 
is a cognitive style which seeks to attain balance by bolstering one value at the expense of 
another, balance-as-counterweight is an ambivalent cognitive style which is distinguished by 
inconsistent cognitive elements which coexist in a manner characteristic of tolerance of ambiguity. 
However, in contrast to Frenkel-Brunswik's theorizing, these cognitive styles are manifest in a 
rhetorical context, and cannot be reduced to properties of individual personality. Thus, besides 
emphasizing individual variability in cognitive style, Billig approaches Frenkel-Brunswik's 
conception of intolerance of ambiguity on a descriptive level by stressing the emotive/evaluative 
features of cognition associated with ambivalent and unambivalent categorizations. 
As with Tetlock's theory, the notion of value/cognitive conflict is central to Billig's conception 
of cognitive style. However, Billig's understanding of values, value conflict, and the resolution 
of dilemmas differs markedly from Tetlock's. These differences stem from Billig's rejection of 
the dualism which is implicit in Tetlock's theory. Instead of arguing that universal psychological 
phenomena (consistency motives) engage external entities (values), Billig (1982) poses the 
question: "What makes two psychological elements come to be perceived as being inconsistent 
with one another?" (p. 141). For Tetlock, this is a banal question. By drawing on Rokeach's 
(1973, 1979) conception of "supraindividual", "universal", and "terminal" values, it is obvious 
to Tetlock that conflict ensues when an individual recognises that a belief satisfies one value at 
the expense of another. This is not obvious to Billig since he acknowledges cultural and 
contextual variability in value conflict, and cannot assume that individual's privately ascribe a 
"definite value" to an external belief. Offering one's children to the gods, for instance, may 
arouse conflict in one culture but not in another. Billig thus responds to his question by arguing 
17 More recently, Tetlock ( 1993) has acknowledged that the "identity of integrative complexity as a purely 
cognitive construct has been challenged" (p. 384). 
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that "the simple answer would be to refer to norms and assert, for example, that two elements 
are inconsistent if it is generally accepted in the given cultural context that they are inconsistent" 
(p. 141). The non-resolution of dilemmas such as sacrificing children to the gods is not 
attributable to a faulty ascription of "definite value", or to the breakdown of psychological 
consistency dynamics (between the value of sanctity of the life and of respect for the gods), but 
can be translated into "much more obvious statements about social desirability and conformity 
to norms" (Billig, 1982, p. 142). 18 Thus, social and rhetorical influences, as well as contexts, 
are integral to all expressions of cognitive style, and cannot be separated from individual traits. 
Two implications follow from Billig's conception of v'alues and value conflict. Firstly, the 
processes which are employed to achieve conflict resolution, and the ends toward which they aim 
are substantially different from Tetlock's theory. Tetlock's conflict resolution involves developing 
more highly differentiated and integrated cognitive systems with the aim of fmding logicaUcorrect 
solutions to the dilemmas. In response to a value dilemma, Tetlock's (1986) asks: "What common 
metric can be used to compare the value of human lives saved as a result of costly industrial 
safety regulations against the economic losses associated with those regulations?" (p. 819). By 
seeking different implications of each path of action (differentiation), and weighing and balancing 
these in relation to each other (integration), Tetlock suggests that an individual may fmd some 
criterion in the world whereby the two values may be compared and the conflict may be resolved. 
In this sense, Tetlock's notion of conflict resolution is empiricist. It refers to formal internal 
mental operations on a static, knowable, external world (under assumptions of empirical realism). 
In contrast, Billig suggests that individuals may draw on contrary themes of commonsense (or 
discourses) in order to construct an issue in one particular way or another (Billig et al., 1988; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992). He recognises that the 
conflict between human life and economic profit, while real within a particular socio-historical 
context, is not some basic feature of the world which the mind may recognise, ascribe a "defmite 
value", and "resolve". According to rhetorical psychology, ambivalent cognitive styles originate 
from drawing on conflicting (social) themes in the context of argumentation and persuasion, not 
in mental operations on an external world. In this sense, cognitive style emerges out of dialogical 
social relations rather than the functioning of a psychological mechanism. Although Tetlock's 
18 Billig uses the term "norms" in a non-normative sense. In agreement with discourse theory, norms are 
not viewed as stable cultural entities, but as a set of discourses (or themes of commonsense) which have 
become institutionalized through historical processes, and which are ideological and sustain power relations 
(cf. Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Parker, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This view of norms posits 
that, within any context, an individual may endorse many conflicting discourses (contrary themes of 
commonsense). Of course, this opens up a field of enquiry regarding norms, conformity, and desirability 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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studies of accountability support this basic claim, in the Billigian framework, people are always 
accountable in rhetorical contexts of language use. Individual traits cannot be separated from 
(situational) accountability. 
Secondly, Billig's notion of values and conflict resolution open an avenue to theorize both 
individual variability in cognitive style over content and context, as well as a necessary 
relationship between the style and content of cognition in a particular context. Since particular 
belief contents (i.e., discourses, themes of commonsense) are normative in certain contexts, 
individuals who endorse other, non-normative contents are expected to adopt flexible and 
ambiguous cognitive styles if they are to be rhetorically persuasive. Racist beliefs, for example, 
when advanced in a liberal or anti-racist context, are highly ambivalent (Billig, 1988a; van Dijk, 
1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Thus, while recognising individual variability, by taking 
account of the context of interaction and thinking, Billig can accommodate a necessary 
relationship between ambivalent cognitive styles and ideological beliefs. 
This relationship between the content and style of cognition is central to what Billig (1978) refers 
to as "the paradox at the centre of the concept of authoritarianism" . He argues that, far from 
measuring intolerance of ambiguity, the F-scale was "deliberately constructed to contain the very 
ambiguities, hedgings and lack of categorical assertion which are supposed to threaten the 
authoritarian" (p. 59)! In America of the 1940's, Billig explains, some tenets of fascism 
conflicted with the generally held norm of democracy. Consequently, statements of hostility 
against a minority group were "tempered and disguised by means of a compromise with 
democratic ideals" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 60). Since deviance from normative beliefs has been 
shown to have emotive correlates (Asch, 1956; Bogdanoff et al., 1961), and since beliefs and 
values not only "locate one in a culture ... but also constrain the organization of the self" 
(Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992, p. 28; Davies & Harre, 1990; Sampson, 1993; Shotter 
& Gergen, 1989), these ambivalent cognitive styles are also expected to have an inseparable 
affective component, rather than being purely formal and private mental operations. 
Billig thus offers an alternative to the universalistic theories of cognitive style which have 
characterized the psychological literature. His conception of cognitive style has many parallels 
with Frenkel-Brunswik's description of intolerance of ambiguity: it includes both the features of 
ambivalent categorization, and its emotive/evaluative correlates. By focusing on language as the 
object of analysis, though, Billig has no need to go beyond manifest tolerance/intolerance of 
ambiguity, and theorise its status as a personality variable or as a law-like cognitive process. In 
contrast to Tetlock and the learning theorists, cognitive style is not seen as a function of private 
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mental activity, but as originating in a rhetorical context. Ambivalent cognitive styles are argued 
to result from an individual's negotiation of contrary, shared themes of commonsense. Also, by 
incorporating insights regarding the indexical and performative aspects of language, he theorizes 
the inherently context- and content-bound nature of manifest cognitive style. 19 By rejecting the 
individual as the locus of explanation, Billig may advance beyond Tetlock and the learning 
theorists by rejecting the trait-like nature of cognitive style unequivocally. In addition, however, 
by arguing that values and opinions which are unpopular within a particular context will require 
more flexible and complex cognitive styles, Billig may theorize a necessary relationship between 
the style and content of cognition in a particular context. Chapter 6 presents a dialogical account 
of individual variability, and an anti-universalistic account of individual differences in cognitive 
style, mediated by ideological content and context. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the Popperian notion of falsification, it appears as though theoretical change does 
not flow all to easily from our being "disappointed in our expectations". At least for the body 
of literature under consideration here, two complementary processes have frustrated attempts to 
escape an empiricist ontology: the ontology has been assumed by the methods of observation, and 
unexpected observations have been accommodated by interactionist theory, which leaves an 
empiricist ontology intact. 
As this chapter has argued, in contrast to Frenkel-Brunswik's description of tolerance/intolerance 
of ambiguity, later research has gradually assumed ambiguity tolerance to be a generalized 
personality trait. On the basis of observed differences in the talk of prejudiced and non-prejudiced 
individuals, Frenkel-Brunswik originally defmed intolerance of ambiguity as an evaluative 
"attitudinal variable" which is manifest in Manichean categorizations of social "objects". Her 
"prime concern" was then to test a theory that these differences in talk were attributable to the 
underlying dynamics of a generalized personality trait. Ensuing research has, however, assumed 
intolerance of ambiguity to be a generalized personality trait by developing asocial and non-
evaluative measures of the construct which apportion each individual a single score to represent 
her/his position along the continuum of traits. Accordingly, being disappointed in our 
expectations has proved rather difficult. as our means of observation has incorporated 
19 Compare this conception of cognitive style with the contextual and dialogical accounts of meaning 
(Barwise, 1988; Rommetveit, 1990). 
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assumptions which do not allow a fair test of theory. Moreover, being task specific and 
ideologically biased, the single scores of cognitive style which have been derived from 
experimental and scaling measures of cognitive style have possessed little construct validity. The 
literature which has sought to investigate the generality of cognitive style is thus difficult to 
assess. 
More recently, interest in individual variability in cognitive style has gained the attention of 
researchers, and a few procedures have been developed in order to test for possible individual 
variability. Even here, though, the results have been mixed. Although individual variability has 
generally been identified, the research has also suggested that cognitive traits may be partially 
generalized over circumscribed content domains and facets of cognitive structure. In addition, 
observed individual variability has been accommodated by interactionist models of personality, 
and has not threatened the empiricist assumptions which underlie an individualistic psychology 
of cognitive style. 
Consequently, not only have measurement assumptions made theoretical change difficult, but 
institutionalized theoretical orientations have accommodated conflicting observations. It is thus 
necessary first to detail theoretical alternatives to a universalistic conception of cognitive style, 
then derive methodological procedures which may allow a fair test of the basic assumptions of 
this theory. In other words, it is necessary to break from one methodological circle and enter 
another, hopefully, more productive one, grounded in a sound philosophy of science. 
The insights from Billig's rhetorical psychology have been used to sketch an alternative, anti-
universalistic theory of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. Billig argues that the "thinking 
society" should be the proper object of social psychological analysis. Accordingly, the analysis 
of conversation and rhetoric provides an appropriate framework by which to understand the 
'cognitive processes' of the thinking society. By emphasizing the inherently context- and content-
bound nature of talk, this model provides a radical shift away from a universalistic theory of 
cognitive style. Nonetheless, it has many descriptive commonalities with Frenkel-Brunswik's 
original formulation of intolerance of ambiguity. Intolerance of ambiguity is seen as an evaluative 
"attitudinal variable" manifest in unambiguous categorization. 
Due to measurement assumptions and methodological problems with previous research, however, 
the empirical evidence that would justify a shift to an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive 
style remains equivocal. No firm conclusions can be drawn regarding whether or not individual 
cognitive style is indeed variable over context and content domain. As this chapter has argued, 
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the vast majority of research has incorporated into its measurement instruments the assumption 
that cognitive style is a generalized trait-like phenomenon. The research which has sought to test 
the generality of cognitive style has generally either been inconclusive because of methodological 
problems, or has produced mixed fmdings which have typically been assimilated by interactionist 
models of personality, and have left the possibility of a trait-like notion of cognitive style intact. 
The next chapter aims to develop a measure of cognitive style which overcomes some of the 
methodological problems with previous measures, and tests whether tolerance/intolerance of 
ambiguity is a generalized trait. 
Chapter 4 
Investigating variability in tolerance of 
ambiguity 
In short we know that the facts are theory dependent and changeable; and that sdence itself 
appears ... as a historical process of levels and connections, a weighted network, without 
foundations, developing in time. This view does not dispute the epistemic value of experience. 
However, it interprets this not as the absolute privilege of a content, but as dependent upon the 
ontological and sodal contexts within which the significant experience occurs. 
(Roy Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 96) 
Thus far the thesis has argued that social psychological theories of the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs have been bedeviled by an underlying tension between 
empiricist theoretical universalism, and the potential to sustain political critique. In addition, it 
has been suggested that universalist assumptions have been incorporated into measurement 
procedures which have presumed cognitive style to be a stable and general property of individual 
psychology. Moreover, even findings which demonstrate individual variability have been 
accommodated by universalistic theory. Because of the degree of circularity which exists between 
theory and observation, the evaluation of theoretical assumptions within the discipline has proved 
complex. Consequently, an anti-universalistic account of the relationship between cognitive style 
and ideological beliefs has been difficult to establish. 
Where the previous chapters have been descriptive and critical, the following two escape the 
impasse which has been reached by evaluating the universalistic conception of cognitive style 
empirically. The substantive aims of this chapter are twofold: to develop a measure of 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity which can test the assumptions of generality, and report the 
findings of a study which investigated cross-content variability in ambiguity tolerance. The results 
show a high degree of cross-content variability in intolerance of ambiguity, and question the 
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common assumption that ambiguity tolerance is a generalized trait-like property of mind. The 
following chapter reports the fmdings of two studies which use this measurement procedure to 
examine the relationship between tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity and ideological beliefs. 
Since this is the first chapter to report empirical data, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion 
of the role that observation plays in this thesis. For an empiricist psychology, observation is 
unproblematic, and there is little need to digress from the well-worn hypothetico-deductive path 
(Kimble, 1989). This practice is sustained by a philosophy of science which rests on the 
assumption that theory, guided by value-free observation, may mirror reality. It is precisely this 
assumption which is brought into question by recognising the theory-bound nature of observation 
(as in the "methodological circle"). The mounting critique which has been levelled against 
empiricism has argued that, since observation is theory-dependent, it is not feasible to ground 
theoretical certainty in observation. Instead, it is possible that incommensurable, independent, and 
circular bodies of knowledge (theory) may co-exist, with no value-free, second-level theory or 
observation by which to evaluate them (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Rorty, 1979, 1991). 
Thus, in contrast to an empiricist foundationalism - based on observation and rooted in a 
correspondence theory of knowledge and reality - the radical relativist alternative which has 
recently been proposed questions the role of observation in science. 
At the opposite extreme to empiricist foundationalism is a post-Marxist (Eagleton, 1991) or 
posonodernist (Simons & Billig, 1994) philosophy which questions empiricist correspondence 
theory, postulates a radical indeterminacy between theory and reality, and consequently, rejects 
theory, epistemology, and the role of scientific observation (e.g., Feyerabend, 1975; Fish, 1985; 
Rorty, 1991). The present work takes a middle way between empiricist foundationalism and 
postmodern radical relativism by drawing on a critical realist philosophy of science. 
Critical realism: ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
In response to the possibility of Cartes~an doubt, an empiricist philosophy of science strives for 
certainty by grounding knowledge in the observation of "constant conjunctions of events" which, 
under a Humean-Hempelian conception of cause, are _used to identify a law-like, mechanical 
reality (Bhaskar, 1975, 1989b; Chalmers, 1988). Empiricist foundationalism is thus established 
on the assumptions that (a) observation gives clear, value-free access to reality, and (b) the 
knowledge derived from scientific observation may reflect or correspond with reality ( cf. 
Hempel, 1965). Both of these related assumptions are untenable. First, value-freedom and 
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scientific objectivity do not exist (Danziger, 1990; Kuhn, 1970); and moreover, "an unbridled 
lucidity can destroy our understanding of complex matters" (Polanyi, 1967, p. 18). Second, 
representationism (a correspondence theory of truth) has been criticised for it rests on the 
(metaphysical) assumption that the world takes the shape of a concept, or that language and 
observation may give us untroubled access to the real- i.e., that language "cuts reality at the 
joints" (Rorty, 1991, p. 80; Quine, 1953; Lakoff, 1988). This, Bhaskar has called the antic 
fallacy, "the ontologization and hence naturalization (and thence eternalization) of knowledge, and 
so its compulsive determination by being" (1989b, p. 181). By establishing causal laws through 
observing constant conjunctions of events, the Humean account of science, Bhaskar (1975, 
1989b) contends, ignores an ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns of events, 
depends on a "misidentification" of causal laws and their empirical grounds, and correspondingly, 
ontologizes knowledge. 
A number of philosophies have reacted against empiricist foundationalism and its assumptions of 
scientific objectivity and representationism. 1 These have recognised the theory-bound nature of 
observation, have taken seriously the constructive or performative powers of language, and have 
concluded that empiricist foundationalism has no foundation (Austin, 1962; Bhaskar, 1975, 1986, 
1989b; Kuhn, 1970; Polanyi, 1967; Quine, 1953; Rorty, 1979, 1991). There can be no 
theoretical certainty because 1) different knowledges may derive, not from error in mapping 
reality, but from the theory-bound nature of observation (cf..Shotter, 1993a), and 2) that there 
is no value-free, second-order language or theoretical system- what Rorty (1991) calls a 'God's 
eye view' -by which to choose which theory comes closer to a true account of the world (cf. 
Feyerabend, 1975). Accordingly, anti-foundationalist philosophies of science recognise 
epistemological relativism. 
It is here that critical realism differs from post-Marxist, postmodernist, and neo-pragmatist 
accounts. Bhaskar (1989a) agrees that "all beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge 
is transient, and neither truth-values nor criteria for rationality exist outside historical time" (p. 
57). However, in contrast to the radical relativist thesis, he does not proceed from 
epistemological relativism to the irrationalist conclusion that all beliefs are then equally valid 
(i.e., judgemental relativism). This movement from epistemological to judgemental relativism is 
characteristic of theories which, by drawing on the arbitrary relationship between signifier and 
signified, have used post-structuralist insights to argue that there is "nothing beyond the text" 
1 Since empiricist foundationalism concerns the relationship between signifier and signified (theory and 
reality), the crisis in the philosophy of science is a variant of the broader (modem) problem surrounding 
signification and meaning (cf. Eagleton, 1983; Eco, Santambrogio & Violi, 1988). 
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(Derrida, 1976, p. 158); or, as Eagleton (1991) says in criticising the post-Marxists, that "objects 
are entirely internal to the discourses which constitute them" (p. 205, emphasis added). Similarly, 
Bhaskar (1989b, chap. 8) has reproached Rorty for (wrongly) inferring that "there is no way to 
know that a thing exists (or acts) independently of a particular description" from the legitimate 
claim that "there is no way to know a thing except under a particular description". In the hands 
of Rorty (and others), Bhaskar and Eagleton argue, the epistemological relativist position leads 
to anti-realist thesis. 2 
Once the relationship between theory and reality is judged to be arbitrary- as it is, for example, 
in Rorty's (1991) abandonment of epistemology or Fish's (1985) rejection of theory as 
inconsequential - an anti-realist ontology and judgemental relativism follow. Since reality is 
collapsed into discourse, it becomes impossible to judge that a discourse had constructed an 
object validly, that one set of experiences is more authentic than another, or that any particular 
political perspective is more beneficial than any other (Eagleton, 1991; Parker, 1992; Simons, 
1985; Simons & Billig, 1994). By inferring judgemental relativism from epistemological 
relativism, postmodern philosophy has progressed from an anti-foundationalist philosophy of 
science to an anti-realist position. In consequence, all observation in science is rendered futile, 
for the statement that one set of observations is closer to reality is rendered absurd. 
Although the thoroughgoing relativism of postmodern theory strikes one as immediately 
antithetical to empiricist foundationalism, this opposition has been deconstructed. In his adroit 
manner, Eagleton ( 1991) has shown the unity between empiricist correspondence theory of truth 
and the "vicious relativism" of postmodernism. He argues that, by collapsing signifier and 
signified, the anti-realist position of Hindess & Hurst ( 1977) merely inverts the empiricist model 
they wish to destroy: 
... whereas empiricists thought the signifier is thought to follow spontaneously from the 
signified ... now it is a question of the signified following obediently from the signifier (p. 
208). 
By taking the theory-bound nature of reality to its logical extreme, the anti-realist thesis promotes 
a new form of representationism: all description is reduced to value judgement (construction). 3 
In his efforts to reclaim reality, Bhaskar has developed a parallel critique of both empiricism and 
anti-realism. Because his interests involve the relationship between theory and reality (and 
2 Harre (1992a) offers a similar criticism of Gergen's (1991) postmodernist psychology expounded in The 
saturated self 
3 In practice, few psychologists have endorsed this extreme formulation. Instead, like Potter & Wetherell 
( 1987), they rely on an unexplained voluntarism to link explanation to reality ( cf. Bowers, 1988). 
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epistemology and ontology), Bhaskar speaks of the transitive and intransitive realms instead of 
signifier and signified. However, much the same distinction is being marked: the transitive realm 
is a linguistic one of signifying practices - rhetoric, metaphor, and narrative - where meaning 
is indexical and self-referential; whereas, the intransitive realm refers to an external reality, the 
signified. 
Bhaskar argues that the anti-realist and empiricist positions are analogous since they both 
subscribe to the epistemic fallacy: the definition of being in terms of knowledge. By claiming that 
"every meaningful statement is ... translatable into a statement about immediate experience", 
empiricism implies that the truth about reality (a meaningful statement) may be reduced to 
knowledge of reality as derived from observation (Quine, 1953, p. 38; see also Eco et al., 1988). 
This leads empiricism quickly to the ontic fallacy which ontologizes knowledge by assuming that 
(true) knowledge represents reality; the intransitive realm mirrors the transitive realm. In his 
critique of Rorty, Bhaskar ( 1989b) argues that Rorty has rejected the ontic fallacy, but, by 
remaining committed to the epistemic fallacy, he adopts an anti-realist position. To oversimplify 
the argument, Bhaskar contends that Rorty reaches an anti-realist thesis by recognising 
epistemological relativism, but, because he remains committed to the epistemic fallacy (the 
defmition of being in terms of knowledge), he draws the (false) conclusion that reality is 
thoroughly indeterminate. The result is that "Rorty has furnished us with a post-epistemological 
theory of knowledge without justification which matches his account of science without being" 
(Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 160, emphasis added). Consequently, because of the radical indeterminacy 
of being, observation is useless to science. Rorty has inverted empiricism. 
Critical realism rejects the anthropomorphic, epistemological defmition of being in terms of 
knowledge, but does not deny the reality of events and discourses. On the contrary, critical 
realists insist upon a real, for "we will only be able to understand- and so change- the social 
world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events or discourses" (Bhaskar, 
1989b, p. 2). These structures are not reducible to observed patterns of events as empiricists 
contend, neither are they the mere products of discourse, but are casually prior to events and 
discourse, and can only be identified through "practical and theoretical work". In other words, 
critical realism allows for the existence of a independent, non-anthropomorphic reality. 
Bhaskar ( 1975) has provided a powerful transcendental argument to the effect that the world must 
be characterized by "natural necessity, causal complexity, and emergent powers" if science as 
we know it is to be possible. For, what is significant about the pattern of events which scientists 
co-determine in their (controlled) experimental activity is that it enables them to identify "the 
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mode of operation of structures, mechanisms or processes which they did not produce" (Bhaskar, 
1989a, p. 9). In contrast to empiricism, causal structures are not reduced to patterns of events. 
If the pattern never occurs in the uncontrolled real world - "autumn leaves rarely, if ever, fall 
to the ground in accordance with the law of fall" (Chalmers, 1988, p. 18)- this does not mean 
that the causal structures do not exist in the world. Instead of identifying causal laws with 
regularities of events (i.e., an anthropomorphic epistemology), Bhaskar argues for an independent 
reality, consisting of powers, tendencies, and generative mechanisms. 
Eagleton has provided a similar argument against anti-realism: the rationality and intelligibility 
of our activity is determined by the real nature of the objects we act on. He argues that despite 
the fact that 'wine' and 'wallabies' may signify different things for different cultures (in the 
transitive realm), "this does not mean that they stock their off-licences with wallabies or 
encourage their children to feed bottles of wine in their zoos" (1991, p. 204). While recognising 
the socially constructed nature of beliefs, critical realists dispute Rorty's (1991) claim that an 
object "cannot suggest beliefs for us to hold" (p. 83). 
The distinction between the transitive and intransitive realm thus allows us to establish 
epistemological and moral/political criteria for 'truth' (i.e., adequacy of explanation). We are not 
reduced to the Rortian conclusion that "'human nature' is not a useful moral concept" (1991, p. 
31), for the underlying (intransitive structures) of real humans demand that they need sustenance 
and shelter, despite the fact that in the transitive realm they may live in igloos and eat raw fish, 
fried eggs, or other humans (cf. Harre, 1992a). Bhaskar, however, insists on the non-identity of 
(or ontological gap between) the transitive and intransitive realms. He recognises the non-
representational nature of language and theory, but as an epistemological criterion "relegates the 
notion of correspondence between [theory and reality] to the status of a metaphor for the aim of 
an adequating practice" ( 1989b, p. 23). Critical realism thus stands opposed to both (a) epistemic 
absolutism, since it recognises that all beliefs are socially produced, transient, and theory-bound, 
and (b) epistemic irrationalism, since it admits an external real, and posits rational grounds for 
preferring one belief to another. 
The real, however, is not like a concrete slab upon which one may stumble. The structures which 
Bhaskar (1986, 1989a, 1989b) proposes for the human sciences are social-relation-dependent, 
praxis- and concept-dependent, and manifest a material-space-time specificity and substantial gee-
historicity. This means that the scientist must move from manifest phenomena such as Humean 
empirical regularities, to the structures that generate them - that is, from a substance-like 
mechanical ontology (e.g., personality traits) to a emergent ontology in which historical things 
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are viewed as "ensembles of tendencies, liabilities and powers" (Bhaskar, 1989a, p. 19), or 
Gibsonian "affordances" (Parker, 1992; Shotter, 1993a). This, of course, does not imply that 
critical realists seek an "honest-to-God, down-home, accurate representation of the way the world 
is" (Rorty, 1984, p. 3). 
On a concrete level, critical realism has substantial implications for the conception and 
measurement of cognitive style. Most obviously, it means that cognitive style should not be 
viewed as a property of individual psychology, or that factors of cognitive style be seen as 
dimensions of personality. This conception originates in the ontic fallacy, where (static, surface) 
correlation matrices and factor structures have been used to represent the world (i.e., human 
psychology), despite the fact that the observation and representation are thoroughly theory-bound. 
Empiricist psychology assumes that cognitive traits are generalized psychological phenomena 
which may be (theoretically and methodologically) abstracted from their context of manifestation. 
Instead, critical realist theory would argue that manifest correlations between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs or between different indices of cognitive style are emergent surface 
phenomena, attributable to underlying generative structures which, under particular context- and 
content-bound conditions (e.g., the experimental situation), may conjoin in certain observable 
ways. Critical realism therefore implies a change in the object of research: from constant 
conjunctions - which via the ontic fallacy and the assumption of correspondence are given 
ontological status by empiricism- to underlying generative structures. While these structures 
may not be determinate (because of the non-identity between the transitive and intransitive 
realms), they are generative and their operations may be understood by investigating their effects 
(i.e., the nature of the reproduced outcomes which they generate). It is imperative, therefore, that 
a measure of cognitive style be developed which enables the researcher to capture the potential 
for individual variability, and the context- and content-bound nature of expression of cognitive 
style. This will assist in distinguishing between the validity of the empiricist and critical realist 
ontologies. These models of reality may be evaluated by employing a measure which allows the 
researcher to examine the differential manifestations of cognitive style that these models expect. 
By averring the non-identity of the transitive and intransitive realms (i.e., epistemological 
relativism), critical realists realise that correspondence is nothing more than a metaphor (Bhaskar, 
1986, 1989b; Greenwood, 1992b). Unlike empiricist science, critical realism is not ensnared by 
the ontic fallacy into believing that to record constant conjunctions is to document reality. 
Bhaskar recognises the degree to which reality is constituted by observation and theory. 
Nonetheless, "correspondence" is a metaphor which can provide some kind of limit to what is 
considered adequate knowledge. While it is true that all measurement incorporates ontological 
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assumptions, this does not mean that measurement instruments and their associated theories 
construct reality in toto, or that there is no way of judging which measurements (and associated 
discourses) allow a better "representation" of reality. On the contrary, it is possible for example, 
to establish/communicate criteria whereby one could test whether cognitive style is manifest as 
a generalized personality trait or as an inherently context- and content-dependent phenomenon. 
Such a test will allow us to make plausible judgements as to which ontology is more appropriate 
for the study of cognitive style. 
The critical realist philosophy of science meshes nicely with a rhetorical account of cognitive 
style. The dialogical nature of cognitive phenomena proposed by rhetoricians implies that any 
surface manifestation of cognitive style is emergent and causally dependent upon social relations 
which operate in particular contexts. Moreover, like critical realists, rhetoricians endorse neither 
a correspondence theory of truth nor an antirealist "vicious relativism". They hold fast the notion 
of objectivity, in a "minimal sense", without making substantial epistemic claims about "knowing 
what is really 'out there'" (Keith & Cherwitz, 1989, p. 204; Nelson & Megill, 1986). More to 
the point, rhetoricians are interested in the relationship between language and power, and are 
aware of the real effects that institutions and ideologies have on the style and content of cognition 
(Harriman, 1989; McCloskey, 1985). Thus, both aver a non-identity between the transitive and 
intransitive realms, but acknowledge the existence of non-anthropomorphic "things out there", 
and their impact on language and thought. 
The study of rhetoric has two potential contributions to make to a theory of cognitive style. 
Firstly, rhetoric provides an appropriate model of the structured, relational, and emergent 
features of cognition which critical realism recommends we study (cf. Billig, 1985a, 1987a, 
1993; Billig et al., 1988). Rhetoric assists in shifting from an individualistic conception of social 
structure to a critical realist definition of structure in terms of "systems of human relationships 
among social positions" (Porpora, 1989, p. 195). Secondly, the study of rhetoric may help to 
give content to the generative structures which impact on cognitive style. Analyzing the usage 
of different cognitive styles may assist in identifying and studying the particular relational 
structures which generate manifest patterns of cognitive style. This twofold distinction 
corresponds roughly with the methodological distinction which Bhaskar derives from his model 
of science; between: 
... the social sciences, which abstract from human agency, studying the structure of 
reproduced outcomes; and the social psychological sciences which abstract from 
reproduced outcomes, studying the rules governing the mobilization of resources by 
agents in their everyday interaction with one another and with nature (Bhaskar, 1989b, 
p. 93, emphasis in original). 
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The empirical research reported in this thesis employs these two methodological strategies to 
explore the different uses to which the study of rhetoric may be put in investigating cognitive 
style. This and the following chapter adopt the methodology of the social sciences to investigate 
the structure of reproduced outcomes. Quantitative methods are used to investigate the stability 
and generality of cognitive style, and the relationship between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs. This research aims to identify the structure of reproduced outcomes in order to supply 
empirical grounds for shifting from an empiricist to critical realist ontology and conception of 
cognitive style. Chapter 6 studies the rules governing the mobilization of resources - the use 
of tolerance and intolerance of ambiguity- in practice. This involves the analysis of rhetoric, 
and the methodology is qualitative. This research aims to identify the generative structures 
underlying the use of cognitive style in a rhetorical context. 
The remainder of this chapter proposes a measure of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity which 
allows for the observation of possible variability in cognitive style over different content domains, 
and employs this measure to examine the plausibility of an anti-universalistic theory of cognitive 
style. The aims are modest. The study does not strive to identify underlying structures, causal 
laws and the like. It merely aims to investigate the plausibility of two models of cognition. Of 
course, the observation is filtered by theoretical assumptions (e.g., numerical data), but I do not 
assume that what is being observed is the 'reality' of cognitive style. Instead, the study aims to 
explore the effects of underlying generative structures in an effort, not to derive predictive 
models, but to examine the validity of two diametrically opposed explanations of the causal 
structure underlying manifest expressions of cognitive style: one, property-like and stable; the 
other, emergent and variable. 
Measurement 
While all measurement is theory-bound and rooted in ontological assumptions, this does not mean 
that all measurement instruments are equally worthless. On the contrary, some measures allow 
the researcher to examine the assumptions upon which others are based (i.e., methodological 
reflexivity), thus allowing an evaluation of the former assumptions. This is clear from the 
measurement of cognitive style discussed in the previous chapter. An array of measures have 
been employed which have explicitly ruled out individual variability in cognitive style. These 
have treated cognitive style as an asocial and non-evaluative trait, and have assigned each 
individual a single score to represent his/her characteristic trait-like style. Only two measures-
Tetlock's integrative complexity coding scheme, and Scott's measure of object ambivalence-
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have been designed in a manner which allows the researcher to examine the assumption of 
generality. These are surely better in the context of a body of literature which must first establish 
the generality of cognitive traits before proposing theories which assume the existence of 
generalized cognitive traits. 
Due to a number of theoretical and methodological difficulties, the measures proposed by Scott 
and Tetlock are inappropriate for the present purposes. The rhetorical approach to cognitive style 
recommends an evaluative construct which, like Frenkel-Brunswik's description of 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity, includes features of ambivalent versus unambivalent 
categorizations of meaningful social objects (see pp. 66-67). Thus, in addition to assessing 
individual variability in cognitive style, the present work seeks to defme cognitive style as an 
attitudinal variable reflecting evaluative categorization. Although the integrative complexity 
coding scheme may capture ambivalence, this is tangential to its explicit purpose. It was 
originally developed as a measure of the formal aspects of information processing, and assesses 
the complexity of thought with reference to "the number of evaluative distinct dimensions of a 
problem that an individual takes into account" (Tetlock et al., 1989, emphasis added). Taking 
a number of evaluative dimensions into account, however, does not necessarily imply evaluative 
conflict for the subject concerned. Take for example, the instance of highest integrative 
complexity recorded by Tetlock et al. (1989): 
I can see why people disagree with capital punishment. A lot depends on whether you 
look at the issue from the point of view of the victims or from the point of view of the 
criminals. Victims want revenge. Criminals want leniency - and leniency may be 
justified sometimes depending on the circumstances. On balance I support the death 
penalty, but only when there is no doubt regarding guilt and only when the crime is 
especially vicious (p. 635). 
Although this extract shows moderate to high integrative complexity, it does not necessarily imply 
subject ambivalence. Few Americans would support the death penalty for innocent persons or for 
individuals accused of minor crimes. Obviously, the victim's evaluation of the death penalty will 
differ from the criminal's. However, merely being able to see and take account of different sides 
of an issue does not mean that one believes/feels them to be relevant, or agonizes over them. 
This subject may deny the sanctity of life and endorse capital punishment unequivocally in 
instances of murder. Integrative complexity does not imply ambivalence or tolerance of 
ambiguity. 
In addition, there are a number of methodological difficulties with Tetlock's measure. Firstly, 
the integrative complexity coding scheme may confound cognitive style with cognitive contents. 
Scott et al. (1979) argue that since the raters are exposed to both the style and content of 
cognition when coding their texts, explicit ideological contents may insidiously impact on the 
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recorded cognitive simplicity-complexity. Due to cultural stereotypes and the ideological values 
of the raters, conservative contents may, for example, be rated as less integratively complex than 
liberal contents. Additionally, the types of contents which the research subjects endorse in a 
particular context may influence their integrative complexity scores. For example, if the sample 
is selected from a liberal context, conservatives may need to employ more complex arguments 
to justify their beliefs, resulting in conservatism being correlated with integrative complexity (see 
e.g., Tetlock et al., 1989). Thus, despite Tetlock's (1993) insistence that the integrative 
complexity coding scheme assesses "structure, not content, of expressed beliefs and is not biased 
for or against any particular ideology" (p. 382, emphasis in original), it may very well be biased. 
This raises the perennial difficulty of confound when interpreting the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs. 4 Significant correlations between the style and content of 
cognition may be spurious, originating in covert assumptions of the coders, or the relationships 
may be attributable to a dynamic between content and context. 
Secondly, Tetlock's measure includes no way of assessing the effect of a "coding set" which the 
raters may develop, particularly when coding longer extracts of talk. After recognising instances 
of cognitive complexity in an early part of a text, for example, raters may tend to code the full 
text as cognitively complex. This would portray individuals as more consistent than they are. 
While all these criticisms undermine the validity of the measurement procedure, the external 
factors which structure coding (i.e., text content, and coding set) would lead to an increased, but 
spurious, coder reliability. 
Scott's measure of object ambivalence, in contrast, constitutes an advance over previous measures 
of ambiguity tolerance because, in addition to allowing the researcher to assess cross-content 
variability in cognitive style, it includes both social content and the evaluative aspects of 
intolerance of ambiguity. s However, the task that Scott employs to assess ambivalence is deeply 
problematic since it entails a translation of meaning between the subject and the experimenter. 
For example, the adjectives "strict" and "lenient", while being coded as negative and positive 
respectively, may have the opposite meaning for the subject who selects them. One can never be 
sure that the subject views the adjective in a similar manner to the experimenter. Scott must 
assume that his adjectives have fixed (empiricist) meaning. This problem is compounded when 
undertaking cross-content investigations in ambiguity tolerance. It must be assumed that "lenient", 
4 Integrative complexity scores are also potentially confounded with other variables. Higher integrative 
complexity scores are likely to be associated with longer responses, and with greater rhetorical and 
linguistic sophistication. 
'The procedure which Scott uses to measure object ambivalence is discussed on p. 83. 
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for example, has the same connotation when employed to evaluate very different contents, 
including parents, nations, teachers, employers, the courts, etcetera. 
Measuring tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity is a complex undertaking. In addition to difficulties 
in defining the construct and screening out extraneous variables which may influence 
measurement, complications stem from the ambiguity of the content-style linlc On the one hand, 
it is imperative to weld style onto particular contents. This is a basic requirement of a measure 
which aims to assess cross-content variability in cognitive style. However, once the measure of 
cognitive style is confounded with cognitive contents, it becomes difficult to interpret observed 
relationships between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. This is a problem for the 
measurement scales such as the Budner scale, as well as for Tetlock's measure of integrative 
complexity. 
In the studies which follow, the unipolar scaling procedure, originally developed by Kaplan 
(1972), will be modified and employed as the principal measure of cognitive style. Although 
Kaplan was primarily interested in psychometric issues, his unipolar scaling procedure is ideal 
for the purpose of measuring the attitudinal variable of ambiguity tolerance. To assess 
ambivalence, Kaplan developed a procedure to measure the "liking" and "disliking" components 
of an attitude separately. To this end, he employed two independent unipolar scales: one assessing 
the degree of liking toward the item; and the other, the degree of disliking. Unlike bipolar scales 
(e.g., the Likert scale and the Semantic Differential), which assume that the more a person agrees 
with a statement (i.e., marks the agree pole) the less they disagree with the statement (i.e., their 
mark is further from the disagree pole), the unipolar scaling procedure does not presume 
psychological rationality. Accordingly, it is possible to measure cognitive style directly from the 
style of response, without inferring an underlying stylistic trait from responses to attitudinal 
content. The unipolar scaling procedure allows the respondent to express unambivalent acceptance 
or rejection, or varying degrees of ambivalence toward an object. The modified version of the 
scale - to be called the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale (AAT) - and instructions are 
reported in Figure 4.1. 
In order to examine the generality of ambiguity tolerance across content domain, a wide variety 
of authority figures were employed as scale items. Authorities were used as stimuli since they 
are central to any system of ideological beliefs. In addition, generalized individual differences 
in ambivalence toward authorities - which originate in early psychodynamic relations with 
authority figures - is a basic feature of both authoritarianism and dogmatism (Adorno et al., 
1950; Rokeach, 1960). Finally, since authority and identity are "mutually implicated" (Robertson 
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& Holtzner, 1980, p. 5), most people are expected to have meaningful opinions and dispositions 
toward central authorities. 
Figure 4.1. Instructions and format of the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale. 
It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture of both likes (respect) 
and dislikes (disrespect), given different situations. Give two scores for each of the following 
authorities or authority figures, one indicating the level that you sometimes like (respect) the 
authority, the other the level of your possible dislike (disrespect). 
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your 
personal opinion. 
Example l: If on occasions you truly respect the American government and support their decisions, 
but on other occasions you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer: 
The American Government 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 @ Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 0123456789@) Very much 
Example 2: If you respect John Major completely and support him at all times, then you may 
answer. 
Prime minister John Major 
Like/respect 
Not at all 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 
0123456789(@) 
@1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lO 
Very much 
Very much 
This measure closely approaches Frenkel-Brunswik's definition of intolerance of ambiguity. It 
assesses cognitive style along a dimension ranging from a black-white, Manichean style, to a style 
which recognises conflict between the positive and negative features of a single social object. 
While not making assumptions of generality, the AA T scale acknowledges both the evaluative 
and social aspects of the original definition of intolerance of ambiguity. As such, the measure 
approaches Billig's conception of cognitive style. It differentiates between balance-as-consistency 
- the style which censors inconsistent evaluations of a single category -and the ambivalent, 
balance-as-counterweight style. 
In addition to its construct validity as a measure of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity, the 
unipolar scaling procedure also satisfies the conflicting requirements to weld style to content, and 
to ensure that the measure of style is not confounded by ideological belief content. In contrast 
to the Budner scale, the AA T scale does not measure a reified internal cognitive trait indirectly 
by eliciting a number of opinions which are theorized to reflect the trait. Instead, the scale 
measures evaluative performance, independently of content. On the other hand, the unipolar 
scaling procedure can estimate the style with which a number of different social objects are 
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evaluated. Therefore, style can be associated with particular objects, and cross-content variability 
in intolerance of ambiguity may be assessed. Moreover, since the same task (evaluative 
categorization) is employed to assess cognitive style across diverse contents, in contrast to earlier 
performance measures (e.g., Azzageddi test, Rorschach, autokinetic illusion, etc.), the AAT scale 
avoids the problems associated with correlating different "task-specific" measures of performance 
(Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958; Millon, 1957). Also, the AAT scale does not use adjectival contents 
to assess ambivalence. Unlike Scott's measure of object ambivalence, therefore, it does not 
necessitate a translation in meaning between the experimenter and subject. 
Researchers have generally scored ambivalence on the unipolar scaling procedure by variants of 
the same formula (see Kaplan, 1972; Laponce, 1978; Moore, 1973, 1980): 





where: H = the higher of the two scores 
L = the lower of the two scores 
AMB = (H + L) - (H - L) 
AMB=H+L-H+L 
AMB = 2(L) 
Kaplan's formula thus destroys the logic of the unipolar scaling technique since it employs the 
information from only one of the two unipolar scales (the lowest score) to estimate ambivalence!6 
· The formula employed to estimate ambivalence in the present research is the same as that used 
by Scott (1966, 1969; Scott et al., 1979) to score his measure of object ambivalence: 
AMB = 2L + 1 
L+H+2 
This formula is appropriate since it includes estimates of the degree of contradiction plus the 
degree of total affect present in evaluation. Scores become large (ambivalent) to the extent to 
which subjects give similar responses to both the positive and negative unipolar scales, and to the 
extent to which the maximum degree of liking or disliking are approached. If the two rating 
scales were of infinite length, the ambivalence index would have an upper limit of one and lower 
limit of zero. In the following studies, two 11-point unipolar scales are used to assess 
ambivalence. As such, the scores range from an upper limit of 0. 95 (ambivalent) to a lower limit 
of 0.08 (unambivalent). The lower limit is approached when Lis zero and H becomes large, and 
the upper limit is approached when L = H, and both become large (see Table 4.1). 
6 I am indebted to Colin Tredoux for pointing out this obvious, but elusive fact. 
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Table l: Schedule for scoring Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance by the Scott formula 
Higher score Lower score 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 .50 
.33 .75 
2 .25 .60 .83 
3 .20 .50 .71 .88 
4 .17 .43 .63 .78 .90 
5 .14 .38 .56 .70 .82 .92 
6 .13 .33 .50 .64 .75 .85 .93 
7 .11 .30 .45 .58 .69 .79 .87 .94 
8 .10 .27 .42 .54 .64 .73 .81 .88 .94 
9 .09 .25 .38 .50 .60 .69 .76 .83 .89 .95 
10 .08 .23 .36 .47 .56 .65 .72 .79 .85 .90 .95 
The Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale provides a useful tool for assessing intolerance of 
ambiguity. Besides its construct validity as a measure of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity as 
described by Frenkel-Brunswik and Billig, the scale does not embody the common assumption 
that cognitive style is a generalized individual trait. Of course, this does not mean that the 
measure makes no substantial assumptions regarding the nature of cognitive style. For one, it 
generates numerical data on the basis of acknowledged ambivalence, and thus assumes that 
ambiguity tolerance is manifest consciously and can be measured as a interval variable. This is 
incompatible, for example, with Freud's (1927) defmition of ambivalence as an unconscious 
feeling resulting from insufficient fusion of the life and death instincts. At the psychodynamic 
level, ambivalence may be unquantifiable and not manifest as expressed conflicting evaluations 
(quite the opposite, see Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). However, for present purposes, this does not 
matter. The scale is useful here for it allows us to examine different manifest patterns of 
cognitive style which are offered/implied by empiricism and critical realism. It allows us to 
investigate the individualistic assumptions which have hindered attempts to establish an anti-
universalistic theory of cognitive style. 
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Study 1 
Study 1 investigated the generality of ambiguity tolerance across different contents by employing 
the unipolar rating scale as a measure of tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity. As this measure has 
been modified and newly developed as a measure of ambiguity tolerance, a first task was to 
investigate the validity and reliability of the AA T scale. In addition, the study aimed to compare 
this measure of ambiguity tolerance with the Budner scale in order to determine whether the 
popular Budner scale is associated with performance reflecting Frenkel-Brunswik's original 
description of intolerance of ambiguity. 
Method 
Sample and procedures 
The sample consisted of 244 first year psychology students who were registered at the University 
of Cape Town during 1993, and who completed both questionnaires upon which the study was 
based. 7 It was comprised of 46 Black, 151 White, and 47 Coloured subjects. 8 Sixty two subjects 
were male and 182 were female. The mean age of the sample was approximately 19.3 years. 
While some variation was evident in the home language of the Black sample - who spoke a 
range of African languages - the White sample was English-speaking, and the Coloured sample 
was predominantly English-speaking. 
In order to establish the test-retest reliability of the AAT scale, two separate questionnaires were 
completed by the same sample (see Appendix B and C). Since the AAT scale included a large 
number of diverse items, it was unlikely that on the second administration, the subjects could 
have had remembered their earlier responses, and the influence of carry-over effects was 
expected to be minimal (cf. Nunnaly, 1978). To further reduce the influence of carry-over 
effects, a 10 week interval separated the administration of the two questionnaires. 
7 The first questionnaire was completed by 464 subjects, and the second was completed by 279 subjects 
(35 of whom had not completed questionnaire 1). While the loss of subjects was disturbing, it appears to 
have resulted from a drop in lecture attendance associated with students "shopping" for courses during the 
first two weeks of semester (as faculty allows). The subject loss would thus not be systematically related 
to any of the variables under investigation. The descriptive statistics for the measures included in the first 
questionnaire are based on the full sample size. 
8 It is recognized that the classification by population group Black, Coloured, and White was designated 
by the Population Registration Act of 1950 (now defunct). The use of these terms does not imply 
acceptance of racial classification or discrimination. 
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The subjects were asked to provide their names so that their two questionnaires could be 
matched. They were thus not anonymous, but were assured of the strictest confidentiality both 
verbally and in a covering paragraph to each questionnaire. 9 The questionnaires were completed 
voluntarily during formal lecturing time. The subjects were informed that the questionnaires 
included questions regarding a number of personal and social beliefs and opinions, and they were 
asked not to discuss the questions with their friends. It required between 30 and 45 minutes to 
complete each questionnaire. The researcher was present throughout both studies, and the 
procedures were standardized. 
Measures 
The questionnaires were comprised of a number of socio-demographic items as well as 
psychometric scales measuring various constructs of tolerance of ambiguity, ideological beliefs, 
and ideological commitment. 10 
Socio-demographic variables 
The following socio-demographic variables were employed for descriptive and explanatory 
purposes (see Appendix B, Section 2): 
l. Political party preference (coded as National Party, African National Congress, 
Afrikaanse Weerstands Beweging, Inkatha Freedom Party, South African Communist 
Party, Democratic Party, Azanian Peoples Organization, Conservative Party, Pan African 
Congress). Respondents indicated the party they would "most likely" support and the 
party the would "least likely" support. 
2. Self-ranked liberalism-conservatism (coded on a 7-point scale from very liberal [1] to 
very conservative [7]). 
3. "Population group" (coded as Black, White, Coloured, Indian, Asian, Other). 
4. Age (in years). 
5. Sex. 
6. Home language (coded as Afrikaans, English, South Sotho, North Sothu, Tswana, Swazi, 
Ndebele, Xhosa, Zulu, Tsonga, Venda, Oriental, and Other). 
9 The covering paragraph assured the subjects that nobody but the researcher would see their answers. 
10 The data derived from both questionnaires was used in Study l as well as Study 2 (which is reported 
in the next chapter). Only the measures which are relevant to the present study are discussed here. 
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Tolerance of ambiguity 
Tolerance of ambiguity was the central construct of the study and was assessed by four different 
measures: 1) the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale, 2) the Ambivalence scale, 3) the Budner 
(1962) scale, and 4) the Ideological Orthodoxy scale. 
Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale (AAT) 
The Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale included 45 items (authorities) which were each rated 
on the two unipolar scales (see Appendix B, Section 4, and Appendix C, Section 2). The 
authorities were selected by a search of the literature, social psychological theory, and a free 
association type study. 11 Of particular importance were the inclusion of political, religious, and 
familial authorities. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, an effort was made to include as 
wide an ideological range of authorities as possible. An initial list of 112 items was reduced to 
45 by classifying each authority into one of seven categories - political party (local), political 
institution (local), political (international), religious, educational, economic, professional, familial 
- and then selecting the most familiar of each category. 
Ambivalence scale 
The Ambivalence scale was developed as a means of estimating the measurement validity of the 
AAT scaling procedure. This scale included eight items drawn from the AAT scale, but which 
were presented in the format of Scott's measure of object ambivalence (see Appendix C, Section 
5). The scale was employed as an independent measure of tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity. The 
items were chosen so as to reflect different dimensions of authority underlying the AAT scale. 
Instead of employing the two unipolar scales, the Ambivalence scale required respondents to 
select as many adjectives, from a list of 20, which described each authority. Ten positive and 10 
negative adjectives were included in the list. 12 An original list of 10 pairs of antonyms were 
selected from the semantic differential scale (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). The negative 
adjectives of many of the couplets included the prefixed version of the positive item (e.g. 
truthful-untruthful). This was deemed unsuitable as it may have elicited rational and non-
contradictory responses from self-presentational motives. Roget's Thesaurus was used to generate 
11 Subjects (N = 23) in third year psychology tutorials were given a blank sheet of paper and were asked 
to record as many associations they had for the concepts, "authority" and "leader". 
12 This scale shares the same problems as Scott's measure of object ambivalence. It prespecifies adjectives 
and must assumes that all individuals attribute similar meanings to these words, and that the meaning is 
similar across different attitude "objects" . 
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adjectives of similar meaning to those originally selected, but which did not form clearly 
antithetical couplets. The scale was scored as per Scott et al. (1979)- i.e., in a similar manner 
to the AAT scale (high scores indicate tolerance of ambiguity). 
Budner scale 
Budner's (1962) 16-item scale was used as a personality measure of tolerance of ambiguity (see 
Appendix C, Section 3, items 11-26). The scale was scored by means of a 9-point Likert-type 
format, with poles marked very strongly disagree and very strongly agree. High scores on the 
Budner scale indicate tolerance of ambiguity. 
Ideological Orthodoxy scale (10) 
The Ideological Orthodoxy scale was used as a measure of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity 
regarding attirudinal diversity across society (see Appendix B, Section 6). It operationalizes 
intolerance of social attirudinal ambiguity - an interpersonal construct - by assessing 
intolerance of individuals who hold ideological beliefs which differ from one's own. The scale 
was included in order to ascertain whether ambiguity tolerance is generalized from personal 
expressions to social expressions. 
The IO scale consisted of 13 items which elicited responses in one of four categories: (a) I 
believe it and all South Africans must believe it, (b) I believe it but other South Africans need 
not believe it, (c) I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it, (d) I don't believe it 
and other South Africans must not believe it. Following Deconchy (1980, 1984), who developed 
this scaling procedure, responses (a) and (d) are considered "extreme", while (b) and (c) are 
considered "liberal". Extreme responses demand uniformity in social attirudes, and may thus be 
considered expressions of intolerance of attirudinal diversity, a characteristic of the anti-
democratic tendency of opinionation (Rokeach, 1956a, 1960). Responses (a) and (d) were scored 
0, and (b) and (c) were scored 1. As such, the scale has a potential range from 0 (intolerance) 
to 13 (tolerance). The items were selected to reflect different contemporary political views 
regarding order and disorder within South African society. The order-disorder dimension was 
employed as it has been associated with conservatism (Wilson, 1973), the desire for certainty in 
the face of social change, and with modem antidemocratic behaviour (Baumann, 1991; Fromm, 
1941). Consequently, the items reflected a loosely defmed liberalism-conservatism dimension. 
The scale included both conservative and liberal beliefs to control for response acquiescence. 
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Results 
Factor analysis and reliability 
As the interpretation of results derived from multidimensional scales is hazardous, and since the 
alpha coefficient for multidimensional scales may lead to an underestimation of average item 
intercorrelations within dimensions (Cortina, 1993), the scales were factor analyzed (to assess 
dimensionality) before internal consistency was estimated. Factor analyses were computed for the 
full sample to ensure the comparability of factor scores across the population groups. 
Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale 
Many subjects experienced difficulties with, and did not respond to nine items on the first 
administration of the AA T scale. These items were excluded from the second questionnaire. The 
scale was reduced to 32 items by removing a further four items due to their low test-retest 
correlations. The data for the second administration of the AAT scale were used in analysis as 
the other measures were completed on this occasion (mainly [stable] demographic data were 
included in the first questionnaire). 
The factor analysis of the AAT scale was exploratory as the measure was newly developed, and 
the purpose of the study was to ascertain whether the scale "hung together" in a unidimensional 
manner suggestive of personality functioning. The intercorrelations between the 32 items of the 
AA T scale were factor analyzed using the principal factor method, with R2s in the diagonals as 
communality estimates (Harman, 1976). This preliminary factor analysis yielded 10 factors with 
eigenvalues greater than unity. No single factor was dominant, indicating that no general factor 
of ambiguity tolerance was reflected in responses to the scale. 
The factor structure was then rotated using the Harris-Kaiser orthoblique transformation (Harris 
& Kaiser, 1964). This method is appropriate for exploratory factor analysis as it obviates the 
necessity to state beforehand, whether factors are orthogonal or oblique; orthoblique rotation "has 
the property, apparently, of transforming the axes, always, in the right direction - the best 
simple structure can always be seen" (Kaiser, 1970, p. 409). The rotated 10-factor structure 
distinguished very clearly between different types of authority. For example, the police and the 
army constituted a single factor, and christian religious authority was distinguished from non-
christian religious authority. This structure was, however, unsuitable for further analysis as it was 
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unparsimonious, and missing values for some items substantially reduced the sample size. 13 In 
accordance with the exploratory nature of the investigation, the AA T scale was improved by 
eliminating items which included many missing values, and those with communality estimates less 
than .30. 
By this procedure, a final 20 item scale was derived, and submitted to a principal factor factor 
analysis. The scree test indicated that four factors should be extracted from the scale (Cattell, 
1966). These factors explained 43.9% of the shared item variance. The factor structure was then 
rotated by the Harris-Kaiser method. Once again, the factor analysis clearly distinguished 
different domains of authority on the basis of ambiguity tolerance scores, and the final factor 
structure was readily interpretable. The factors were named tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity 
toward (1) conservative political authority (AAT-cPol), (2) political authority (AAT-Pol), (3) 
familial authority (AAT-Fam), and (4) religious authority (AAT-Rel) (see Table 4.2). The 
weighted factor scores were computed and used as indices of ambiguity tolerance towards the 
respective domains of authority. The unweighted sum of all 20 items was named AAT-Total. 
The test-retest reliability coefficient for the summed AAT scale was acceptable, ru = .66, p < 
. 0001, N = 237, given that the relatively long period between the two questionnaires could have 
allowed real change in attitudinal ambiguity tolerance. This is probable in the vacillating political 
climate in South Africa at the time. 14 Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the total scale was 
adequate (a = .81). 
In order to ascertain whether responses to the AAT scale were influenced by response style-
including either acquiescent response set or the desire to appear rational and non-contradictory 
- the like/respect score for each item was correlated with the dislike/disrespect score. This 
allowed a test of whether responses to the one unipolar scale were dependent on responses to the 
other, as would be the case if either there was a tendency to respond "very much" or "not at all" 
to all the items, or to respond in a consistently non-contradictory manner. The correlations for 
each item varied from -.08 to -. 73, with a mean correlation of -.45. This suggested that high 
scores on the one unipolar scale tended to be associated with low scores on the other. These 
findings reflect both the desire to appear rational, and the manner in which attitudes are held. 
13 The main reason for the missing values was that many students did not understand the meaning of some 
of the items (e.g., the Talmud, the Koran, Umkontho we Sizwe, and the Organization of African Unity). 
14 The secretary general of the South African Communist party, Mr Chris Hani, was assassinated 
approximately four weeks before the second questionnaire was completed. This resulted in widespread 
political unrest in the country. 
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However, since the response bias derived from a desire to appear rational should be constant 
across all items. and since the magnitude of the correlations varied substantially across the items, 
it appears as though these correlations reflect the manner in which attitudes are held, rather than 
response bias. This conclusion is supported by the fact that for almost every item, the full 
potential range of ambiguity scores was obtained. It thus appears as though neither acquiescent 
response set nor rational self-presentation played a major role in the fmdings. 
Table 4.2: Factor structure for Tolerance of Attitudinal Ambiguity scale (N = 194). 
Factors 
Items Communality 
Conservative Political Familial Religious 
political 
Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging .779 .620 
Eugene Tern!blance .761 .582 
The Conservative Party .725 .575 
The SA Government .387 .448 .315 
The Inkatha Freedom Party .304 .584 .361 
The African National Congress .753 .399 .594 
Nelson Mandela .751 .307 .565 
Bishop Desmond Tutu .632 .401 
Parents .399 .717 .535 
The family .417 .667 .474 
Your own values .649 .440 
Friends .618 .397 
Personal conscience .597 .362 
Doctors .544 .300 
Your culture .494 .353 .306 
The bible .821 .682 
Jesus Christ .782 .625 
God .305 .758 .579 
Your church .580 .355 
The pope .313 .502 .329 
E(loadings)2 2.134 3.075 3.320 2.933 
Note. To facilitate interpretation, only weights greater than or equal to .30 are reported. 
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Concurrent validity of the AA T scale was examined by correlating the Ambivalence scale with 
a subscale of AAT comprised of the same eight items as the Ambivalence scale. A subscale, 
rather than the full AA T scale, was used to ensure that the two measures assessed ambiguity 
tolerance toward similar contents. Given the difference between the two measurement procedures, 
and the methodological problems associated with the Ambivalence scale (discussed earlier), the 
correlation coefficient, r = .36, p < .0001, N = 233, was considered a satisfactory indication 
of validity. This suggests that both scales measured expressed attitudinal ambivalence toward the 
authorities represented in the scales. Although it is possible that subjects' responses to the 
Ambivalence scale were influenced by their responses to the AA T scale, this is unlikely since the 
AAT scale included many diverse items, and the two scales were separated by other measures. 
Furthermore, it appeared as though the subjects heeded the request to "complete each page 
separately without referring to [their] previous answers". 
Budner scale and Ideological Orthodoxy scale 
In accordance with previous factor analysis of the Budner scale (Sidanius, 1978b), it was 
submitted to a principal components factor analysis. Six factors were extracted with eigenvalues 
greater than one. These explained 57.64% of the total variance. Orthogonal and oblique rotations 
were performed in an effort to achieve simple structure. As this was not attained, the varimax 
solution was rotated according to the Harris-Kaiser method. The factors were not named as their 
interpretation was equivocal. Many items loaded on more than one factor, and the items which 
loaded highest on each factor were heterogenous. Nonetheless, weighted factor scores were 
derived and used as indices of tolerance of ambiguity. Cronbach' s alpha coefficient for the total 
scale was low as expected (a = .55). 
An initial principal factor factor analysis of the IO scale found it to be unidimensional. The alpha 
coefficient for the scale was . 91. 
Scale statistics 
The distribution of scores for IO, AAT-cPol, and AAT-Rel were slightly positively skewed. 
Scores on all other measures were normally distributed. Means, standard deviations, and sample 
sizes for all indices of ambiguity tolerance were computed separately for each population group 
(see Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3: Univariate statistics for all indices of tolerance of ambiguity15 
Population group 
Index Mean dif 
White Black Coloured 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
MT-Total R1 =.24 8.78 c 2.27 150 5.30 a 2.59 41 7.48 b 2.32 47 
MT-con. Pol. R1=.06 0.16 b 0.94 122 -0.35 a 0.71 34 -0.22 a 0.74 38 
MT-Political R1=.38 0.35 c 0.67 122 -1.16 a 0.85 34 -0.08 b 0.76 38 
MT-Familial R1==.08 0.15 b 0.89 122 -0.55 a 0.84 34 0.02 b 0.88 38 
MT-Religious 0.15 0.92 122 -0.27 0.97 34 -0.24 0.81 38 
Budner R1=.12 77.05 b 11.16 151 67.37 a 13.26 43 69.77 a 9.51 46 
B1 R1=.05 0.14 b 0.91 149 -0.49 a 1.25 38 -0.06 b 0.92 46 
82 R1 =.13 0.24 c 0.84 149 -0.73 a 1.25 38 -0.16 b 0.92 46 
83 R1=.04 0.00 a 0.96 149 0.37 b 1.13 38 -0.29 a 0.92 46 
84 0.05 1.02 149 -0.15 1.11 38 -0.03 0.85 46 
85 R1 =.12 0.24 c 0.90 149 -0.66 a 1.07 38 -0.21 b 0.98 46 
86 0.10 0.97 149 -0.11 1.14 38 -0.22 0.95 46 
10 R1= .02 10.64 a 3.20 301 10.06 4.15 87 9.39 b 4.07 76 
Note. Significant multiple comparisons [Newman-Keuls] arranged from the smallest mean (a) to largest (c) 
(a= .05). 
•Effect sizes are reported for significant group mean differences (a=. 05). 
Whites were more tolerant of ambiguity than Blacks in all but one instance (B3) where group 
mean differences reached significance. The difference between the AAT means of the Black, 
White, and Coloured sample provides further evidence of validity of the AAT scale. As would 
be expected of these "criterion groups", the Black and Coloured samples were less ambivalent 
in their evaluation of conservative political, political, and familial authorities than was the White 
sample. These fmdings were anticipated in the political domain since politics is fraught with many 
contradictions for liberal (English-speaking) Whites, who must reconcile material advantage with 
the inequality of the system. The Black sample, on the other hand, tended to either accept or 
reject political authorities in an unambivalent manner. The differences in AA T scores toward 
familial authorities may reflect the difference between traditional and permissive family structures 
of Blacks and liberal Whites respectively. The findings are thus readily interpretable by 
considering the material and ideological meanings that the different authorities have for the 
u The variation in sample size across the different indices is attributable to the different sample sizes 
which completed the first and second questionnaire, as well as the factor analysis which rejects subjects 
with any missing data. The sample sizes reported here are relevant to all further analysis. Correlation 
analyses are based on the sample size of the index with the smallest sample. 
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different population groups. However, they are equally explicable in terms of personality 
differences since the group differences across the Budner scale largely mirrored those across the 
AAT scale. 
Correlational analysis 
The multidimensional nature of the AAT scale has already suggested that tolerance/intolerance 
of ambiguity is not a generalized personality trait. The precision with which the factor analysis 
distinguished between ambiguity tolerance toward different domains of authority suggests that 
expressions of ambiguity tolerance are content dependent. The investigation is extended here to 
incorporate an analysis of the intercorrelations between all the indices of ambiguity tolerance. 
This will clarify the nature of the relationships between the AAT scale, the Budner scale, and the 
IO scale, as well as demonstrate whether the scale factors are orthogonal or oblique. 
Since heterogenous samples may yield attenuated correlation matrices (Howell, 1991), and thus 
bias results toward orthogonal associations (i.e., against the predictions of the trait thesis), 
correlation matrices for the indices of ambiguity tolerance were computed separately for the 
White, Black, and Coloured samples (see Tables 4.4a, 4.4b, 4.4c). Overall the correlation 
matrices are remarkably similar: the significant correlations are concentrated among the factors 
of the AA T scale, while the Budner factors are unrelated to each other, and to the AA T 
factors. 16 
Table 4.4a: Correlations between indices of tolerance of ambiguity (White sample) 
AAT·cPo1 AAT·Po1 AAT·Fam AAT·Re1 Budner B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
AAT·Tot. .27'' .68'" .70'" .60'" .21' .05 .04 ·.07 .17 .IS .14 
AAT-Con. Pol. .25" ·.23' ·.14 ·.34"' ·.34'" ·.28' ·.17 ·.12 ·.09 ·.II 
AAT-Politica1 .43'" .00 .03 ·.08 ·.03 ·.OS .16 ·.02 .08 
AAT-Familia1 .30" .40 .30" .18 ·.01 .29' .25' .19 
AAT-ReligiOUS .16 .23 ·.02 ·.20 .16 .12 .17 








BI .19 .06 .08 .04 ·.16 ·.06 
B2 .18 .16 .07 .15 ·.08 
B3 .OS ·.OS .00 ·.13 
B4 .17 .22' .07 
BS .14 .07 
B6 .06 
'p< .01. "p< .001. "'p<.OOOI. 
16 At the risk of increasing the type II error rate, the significance level for the White sample was set at 
a = .01 as a protection against increased familywise error rate arising from the large number of 
inferential tests. The Black and Coloured samples were too small for similar precautionary measures. 
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Table 4.4b: Correlations between indices of tolerance of ambiguity (Black sample) 
AAT-cPol AAT-Pol AAT-Fam AAT-Rel Budner Bl B2 B3 84 BS 86 10 
AAT-Tot. .44"' .82''' .85"' .68'" .14 -.13 .36' -.17 -.OS .IS ·.07 .12 
AAT-Con. Pol. .46" .20 -.13 .12 -.17 .31 -.08 -.12 .13 -.13 .18 
AAT-Political .59'" .29 .14 -.28 .47" .08 -.IS .22 -.14 .15 
AAT-Familial .58' .03 -.25 .22 .09 -.06 .OS -.02 .19 
AAT-Religious .07 -.29 -.04 .30 .00 .OS .21 -.OS 
Budner .25 .50" .53" .18 .74" .12 .14 
81 -.06 .32' -.23 -.17 -.22 -.18 
B2 .17 -.19 .36' -.33' .15 
B3 -.13 .IS -.07 -.15 
84 .IS .02 .16 
BS .15 .05 
86 .07 
'p<.05. "p< .01. '"p<.OOI. 
Table 4.4c: Correlations between indices of tolerance of ambiguity (Coloured sample) 
AAT-cPol AAT-Pol AAT-Fam AAT-Rel Budner Bl B2 B3 84 85 86 10 
AAT-Tot. .14 .68"' .71'" .61"' .18 .27 .07 -.14 -.II .23 -.18 .36' 
AAT-Con. Pol. .32' -.26 -.38' -.47" -.27 -.38' -.08 -.09 -.09 -.14 .16 
AAT-Political .17 .06 -.II -.03 -.IS -.01 -.02 .09 -.32' .55'" 
AAT-Familial .48" .32 .34' .09 -.II ·.03 .04 .16 .25 
AAT-Religious .52'" .41" .26 ·.08 ·.09 .39' .15 .07 
Budner .73'" .54'" ·.07 .30' .62'" .17 -.05 
Bl .51"' -.16 ·.08 .39" -.10 .09 
B2 ·.12 -.03 ·.01 -.20 ·.10 
BJ .07 -.24 ·.01 ·.24 
84 .12 -.10 -.17 
B5 .16 .12 
86 .08 
'p<.05. "p< .01. "'p< .001. 
The upper left hand area of the tables shows the intercorrelations among the factors of the AA T 
scale. The significant correlations between AAT -total and its factors were expected on 
mathematical grounds since the AAT scale is a composite of its factors (cf. Mulaik, 1972). The 
intercorrelations between the factors of the AA T scale do not reflect a generalized personality 
trait of ambiguity tolerance. On the contrary, the mixed pattern of positive, negative, and 
orthogonal associations suggests a marked degree of individual variability in tolerance of 
ambiguity across different cognitive contents. While AAT-cPol and AAT-Pol were significantly 
correlated, in all cases bar one (between AAT-cPol and AAT-Rel for the Coloured sample), 
ambiguity tolerance toward political and conservative political authorities was unrelated to 
ambiguity tolerance of religious authorities. In contrast, the indices of ambiguity tolerance toward 
familial and religious authorities were significantly correlated for all three samples, and AA T-
Fam was associated with AAT -Pol for the Black and White samples. Possibly the most 
outstanding fmdings were the significant negative associations between AA T -cPol and AA T -Fam 
for the White sample and AAT -cPol and AAT -Rei for the Coloured sample. These results 
directly contradict the trait thesis since they suggest that for the same person, high levels of 
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ambiguity tolerance within one content domain may be associated with low levels in another. 
In addition to the consistent pattern of associations across all three samples, conspicuous 
differences were also evident between the samples. These differences suggest cross-cultural 
influences on the ambiguity tolerance that members of different groups have toward different 
domains of authority. The negative correlations between AA T -cPol and other indices for the 
White and Coloured samples, but not for the Black sample, are particularly telling. These results 
suggest that, directly contrary to the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950), authoritarian styles of 
evaluating familial and religious authorities were associated with ambivalence in evaluating 
conservative political authorities. These fmdings are, however, explicable if one takes the 
ambivalent relation (within the liberal context of UCT) that conservative Whites and Coloureds 
(but not Blacks) have toward conservative politics. While conservative Blacks reject racist 
authorities outright, conservative Whites and Coloureds may equivocate between rejecting racism 
and maintaining advantage (i.e., ingroup status, and economic and political privilege etc.). 
With these fmdings in mind, it is no wonder that the correlations between the factors of the AA T 
scale and the Budner scale are puzzling: whereas the Budner scale was developed to measure a 
generalized trait of ambiguity tolerance, the results for the AA T scale have shown ambiguity 
tolerance to be content specific. Accordingly, the cluster of non-significant associations between 
the two measures is not surprising - they question whether the two scales measure the same 
construct. Although the correlation of . 21 between the Budner scale and the total AA T scale for 
the White sample suggests that both scales may tap a personality dimension of ambiguity 
tolerance, only the familial and conservative political factors of the AA T scale were related to 
this personality factor. Moreover, for the Black and Coloured samples, these scales were not 
significantly correlated. Besides the overwhelming pattern of non-significant associations, the 
matrices have three noteworthy characteristics which question the validity of the trait thesis. First, 
there is no consistent pattern regarding which AA T factors are associated with the different 
Budner factors. Second, the different patten of associations across the three samples suggest that 
one should be wary of cross-cultural work with the Budner scale. Finally, the negative 
correlations between AA T -cPol and the Budner scale for the White and Coloured sample indicate 
that the Budner scale may yield wholly inaccurate predictions of ambiguity tolerance within 
particular content domains. 
Nonetheless, these correlations are theoretically interesting. Since the AA T scale does not 
measure ambiguity tolerance with reference to ideological beliefs, the associations are not the 
result of shared content of the scales. In response to Ward's (1988) question regarding what the 
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Budner scale measures, the fmdings suggest that different parts of the Budner scale: 1) measure 
different things, 2) measure different things for different samples, and 3) within certain content 
domains, the Budner scale may measure the precise opposite of what it is supposed to measure. 
If the Budner scale does tap a personality dimension of ambiguity tolerance, then it appears as 
though, within a particular context, this dimension is relevant only to the evaluation of certain 
contents. Parts of the Budner scale may tap the intolerance of ambiguity toward familial 
authorities, which is central to the theory of authoritarianism. However, in contrast to earlier 
theorizing (Adorno et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, 1951, 1954), this does not appear to 
generalize to intolerance of ambiguity toward all authority - let alone asocial "objects". On the 
contrary, conservative individuals within this liberal context who demonstrated an unambivalent 
evaluation of familial authority tended to evaluate conservative political authorities in an 
ambivalent manner. These fmdings question the validity of the Budner scale as well as the trait 
thesis. 
Perhaps the most surprising fmdings of all was the orthogonality between different factors of the 
Budner scale. Since this scale was developed as a measure of a generalized personality trait, and 
has typically been employed as a unidimensional summed score, one would expect the different 
factors to be strongly intercorrelated. However, despite the expected associations between a 
composite variable and its parts (Mulaik, 1972), some Budner factors did not even correlate with 
the summed Budner scale. Even though parts of the Budner scale were weakly associated with 
certain AAT factors, the different Budner factors were not intercorrelated. Thus, while the 
validity of the Budner scale remains vague as Ward (1988) observes, it is clear that, if employed 
as a unidimensional measure, the Budner scale is an inaccurate predictor of ambiguity tolerance 
within specific content domains. 
Finally, the non-significant associations between the IO scale, and the AA T scale and Budner 
scale also question the validity of the trait thesis. These suggest that personal expressions of 
ambiguity tolerance are not generalized to a tolerance of ideological difference within society, 
as Rokeach's theory of opinionation argues. This fmding questions Ward's (1988) proposal that 
the Budner scale is related to the need for uniformity. The significant correlations between IO 
and AAT-Total and AAT-Pol for the Coloured sample indicate cross-cultural variability in the 
association between personal and social expressions of ambiguity tolerance, and imply that it is 
not personality, but other factors (about which I will not speculate here), which underlie these 
relationships. 
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In sum, the fmdings suggest that expressions of ambiguity tolerance are content specific. 
Knowledge of an individual's tolerance of ambiguity in one domain cannot be generalized to other 
domains, or to the need for social uniformity. These fmdings question the utility of personality 
measures of ambiguity tolerance such as the Budner scale. In the present study, for example, 
Budner scores were related to attitudinal ambiguity tolerance both positively and negatively, and 
non-significantly. 
· A secondary factor analysis (Cattell, 1978, chap. 9) was undertaken for the White sample in 
order to summarize the intercorrelation matrix, and to corroborate the conclusions of 
multidimensionality. 17 The 13 indices of ambiguity tolerance were submitted to a principal 
components factor analysis. By the criterion of eigenvalues greater than one, four factors were 
extracted which accounted for 62.08% of the total variance. In the light of the observed 
independence between many of the indices, the factors were rotated orthogonally by the varimax 
transformation. The final factor structure separated the AA T scale from the Budner scale, and 
divided the indices of each of these scales into two further dimensions (see Table 4.5). Attitudinal 
ambiguity tolerance toward political authorities was separated from ambiguity tolerance toward 
other authorities, and Budner factors 1, 2 & 3 were distinguished from the other Budner 
indices. 18 Ideological Orthodoxy loaded moderately onto the ambivalence toward political 
authority factor. 
Overall, the correlation matrix and the secondary factor structure do not present a picture of a 
generalized trait of tolerance of ambiguity. While it is certain that this is partially due to 
measurement error associated with the poor validity of the Budner scale, this cannot account for 
the independence between different factors of the AA T scale and between the AA T scale and 
Ideological Orthodoxy. The results suggest that expressions of tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity 
are closely tied to particular contents. Most importantly, ambivalence toward political authority 
was clearly distinguishable from ambivalence toward other authorities. In addition to the influence 
of content, personal expressions of tolerance of ambiguity were not related to social tolerance in 
an isomorphic manner. 
17 Only the White sample large enough to warrant a secondary factor analysis. 
18 I once again attempted to interpret the Budner scale by examining the secondary factors. No 
unambiguous interpretation was possible. 
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Table 4.5: Secondary factor structure for Tolerance of Ambiguity (White sample, N = 122). 
Secondary Factors 
Index Communality 
Ambivalence Political 81, 82 & 84, 85 & 
Ambivalence 83 86 
AAT-Tot .745 .600 .956 
AAT-cPol .794 .703 
AAT-Pol .363 .753 .766 
AAT-Fam .730 .687 
AAT-Rel .800 .700 
Budner .718 .651 .965 
81 .389 -.318 .572 .599 
82 .785 .629 
83 -.329 .341 .287 
84 .640 .421 
85 .358 .583 .549 
86 .726 .582 
10 .487 .250 
l:(loadings)2 2.210 2.026 1.936 1.871 
Note. Only weights greater than .30 are reponed. 
Discussion 
The conflicting findings and resulting loss of interest in studying intolerance of ambiguity has 
been attributed to invalid and unreliable measures of the construct, which, according to Altemeyer 
(1981), "deserves some intolerance" (p. 53). I have argued that most of these measurement 
problems originate in the misinterpretation of Frenk:el-Brunswik's definition of intolerance of 
ambiguity. On the basis of her descriptive research, Frenk:el-Brunswik (1948b, 1949, 1951, 1954) 
defined intolerance of ambiguity as an evaluative construct, rooted in psychodynamic emotional 
ambivalence, and manifest as an "attitudinal variable" reflecting an unambivalent evaluation of 
social "objects". In order to test the generality of the construct as a personality trait, Frenk:el-
Brunswik proceeded in a deductive manner: she designed asocial and non-evaluative measures 
of intolerance of ambiguity and tested whether these were associated with the original construct. 
These latter asocial and non-evaluative measures have, however, typically been employed as the 
operational definitions of intolerance of ambiguity. In contrast to Frenkel-Brunswik, therefore, 
researchers have assumed intolerance of ambiguity to be a generalized personality trait which 
influences individual performance at a variety of tasks, and which is reflected in the cognition 
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of a diversity of "objects". These measures have thus reified intolerance of ambiguity as a formal 
and pervasive property of individual psychology. 
With growing interest in the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs (e.g., 
Sidanius, 1985; Stone et al., 1993; Tetlock, 1983a), it has become increasingly important to 
design measures of intolerance of ambiguity which are free from the above assumptions. In this 
chapter, Kaplan's (1972) unipolar scaling procedure has been modified and proposed as a valid 
measure of tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity. The AA T scale has the advantage of not assuming 
tolerance of ambiguity to be a generalized personality trait, and can test for cross-content 
variability in ambiguity tolerance. In addition, it assesses the central evaluative aspects of 
ambiguity tolerance. Accordingly, The AA T scale does not reify intolerance of ambiguity, but 
measures evaluative performance across different social "objects" in a direct and non-reductive 
manner. 
In Study 1, the AA T scale was found to be a valid and reliable measure. Both the test-retest and 
internal consistency statistics were of sufficient magnitude to consider the scale reliable. Validity 
criteria were derived from two sources. The scale was found to correlate significantly with an 
independent measure of ambivalence; and it distinguished, in a predictable manner, between the 
levels of ambiguity tolerance which the Black, White, and Coloured samples expressed toward 
political and familial authorities. 
The results provide strong grounds for rejecting the theory of a general trait of intolerance of 
ambiguity. They showed expressions of tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity to vary considerably 
across content and culture. The factor structure of the AA T scale made clear and unambiguous 
distinctions between ambiguity tolerance toward different domains of authority. Rather than being 
unidimensional, the factors of the scale were associated with each other positively, negatively, 
and non-significantly. These findings suggest that, within a single individual, high levels of 
ambiguity tolerance within one content domain may be associated with low levels in another 
domain, and may be unrelated to ambiguity tolerance in a third. In addition, the pattern of 
relationships varied across the three different samples, indicating that social factors, rather than 
universal personality dynamics, may underlie the associations between different domains of 
ambiguity tolerance. 
By questioning trait theory, serious doubts are raised concerning the validity of personality 
measures of intolerance of ambiguity. Measures such as the Budner scale have typically assumed 
intolerance of ambiguity to be a general trait and have reified the construct as such by 
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apportioning each subject a single score to represent their cognitive style (Furnham, 1994; Scott 
et al., 1979). The orthogonal multidimensional factor structure of the Budner scale questions 
whether intolerance of ambiguity can be regarded as a pervasive personality dimension. More 
seriously, the intercorrelations between the Budner scale and AA T scale suggest that the Budner 
scale may be completely inaccurate in predicting ambiguity tolerance within particular content 
domains. 
The fmdings raise some important theoretical issues. By challenging trait theory, the results raise 
questions concerning the underlying reasons for the correlations between ambiguity tolerance 
toward different contents, and between ambiguity tolerance and ideological beliefs. An alternative 
to theorizing these associations in terms of a generalized personality trait is required. The present 
results can give no definitive theoretical alternatives. On the one hand, the correlation between 
the total AAT scale and the Budner (for the White sample) suggests that a personality factor may 
influence the manner in which individuals evaluate authority figures in general, while the 
evaluation of specific authorities may be influenced by other factors. 
However, this interactionist partition of ambiguity tolerance into general personality traits and 
other factors is inadequate. The pattern of positive, negative, and orthogonal associations between 
ambiguity tolerance toward different domains of authority indicates that expressions of ambiguity 
tolerance are inextricably bound up with cognitive contents. The results suggest, therefore, that 
we need to consider the meaning of the cognitive contents if we with to understand the stylistic 
features of cognition. This, in turn, implies that we are to expect context and culture to play an 
important role in shaping expressions of ambiguity tolerance (Barwise. 1988; Lakoff, 1988; 
Markova & Foppa, 1990). To explain cognitive style we must consider the meaning of the 
content of cognition for a group within a particular context. 
Such an interpretation would recommend, for example, that we do not explain the Black sample's 
univalent evaluation of political authorities in terms of basic personality differences between 
Blacks and Whites. Instead, one could argue that, due to the history of apartheid, Blacks have 
unambivalently rejected the legitimacy and value of the apartheid regime and supported the 
aligned Black liberation movements. Liberal Whites, however, due to their material and political 
advantages under the illegitimate regime, are much more ambivalent in their evaluation of 
political authorities. Such an argument introduces material and ideal, praxis- and concept-
dependent structures as the causal powers underlying expressions of cognitive style. Democratic 
commitment under oppressive regimes such as apartheid South Africa and Nazi Germany, for 
instance, may be associated with univalent evaluation of political authorities (cf. Fromm, 1984). 
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Finally, the fmdings reported here reassert the importance of intolerance of ambiguity as an 
ideological and psychological construct. It cannot be mere coincidence that ambiguity tolerance 
scores distinguished so clearly between different dimensions of authority. Like Rutherford's 
famed surprise at witnessing a particles rebounding off gold foil in his studies of radioactivity, 
it was with astonishing accuracy that the factor analysis used ambiguity tolerance scores to 
identify subtle differences between various domains of authority - it was as if SAS was 
employing variable names rather than the data to derive factors. These fmdings support Frenkel-
Brunswik's conclusion that intolerance of ambiguity is "one of the basic variables in both the 
emotional and the cognitive orientation of a person toward life" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 
113), and suggest that this may be a fruitful avenue of research. Of course, the underlying 
reasons for the significant associations between ambiguity tolerance toward different content 
domains remains an open question. 
Conclusion 
The textuality of observation means not only that observation is theory-bound, but implies also 
that observations are always potentially contentious. In contrast to the present interpretation, for 
example, to support his personality-based theory of ideological beliefs, Eysenck uses factor 
structures similar to the ones reported here. Eysenck (1975) had a sample of Londoners complete 
a questionnaire of 88 attitudinal items, and submitted their responses to factor analysis. Primary 
factor analysis yielded I 0 factors and the secondary factor analysis produced three orthogonal 
"superfactors". According to Eysenck, the "data speak for themselves" (p. 330). They divulged 
that Eysenck's (1954) two-factor personality-based theory of sociopolitical attitudes was, with 
minor modifications, substantially correct. 
The analysis of the AAT scale yielded results roughly similar to Eysenck's. Although the scale 
assesses attitudinal style rather than content, the preliminary factor analysis produced 10 factors 
and the secondary analysis produced two factors. These data, however, do not speak for 
themselves, nor do they necessarily imply that two independent dimensions of personality underlie 
the factor structure. On the contrary, I have rejected personality theory in interpreting the results. 
In response to the contentious nature of observation, the following discussion argues against a 
personality-based interpretation of these fmdings. This is undertaken on two levels. First, the 
explanation of the fmdings is contextualized by situating an interpretation of the data within an 
empiricist and a critical realist framework. Second, the results are used to advance concrete 
reasons why a critical realist explanation is preferred. 
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A basic difference between empiricism and critical realism lies at their starting point. Empiricism 
begins with epistemological questions, and defmes ontology, via the epistemic fallacy, in terms 
of knowledge statements (Bhaskar, 1989b). The knowledge statements which are true for an 
empiricist science are those based on constant conjunctions of events. This leads empiricist 
psychology to focus on individual differences, and to offer personality-based explanations of 
manifest associations between measures of cognitive style (see pp. 22-24). By assuming that 
empirical factor structures correspond to dimensions of personality, empiricist psychology then 
ontologizes observed surface phenomenon such as factor structures (i.e., commits the ontic 
fallacy). Psychologists thus conclude that the individuals across whom the constant conjunctions 
were observed, are the immediate material cause of these conjunctions. In addition to advancing 
a theory which can boast predictive power (and so justify its truth value), empiricists offer what 
at first sight appears to be an complete explanation of cognitive style. 
Critical realism, in contrast, is an ontological rather than an epistemological philosophy - it is 
interested in content above process (cf. Harre, 1981). It begins transcendentally, by arguing that 
certain underlying generative structures must exist for human activity (including science) to be 
rendered rational and intelligible. Moreover, critical realism tells us something of the nature of 
the underlying generative structures. Bhaskar (1986, 1989a, 1989b) argues that, for the human 
sciences, these structures are social-relation-dependent, praxis- and concept-dependent, and 
manifest a material-space-time specificity and substantial gee-historicity. Under certain conditions 
(e.g., controlled scientific activity) these structures may produce empirical regularities, but by 
and large, the regularities are masked by the uncontrolled nature of day-to-day life (Bhaskar, 
1975, 1989b; Chalmers, 1988). Critical realism thus acknowledges empirical regularities, but 
interprets them as surface phenomena which are inherently variable, because their generative 
structures, being praxis- and concept-dependent (i.e., anti-universalistic), are meaningful and 
bound to content and context (cf. Barwise, 1988; Lakoff, 1988; Markova & Foppa, 1990). This 
suggests that cognitive style is not a thing which exists in the individual (i.e., a psychological 
property). Quite the opposite, on an emergent surface level, cognitive style is expected to be 
variable across content, context, and cultural group. 
Observed factor structures do not, therefore, speak for themselves. The same factor structure will 
be interpreted very differently by an empiricist and critical realist. While the former sees the 
empirical regularities as the manifestation of the property of things (in this case personality), the 
latter interprets these regularities with reference to the work (including controlled measurement 
and primary and secondary factor analysis) that the scientist must perform to "produce" and 
render regularities visible. By the ontic fallacy, the snap-shot factor structure leads the empiricist 
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to conclude that the world is stable and consistent, whereas the critical realist argues that 
underlying generative structures can be made to yield stable relationships 
(methodologically /technologically). 
The data at hand offer a number of reasons why a critical realist interpretation is more 
appropriate than an empiricist interpretation in terms of personality. Fundamentally, an 
individualistic personality theory encounters difficulties in reconciling a theory of stable and 
general traits with manifest variability in cognitive style. Empirical variability questions the 
validity of a "thing-like" empiricist ontology. 
Firstly, the extensive variability across the different factors of the AA T scale poses major 
problems for personality theory. How is it possible for personality theory to explain the two 
secondary factors of the AA T scale? Traditionally, different "superfactors" - as Eysenck reifies 
them - are explained in terms of different dimensions of personality. 19 Personality theory, 
however, labours to explain this variability (which inevitably creeps into research fmdings). Why, 
for example, would different dimensions of personality be involved in evaluating political and 
religious authorities, and cause individuals to evaluate political authorities differently from 
familial and religious authorities? Are there distinct political, religious, and familial dimensions 
of personality structure? What causes different dimensions of personality to separate out so nicely 
(across ideological contents), and how do these dimensions of personality recognise different 
ideological contents? These are especially troubling questions once one considers that the objects 
of evaluation in Study 1 were restricted to the very narrow domain of authorities, and that similar 
value conflicts are involved in evaluating all authorities (cf. Rokeach, 1973). By relying on a 
correspondence theory of meaning, empiricism leaves the structure of personality and link 
between personality and ideological contents largely unexplained. 
This first difficulty becomes more acute when considering the relationships between the different 
factors of the AAT scale before they are masked by the secondary factor analysis. Even if 
cognitive style is not generalized over different domains of authority, but if two or so different 
superfactors of personality underlie the evaluation of political and other authorities, how can this 
help to explain the variable pattern of relationships between the different AA T factors? How and 
why, for example, does personality functioning cause negative relationships between AAT -cPol, 
and AA T -Fam and AA T -Rei for the White and Coloured samples? This would suggest, not only 
19 This is a classic example of the ontic fallacy - the ontologization of knowledge - which in combination 
with Humean causality leads to the ontologization of observation: The observed factor structures become 
superfactors which in turn become dimensions of personality. 
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that there are two different dimensions of personality, but that these dimensions are (somehow) 
negatively related to each other (in psychology). 
Finally, all these difficulties become unpleasantly compounded once cross-cultural variability is 
taken into account. Not only must the personality theorist argue (a) that there are different 
dimensions of personality (which make very subtle distinctions between different domains of 
authority), (b) that these different dimensions can cause positive, negative, and orthogonal 
relationships between ambiguity tolerance toward different domains of authority, but (c) must 
explain cross-cultural differences in (a) and (b). In sum, variability across content and social 
group pushes the personality-based account of cognitive style past its self-imposed limits of 
stability and consistency. The theory must explain cross-content and cross-cultural difference in 
personality structure, and is thereby plunged into the world of the social. Thus, although 
empiricist personality theory may generate powerful predictive accounts by assuming an 
isomorphism between empirical regularities and personality, they leave unanswered a number of 
ontological questions regarding how personality produces observed outcomes. 
A much more obvious - and I think eventually more parsimonious - answer to manifest 
variability would not involve masking it in secondary "superfactors", but would involve adopting 
a critical realist ontology. This means changing the focus of research from prediction, based on 
personality (i.e., the routine function of cognitive traits), to an analysis of the kinds of generative 
structures which must exist to produce the recorded patterns of manifest associations. A shift in 
the values guiding theory-building is required. This entails a switch from evaluating theories in 
terms of their predictive power, to an "exclusively explanatory" science (Bhaskar, 1989a). 
According to such an approach, personality theory would need to develop detailed explanations 
of how and why personality structure produces the variable pattern of relationships between the 
different AAT factors, both within and across different social groups. This is a difficult, if not 
impossible task, given the deflnition of personality in terms of generality, stability, and 
consistency. 
The results of Study 1 cannot help to identify generative structures, as an explanatory science 
would recommend. The study has been designed with a more general aim in mind: to examine 
the plausibility of two ontologies which are theorized to underlie the expression of ambiguity 
tolerance. It would thus be inappropriate to speculate here on the content of these underlying 
structures, but it seems clear that a change from an universalistic empiricist ontology is required 
to explain the manifest variability in ambiguity tolerance. A critical realist ontology may be useful 
as it can easily accommodate the observed fmdings. Since it posits generative structures which 
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are relational and praxis- and concept-dependent, it anticipates psychological phenomena which 
are thoroughly social and indexical. 
The explanatory usefulness of such a generative ontology can be illustrated by considering the 
distinction between ambiguity tolerance toward political and religious authorities which was 
evident in this study. Rather than arguing that different dimensions of personality produced these 
fmdings, they could be explained in terms of praxis- and concept-dependent generative structures. 
This would suggest that it is the meaning that these different authorities have for individuals, 
rather than some (largely unexplained) feature of individual psychological make-up, which causes 
them to be evaluated in different ways. This explanatory turn shifts the focus of interest away 
from the individual's psychological make-up (e.g., dimensions of personality) to the context-
a "scientific" study in a psychology lecture at the University of Cape Town - in which the 
fmdings were produced. 
This would account for the unexpected manner (from personality theory) in which AAT-cPol 
behaved. Thinking about conservative political authorities within the liberal atmosphere of UCT 
may invite high levels of value conflict for real praxis- and concept-dependent reasons. While 
Whites, and to an extent Coloureds, have (and continue to) enjoyed economic, and social 
advantage (and political power in the Western Cape), the race-based advantages of the apartheid 
regime are strongly condemned by the liberal institution. Conservative politics is a domain where 
two highly salient, but antithetical discourses exist from which students may draw. This conflict 
is especially acute for White students who have been brought up in conservative households. If 
these students evaluate their parents unambivalently (as would be expected from a conservative 
upbringing), then the negative association between AA T -cPol and AA T -Fam could be accounted 
for in terms of underlying praxis- and concept-dependent structures, rather than dimensions of 
personality. 20 
Such reasoning suggests that there may indeed be a relationship between the content and style of 
cognition. However, this would not be attributed to some underlying personality dynamic. Rather 
social factors arising from material interests and institutional "pressures and suggestions" about 
certain beliefs (e.g., fascist sentiments in the USA during WW2) would underlie these emergent 
20 In contrast to Tetlock's theory of stylistic cognitive change in contexts of accountability, this account 
stresses the praxis- and concept-dependence of generative structures. By focusing purely on changes in 
attitude and cognitive style in contexts of accountability, Tetlock psychologizes the rhetorical encounter, 
and disregards the material and ideological investments which constrain individuality, attitude and 
cognitive change, and impression management. 
---------
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associations. This would suggest cross-context and cross-content variability in relationship 
between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. This will be explored in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Investigating the relationship between 
tolerance of ambiguity and ideological 
conservatism 
This chapter returns to the main concern of the thesis: investigating the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs. After reviewing the social psychological theories of this 
relationship in Chapter 2, it was concluded that an anti-universalistic account may be a fruitful 
way of resolving the theoretical ambiguity which has marked this body of literature. This 
necessitated a detour through Chapters 3 and 4; current measures of cognitive style were 
evaluated according to their universalistic assumptions, a new measure was proposed, and a 
prime universalistic assumption - the stability, consistency, and generality of cognitive traits -
was scrutinized. It was concluded that tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity does not appear to be 
a trait-like feature of personality, but that expressions of ambiguity tolerance are inextricably 
context- and content-dependent. The indexical nature of ambiguity tolerance suggests that the 
underlying structures which generate manifest expressions of cognitive style may be associated 
with the meaning of the contents under cognition. In contrast to personality-based theories of the 
relationship between cognitive style and content, this would imply variability in the relationship 
between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism across different content domains. 
Rather than a single universal law accounting for the relationship between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs, cross-content variability in the pattern of associations is to be expected. 
Before examining this hypothesis, the present chapter first develops a scheme whereby the four 
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social psychological theories may be evaluated. The results of two studies which employ the AA T 
scale to assess the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs are then reported. 
Finally, the results are discussed in terms of an anti-universalistic conception of cognitive style. 
Theoretical predictions 
The social psychological theories which have undertaken to explain the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs have been discussed in Chapter 2. These accounts have 
relied largely on personality theory, but have offered widely different predictions of this 
relationship. Here, these predictions are explained and summarized so that they may be evaluated 
in the empirical work which follows. 
Table 5. 1 provides a summary of the theoretical predictions relating to the nature of cognitive 
style. The second and sixth columns of the table refer to the trait-like manner in which cognitive 
style has been conceived by most theory. By theorizing pervasive individual differences in 
cognitive style, authoritarianism, extremism theory, and context theory all anticipate tolerance 
of ambiguity to be generalized across content domain. and from individual expressions to social 
expressions. Consequently, they predict that cognitive style toward different authorities will 
constitute a unidimensional factor, and they propose an isomorphic relation between this 
unidimensional factor and tolerance of attitudinal diversity across society. These predictions were 
not confirmed by Study 1. Tetlock. in contrast, is far less clear in his predictions. As has been 
noted (see pp. 51 & 91-92), at times he treats cognitive style as a trait while on other occasions 
he theorizes cross-content variability in cognitive complexity. To the extent to which he 
emphasizes individual variability over content, he does not theorize an isomorphism between 
individual expressions of cognitive style. 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. Three 
salient features of this relationship are recorded in Table 5.1. The first concerns its direction. 
While authoritarianism, extremism, and context theories all conceptualize cognitive style as a 
personality trait, they offer different reasons as to why this trait should be associated with 
ideological contents. In so doing, they hypothesize different relationships between cognitive style 
and content. The psychodynamic account of Adorno et al. ( 1950) argues that ego-threat 
emanating deep-seated emotional ambivalence is dissipated by the simultaneous use of stylistic 
defences such as intolerance of ambiguity, and content-based defences, including ideological 
conservatism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarian attitudes. As such, they anticipate a direct negative 
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relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological conservatism, with high-scoring 
conservatives being less tolerant of ambiguity than liberals. 
Table 5.1: Theoretical distinctions between four theories of cognitive style 
Cognitive Relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and Personal and 
Style ideological conservatism social 
Theory expressions 
Trait Direction Commitment Content effect Isomorphism 
Authoritarianism Yes -linear No No Yes 
Extremism Yes n-shaped Yes No Yes 
Context Yes v-shaped Yes Conditional Yes 
Value pluralism unclear variable No Yes No 
Rokeach' s (1956a, 1960) extremism theory offers a similar psychodynamic account, but in 
contrast to Adorno et al. (1950), Rokeach argues that ideological commitment is a central 
mediating variable in the relationship between cognitive style and content. By arguing that 
extreme ideological orientations demand submission and commitment to absolute authorities, and 
that this commitment satisfies the psychodynamic desires of dogmatic individuals, Rokeach 
theorizes the authoritarian-like traits - including intolerance of ambiguity - of both the 
ideological Left and Right. In addition to satisfying psychodynamic defences, Rokeach argues, 
ideological commitment is also related to intolerance of ambiguity. For, by accepting the word 
of an "absolute authority" as final, dogmatic individuals organize the world unambiguously into 
those who accept and reject the said beliefs of the authority, and employ cognitive strategies of 
isolation, rigid categorization and denial in defending these beliefs. Accordingly, Rokeach 
proposes a curvilinear. n-shaped relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
radicalism-conservatism, with extremists being less tolerant of ambiguity than moderates. 
Context theory also suggests that ideological commitment and interest will be associated with the 
relationship between cognitive style and content. Sidanius (1984, 1985, 1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 
1989) argues that certain personality traits such as tolerance of ambiguity allow individuals to 
resist "modal conformity" and adopt deviant or extreme ideological positions. This in tum 
encourages extremists to greater effort in political information search, to display more complex 
cognitive skills, and to be more genuinely interested in politics and more committed to their 
ideological beliefs. Consequently, Sidanius hypothesizes a curvilinear, v-shaped relationship 
between tolerance of ambiguity and radicalism-conservatism, with extremists on both ends of the 
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spectrum displaying greater tolerance of ambiguity, political sophistication and ideological interest 
and commitment. 
In contrast to the three personality-based theories, Tetlock is far less explicit in his predictions. 
On the one hand, value pluralism theory anticipates a n-shaped curvilinear relationship between 
integrative complexity and radicalism-conservatism (Tetlock, 1984, 1993). According to Tetlock, 
extreme ideological orientations of the twentieth century are monistic in comparison with 
(pluralistic) moderate ideologies, offering their supporters simple cognitive means (i.e., bolstering 
and denial) to reduce conflict between opposing ideological values. By so arguing, Tetlock's 
account of cognitive style is remarkably similar to that proposed by personality theorists, for 
individuals are supposed to possess a characteristic style as determined by their ideological 
orientation. The more general value conflict theory, on the other hand, argues that the 
relationship between cognitive style and content is dependent upon the particular contents under 
cognition (Tetlock, 1986). It predicts a variable relationship between cognitive style and 
ideological beliefs over issues where different values are drawn into conflict. Nowhere, however, 
does Tetlock suggest that ideological interest or commitment would be associated with ideological 
orientation, and therefore does not consider this a possible mediating variable. 
Since Tetlock has stressed ideology-by-issue variation, in Table 5.1 I have suggested that value 
pluralism theory proposes a variable relationship between cognitive style and content. However, 
in addition to his talk about monism-pluralism and personality traits of cognitive style, there is 
a further reason why Tetlock may expect a non-variable relationship over the different content 
domains investigated in this chapter. Tetlock argues that variability in cognitive style will be 
manifest only over issues which bring different, differentially important values into conflict (e.g., 
economic and civil rights offenses). However, the content domain covered by the AA T scale does 
not touch on a wide diversity of issues which may evoke different values. On the contrary, the 
scale includes only authorities. By drawing on Rokeach's (1973) theory, as Tetlock does, one 
would expect a single set of values - freedom versus equality (authoritarianism versus 
egalitarianism)- to predominate in evaluating different authorities. Thus, although Tetlock does 
theorize variability in the relationship between cognitive style and content, there are strong 
grounds for arguing that value pluralism theory would predict a consistent n-shaped relationship 
across the different domains of authority covered in the AAT scale. 
The only other theory which could anticipate variability in the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and radicalism-conservatism is Sidanius' context theory. Authoritarianism and 
extremism theories cannot offer such predictions because, in addition to their general trait theory, 
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they posn.llate a much closer relationship between specific cognitive styles and ideological 
contents than do Sidanius and Tetlock. 1 Authoritarian and dogmatic individuals are authoritarian 
and dogmatic - both in style and content - in the family, in religion, and in politics. Sidanius, 
however, can anticipate cross-content variability in the relationship since he has divorced 
cognitive style from content, and suggests that, depending on context, the same style may be 
associated with different contents (see pp. 43-44). Variability in the relationship between 
ambiguity tolerance and conservatism would, however, be conditional on a negative association 
between the conservatism of beliefs in two different content domains. This could occur, for 
example, if religious conservatism and political liberalism were both normative in a particular 
context. In this case, individuals who are intolerant of ambiguity would be religious 
conservatives, but political liberals. 
Despite its ambiguities, Tetlock's theory is the most convincing of the four because it explicitly 
theorizes ideology-by-issue variation in cognitive style. Thus, while the expectations of all four 
theories will be examined in the work which follows, Tetlock's will receive the most attention. 
The main feature which distinguishes Billig's anti-universalistic account of cognitive style from 
Tetlock's theory is the emphasis Billig gives to the context of cognition. This difference stems 
from two very different conceptions of belief conflict. Tetlock's dualistic theory suggests that 
(self-contained) individuals attempt to resolve dilemmas between Rokeachian terminal values. 
While value conflict may vary according to the particular issue under consideration, the values 
themselves are considered to be universal, and to a large degree independent of context (see pp. 
94-96). Consequently, the conflict associated with reconciling two incompatible values - for 
example, whether to raise income tax toward a larger defence budget- will arise in any context 
(e.g., academic, religious, business), for this is seen as a dilemma in the world external to the 
individual which needs to be thought through and solved. 
Billig's dialogical theory, in contrast, takes the thoroughly social nature of cognition into 
consideration. Not only is cognitive style expected to vary over content domain, but this 
variability will be influenced by features of the context of cognition. According to Billig (1985a, 
1987a; Billig et al., 1988), dilemmas and value conflict are emergent features of an ideological 
context. Value conflict is not defmed in terms of dilemmas which exists out in the world (to be 
found and resolved by the subject). On the contrary, value conflicts and ideological dilemmas are 
created and resolved actively between people within contexts where meanings are socially 
1 In attempting to establish universal accounts of the relationship between cognitive style and content, 
cognitive style is only properly split off from cognitive content (theoretically and methodologically) during 
the 1980's (see chap. 1). 
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negotiated (cf. Shotter, 1993a). Because of the complex nature of meanings within a particular 
context, Billig anticipates variability in cognitive style over quite subtle differences in ideological 
content. He can, for example, accommodate differences between ambiguity tolerance of political 
and conservative political authorities, not because they involve different values, but because 
within a certain context they may rouse vastly different meanings. 
A rhetorical account of cognitive style thus recommends that the ideological context of cognition 
is central to the relationship between cognitive style and content. This may explain Tetlock et al's 
(1989) "unexpected" fmding that "the number of conservative thoughts was correlated with 
integrative complexity" (p. 635). Since the study took place in a liberal context, perhaps the 
fmdings are not so unexpected. By taking the social nature of value conflict into consideration, 
one could argue that conservatives experienced more value conflict in thinking about affirmative 
action and capital punishment than did liberals. In a conservative context the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs may be reversed. 
The main theoretical differences between the four social psychological accounts which have been 
discussed here (and summarized in Table 5.1) will be examined in the two studies reported 
below. Study 2 presents different aspects of the same data which were collected for Study 1 
(reported in the previous chapter). Here we focus on the relationship between radicalism-
conservatism and the factors of the AA T scale, Budner scale, and the 10 scale. Study 3 reports 
the results of a study which aimed to re-examine (a) the validity of the AA T measurement 
procedure, and (b) the relationship between cognitive style and content, with a different set of 
contents as scale items. 
Study 2 
A student sample from a historically liberal, White English-speaking South African university was 
deemed appropriate for studying the relationship between ideological beliefs and ambiguity 
tolerance. These students were expected to manifest high levels of value conflict within the 
political sphere. The student population at UCT has a history of anti-apartheid protest, and has 
upheld the liberal values of freedom, equality, and democracy. Recent change has, however, 
complicated matters somewhat. While progress has been made toward these liberal ideals, this 
has been accompanied by increased uncertainty and threat. The clear-cut options between the 
"bad" apartheid and the "good" liberation no longer exist. Change has eased economic sanctions 
and reduced the international pariah status of White South Africans. At the time of the study 
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(1993), however, it had also produced increased levels of crime, violence, and economic 
uncertainty. This affects these students directly, for security is threatened and employment 
prospects are diminished. Such threat and uncertainty is expected to be associated with generally 
intolerant, conservative, and authoritarian inclinations (Berry, Kalin & Taylor, 1977, chap. 7; 
Sales, 1973). This cuts across the racial divide. In the eyes of many Whites, it is largely Black 
radicals who are propagating the violence. In addition to the negative effects that violence and 
mass action have on the economy, affirmative action policies are also seen to be responsible for 
the lack of employment opportunities. Therefore, one would expect liberal and non-racist values 
to conflict with conservative and racist tendencies among these White students. 2 
In contrast to the students' ambivalence, the university presents an image of a liberal and non-
racist institution. Affirmative action is publicly advocated in both staff and student selection. 
Moreover, the university has been trying to 'restructure' itself as a multiracial institution, and 
has instituted a body with powers to police and convict people of racism. While these efforts may 
seem insufficient in the eyes of many (radicals), it is widely recognised that powerful norms 
toward liberalism and non-racism exist in the university. This fact was forcefully demonstrated 
in the study undertaken to validate a conservatism scale among UCT students. 'Apartheid' was 
rejected by all respondents, while 'the new South Africa' was almost unanimously accepted. 
The university setting provides an ideal context to study the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and radicalism-conservatism, because it is possible to derive expectations which are 
directly opposed to the widely accepted predictions of Adorno et al. (1950). The students' 
conflict between liberalism and conservatism is played out under powerful norms and "pressures 
and suggestions" toward liberalism and non-racism. Under these circumstances, conservative and 
racist attitudes will conflict with institutional norms to a greater extent than liberal and non-racist 
attitudes. In direct contrast to the expectations of Adorno et al. (1950), therefore, conservatives 
should experience higher levels of belief conflict within the university context, and be more 
tolerant of ambiguity than liberals. 
In this study, the lack of anonymity may have been vital to the fmdings, making institutional 
norms salient and rendering the subjects accountable to their responses in the context of the 
university (and a "scientific psychological study"). This may have pronounced any possible value 
conflict that the subjects experienced between opposing discourses within the institutional setting. 
1 The ambivalence between non-racism and apartheid/capitalist values among liberal White South Africans 
has been discussed by Dixon et al. (1994). 
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The use of formal lecturing time further aided efforts to increase the salience of institutional 
university norms. 
Because the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs may be influenced by a 
number of extraneous variables, this study - unlike most of the research conducted in this area 
-controls for possible mediating variables, including the effects of education and intelligence 
(Chown, 1961; Schaie, 1958; Schroder et al., 1967; Scott et al., 1979), and ideological 
commitment, interest, and involvement (Rokeach, 1956a, 1960; Sidanius, 1984, 1985). Education 
was controlled in the present study by the use of first year psychology students. While this does 
not eliminate the influence of intelligence, it may reduce it (Schroder et al., 1967). In a related 
area, Schonbach ( 1981) has argued that "the correlations between intelligence and prejudice drop 
to fairly low levels if educational status is controlled" (p. 127). Measures of political interest and 
religiosity were employed to partial out the influence of ideological commitment toward these 
domains. 
Method 
Sample and procedure 
The sample and procedure was precisely the same as that reported in Study 1. The only 
difference is that here, the results for the White sample form the primary focus of the study. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the Black and Coloured samples were too small for the 
AAT factors to be analyzed by polynomial regression procedures, which included up to 14 
independent variables. Secondly, an anti-universalist theory of the relationship between cognitive 
style and content recommends an analysis of the contextual meaning of cognitive contents. As 
a White researcher, I have inadequate understanding of the meanings that various conservative 
beliefs have for Black and Coloured students at UCT, so the theoretical implications of any set 
of results would be unclear. One can be sure though that measures of racism, authoritarianism, 
and conservatism certainly have different meaning for these different groups. 
Measures 
In addition to the socio-demographic items and measures of ambiguity tolerance which were 
discussed in Study 1, the first questionnaire included also Duckitt's (1990) Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism scale and measures of religiosity and political interest; and the second 
questionnaire included measures of conservatism and racism. 
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Ideological beliefs 
Although the main focus of the thesis is cognitive style, investigating the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological beliefs involved a substantial amount of preliminary work in 
developing a measure of ideological conservatism, appropriate for use with a South African 
sample. A new measure of conservatism was needed, primarily, because the original Wilson-
Patterson ( 1968) scale consists of many items which are dated and culture-bound, and which are 
totally inapplicable to the South African context. In addition, the construct of conservatism is 
contested, and it would be inappropriate to assume uni- or multidimensionality in the work which 
follows. In order that the preliminary analysis of conservatism does not detract from the focus 
of this chapter, a full discussion of the development of the Conservatism scale is reported in 
Appendix D. Overall, conservatism is conceived as a "fuzzy set" of oblique factors which varies 
cross-culturally. Seven indices of conservatism were used in the analysis which follows: the total 
conservatism scale plus its three factors - religious conservatism, political and economic 
conservatism, and punitiveness- as well as Duckitt's measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
and Subtle Racism, and a measure of self-ranked liberalism-conservatism. 
Ideological commitment 
Measures of religiosity and political interest were included to determine their potential influence 
as variables mediating the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs in religious 
and political domains. 
Religiosity 
Religiosity was assessed by means of the balanced, eight item scale developed by Rohrbaugh & 
Jessor (1975) (see Appendix B, Section 3, items 1-8). The scale has been found to be a valid and 
reliable unidimensional measure, relevant to both "conventional and unconventional religious 
involvement" (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975, p. 137). As the scale has been associated with 
fundamentalism of religious convictions, it was considered a suitable as a measure of religious 
ideological commitment. 
Political commitment 
A four item Likert-type measure was developed to assess the degree to which subjects were 
committed to, or interested in political affairs (see Appendix C, Section 2, items 5-8). Items were 
based on Sidanius' (1988b) measure of "cognitive orientation toward politics", but also included 
emotive aspects of political involvement. 
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Results 
Initial principal factor factor analyses of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the Subtle 
Racism scale, and the Religiosity scale found them all to be unidimensional. The alpha 
coefficients for all three scales were adequate (RWA, a = .75; Subtle Racism, a = .79; 
Religiosity, a = . 92). One item of the Political Interest scale (Appendix B, Section 1, item 8) 
was deleted due to its low item-total correlation. The remaining three items had an alpha 
coefficient of .84. The distribution of scores for all measures of conservatism and ideological 
interest was normal. 
The mean differences in Religiosity and Political Interest scores for the three samples were 
anticipated (see Table 5.2). The trend for Black students to be more politicised than their White 
counterparts is widely recognised, and has been explained in terms of socialization surrounding 
the struggle for liberation (Danziger, 1963; Hyslop, 1990). The relatively low levels of 
Religiosity was also expected from the liberal White sample. 
Table 5.2: Univariate statistics for all indices of ideological commitment 
Population group 
Group 
Ideological Di fferences• 
commitment White Black Coloured 
M SD N M SD N M SD 
Pol. Interest R2=.02 10.27 a 6.81 298 13.15 b 8.92 84 10.05 a 6.64 
Religiosity R2=.08 15.72 a 8.10 301 19.15 b 7.44 87 21.33 b 6.64 
Note. Significant multiple comparisons [Newman-Keuls] arranged from the smallest mean (a) to largest (b) (a= .05). 




Two types of analysis were undertaken to assess the relationship between the indices of ambiguity 
tolerance and ideological conservatism. Correlation coefficients were generated in order to 
estimate the direction and strength of linear association between the various measures of 
ambiguity tolerance and dimensions of conservatism. Correlation matrices were also employed 
to identify any relationships between tolerance of ambiguity and Political Interest and Religiosity. 
Multiple polynomial regression analyses were then performed to identify curvilinearity in the 
relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and sociopolitical beliefs, and to partial out the 
possible effects of ideological commitment. 
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Correlational analysis 
Tables 5.3a, 5.3b, and 5.3c report the matrix of correlations between the 13 indices of ambiguity 
tolerance and six indices of ideological conservatism for the White, Black, and Coloured samples 
respectively. The results reiterate the conclusions reached in Study 1 regarding the generalized 
personality status of ambiguity tolerance. First, by suggesting that the form of the relationship 
between ambiguity tolerance and conservatism varies over domain of cognition, they highlight 
the need to distinguish between ambiguity tolerance toward different contents. Second, since only 
certain dimensions of conservatism were associated with each AA T index, the results indicate that 
it is imperative to distinguish between different dimensions of conservatism. In contrast to early 
personality models which treated conservatism and cognitive style as isomorphic and pervasive 
unitary traits, the variability in the results suggests that there are a number of different 
relationships between cognitive style and ideological content, depending on what aspect of 
conservatism and which domain of cognitive style one is talking about. Consequently, the results 
imply that personality measures of ambiguity tolerance (e.g., the Budner scale) may produce 
misleading results within particular content domains. Finally, the marked cross-cultural variability 
which was evident in the pattern of relationships, suggests that social determinants may influence 
the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism. 
For the White sample, the vector of sociopolitical beliefs was correlated with AAT-Total, AAT-
Fam, AA T -Rei, and all the Budner indices in the negative linear manner predicted by the theory 
of authoritarianism. While the correlations between the Budner scale and ideological beliefs may 
be spurious, arising out of common ideological scale content, the correlations involving the AAT 
scale do not suffer from this problem. Conservative White subjects were more intolerant of 
ambiguity toward familial and religious authorities than liberals in the UCT context. However, 
the opposite relationship held true for tolerance of ambiguity toward conservative political 
authorities. In a relationship diametrically opposed to the predictions of authoritarianism, 
individuals endorsing conservative beliefs were more tolerant of ambiguity toward conservative 
political authorities than liberals. Furthermore, AAT -Pol and Ideological Orthodoxy were 
orthogonal to all indices of ideological conservatism. This is unanticipated by the theory of 
authoritarianism as it suggests that the antidemocratic demand for belief congruence across 
society was just as prevalent among liberals as it is among conservatives. Overall, cross content 
variability appears to have a significant impact on the strength and direction of association 
between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological beliefs. 
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Table 5.3a: Correlations between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism (White). 
C-Tot C-Rel C-PEC C-Pun RWA SR 
AAT-Total -.28"" -.31""" -.09 -.13 -.18 .01 
AAT-cPol. .38""" .14 .34""" .43""" .41""" .49""" 
AAT -Political .07 .05 .12 .11 -.02 .01 
AAT-Family -.42""" -.27" -.31"" -.34""" -.37""" -.26" 
AA T -Religious -.51""" -.54""" -.15 -.31"" -.23" -.03 
Budner -.4o··· -.33**" -.17 -.33*** -.36*** -.29*" 
Bl -.27*" -.18 -.17 -.25" -.19 -.29"* 
B2 -.22" -.17 -.05 -.30*" -.19 -.15 
B3 -.07 .03 -.08 -.18 -.10 -.25" 
B4 -.17 -.10 -.11 -.16 -.30"* -.10 
B5 -.25* -.28*" -.12 -.03 -.22* -.28"" 
B6 -.20 -.23* .00 -.16 -.16 -.14 
10 .02 -.02 -.05 .11 -.09 .12 
"p<.Ol. *"p < .001. ""*p< .0001. 
Table 5.3b: Correlations between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism (Black). 
C-Tot C-Rel C-PEC C-Pun RWA SR 
AAT-Total -.06 -.25 .38* -.10 -.23 -.21 
AAT-cPol. .05 -.11 .18 -.05 .02 -.08 
AA T -Political .09 -.19 .58··· -.05 -.15 -.07 
AAT-Family -.06 -.16 .38* -.18 -.23 -.26 
AA T -Religious -.34 -.43* -.05 -.12 -.39* -.41" 
Budner .00 -.08 .25 -.06 -.07 .09 
Bl .15 .13 .08 .03 .00 .04 
B2 .07 -.10 .43*" -.07 .04 -.01 
B3 -.07 -.23 .06 .04 .08 -.09 
B4 -.15 -.09 -.08 -.11 -.40" .07 
B5 .13 -.05 .31 .18 -.19 .08 
B6 .01 .04 .06 -.07 .06 .12 
10 -.33* -.27 -.04 -.36* -.08 .05 
"p<.05. ""p<.Ol. *""p < .001. 
Table 5.3c: Correlations between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism (Coloured). 
C-Tot C-Re1 C-PEC C-Pun RWA SR 
AAT-Total -.22 -.36" .12 -.11 .05 .02 
AAT-cPol. .31 .27 .15 .28 .16 .31 
AAT-Political .01 -.08 .22 .06 .04 .26 
AAT-Family -.6r·· -.59""" -.20 -.46** -.29 -.05 
AA T -Religious -.so··· -.60··· -.17 -.22 -.20 -.24 
Budner -.35" -.36* -.21 -.12 -.06 -.17 
B1 -.40*" -.39*" -.17 -.27 -.05 -.12 
B2 -.13 -.16 -.04 -.03 .15 .01 
B3 .11 .31" -.21 .00 .10 -.11 
84 -.05 .00 -.15 -.02 -.14 .06 
B5 -.12 -.21 -.13 .12 -.09 -.24 
B6 -.17 -.15 -.08 -.14 -.06 -.03 
10 -.37*" -.43"" .05 -.31" -.25" .16 
"p < .05. ""p<.Ol. """p< .001. 
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In addition to mediating the strength and direction of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance 
and ideological beliefs, each content domain of ambiguity tolerance was only related to certain 
sets of beliefs. This fmding reinforces the necessity to distinguish between different dimensions 
of ideological conservatism rather than treating conservatism as a unidimensional construct (see 
Appendix D). For the White sample, AAT-Rel was not associated with Political and Economic 
Conservatism or with Subtle Racism. Instead, it was strongly associated with Religious 
Conservatism and Punitiveness. The opposite holds true for tolerance of ambiguity toward 
conservative political authorities. AA T -cPol was unrelated to Religious Conservatism, but 
strongly related to Subtle Racism. These fmdings suggest that a relationship between the style and 
content of cognition is manifest only when there is a meaningful connection between a particular 
set of beliefs and a specific content domain of ambiguity tolerance. The fmdings warn against 
making general statements to the effect that cognitive style predisposes individuals to conservative 
ideology. 
The vague conceptual status and ideological bias of the Budner scale makes its results difficult 
to interpret (see pp. 75-76). Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the 
intercorrelation matrix for the White sample. Despite their common ideological content, the 
Budner scale and its factors were less strongly associated with the indices of ideological beliefs 
than the AA T factors. Furthermore, the Budner scale was unrelated to Political and Economic 
Conservatism. Thus, in addition to its universalist assumptions and interpretative difficulties 
associated with ideological bias, the Budner scale explains less variance and is generally less 
useful in predicting political beliefs than the AAT scale. 
Although the correlation matrices of the Black and Coloured samples differed form that of the 
White sample, the main fmdings were corroborated. In contrast to the predictions of all 
personality-based theories, the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
conservatism varied across content domain and dimension of ideological conservatism; and 
included negative, positive, and orthogonal associations. Also, for all three groups, AAT-Pol and 
AAT -cPol were distinct from AAT -Rei. In all instances, AA T -Rei was negatively correlated with 
conservatism as anticipated by the theory of authoritarianism. 
The varying pattern of correlations across the three groups may provide clues as to the dynamics 
underlying the associations. In contrast to the White sample, the associations between AA T -cPol 
and the indices of conservatism were orthogonal (rather than positive) for the Black and Coloured 
samples. This suggests that political beliefs - including racism, authoritarianism, political and 
economic conservatism, and punitiveness - were related to the style in which the White, but not 
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the Black or Coloured sample evaluated conservative political authorities. The lack of similar 
relationships for the Black and Coloured sample could be related to the fact that these subjects 
reject apartheid and conservative White politics unequivocally. In contrast. value conflicts 
surrounding political, economic. and race issues may have lead conservative White subjects to 
express some positive, albeit ambivalent, evaluation of conservative political authorities within 
the liberal context. The similar positive relationship between Political and Economic 
Conservatism and AAT-Pol and AAT-Fam for the Black sample suggests that value conflict 
underlying political conservatism among the Black subjects was related to ambivalent evaluation 
of political and familial authorities; perhaps indicating the presence of conflicting discourses in 
these domains. These results imply that value conflict surrounding ideological conservatism was 
only associated with ambivalent evaluation of those authorities which are meaningfully (materially 
and ideologically) related to that aspect of conservatism for the different social groups within this 
liberal context. More conservative and racist Whites may express some positive evaluation of 
conservative political authorities, despite the institutional censure, because of the possible material 
and social advantages which such politics promises. 
If this reasoning is taken further, it may explain why different dimensions of conservatism tend 
to be related to each index of ambiguity tolerance for the different samples. While punitive. 
authoritarian. and racist beliefs were generally not related to ambiguity tolerance for the Black 
and Coloured samples. the correlations between AAT -Rel and the RW A and SR scales for the 
Black sample. for example. indicates that ambivalence toward religious authorities was associated 
with conservatism in these dimensions. Similarly. punitiveness among the Coloured sample could 
be related to conservative discourses within the family. The overall differences between the 
samples suggest that punitive. racist, and authoritarian beliefs are part of a part of a wider 
ideological constellation for Whites, whereas for the Black and Coloured samples. they are 
related only to a narrow domain of authority. Cross-cultural variability is further evident in the 
different pattern of associations between Ideological Orthodoxy and ideological conservatism 
across the three groups. Unlike the consistent non-significant correlations for the White sample, 
Ideological Orthodoxy was associated with Punitiveness and Religious Conservatism for the Black 
and Coloured samples. Although the direction of these relationships were consistent with the 
predictions of Adorno et al. (1950), given the cross-cultural variability and specificity of the 
domain of ideological conservatism with which IO was associated, a personality-based explanation 
seems implausible. 
The overall pattern of results underscores the necessity to distinguish between different 
dimensions of tolerance of ambiguity and different forms of conservatism. Not only were 
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different factors of AA T scale associated with sociopolitical beliefs in different directions. but 
each AA T factor was only associated with particular (possibly predictable) dimensions of 
conservatism. These fmdings provide very strong evidence against a personality-based account 
of the relationship between cognitive style and sociopolitical beliefs. and warn against the 
common practice of employing single ("unidimensional") measures of both constructs to test 
research hypotheses. The results suggest that it is not a particular personality type. which is 
intolerant of ambiguity. who is predisposed to conservative beliefs. On the contrary. the content 
of various ideological beliefs are differentially related to ambiguity tolerance toward different 
authorities. While personality theory is stretched to explain the overall pattern of correlations. 
it may be explicable with reference to the different ideological belief systems of the various 
population groups. Ideological beliefs will only be related to the style of evaluating those 
dimensions of authority which are salient to that domain of ideology for each social group. Since 
apartheid has infiltrated all aspects of social authority for Whites. and has integrated racism. 
authoritarianism. and conservative political and economic policy into an interrelated and coherent 
whole. it is expected that more dimensions of conservatism will be related to ambiguity tolerance 
toward each domain of authority for the White sample. 
These linear associations do not. however. cover the full range of predictions regarding the 
relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism. Both Rokeach and 
Sidanius argue that ambiguity tolerance should be related to ideological commitment. and that this 
association should underlie a curvilinear relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
conservatism. In order to examine the possible mediating effects of ideological commitment. the 
indices of ambiguity tolerance were correlated with Religiosity and Political Interest (see Table 
5.4). Strong correlations were evident between the IO scale and Political Interest. and between 
AA T -Rei and Religiosity for all three population groups. Although there were a few other 
moderate correlations between the indices of ambiguity tolerance and ideological commitment. 
it appears as though the majority of the associations between ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
conservatism are not influenced by Religiosity and Political Interest. Nevertheless. this does not 
justify the standard practice of ignoring these variables completely since they may play a 
significant role within certain content domains. 
Overall. the correlational analysis has raised some serious doubts concerning the validity of a 
personality-based theory of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
conservatism. The results indicate that the strength and direction of the relationship is dependent 
upon the content domain within which ambiguity tolerance is expressed. Rather than a generalized 
personality trait of intolerance of ambiguity fmding expression in a whole vector of conservative 
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beliefs, it appears as though different types of conservatism are related to different cognitive 
styles within a particular context. The variability within a single context as well as the cross-
cultural contrasts suggest that social factors - including the meaning of the ideological contents 
-may play a role in determining the nature of the relationship. 
Table 5.4: Correlations between tolerance of ambiguity and Religiosity and Political Interest 
Population group 
Tolerance 
White of Black Coloured 
ambiguity Religiosity Political Religiosity Political Religiosity Political 
Interest Interest Interest 
AAT-Tot -.30"" .08 -.26 -.02 -.35" -.12 
AAT-cPol .14 -.22 .08 -.30 .27 -.17 
AAT-Pol .13 -.09 -.04 -.14 -.08 -.20 
AAT-Fam -.16 .14 -.17 .06 -.42"" .08 
AAT-Rel -.67*"" .14 -.59""" .43" -.53""* .07 
Budner -.20 .13 .02 -.03 -.17 -.07 
B1 -.10 .13 -.33" .13 -.18 -.11 
82 -.15 .08 .11 -.40" -.02 -.23 
83 .05 .15 -.34" .38" .20 .11 
B4 -.03 .00 -.07 .01 .00 .00 
B5 -.06 .12 .15 -.12 -.09 .02 
86 -.25"" .13 .06 .37" -.19 .19 
IO -.02 -.57""" .04 -.51""" -.27 -.41""* 
"p < .01. ··p < .001. ···p < .0001. for White sample. 
"p < .05. ""p < .0 1. ···p < .00 1. for Black and Coloured samples. 
It now remains to consider whether tolerance of ambiguity is associated with sociopolitical beliefs 
in a curvilinear manner, and whether this relationship is evident over and above the influence of 
Political Interest and Religiosity. 
Regression analysis 
Regression equations were developed for all indices of ambiguity tolerance. "New look" multiple 
regression procedures were employed; the purpose of which is to develop theoretical models 
rather than predicting or forecasting some criterion (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). As such, the 
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regression analysis proceeded by the hierarchical method recommended by Cohen & Cohen 
(1983). Sets of variables were entered into the regression equation on the basis of their predefmed 
theoretical import. At places where a priori theoretical import could not be established, 
empirically grounded stepwise procedures were employed. 
The regression analysis aimed to determine the form of the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and ideological conservatism over and above the possible mediating effects of 
ideological commitment. Therefore, Political Interest and/or Religiosity were entered into the 
models first in order to partial out the influence of ideological commitment before the indices of 
conservatism were modelled against each factor of ambiguity tolerance. Only in those instances 
where Political Interest or Religiosity accounted for very little variance relative to conservatism, 
and where conservatism could account for all the variance of the indices of ideological 
commitment, was the ideological commitment variable exited from the regression equation. As 
such, ideological commitment took priority as a covariate in the regression analysis, except in 
those instances where had no unique predictive power. 
A number of preliminary analyses were undertaken for each index of ambiguity tolerance before 
the final models were developed. The first stage of analysis attempted to determine which 
dimensions of ideological conservatism were related to each index of ambiguity tolerance in a 
curvilinear manner. For each index of ambiguity tolerance, separate polynomial regression 
analyses were performed for all factors of ideological conservatism by modelling first the linear 
and then the quadratic score of conservatism against the index of ambiguity tolerance (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983; Draper & Smith, 1981; Pedhazur, 1982). To reduce the problems associated with 
multicollinearity between the linear and curvilinear effects, and between the different oblique 
indices of conservatism, all variables of sociopolitical beliefs were standardized in order to 
"centre" them (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). 
The second stage of analysis was empirically driven. All conservatism indices which were 
significantly (a = .05) associated with each ambiguity tolerance factor in the first stage of 
analysis were entered into the regression model for that factor of ambiguity tolerance. If Political 
Interest and/or Religiosity were significantly correlated with the particular index of ambiguity 
tolerance, they were entered into the regression equation first to partial out their variance. 
Following this, stepwise regression analysis was performed in order to select those indices of 
ideological conservatism which contributed significant unique explanatory variance. Stepwise 
procedures were employed here as no clear theoretical rationale existed by which to determine 
which ideological beliefs took precedence in the relationship with the particular index of 
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ambiguity tolerance. Thus, for example, whether AAT -Rei was associated with Religious 
Conservatism rather than any other index of conservatism, was left an empirical issue. The linear 
and quadratic components of ideological conservatism were entered into the stepwise procedure 
simultaneously (as sets) when both of these effects had been found to be significant (in Stage 1) 
(see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, chap. 4). 
In the final stage of the analysis, the indices of ideological conservatism were once again entered 
into the model after the influence of Political Interest and/or Religiosity had been partialled out. 
The order of entry was determined by size of the F-ratio of the respective partial regression 
coefficients which had been identified in the stepwise (Stage 2) analysis. In this final stage, 
however, linear and curvilinear effects were not entered simultaneously. Linear effects were 
entered first, followed by the curvilinear effects. In this manner, it was possible to ascertain the 
size of the curvilinear effects for a particular variable once the influence of ideological 
commitment, more important linear and curvilinear effects, and the linear effect for that particular 
conservatism variable had been partialled out ( cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Draper & Smith, 1981; 
Pedhazur, 1982). 
These torturous analytical procedures were necessary because of the high levels of 
multicollinearity present, and the large numbers of independent variables in relation to available 
degrees of freedom. Multicollinearity was apparent, not only between the linear and quadratic 
effects, but also between different indices of conservatism, and between conservatism and 
ideological commitment. In such instances, a hierarchical entry of variables - in order of 
theoretical import - is required as it ensures that the most important variables (including 
ideological commitment over conservatism, and linear over quadratic effects) remain in equation 
regardless of shared variance. Although regression analyses were computed for only the White 
sample, the available degrees of freedom were still insufficient to produce stable regression 
models for the 14 possible independent variables, particularly in the light of multicollinearity. 
Therefore, preliminary elimination of independent variables at Stage 1 was necessary before all 
variables were entered into the stepwise procedure in Stage 2. 
It will be recalled that for the White sample, AAT -Pol and Ideological Orthodoxy were not 
linearly associated with ideological beliefs. The polynomial regression analysis performed in 
Stage 1 indicated that these variables were associated with ideological conservatism in a 
curvilinear manner (see Table 5.5). AAT-Pol was associated with the RWA scale and the Subtle 
Racism scale in a negative quadratic manner, and Ideological Orthodoxy was related to Religious 
Conservatism, also by a negative quadratic function. These relationships are congruent with the 
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predictions of extremism theory since they indicate that moderates demonstrated highest levels 
of ambiguity tolerance, while extremists on both the Left and Right were more intolerant of 
ambiguity. 
Table 5.5: Curvilinear effects between tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity and sociopolitical beliefs 
Tolerance Conservatism 
of 
ambiguity C-Total C-Rel C-PEC RWA SR 
If=.059 If=.074 






AAT-Rel F(1,119)=4.94 F(l, 119)= 12.94 
p<.03 p<.OOOS 
R2=.027 R2=.052 
Bl F(l, 146) =4.32 F(1,146)=6.25 
p<.04 p<.003 
R2=.099 
IO F(l, 148) = 16.45 
p<.OOOl 
Note. Partial correlation coefficients are reported for the entry of the quadratic effect after the linear effect has been 
partial led. 
The correlational analysis reported in Table 5.3a had found AAT-Fam and AAT-Rel to be 
negatively associated with ideological conservatism for the White sample. The polynomial 
analysis suggested that, in addition to these linear effects, AAT -Fam was related to Political and 
Economic Conservatism in the positive quadratic manner predicted by context theory. AAT-Rel 
was associated with both Political and Economic Conservatism and Subtle Racism in a positive 
quadratic manner. Although these relationships take the form predicted by context theory, the 
latter is somewhat ironical since racism is the only set of beliefs which Sidanius argues is not 
related to ambiguity tolerance in a curvilinear manner. In contrast to these positive and negative 
quadratic functions, AA T -cPol was not associated with ideological conservatism in a curvilinear 
manner. The only Budner factor to attain curvilinearity was related to Total Conservatism and 
Political and Economic Conservatism by a positive quadratic function. 
The direction of association between the various indices of ambiguity tolerance and ideological 
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conservatism has yielded support for the predictions of all three personality-based theories, and 
has yielded support for none. The factors of the AA T scale have been found to be associated with 
the indices of conservatism in (a) the negative linear direction predicted by authoritarianism, (b) 
the negative quadratic manner predicted by extremism theory, and (c) the positive quadratic 
manner predicted by context theory. The positive linear association between AA T -cPol and 
conservatism was, however, not anticipated by any of the three theories. Also not predicted by 
the three theories was the differential relationships between ideological beliefs and ambiguity 
tolerance toward different domains of authority. As personality-based theories, they anticipate 
similar associations over different content domains. It is also doubtful whether Tetlock could 
anticipate such a high degree of variability in the relationship across different domains of 
authority. Certainly, the value pluralism model does not anticipate the positive linear and positive 
quadratic relationships. 
The analysis reported in Appendix D had found different indices of ideological conservatism to 
be highly intercorrelated for the White sample, but has also found important distinctions between 
different dimensions of conservatism. Thus, while it is essential to consider different dimensions 
separately, they share a substantial amount of variance. Consequently, many of the linear and 
curvilinear relationships between the indices of conservatism and the AA T factors are redundant. 
The second stage of analysis involved stepwise regression analysis, after the effects of Political 
Interest and/or Religiosity had been partialled out. This was done as a means of identifying those 
indices of ideological conservatism which contributed the most unique explanatory variance to 
the regression models. If both a linear and a quadratic effect had been identified as significant 
in the tirst stage of analysis, they were entered into the stepwise procedure simultaneously. 
Final regression models were developed in the third stage of analysis. Here, variables were 
entered into the regression equation by the "step up" procedure, in order of their importance as 
identified in the (Stage 2) stepwise analysis (Howell, 1991). The significance of linear effects 
cannot be ascertained from the simultaneous regression analysis of both the linear and the 
quadratic terms since these simultaneous effects are highly unstable due to multicollinearity and 
possible suppression (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Draper & Smith, 1981). The linear and quadratic 
effects were thus not entered together as sets, but quadratic effects were entered after the linear 
effects. The final regression coefficients for both the linear and quadratic effects were, however, 
derived from the final models for the simultaneous analysis (sets) of the independent variables 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Draper & Smith, 1981). 
The final regression models for each index of ambiguity tolerance are reported in Table 5.6. The 
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multiple regression analysis clarified and extended earlier fmdings regarding: 1) which 
dimensions of conservatism were the most important predictors of each index of ambiguity 
tolerance, 2) the influence of ideological interest and commitment as a potential mediator 
variable, and 3) the overall shape of the relationship between each index of ambiguity tolerance 
and ideological conservatism. 
First, considering only the dimensions of ideological conservatism which were associated with 
the AAT factors, a distinction may be drawn between expressions of ambiguity tolerance toward 
political authorities on the one hand, and religious and familial authorities on the other. Both 
AA T -cPol and AA T -Pol were related to the Subtle Racism scale and aspects of authoritarianism 
(including the RWA scale and Punitiveness). This is not surprising since racism and 
authoritarianism have been the foundation of the political ideology of apartheid in South Africa 
(cf. Foster, 1991). It is especially noteworthy that the RWA scale was associated with AAT-Pol, 
whereas it was the authoritarian aggressive aspects of Punitiveness which were associated with 
AAT -cPol. Although these results were derived from empirical (stepwise) procedures, they 
resonate strongly with what one would expect by intuition. It appears as though ambiguity 
tolerance toward a domain of authority is related to only those beliefs which are salient for that 
domain. To carry this argument further, it appears as though a general conservatism factor was 
the most salient set of belief contents associated with ambiguity tolerance of religious and familial 
authorities. AAT-Fam was associated with Total Conservatism and marginally with RWA, while 
AAT-Rel was associated only with Total Conservatism. Not only do these fmdings underscore 
the necessity to distinguish between different dimensions of ideological conservatism, but they 
demonstrate the need to differentiate between ambiguity tolerance toward different content 
domains. Furthermore, the results suggest that ambiguity tolerance is associated only with those 
beliefs which are implicated in the domain toward which ambiguity tolerance is expressed. As 
this is to be expected, the fmdings confirm the validity of the AAT scale. 
It is significant that many of these effects were manifest over and above the mediating influence 
of Religiosity and Political Interest. While these fmdings do not rule out the possibility that other 
variables may underlie the relationship between sociopolitical beliefs and ambiguity tolerance, 
they do suggest an intimate relationship between the content and the style of cognition within any 
particular context. In contrast, the relationship between the dimensions of conservatism and AAT-
Total and Ideological Orthodoxy were reduced to non-significant levels once the Religiosity and 
Political Interest had been partialled out. Similarly, the relationship between AAT -Rel and Total 
Conservatism, while still significant, was substantially reduced once Religiosity had been 
partialled out. 
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These fmdings indicate that the relationship that AAT-Total, AAT-Rel, and Ideological 
Orthodoxy have with ideological conservatism may be a byproduct of the mediating influence of 
ideological commitment. Ambiguity tolerance towards religious authorities appears to be related 
to commitment to religious beliefs rather than to the orthodox or liberal nature of these beliefs. 
This was a major difference between expressions of attitudinal ambiguity tolerance toward 
political and religious authorities. Whereas ambivalent evaluation of political authorities was 
associated with political belief contents (radicalism-conservatism), similar evaluation of religious 
authorities was associated with commitment to religion rather than any panicular religious 
contents (orthodoxy). Similarly, the Ideological Orthodoxy characteristic of opinionation was 
associated with interest in politics regardless of the content of the beliefs of interest. For both 
Ideological Orthodoxy and AA T -Rei, the effect size for these relationships was very strong, 
indicating the importance of these variables as predictors of ambiguity tolerance. 
The role of ideological commitment as a mediator variable is congruent with Rokeach's (1956a, 
1960) theory of dogmatism and with context theory. These theories suggest that the relationship 
between cognitive style and beliefs is not direct, but that it is the byproduct of the underlying 
relationship between commitment and cognitive style on the one hand, and between commitment 
and ideology on the other. Dogmatic individuals, for example, uphold extremist ideologies, not 
because of a direct relationship between dogmatism and the beliefs of the extremist ideologies, 
but because these ideologies demand high levels of commitment to an absolute authority. For 
context theory, individuals who are tolerant of ambiguity have the potential to appropriate 
extremist ideologies. Since these ideologies are deviant, these individuals demonstrate higher 
levels of ideological interest and active participation in information gathering in order to sustain 
their deviant ideological positions. 
Although the present results confirm the import of ideological commitment as a mediator 
variable, they do not support the predictions of either context theory or extremism theory. The 
form of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and conservatism, which ideological 
commitment mediates, varies over content domain. In support of extremism theory, Political 
Interest mediates a negative quadratic relationship between Ideological Orthodoxy and Religious 
Conservatism. However, Religiosity mediates positive quadratic relationships between AAT-Rel 
and Political and Economic Conservatism and Subtle Racism, and a purely linear relationship 
between AAT-Total and Total Conservatism. Once again, the personality-based theories are 
questioned, not because no support can be found for them, but because, once different content 
domains of ambiguity tolerance are taken onto consideration, support may be generated for the 
predictions of all theories. 
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Similar conclusions may be drawn from the regression models of AAT-cPol, AAT-Pol, and 
AA T -Fam since the direction and strength of the relationships varies considerably over content 
domain. AA T -cPol was related to Subtle Racism and Punitiveness in a positive linear manner. 
Contrary to the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950), racist individuals were more tolerant of 
ambiguity toward conservative political authorities than were non racists. The effect size for this 
relationship was large (If- = .24), indicating its strength, and suggesting that this was not a 
counterfactual anomaly. In contrast, AAT-Pol was related to Subtle Racism and Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism in a negative quadratic manner, with both high and low scoring racists being 
less tolerant of ambiguity than moderates. Although this relationship was in the direction 
predicted by extremism theory, it does not support the underlying dynamics by which Rokeach 
derives the relationship. Ideological commitment did not mediate the relationship between 
ambiguity tolerance and belief extremism. Finally, AA T -Fam was strongly related to Total 
Conservatism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism in the negative linear manner predicted by 
Adorno et al. (1950). Although this was the only model for the AAT factors which supported the 
theory of authoritarianism, it is potentially theoretically important since, according to Adorno et 
al. (1950), the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs originates in early 
family interaction. Regardless of whether authoritarian dynamics underlie this relationship or not, 
it is definitely not generalized across different domains of authority as the theory argues. 
In sum, the regression analyses for the AA T factors have confirmed the body of fmdings which 
have amassed throughout the thesis thus far. Tolerance of ambiguity is not a personality trait 
which is generalized across content domain or from personal expressions to a vector of tolerant 
ideological beliefs. Rather, ambiguity tolerance toward different contents are related to (a) 
different sets of ideological beliefs, (b) with different strengths, and (c) in different directions. 
A substantially different picture would have been generated if only the Budner scale had been 
employed. The Budner scale and its factors, although associated with different components of 
conservatism, were generally associated with these beliefs in the negative linear manner predicted 
by Adorno et al. (1950). It is interesting that the effect size for the models of the AAT factors 
are considerably larger than those for the Budner scale. This is perhaps surprising, for if the 
Budner scale and the AAT scale both assess the same cognitive style, but the Budner scale 
assesses conservatism in addition to ambiguity tolerance (i.e., content bias), then one would 
expect the Budner scale to have stronger associations with ideological conservatism than the AA T 
scale. Perhaps the small effect sizes for the Budner scale accrued purely due to content 
commonalities between the Budner scale and the measures of conservatism. In response to Ward's 
(1988) query regarding what the Budner scale measures, the regression analysis for this sample 
of White students suggests that, in part, the first four factors of the scale tap contents associated 
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with racist and authoritarian beliefs, while the last two factors are related to a religious dimension 
of conservatism. 3 
Discussion 
This study aimed to examine the predictions regarding the relationship between tolerance of 
ambiguity and ideological conservatism which have been advanced by the theory of 
authoritarianism, extremism theory, context theory, and value pluralism theory (see Table 5.1 
for a summary of these predictions). Overall, the results for the Budner scale tend to support the 
theory of authoritarianism. Although the Budner scale is not unidimensional, its factors were 
linearly correlated with authoritarian and conservative beliefs in the direction predicted by Adorno 
et al. (1950). Moreover, these relationships did not originate in the mediating influence of 
ideological commitment. Because of possible content bias of the Budner scale, however, the cause 
of these associations remains unclear. Rather than authoritarian dynamics underlying the 
relationships, they may have accrued purely because of the shared content of the Budner scale 
and the measures of ideological conservatism. 
The AA T scale, in contrast, does not suffer from this potential flaw as it assesses ambiguity 
tolerance in an active and direct manner, and does not infer cognitive style from attitudinal 
content. Like the previous findings in the literature as a whole, the results involving the AAT 
scale yielded evidence for aspects of all four theories, and evidence for none. Firstly, the 
direction of the relationship varied over content domain, with conservatism being related to the 
AA T factors according to positive and negative, linear and quadratic functions. This covers the 
full range of theoretical predictions, and includes a totally unanticipated positive linear correlation 
(between AAT-cPol and Subtle Racism). Moreover, the role of ideological commitment as a 
mediating variable was, but also was not, significant. While the indices of ideological 
commitment did account for the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and conservatism within 
some domains, as would be expected by extremism and context theory, for most AA T factors, 
ideological commitment played a minimal role. 
Despite the varied and partial support for aspects of all four social psychological theories, the 
results for the AA T scale confute all theories because of the degree of manifest cross-content 
variability. The theories of authoritarianism and extremism do not entertain the possibility of 
3 The secondary factor analysis of the Budner scale (see Table 4.5) makes a roughly similar distinction 
between the Budner factors. 
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variability since they offer global predictions on the basis of generalized personality functioning. 
The conditional variability which context theory could anticipate was also not evident because the 
dimensions of ideological conservatism were not negatively correlated with each other. Finally, 
for reasons mentioned in the introduction, it is uncertain whether Tetlock could anticipate the 
marked degree of variability that was evident over the circumscribed content domain covered by 
the AAT scale. Thus, besides the fact that only one of the final models (AAT-Pol) was of the 
direction predicted by Tetlock, the degree of manifest variability over these delimited content 
domains poses explanatory difficulties for value pluralism theory. If a politically conservative 
individual adopts a monistic cognitive style when evaluating political authorities, why should s/he 
appropriate a pluralistic style when evaluating conservative political authorities? This fmding 
directly contradicts Tetlock's theorizing for the conservative orientation is argued to engender 
monistic styles, especially over such similar content domains. 
The utility of the AA T scale is thus manifest at the level of interpretation. While one cannot be 
sure whether the linear effects between the Budner scale and conservatism were spurious, this 
is not the case for the AA T scale. In addition to the construct validity of the AAT scale (see pp. 
111-114), and the direct tests and incidental indicators of measurement validity reported in Study 
1 (see p. 130), this study has added to the set of validity criteria. Not only did the factor analysis 
of the AAT scale (see Table 4.2) distinguish clearly between the different content domains of 
ambiguity tolerance, but in this chapter it was found that these factors correlated most strongly 
with the ideological beliefs which are relevant to that domain of authority. As would be expected, 
ambiguity tolerance toward all political authorities were related to most strongly to racist and 
authoritarian beliefs among the White sample, whereas religiosity was associated with ambiguity 
tolerance of religious authorities. 
Although the AAT scores have behaved in a manner which instills confidence in the validity of 
the measure, the results reported here cannot answer questions regarding the identity of the 
generative structures which underlie manifest expressions of ambiguity tolerance. Besides the 
methodological difficulties surrounding sampling and subject loss, this is largely due to the 
preliminary exploratory nature of the investigation. Although the results cannot identify 
generative structures, they do suggest that the underlying structures are social in nature. This 
conclusion is based on both the cross-cultural and cross-content variability in AA T scores within 
a single context. While a personality-based account would be hard pressed to explain these 
fmdings, they are easily accommodated by a theory which explains ambiguity tolerance toward 
a particular domain in terms of the meanings that ideological contents within that domain have 
for different groups of subjects within a particular context. Thus, although Whites with a 
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conservative orientation may value the political, economic, and social benefits which conservative 
political authorities wish to uphold, contrary to the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950), they 
evaluate these authorities ambivalently because conservative politics (and the ideology of 
apartheid) is taboo within the university context. Perhaps at a conservative political gathering the 
same individuals would evaluate conservative authorities far less ambivalently. 
Such theorizing suggests that there is a close - but by no means stable, universal, or consistent 
- relationship between the style and content of cognition within particular contexts. This raises 
two clear difficulties with the study. Firstly, context was not manipulated, so the impact of the 
context could not be ascertained directly. Secondly, the relationship between the authorities of 
the AA T scale and the contents included in the measures of ideological conservatism was rather 
indirect. Although authority is central to any ideology, ambivalence toward authorities may be 
influenced by many other factors besides conflict surrounding ideological deviance. The following 
study attempted to expand further the investigation into the nature of ambiguity tolerance by 
documenting relationships between the endorsement of particular contents and ambiguity tolerance 
toward those same contents. 
Study 3 
Study 3 was a "conceptual replication" of Study 2 (Hendrik, 1991). Its aims were threefold. The 
first objective was to reproduce the central fmdings of the previous study in a novel research 
design. The positive linear relationship between AAT -cPol and Subtle Racism, uncovered in the 
previous study, directly contradicted the predictions of all four social psychological theories 
which have sought to explain the relationship between cognitive style and content. As such, these 
findings hold potential theoretical import. Not only do they suggest that intolerance of ambiguity 
may be found in unexpected places along the radicalism-conservatism continuum, but they 
question the theoretical validity of universalistic individualism. This study planned to extend the 
investigation by examining whether similar unexpected results would be found with a different 
sample and different contents within the same context. 
In the present study, subjects completed the Subtle Racism scale and the Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism scale in both the traditional Likert format, and the new unipolar format. On the 
unipolar rating scales, subjects were requested to rate each item by recording: 1) the highest 
degree to which they would, on occasion, agree with the item, and 2) the highest degree to which 
they would, on occasion, disagree with the item (see Appendix E, Section 5). Consequently, it 
was possible to ascertain levels of racism and authoritarianism, as well as levels of ambivalence 
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toward the same racist and authoritarian opinions. A direct relationship could thus be established 
between racist and authoritarian opinions and ambivalence toward these opinions. 
In addition to corroborating the fmdings which were reported in Study 2, this study aimed to 
expand on the validity of the fmdings, and the validity of the AAT scaling procedure. This 
inquiry took two directions. First, replication was deemed necessary under conditions where 
subjects remained anonymous. It was argued that a lack of anonymity in the previous study would 
strengthen the salience of institutional norms which underlie the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and conservatism. However, unidentified factors associated with the lack of anonymity 
may have had some unknown influence on the results, and curtailed the validity of the fmdings. 
Second, the study aimed to reexamine the measurement validity of the AA T scaling procedure. 
The previous studies have reported concurrent validity statistics for the AA T scale as well as 
incidental results which demonstrate its measurement validity. The use of the Subtle Racism scale 
in the present study allowed firmer hypotheses to be offered whereby measurement validity could 
be established. To verify criterion group validity, it was hypothesized that, for obvious reasons, 
Blacks would be less ambivalent in their rejection of the items of the Subtle Racism scale than 
Whites. 
Finally, the study aimed to investigate the nature of the generative structures which underlie 
manifest expressions of ambiguity tolerance. Study 2 argued that the variability in the relationship 
between cognitive style and content could not be explained in terms of a trait-like cognitive style 
which predisposed the individual to particular ideological contents. Instead, it was suggested that 
the contextual meaning of the ideological contents relevant to each domain of authority played 
a substantial role in shaping ambivalent responses toward those authorities. For example, the 
positive linear relationship between AA T -cPol and Subtle Racism was attributed to heightened 
levels of conflict which racist Whites experienced in evaluating conservative political authorities 
within the liberal context. Since the ideological contents under investigation in this study are 
similarly equivocal for politically conservative Whites within the UCT context, a similar positive 
linear relationship between racist and authoritarian beliefs and ambiguity tolerance toward these 
beliefs was expected. Moreover, since among the vector of authoritarian and conservative beliefs, 
it is racist beliefs in particular which are condemned within liberal South African contexts, it is 
likely that these beliefs would be more clearly associated with conflict for conservative 
individuals. Consequently, the positive linear relationship was expected to be stronger for racist 
beliefs than for authoritarian beliefs. In addition, since this study tapped a direct relationship 
between ambiguity tolerance and acceptance of the same beliefs, the strength of the relationships 
was expected to be stronger than those reported in Study 2. 
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As carryover effects may have been present in this "within-subjects" design, questionnaires were 
counterbalanced and randomly distributed to respondents. One half of the questionnaires 
contained the Likert scales at the beginning and the unipolar scales at the end. For the other half, 
the order of presentation was reversed. In both instances, the scales were separated by a number 
of other psychometric measures which constituted "filler tasks". In addition to these precautions, 
the respondents were instructed that the questionnaire was intended to "test a research design and 
not individuals", and they were requested to complete each page separately without reference to 
their preceding responses. 
Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 184 first year psychology students at the University of Cape Town 
during 1992. Due to the disproportionate student composition at the university, the sample sizes 
for various subgroups was unbalanced, including 14 Blacks, 151 Whites (English-speaking), 19 
Coloureds. Forty seven were male and 137 were female. Their mean age was 20.5 years. 
Respondents remained anonymous and the study was completed during formal lecturing time. 
Measures 
The Subtle Racism scale and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale formed the main focus of 
the study. The psychometric properties of these measures have been described previously 
(Appendix D). The unipolar version of these scales was scored in the manner detailed earlier, 
with high scores indicating ambiguity tolerance. Detailed instructions were given as to how the 
unipolar version of these scales should be completed (see Appendix E, Section 5). 
Two filler tasks were employed to reduce the influence of carryover effects. These included the 
Social Distance Questionnaire and the Ambivalence over Emotional Expression Questionnaire 
(King & Emmons, 1990). The Social Distance Questionnaire was an English translation of the 
one used by Groenewald (1975). It assessed social distance towards Blacks, English-speaking 
Whites, Coloureds, Afrikaans-speaking Whites, Indians, Jews, and Russians on a number of 7-
level Bogardus-type measures (see Appendix E, Section 3). The Ambivalence over Emotional 
Expression Questionnaire (AEQ) was employed as an independent measure of ambivalence at the 
level of personality (see Appendix E, Section 2). As the scale was designed to measure 
consciously recognized ambivalent emotional striving, and since authoritarians are theorized to 
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repress ambivalent emotional striving (Adorno et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), the AEQ 
was expected to correlate negatively with authoritarianism. The scale employed a 5-point Likert-
type format, and has been found to be a valid measure and to have an adequate alpha coefficient 
of .89 (King & Emmons, 1990). 
Results 
No significant differences were found in the mean scale scores or the size of the correlations 
between the two counterbalance conditions or across gender. Substantial differences were, 
however, found in the mean scores and correlation coefficients of the different population 
groups. 
The alpha coefficients for the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scores for both the RW A scale 
(a = . 81) and the Subtle Racism scale (a = . 84) were satisfactory. In addition, AA T scores 
were normally distributed for both scales. Since the AAT-RWA scale was comprised of 14 items 
and the AA T -SR scale included 10 items, the scales are made comparable by computing mean 
scores for item means rather than scale means. The means and standard deviations for the two 
scales are reported in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Summary statistics for Tolerance of Attitudinal Ambiguity toward the RWA scale and 
Subtle Racism scale 




Black (n= 12) M = .422, SD = .14 M = .291, SD = .16 .357 
White (n= 148) M = .484, SD = .13 M = .448, SD = .16 .466 
Coloured (n= 18) M = .492, SD = .11 M = .326, SD = .13 .409 
Mean .481 .425 .453 
Note. Scale means are not weighted for differences in sample size. 
A one-way analysis of variance was computed to ascertain whether Blacks were indeed less 
ambivalent in their rejection of the Subtle Racism items than Whites. The mean item mean 
differences between the three population groups was significant (F(2,175) = 8.84, p < .0002, 
If- = .09). Newman-Keuls comparisons revealed that Whites were more tolerant of ambiguity 
than both Blacks and Coloureds. These results confirm the criterion-group validity of the AA T 
scaling procedure and add to the arsenal of validity criteria which have been generated for this 
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method of measuring tolerance of ambiguity. 
The correlations between the indices of ideological beliefs, and emotional ambivalence and 
attitudinal ambiguity tolerance are reported in Table 5.8. The intercorrelation matrix supports the 
fmdings of Study 2. In the liberal atmosphere of the University of Cape Town, White respondents 
who endorse liberal, anti-authoritarian and non-racist beliefs, expressed lower levels of ambiguity 
tolerance towards those beliefs than did conservatives. All these correlation coefficients were 
strong and significant. Similar positive linear relationships were found between authoritarianism 
and AA T-RW A for the Coloured sample, and between Subtle Racism and AA T -SR for the Black 
sample. All these relationships plus the non-significant associations between Emotional 
Ambivalence and authoritarianism are contrary to expectations of Adorno et al. (1950). 
Table 5.8: Correlation coefficients between authoritarianism and racism and indices of 
ambivalence and attitudinal ambiguity tolerance. 
Population group 
Black (N = 14) White (N = 151) Coloured (N = 19) 
Measures RWA SR RWA SR RWA SR 
AEQ .47 .00 .14 .11 -.12 .05 
AAT-RWA .12 .20 .41""" .36""" .62" .15 
AAT-SR .39 .79"" .46""" .64-· .so· .09 
"p < .05. ""p < .005. ···p < .0001. 
Polynomial regression analyses were performed to determine whether significant curvilinear 
trends existed between tolerance of attirudinal ambiguity towards the RWA and Subtle Racism 
scales and endorsement of the scales. Due to the restricted sample sizes of the Black and 
Coloured samples, regression analyses were performed for only the White sample. The 
polynomial regression analyses proceeded by the hierarchical method recommended by Cohen 
& Cohen (1983), and roughly followed the three stage model outlined in Study 2 (see pp. 154-
155). Both the linear and quadratic effects were significant for the models of AAT-RWA and 
AAT-SR (see Table 5.3). 
Scores on the RWA scale and Subtle Racism scale were related to tolerance of attirudinal 
ambiguity toward these scales in both a positive linear and negative curvilinear manner. As such, 
the form of the relationships was curvilinear, but asymmetrical. The linear effect revealed that 
conservatives were more tolerant of attitudinal ambiguity than liberals. The negative quadratic 
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effect indicated that the point of inflection was a maximum, and that extreme conservatives were 
less tolerant of ambiguity than moderate conservatives. The effect sizes for both models was large 
as anticipated, explaining almost half of the variance in ambiguity tolerance scores. 
Table 5.9: Regression models for tolerance of attirudinal ambiguity toward the RWA scale and 
Subtle Racism scale. 
Tolerance of Regression results 
ambiguity 
Model Regressor B t p Partial If 
R2=.43 (RWA)2 -2.13 -9.04 .0001 .256 
AAT-RWA F(2, 145)=53.91 RWA 2.48 9.37 .0001 .171 
p<.OOOl 
R2 =.46 SR 1.39 6.38 .0001 .462 
AAT-SR £(2,144)=61.76 (SR)2 -0.78 -3.58 .0005 .048 
p< .0001 
The relative magnirudes of the partial correlation coefficients of the linear and curvilinear effects 
for the two models revealed different degrees of asymmetry. The curvilinear effect was stronger 
than the linear effect for the model of AAT -RW A, while the opposite was true for the model of 
AA T -SR. These fmdings suggest that, in comparison to the curvilinear effects, the linear 
differences between liberals and conservatives was more pronounced for AA T -SR than for AA T-
RWA. In contrast, the curvilinear effects were more pronounced for AAT-RWA. 
If one accepts that the positive linear relationship between the AA T factors and ideological 
conservatism originates in conflict associated with deviance from contexrual norms, these fmdings 
suggest that this conflict is stronger for AAT -SR than AA T-RW A. This interpretation resonates 
with an a priori analysis of instirutional norms at the University of Cape Town. Anti-racism is 
more salient and clearly endorsed than anti-authoritarianism. Indeed, the day-to-day functioning 
of the university is established upon a quasi-authoritarian strucrure of submission to authority and 
conventionalism. Consequently, one expects higher levels of conflict surrounding racist opinions 
than surrounding authoritarian opinions. 
However, these findings beg the question of what accounts for the decrease in ambiguity 
tolerance from moderate conservatives to extreme conservatives? What, in other words, can 
explain the significant curvilinear effects? For some reason, extreme conservatives expressed less 
ambivalence toward their normatively incongruous beliefs than did moderate conservatives. 
According to the rhetorical-type account proposed here, extreme conservatives should experience 
Tolerance of ambiguity and ideological beliefs 170 
higher levels of ambivalence because of increased disparities between their personal beliefs and 
institutional nonns. 4 Although the data do not provide unambiguous answers to these questions, 
it is possible that multiple processes underlie these observed relationships. The linear effects 
could originate in rhetorical dynamics while the curvilinear effects could be attributed to other 
factors such as authoritarianism. Nonetheless, whatever the explanation for the curvilinear trends, 
due to the nature of institutional nonns, one would expect- as the data has shown - the 
rhetorical processes to be stronger surrounding racism than authoritarianism. 
Discussion 
This study has achieved its aims of replicating the main fmdings of Study 2 under conditions of 
anonymity. In contrast to the predictions of the three personality-based theories of the relationship 
between cognitive style and ideological beliefs, the form of the relationship between tolerance of 
ambiguity and ideological beliefs varied over content domain. Although the models for AA T-
RW A and AA T -SR both included positive linear and negative curvilinear effects, the relative 
strength of each effect differed over the two models. These fmdings underscore the necessity to 
distinguish between different "objects" of ambiguity tolerance as these are differentially related 
to conservative beliefs. 
The shape of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological beliefs also conflicted 
with the predictions of the personality-based theories. The positive linear relationships between 
AA T -SR and Subtle Racism and between AAT -RWA and authoritarianism were exactly opposite 
to the predictions of Adorno et al. (1950) and Sidanius (1984, 1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 1989). 
While the direction of the curvilinear relationships were in the direction anticipated by extremism 
theory, they were asymmetrical and do not, therefore, satisfy the predictions of extremism 
theory. It could, however, be argued that the asymmetry was due to sampling artifact: if more 
genuine conservatives had been included in the sample, a symmetrical n-shaped relationship 
would have accrued. Such reasoning rests on the an absolute defmition of extremism which 
appears implausible given the differential strength of the curvilinear effect for the two models. 
It would imply that there were more extreme authoritarians in the sample than extreme racists. 
Such reasoning is contradictory since the personality account suggests (and empirical evidence 
has shown) that extreme authoritarians will also be extreme racists. 
4 I use the terms "institutional norms" and "personal beliefs" hesitantly. All I wish to mark is the 
distinction between discourses which an individual may bring to the dialogical space opened in a particular 
context, and institutionally sanctioned discourses. 
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It is also unlikely that ideological commitment mediated the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and ideological beliefs. Firstly, the results of Study 2 showed that ideological 
conservatism was correlated with the political factors of the AA T scale over and above the 
mediating influence of ideological commitment. Secondly, the linear and curvilinear effects 
between AA T -RWA and the RWA scale, and between AA T -SR and the Subtle Racism scale were 
substantially stronger than the relationships between ideological commitment and the RWA and 
Subtle Racism scales in the previous study. 5 Thus, contrary to the predictions of extremism 
theory, it is most likely that AA T -RWA and AA T -SR were associated with scores on these scales 
over and above the influence of ideological commitment. 
While both value pluralism theory and a rhetorical theory of cognitive style could explain cross-
content variability in cognitive style and the relationship between cognitive style and ideological 
beliefs, it is highly questionable whether value pluralism theory could account for the present 
fmdings. First, with reference to the hypothesized ideological monism of conservative ideology, 
Tetlock would anticipate conservatives to be less tolerant of ambiguity than moderates and 
liberals. Second, since both authoritarianism and racism implicate similar conflicting values, it 
is doubtful whether the value pluralism model would predict differential relationships between 
scores on these measures and ambiguity tolerance toward them. 
As in the previous study, it seems difficult to account for these fmdings without reference to 
contextual factors. Rhetorical theory anticipates the positive linear relationship between racist and 
authoritarian beliefs and ambiguity tolerance toward these beliefs since both sets of beliefs are 
normatively unacceptable within the institutional context. As such, they are expected to be 
associated with complex rhetorical strategies and increased tolerance of ambiguity. Also, with 
reference to the differential degree to which the two sets of belief are censured, rhetorical theory 
can predict the different strength of the linear trend for each model. Deviant racist beliefs are 
expected to require stronger and more subtle justification than deviant authoritarian beliefs. 
The results of this study corroborate the fmdings of the previous study and thus affirm the 
explanatory efficacy of a rhetorical account of ambiguity tolerance. In addition, the study 
confirmed the validity of the AA T scaling procedure. As hypothesized, Blacks were less 
ambivalent in their rejection of the Subtle Racism scale than Whites. 
' For the White sample in Study 2, Political Interest correlated significantly with the Subtle Racism scale 
(r = -.41, df = 149, p < .0001), but not the RW A scale (r = -.06, df = 295, p < .26). Religiosity 
correlated significantly with the RWA scale (r = .27, df = 298, p < .0001), but not the Subtle Racism 
scale (r = .006, df = 149, p < .95). 
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Conclusion 
The two srudies reported in this chapter have confirmed and elaborated upon the conclusions of 
Srudy 1. All three srudies have highlighted difficulties with accounts of ambiguity tolerance which 
are based on universal properties and processes of mind. Just as Study 1 demonstrated that 
ambiguity tolerance is not generalized across content domain, Studies 2 and 3 have shown an 
isomorphic relationship between the style and content of cognition to be untenable. These fmdings 
pose major challenges to the four psychological theories which have sought to explain the 
relationship between cognitive style and content. As I have argued, the present findings suggest 
that the meanings that particular contents have for individuals within a specific context impact 
on the style with which they are evaluated. Thus, rather than some basic personality dimension 
fmding expression in a particular set of ideological contents, the manifest variability in the 
relationship between the style and content of cognition across different contents and population 
groups suggests that new generative structures be sought; generative mechanisms which do not 
rely on an individualistic, "thing-like" ontology. 
However, it could be maintained that the present results have no such implications since they are 
based on a measure which has been newly developed, and which, furthermore, is not a valid 
measure of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. This argument rests on the contention that 
intolerance of ambiguity is a generalized personality trait - rooted, for example, in a basic 
closedness to experience- which will be manifest over different content domains and contexts. 6 
Further, this argument demands that these are the criteria by which construct validity should be 
evaluated. Against such an argument there is no reply, for the process of defmition and validation 
is circular. Instead, my approach in the work thus far has been to trace the manner in which the 
construct of intolerance of ambiguity has been "produced" as a generalized personality trait by 
psychological practice, both in theory (chap. 2) and measurement (chap. 3). My approach to 
construct validity has been a historical task of investigating the manner in which the construct of 
intolerance of ambiguity has shifted from being a feature of (what empiricists consider) 'external 
reality', through the stages of "discovery" and preliminary investigation, to being part of 
psychological knowledge. Of course, the initial observations and formulations of intolerance of 
ambiguity were theory bound. It is for this reason that Frenkel-Brunswik's original description 
of the social and evaluative construct of intolerance of ambiguity was already infused with the 
language of personality. Nonetheless, to her credit, Frenkel-Brunswik's explicit goal was to test 
6 Such a comment was offered by an anonymous reviewer who evaluated a paper, based on the results of 
Study 1, which was submitted to the Personality and Soda/ Psychological Bulletin. 
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the personality status of the construct in order to ascertain whether the authoritarian's 
unambivalent evaluation of social "objects" was part of being intolerant of ambiguity (i.e., a 
manifestation of an underlying personality trait). 
For the reasons detailed in Chapter 4, I consider the AAT scale an appropriate measure of 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity as Frenkel-Brunswik originally described the construct. The 
scale taps the type of evaluative ambivalence which psychologists have often attributed to 
authoritarian and prejudiced individuals. However, contrary to Frenkel-Brunswik's theorizing, 
the present fmdings suggest that tolerance of ambiguity is not a generalized personality trait. It 
is not generalized either across different domains of evaluation, or from personality structure to 
ideological contents in an isomorphic and invariant manner. Before these results could be 
employed in a critique of trait theory, though, the validity of the AA T scaling procedure as a 
measure of evaluative ambivalence would need to be established. 
The three studies reported above have undertaken a number of validity checks. Firstly, a subscale 
of the AA T scale was correlated with the Ambivalence scale to establish concurrent validity. 
Since the Ambivalence scale was modelled after Scott's measure of object ambivalence, the 
significant association between these measures suggests that, despite measurement error and 
semantic difficulties with Scott's measure, the two scaling procedures both assess evaluative 
ambivalence. Second, the difference in AA T mean scores across population groups provide 
evidence of criterion group validity. The fact that Whites were more ambivalent than Blacks in 
their evaluation of political and religious authorities in Study 1, and were more ambivalent 
towards the items of the Subtle Racism scale in Study 3, were expected and were interpreted as 
supporting the validity of the AA T scaling procedure. 
In addition, the data as a whole have an overall coherence which instills confidence in the results. 
Possibly the most important fmding was the manner in which the factor analysis of the AA T scale 
distinguished so clearly the different domains of authority on the basis of style in which they were 
evaluated (see Table 4.2). This suggests that ambiguity tolerance scores were meaningfully 
related to content domain. In addition, the pattern of correlations between the AA T scores and 
the indices of conservatism is intuitively satisfying since the aspect of conservatism which is most 
closely associated with each domain of ambiguity tolerance conceptually, was also found to be 
most strongly related to that domain empirically. In Study 2, for example, ambiguity tolerance 
of political authorities was most strongly related to racism and authoritarianism for the White 
sample, while AAT-Rel was most strongly related to Religiosity (See Table 5.6), Similarly, in 
Study 3, AAT-SR was related to Subtle Racism, while AAT-RWA was related to the RWA scale. 
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Finally. the counter-intuitive positive linear association between ambiguity tolerance and 
ideological conservatism within certain (politically conservative) content domains was found to 
be stable over Study 2 and 3. This was all the more remarkable since, although the same unipolar 
scaling procedure was used in the two studies. it assessed different types of ambivalence. with 
different samples- in Study 2 subjects recorded their like-dislike of authorities, while in Study 
3 they recorded their agreement-disagreement with attitudinal statements. Overall then, besides 
the specific validity tests, the entire pattern of results indicated that the unipolar scaling procedure 
elicited meaningful data. 
This has facilitated the interpretation of the results. While one can never be sure whether 
correlations between personality measures of ambiguity tolerance (e.g., the Budner scale) and 
ideological conservatism stem from shared scale content, this is not the case with the AAT scale. 
The AAT scale assesses the style with which social "objects" are evaluated, independently of 
content. Moreover, as I have argued, the AA T scale generates valid and meaningful data. 
Consequently, the variability in the form of the relationship between the AA T factors and 
different indices of conservatism is more readily explicable than variability in the relationship 
between the Budner factors and conservatism. The former fmdings clearly indicate cross-content 
variability in the relationship between cognitive style and content. Furthermore. since ambiguity 
tolerance toward the different domains of authority was so clearly distinguished, one can 
approach the interpretation of the fmdings by considering differences in the meanings that the 
different domains of authority have for the subjects within the context of the study. 
The three studies reported above were conducted to investigate the personality-based account of 
cognitive style. and the results were thus discussed in terms of the manifest cross-content and 
cross-cultural variability in ambiguity tolerance. The overwhelming variability in the results have 
shown the underlying ontology implicit in empiricist psychology - that is, the generalized, 
stable, and pervasive psychology of the self-contained individual- to be untenable. However. 
the variation in ambiguity tolerance, both within and between samples, was not purely random, 
but seemed to be organized in a meaningful pattern. Although the interpretation of the fmdings 
takes place in the transitive dimension, there is evidence of underlying generative mechanisms 
at play. In terms of Bhaskar's dictum, the patterns of variability which were "deliberately 
produced under conditions [of control]" allowed the identification of "the mode of operation of 
structures, mechanisms or processes" which were not produced (Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 15). What 
were not (wholly) produced in the present studies were the findings that (a) the factor structure 
of AA T scale distinguished clearly between different content domains of authority. (b) each factor 
of the AA T scale was related to only those dimensions of conservatism with which it is 
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meaningfully related (e.g., AAT-Pol and racism for the White sample), and (c) different patterns 
of correlations were manifest across the different population groups. 
These fmdings indicate the presence of underlying generative "structures, mechanisms or 
processes" which differ from the invariant, atomistic ontology of empiricism. They, however, 
do not facilitate the identification or operation of these structures. At this stage, though, it seems 
clear that these are praxis- and concept-dependent, related to the meaningful material and 
ideological implications that the various cognitive contents had for the respondents within the 
context of the study. 
This conclusion is evident from two striking features of the overall pattern of results. First, the 
political and religious domains of ideology appear distinct, both descriptively and psychologically. 
The distinction was evident in both (a) the separate secondary factors of religious and political 
conservatism (Appendix D), and (b) the independent secondary factors of ambiguity tolerance 
toward religious and political authorities (Study 1). Thus, not only were religious and political 
conservatism relatively distinct, but the style of evaluating religious authorities was unrelated to 
the style of evaluating political authorities. Moreover, the regression models for the religious and 
political AA T factors indicate that, within the context of the study, there may be psychological 
differences between these domains. Whereas, AAT -Pol and AA T -cPol were unrelated to 
ideological commitment, but correlated significantly with ideological conservatism, the opposite 
holds true for religious authorities. AAT-Rel was unrelated to Religious Conservatism. but 
associated with Religiosity (see Table 5.6). Unambivalent evaluation of religious authorities was 
associated with religious commitment, whereas similar evaluation of political authorities was 
associated with political radicalism-conservatism. This suggests psychological differences between 
the political and religious domains, with different dynamics underlying ambiguity tolerance. 
These fmdings do not, however, indicate that mind, psychology, or personalty is somehow 
divided into independent religious and political dimensions. On the contrary, an anti-universalistic 
theory would argue that the psychological differences stem from differences between political and 
religious ideologies- differences related real to praxis- and concept-dependent structures (e.g., 
operations of power). 
Secondly, the results suggest that, within the political field, evaluative ambivalence was related 
to the degree to which particular contents aroused cognitive conflict within a specific context. 
This cognitive conflict, however, is not Tetlockian, originating in a decontextualized and 
monologic attempt by an individual mind to resolve real conflicts in the world. Instead, the 
conflict is rhetorical (dialogical}, arising out of contrary commonplaces or contrary discourses 
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that strucrure individual subjectivity in a particular context. Although this is not the only possible 
interpretation of responses to the AA T scale, the data offers some support for this conclusion. 
Both the cross-group differences in ambiguity tolerance and cross-content variability in the 
relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological contents are explicable in terms of 
differences in value conflict experienced by Blacks and Whites, and liberals and conservatives 
within the context of the srudy. Blacks were expected to experience less conflict than Whites in 
rejecting racist opinions and in evaluating political authorities; and liberals were expected to be 
less ambivalent than conservatives in evaluating conservative political authorities and racist 
sentiments within the liberal instirutional context. 
However, since the srudies reported here were exploratory, and these interpretations rely on a 
post hoc analysis of cognitive conflict, the narure of the underlying generative strucrures must at 
this stage remain tentative. In contrast to the largely critical goals of the previous chapters, the 
following chapter attempts to make a positive contribution. It proposes a new ontology upon 
which to base investigations of cognitive style, and reports the results of a qualitative case study 
which aims to explore the possibility of srudying ambiguity tolerance from within this anti-
universalistic framework. 
Chapter 6 
Toward a rhetorical account of intolerance 
of ambiguity 
The mind of a person can be understood only by reliving its workings 
(Polanyi, 1967, p. 16) 
Usage however is the surest pilot in speaking, and we should treat language as cu"ency minted 
with the public stamp 
(Quintillian, The Institutes of Oratory, Book 1, v. 4) 
In an article which generated widespread and heated debate, Fish (1985) argued that theory can 
"never succeed" since it assumes a rule-like nature, seeking truth by "adhering to the dictates of 
an abiding and general rationality" (p. 435); whereas in fact, "it cannot help but borrow its terms 
and its content from that which it claims to transcend, the mutable world of practice, belief, 
assumptions, point of view, and so forth" (p. 438). The tension between the universal and 
particular in theory is an old problem which has emerged on the margins of contemporary 
psychology, clothed, as elsewhere in' the humanities, as a debate between modernism and 
posnnodernism. In contrast to the themes of modernist foundationalism which characterise 
"mainstream psychology", on its margins, the discipline has responded to recent developments 
toward an anti-foundationalist philosophy of science and has acknowledged the social and 
contextual basis of human action. 
Accordingly, the discipline has begun to recognise that human psychology operates more like 
rules-of-thumb than rules. It "cannot be formalized because the conditions of its application vary 
with the contextual circumstances of an ongoing practice; as those circumstances change, the very 
meaning of the rule (the instructions it is understood to give) changes too, at least for someone 
sufficiently inside the practice to be sensitive to its shifting demands" (Fish, 1985, p. 435). 
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Similarly, human psychology is held to be unformalizable since it is inherently indexical. In stark 
contrast to the assumption of universalism which underlies empiricist psychology, contemporary 
models of psychology have recognised the interdependence between psychological "states", 
"processes", and "properties", and the contexts in which they are experienced/accomplished. 
Accordingly, the discipline has witnessed a "tum to language" - manifest in the recovery of 
rhetoric, discourse, and dialogue - as psychologists have attempted to forge an alternative to 
empiricist universalism (Billig, 1987a, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gergen, 1985; Harre, 
1983; Henriques et al., 1984; Markova & Foppa, 1990; Parker, 1989a, 1992; Parker & Burman, 
1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sampson, 1993; Shotter, 1984, 1993a; Wetherell & Potter, 
1992). 
Depending on how one looks at the matter. though, there appears to be considerable disagreement 
among contemporary anti-foundationalist approaches. Although various realist and social 
constructionist philosophies are unified in their criticism of empiricism, constructionism, like 
realism, may be characterised as "a majority position whose advocates are so divided as to appear 
a minority" (Leplin, 1984, p. 1). Thus, although Greenwood's (1991, 1992a) realist talk about 
"objectivity", "accuracy" and "descriptive statements" would seem to differ radically from 
Bhaskar's critical realism, Shatter's (1993a) social constructionism, Potter and Wetherell's (1987) 
discursive psychology (which all differ from each other), and the general notion of the theory-
bounded nature of observation, all these positions have much of importance in common. 1 First, 
few (even radical) social constructionists or discourse analysts would deny the reality of "things" 
in the world which have "an existence independently of our concepts of them and theoretical 
discourse of them" (Greenwood, 1992a, p. 135; see also Billig, 1994b; Parker, 1992). In 
McCloskey's (1993) words, realists "need not commence kicking rocks and pounding tables to 
show [constructionists] that the world is more than socially constructed" (p. 141). Second, from 
their activity (in criticizing and justifying), it is patently clear that many social constructionists, 
like realists, do not think that "anything goes" or that their are no criteria by which to evaluate 
the adequacy/accuracy of theoretical accounts. Nor do they claim that observation, despite its 
theory boundedness, is useless in this regard (Shotter (1993b) and Billig (1987a) even use 
experimental fmdings to exemplify their arguments). 
1 It seems as though realists and constructionists continually (mis)represent each other in rhetorical moves 
toward advancing their own position. Potter & Wetherell (1987), for example, argue that "the realist 
principle" would be undermined if "psychological models of the self reflect not the true nature of the 
object, as supposed, but our social history" (p. 103). In painting all realists with the same brush, they have 
forgotten that "all philosophies, cognitive discourses and practical activities presuppose a realism of one 
kind or another" (Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 2). "The realist principle" to which they refer is empirical realism, 
which is in fact anti-realist (ibid). Realists have behaved similarly (e.g., Harre, 1992a). 
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I think that Greenwood (1991, 1992b) is correct in claiming that realism, as a general doctrine, 
is II onto logically neutral" because it makes no commitment to any particular kind of phenomena 
that exists. Bhaskar reiterates this point by arguing that his realist philosophy may make a vague 
sketch of what the world must be like for our activities to be rendered intelligible, but that it is 
up to scientific investigation to "tell us what structures the world contains" (1989b, p. 14). 
Accordingly, there is wide agreement among realists and social constructionists regarding the 
falsity of the: 
... uniform ontology of empirical realism [which] is an individualism, comprised of 
atomized units, conjoined (if at all) by contract, passive recipients of a given and self-
evident world rather than active agents in a complex, structured and changing one 
(Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 159). 
However, the proposed content of an alternative ontology is under dispute. What is real for some 
is not real for others. Thus, Greenwood (1991) focuses on personal identity and social dimensions 
of mind, Parker (1992) on institutional discourses, Shotter (1993a) on conversation, and Billig 
(1987a, 1993) on argumentation. What makes the matter so complicated is that it is as yet unclear 
whether these different foci ("reals") are different facets of similar generative structures, or 
whether the arguments between the disputants betray real differences in ontology. 2 
The issue is complicated further. A second site of controversy concerns the degree to which 
theorists stress the making or fmding of the real - the distinction between structure and agency. 
What is common to all versions of constructionism and critical realism is a II dialectical emphasis 
upon both our making of, and our being made by, our own social realities" (Shotter, 1993a, p. 
34, emphasis in original; see also Bhaskar, 1986, 1989a; 1989b; Billig, 1991, Parker, 1992). 
However, where some authors tend to stress making (agency) (e.g., Billig, 1987a; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993a; see Bhaskar, 1993; Bowers, 1988; Reicher, 1988), others stress 
finding (structure) (Bhaskar, 1986, 1989a; Parker, 1992). 
Since this thesis has reacted against empiricist models of cognitive style which have dominated 
the literature, the discussion will not focus on the various "differences - of emphasis - [which] 
remain" between many schools of (critical) realism and social constructionism (Bhaskar, 1993, 
p. 187, my (re)emphasis). Instead, this chapter proposes to discuss what a 'rule-of-thumb' 
conception of cognitive style would be like. In approaching this aim, I will be drawing from a 
collection of perspectives which propose that the primary psychological reality is "humans in 
2 The debates between Greenwood ( 1992a, 1992b) and Shotter ( 1992), and between Parker ( 1990a, 1990b) 
and Potter et al. (1990) suggest real differences, while the later reconciliatory tone of Parker & Burman 
(1993), and collaboration among these authors (e.g., Parker & Shotter, 1990) hints of strong 
commonalities. Like all in the intransitive realm, the differences between the reals are contextual. 
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conversation" (Shatter, 1984, 1993a, 1995; Harre, 1983). This focus allows me to draw insights 
from diverse constructionist and discursive perspectives. For, if conversation is the primary 
human reality, this does not deny either the rhetorical nature of conversation (Billig, 1987a, 
1993), or the constraining and productive effects of institutional discourses (Parker, 1989b, 
1992). A second aim of this chapter is to report the results of an empirical study which aimed 
to investigate the manner in which rules-of-thumb are applied in a rhetorical context. 
An alternative approach to cognitive style 
Ontology 
Fish's distinction between rules and rules-of-thumb is illustrative of the differences between a 
rhetorical account of cognitive style and the type of accounts offered by the four psychological 
theories discussed in Chapter 2. These four theories have endorsed an empiricist model of science 
as they have attempted to uncover universal laws of the properties and processes of individual 
psychology. Consequently, they have treated psychology as "thing-like" object, knowable by the 
methods of the natural sciences. This has resulted in their reliance on an asocial, individualistic, 
monologic, and ahistorical conception of cognition, characteristic of what Harre (1992b) has 
referred to as the "first cognitive revolution". This model suggests that thinking is applied in a 
rule-like manner, and it implies that thought is a systematic process which issues from the mind 
of the self -contained individual, and which deals with all contents in a similar decontextualized 
manner. Much like the operations of a computer, thinking has been seen as a silent, formal 
operation of mind (cf. Shotter, 1991a, 1991b). "Being right" when thinking, as when applying 
rules, results from "adhering to the dictates of an abiding and general rationality" which is formal 
and mathematical in structure (Fish, 1985, p. 435). 
The psychodynamic theories of Adorno et al. (1950) and Rokeach (1960), for example, offer 
accounts of cognitive style in which individuals (unconsciously) apply a particular rule - for 
example, the authoritarian's Manichean rule: "contradictions are prohibited" -to all cognitive 
contents and in all circumstances. For Tetlock the rules are more complex since they involve not 
only subjective processes (i.e., congruency dynamics) but also objective features of the contents 
under cognition (e.g .• the degree of incompatibility between two paths of action). The rules, 
though, remain formalized and exercised by the individual cognizer/mathematician/scientist as 
s/he processes the essentially given and stable external contents (see pp. 95-96). 
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Fish (1985), in contrast, argues that rules-of-thumb are good things to try in particular 
circumstances, and that "being right" becomes a matter of being in tune with the temporary and 
shifting norms of the situation. Similarly, the vanguard of the "second cognitive revolution" has 
suggested that instead of functioning according to the processes and properties of the individual 
mind, thinking has an inherently social, historical, dialogical, and jointly active nature. These 
theorists have argued that the rule-like model of cognition is untenable for a number of reasons. 
On empirical grounds, they have argued that human cognition is not characterized only by rule-
following but also by rule breaking and making (Billig, 1987a; Shotter, 1991a, 1991b). Secondly, 
the cognitivist model encounters a number of theoretical problems. Theories of the rule-like 
nature of cognition confront major difficulties in explaining (among other problems): (a) how a 
system of formal rules could ever be flexible enough to account for human development - the 
"mutuality between the growing organism and its richly structured and changing environment" 
(Still & Costall, 1991, p. 2); (b) how the individual following a rule knows when to apply the 
rule - i.e., the infinite regress implicit in proposing rules of using rules;3 and (c) the nature of 
the relationship between the meaningful contents of cognition and the abstract and formal rules 
of cognition- i.e., the two worlds argument (Gergen & Semin, 1990; Lakoff, 1988; Still & 
Costall, 1991). Finally, there are moral/political difficulties. Self-contained individualism 
reproduces a set of values and interests which affirms the existing social order (Sampson, 1981, 
1983; Shotter, 1991b), and which renders human social accountability "rationally invisible" 
(Shotter, 1991a). 
Instead, theorists of the second cognitive revolution have proposed that thinking, to be properly 
thoughtful, must operate according to rules-of-thumb which are dialogically negotiated, historical, 
and applied differentially over context. This means that thinking is not a silent process which 
operates within the mind of the lone individual. This approach implies more than another theory 
of mind: it requires a totally new ontology. As Parker notes in his reply to Abrams & Hogg's 
(1990, p. 219) contention that discourse analysis should "demonstrate its superiority in dealing 
with the same phenomena that concern social psychologists": "we are not dealing with the 'same 
phenomena"' (1992, p. 29). 
Billig (1987a, 1991, 1993) suggests that the phenomenon with which we are dealing is 
conversation. He cites the comment by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's dialogue The Sophist to 
illustrate the object of interest: 
3 This leads, as in the case of Chomsky's universal grammar, to locating the source of the rules in innate 
universals (Fish, 1985; Markova, 1991). 
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Thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is nothing 
else than an interior dialogue carried on between the mind and itself, without the 
accompaniment of vocal utterance (Plato, 1961, p. 218). 
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Billig interprets this comment literally; thus, "those who wish to study psychological processes 
should pay attention to the details of conversational interaction, ... [for] in revealing the intricacy 
of conversational manoeuvres, [analysts] are studying directly the processes of thinking" (1993, 
p. 121). If, as Polanyi (1967) says, "The mind of a person can be understood only by reliving 
its workings" (p. 16), then cognitive processes must be studied by the analysis of dialogical 
interaction. This understanding of thinking implies that psychological theories have been 
misguided in their attempts to identify universal laws of cognition and properties of mind, for 
processes of thinking emerge from dialogical conversational interaction. According to this 
conception, thinking is a social practice. 
As Billig's reference to sophistic thought suggests, his conception of cognition as a social and 
dialogical process follows a long and venerable tradition of scholarship. Many arguments have 
been offered to support the view that, rather than a formal mental operation, thinking is a social 
process linked to the acquisition and use of language (Bakhtin, 1986; Markova & Foppa, 1990; 
Shotter, 1993a; Volosinov, 1973, 1987a; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Wertsch, 1990; Whorf, 1956). 
These authors echo the sentiment of the Eleatic Stranger when they propose that thinking is a 
linguistic process manifest in the use of inner speech. In short, these authors argue that "if mental 
processes are mediated by language, and if language is inherently social, then mental processes 
are necessarily social in nature" (Wertsch, 1987, p. x). The implications of this account are quite 
profound, for it opens the study of thought to the study of language (usage). Furthermore, such 
reasoning allows for the possibility that power relations, institutional discourses, social contexts, 
and identity may impact on the very nature of thinking. It allows one to reconcile the differences 
of emphasis that remain between anti-foundationalist psychologies. 
This perspective, I will argue, can assist in overcoming some of the central difficulties which 
have plagued the universalistic models of cognitive style. Of paramount importance, it overcomes 
the dualism implicit in psychological accounts of cognitive style. Instead of arguing that 
individuals represent external "objects" in a characteristic manner determined by some mental 
rules, constructionists have turned from "I think" to "we think" models of cognition (Billig, 1991, 
1993; Gergen, 1985; Moscovici, 1983; Sampson, 1981; Shotter, 1984, 1993a, 1993b, 1995). 
This dissolves the Cartesian distinction between the subject and object of thought, for: 
... any locution actually said aloud or written down for intelligible communication (i.e., 
anything but words merely reposing in a dictionary) is the expression of the product of 
the social interaction of three participants: the speaker (author), the listener, (reader), and 
the topic (the who or what) of speech (the hero) (Volosinov, 1987b, p. 105). 
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If thinking is associated with the use of language, and the use of language is a product of the 
social interaction of the speaker, audience, and topic, then thinking, too, must be thoroughly 
dialogical and indexical. The nature of thinking must therefore also be the product of the social 
interaction between the thinker, audience (context), and contents of cognition. This is the crux 
of a rhetorical account of cognition (Billig, 1987a, 1993; Billig et al., 1988). 
Shotter (1984, 1993a, 1993b, 1995) has usefully described this model of thinking by the term, 
"joint action". In his attempts to show that the "mental processes 'within us' are similar to the 
transactions we conduct 'between us'" (1993b, p. 62), he has proposed joint action as "the kind 
of notion we need, through which to see the workings of processes of social construction" 
(1993a, p. 39, original emphasis). For Shotter, thinking emerges out of the two-way flow of 
activity between people as they create a "changing sea of moral enablements and constraints, of 
privileges and entitlements, obligations and sanctions" (ibid). The uncertain and changing nature 
of joint action is characteristic of conversation, because once dialogue is initiated, each 
interlocutor speaks into spaces created by the other (i.e., responds) and the final outcome of the 
conversation can never be known in advance. In contrast to the implications of cognitivist rules, 
processes, and properties of thought, the type of thinking which emerges from joint action 
produces unintended and unpredictable outcomes as interlocutors/thinkers adjust to the changing 
"seascapes" which the developing 'situation' produces (cf. Rommetveit, 1990). 
Importantly, though, despite the unintended nature of the outcomes of joint action, it has an 
intentional quality to it as the situations are "related to something other than or beyond itself" 
(Shotter, 1993a, p. 39). These developing situations have practical-moral constraints (and 
entablements) lent them from what Parker (1989b, 1992) calls institutional discourses and power 
relations, or Bakhtin (1981, 1986) would call speech genres. Thus, although joint action is a 
constructive process in which people flexibly adapt their cognitive strategies (and their 
representations of 'the real') to a changing and uncertain situation, it employs contents and takes 
place in contexts which are, to an extent, preformed - "An utterance fmds language basically 
already prepared for use" (Volosinov, 1987a, p. 79; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986). In addition to 
variability in the contents and style of cognition, therefore, one may expect situations of joint 
action to exhibit a certain degree of organization and intentionality. 
If thinking is associated with the use of language in contexts of joint action, then the 
characteristics of thinking which have traditionally been understood in terms of personality traits 
of cognitive style, must be seen as variable and emergent features of social interaction. According 
to the dialogical unfolding of thought, cognitive style cannot be viewed as the property of 
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individual psychology, but as a functional and shifting cognitive strategy which changes along 
with the shifting seascapes of developing 'situations'. In addition to dissolving the subject-object 
dualism, constructionist perspectives also collapse the distinction between thinking and feeling. 
"There can be no such thing as an absolutely neutral utterance" because the language which an 
utterance fmds already prepared for use is intentional: speech genres embody and specify moral 
entablements and constraints, privileges and entitlements, and obligations and sanctions (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 84). 
It is here that Billig has made a major contribution to the social constructionist literature. For, 
by focusing on rhetoric, or the argumentative aspects of conversations, he highlights the 
persuasive aims of the conversational encounter. Situations of joint action are not characterised 
only by harmonious interaction as interlocutors collaborate in developing shared systems of 
meaning, and fmding 'true' and consensual representations of the world. Rather, Billig (1987a, 
1991; Billig et al., 1988) stresses that (a) the contents of commonsense -the seeds of arguments 
- are dilemmatic, and (b) the aim of the rhetorical encounter is persuasion, as the joint actors 
attempt to 'move' one another. Thus, thinking is not merely a formal mental process in which 
one person imparts knowledge which another did not originally know. Instead, it is a reflexive 
process whereby participants attempt to 'move' each other, "in the sense of morally re-positioning 
[them] in relation to [their] own situation" (Shotter, 1993a, p. 123). Likewise, Shotter follows 
Vygotsky in arguing for a interrelation between intellect and affect, for if they are separated, "the 
door is closed on the issue of the causation and origin of our thoughts" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 10; 
Bakhtin, 1986). To illustrate the affective origins and effects of thinking, Shotter (1993a) shows 
how statements like "use your head, can't you, use your head, you're on earth, there's no cure 
for that", impart no new knowledge, but function only to 'move' an audience in relation to their 
own situation. 4 
Unlike Tetlock's conception of cognitive style as cognitive response to the (real) dilemmatic 
complexity of the issues under cognition, the complexity of the situation is seen here as a 
construction. If the contents of all thought are inherently dilemmatic as Billig contends, then the 
same issue can be presented in a monistic or pluralistic manner, depending on the nature of the 
(developing) situation. Therefore, instead of proposing universal laws of cognitive functioning, 
"what has to be accounted for are the moment by moment changes, this way and that, as the 
4 I do not discuss the origins of the affective tendencies related to the "causation and origin of our 
thoughts". A full account of why these should be located in the productive and constraining effects of 
institutional discourses rather than properties of mind is beyond the scope of this discussion (but see 
Foucault, 1978, 1982; Parker, 1989b, 1?92). 
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process develops" (Shatter, 1987, p. 239). This new ontology, therefore, has methodological 
repercussions. Experimentation, for instance, is automatically excluded. 
Methodology 
In concluding his provocative paper, Danziger (1985) suggests that a "fundamental theoretical 
change would surely depend on a fundamental change in methodology" (p. 10). This is true since 
an instirutionalized methodology will incorporate an ontology which cannot be tested or 
questioned by a mere application of the method. As this thesis has argued, measures which 
allocate each individual in a sample a single ambiguity tolerance score to represent their 
characteristic cognitive style, assume that tolerance of ambiguity is a generalized, pervasive, and 
asocial personality trait. Theoretical change is dependent upon methods which allow a fair test 
of this ontological assumption. The Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance scale has been useful for this 
purpose as it allows one to examine the generality of ambiguity tolerance over varying contents. 
This, however, does certainly not constirute a fundamental theoretical change. A number of 
ontological assumptions associated with empiricist science remain. Firstly, the AA T scale yields 
quantitative data which assume the properties of an interval measurement scale. The strucrure of 
this numerical system will thus be automatically reflected in the theory of intolerance of 
ambiguity; suggesting, perhaps, that the important features of ambiguity tolerance lie in the 
relative amount an individual displays toward a particular content domain. An array of other 
potentially theoretically salient fearures of ambiguity tolerance, such as its functions and effects 
(Edelman, 1977), its structural foundation in instirutions (Merton, 1976), its historical association 
with particular ideologies (Billig, 1982; Weigert, 1991), or its psychodynamic structure, are thus 
disregarded. Secondly, the AAT scale tends to reify ambiguity tolerance. While the scale does 
not presume ambiguity tolerance to be a generalized personality trait, a 'second order' reification 
is evident in references to attirudinal ambiguity tolerance toward political, religious, and familial 
authorities - as if such (natural) entities existed. In fact, these different factors of attirudinal 
ambiguity tolerance were produced (in part) through methodological procedures of sampling, item 
selection, factor analysis, etcetera. If the AA T scale had included different contents - for 
example, only religious authorities- different factors would have emerged. Perhaps, as in the 
preliminary factor analysis reported in Chapter 4, christian authorities would have been 
distinguished from non-christian authorities. Moreover, the nature of the factors would vary 
across context, with christian and non-christian authorities perhaps being more clearly 
differentiated if the study were to be performed in an orthodox religious context. 
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Armed with these remaining empiricist assumptions, a diligent researcher would not rest, content 
after demonstrating individual variability in ambiguity tolerance, but would proceed to construct 
and test theoretical models of the conditions when authoritarians, for example, are expected to 
be tolerant or intolerant of ambiguity towards particular contents. Such models could rely on 
constructs such as context, content, norms, deviance, etcetera. In other words, the AA T scale 
may be appropriated by universalistic theory in an effort to generate laws of psychological 
functioning. Nothing, to my mind, would be more futile for context and content would be reified 
as "situation" and "attitude"; and, as in Tetlock's case, the theory would again reduce to 
individualism (cf. Parker, 1990b; Sampson, 1981; see also pp. 91-93). 
Why then, it may be asked, has this thesis delved so deeply into the positivist honey jar of valid 
and reliable quantitative measurement and fme tuned techniques of data analysis if these cannot 
assist in its aims of fundamental theoretical change? The reasons for this focus are rhetorical, and 
are specific to the nature of the literature under consideration. 
Within the discipline of psychology the study of authoritarianism has been undertaken by two 
groups of researchers with conflicting theoretical and methodological frameworks. The first group 
is characterized by their reliance on quantification and universal theorizing, based on the notion 
of a psychological typology. Stone et al's (1993) recently published, Strength and Weakness: The 
Authoritarian Personality Today is typical of this approach. Sidanius and Tetlock are recognized 
as having made important theoretical contributions with their highly individualistic work, and 
Altemeyer's universal defmition of authoritarianism is cited with approval.5 It shows no 
recognition of social constructionist thought which has swept through the discipline of social 
psychology in response to the "crisis", and barely acknowledges the two decades of work that 
Michael Billig, for example, has devoted to the study of fascism, prejudice, and authoritarianism. 
Instead. the generalized personality is revived with Roger Brown's (1965) old trope, "Do you 
know him (sic) - the Authoritarian, the Antidemocrat, the Pre-Fascist ... ", and an attempt is 
made to establish the global validity of the F scale as a measure of this type. In other words, the 
authoritarian is accepted as a type, with a characteristic cognitive style and a penchant for fascist 
ideology. 
This approach, however, receives little respect from some philosophers, political scientists, and 
social critics who regard the traits measured by the F scale as "'pop' psychology [which] fmds 
little or no place in the more sophisticated analysis of fascist ideology" (Eatwell, 1989a, p. 41). 
' See p. 26 for a discussion of Altemeyer's definition of authoritarianism. 
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Billig is representative of a second school which rejects the primacy of quantification and 
theoretical universalism in the study of ideology. The aim of the present work is to bridge the 
divide, and stimulate a dialogue between these two schools of thought. If the work had focused 
purely on a social constructionist account of ambiguity tolerance, it may have been accused of 
throwing the baby out with the bath water (cf. Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Instead, an attempt has 
been made, first to demonstrate the implausibility of the notion of a generalized trait of ambiguity 
tolerance, using a quantitative method, and then to build upon this conclusion by developing an 
account of ambiguity tolerance with social constructionist insights. As such, the thesis has been 
an exercise in ambiguity tolerance - it is an argument woven between two conflicting schools 
with the aim of stimulating dialogue between them. 
To achieve fundamental theoretical change, though, fundamental methodological change is 
required. This chapter aims to break completely with a quantitative, empiricist methodology and, 
instead, employ a qualitative method, which focuses on language, rather than the individual, as 
the object of analysis. It is not merely a matter of selecting one method over another in the 
marketplace of methods. Rather, a methodological shift is necessary in order to repudiate the 
"fantasized real" object of psychological inquiry (Parker, 1992), and "to take seriously the 
proposition that mental states are themselves socially created" (Billig, 1991, p. 14). In the study 
which follows, then, intolerance of ambiguity will not be regarded as a 'real' property of 
psychology, but as (a) a rhetorical strategy which is an emergent feature of joint action, and (b) 
a socially constructed attribute which is used in talk to achieve certain effects. 
Investigating cognitive style through the study of language usage is by no means a novel 
approach. It is significant that Frenkel-Brunswik (1948) originally identified tolerance/intolerance 
of ambiguity in the talk of prejudiced and non-prejudiced children. However, for political and 
scientific reasons, these expressions of ambiguity tolerance were 'seen through' a theory of 
individual differences (Durrheim, in press/a). Tetlock's attempts to code talk by means of the 
integrative complexity coding schedule is similarly theory bound. He sees talk not as a 
conversational or argumentative encounter, but in terms of individual information processing. By 
analyzing only the talk of their subjects, Frenkel-Brunswik and Tetlock disregard the dialogical 
and indexical nature of talk, treat talk as the product of the self-contained individual, and thereby, 
reproduce the notion that thinking is a mono logic individual mental function. Moreover, their 
tendency to employ "gross categorization" - of people (Frenkel-Brunswik) and excerpts of 
speech (Tetlock) - leads to a suppression of variability (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1987). These 
approaches cannot satisfy the requirements of a conversational ontology for we need a method 
which 'fits in' with the nature of thinking rather than the requirements and practices of the 
empiricist science. 
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The approach which is adopted here focuses on the deployment and effects of talk within a 
dialogical argumentative context. This places the discussion of intolerance of ambiguity squarely 
within the tradition of discourse analysis (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Parker, 1992; Parker & Burman, 1993; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Instead of treating 
'intolerance of ambiguity' as a term describing a property of psychology, it is viewed as 
performative (cf. Austin, 1962), and the focus shifts to the crucial role that language plays in 
constructing objects and (re)producing social consciousness (Billig, 1991; Henriques et al., 1984; 
Parker, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
This approach to 'tolerance of ambiguity' is well illustrated by Murray Edelman's (1977) analysis 
of political language. Edelman analyzes the effects of language usage when he argues that 
ambiguity in talk can be used as a political strategy. For Edelman, the strategic use of ambiguity 
is revealed when: 
The FBI tells us repeatedly both that crime is increasing and that the FBI has never been 
more effective in coping with it. (Edelman, 1977, p. 4). 
Edelman brackets off questions about whether such statements are accurate reflections of the real 
state of affairs (i.e., whether crime is actually increasing), or reflections of the psychological 
attributes of the speaker. Instead, he analyses the functions of talk, including such ambiguous 
statements which simultaneously excite and mollify fears. These, he argues, allow leaders to gain 
followings as "people are induced to accept sacrifices and remain susceptible to appeals for 
support" (Edelman, 1977, p. 5). For Edelman, language is "not simply an instrument for 
describing events but is itself a part of events, shaping their meaning, and helping to shape the 
political roles officials and the general public play" (Edelman, 1977, p. 4). Thus, ambivalent 
opinions regarding the role of the FBI in crime prevention extend beyond the psychological make-
up of the American citizen. 
By analyzing the different effects which speakers achieve in shifting contexts, Potter & Wetherell 
( 1987) have shown a thoroughgoing variability in the attitudinal content that individuals espouse. 
Similarly, in the study which follows, I aim to demonstrate that with the changing demands of 
a developing argumentative encounter, individuals will manifest thoroughgoing variability in 
cognitive style. In achieving this aim, I will draw heavily on Billig's rhetorical psychology, which 
has emphasized the rhetorical nature of the structure of thought and attitudes (Billig, 1985a, 
1987a, 1991, 1993; Billig et al., 1988). Billig has, however, been concerned mainly with the 
general proposition that attitudinal style is complex and contradictory (Billig, 1988a, 1988b, 
1989b, Billig et al., 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1988). In addition to explaining variability in 
attitudinal content (i.e., attitudinal complexity), though, rhetorical theory may also be useful in 
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explaining variability in ambiguity tolerance (i.e., stylistic complexity). Accordingly, this chapter 
aims to offer an "instructive account" (Shotter, 1993a) of variability in ambiguity tolerance by 
analyzing the strategic use of two rhetorical processes - categorization and particularization -
in an argumentative context. It will be argued that shifts between tolerance and intolerance of 
ambiguity are a basic feature of argumentation and, therefore, also a basic feature of all thought. 
Once individual variability in ambiguity tolerance has been established and set within a rhetorical 
framework, a second set of interests arise: what functions do talk of 'tolerance/intolerance of 
ambiguity' serve in discourse? Statements such as "fascists are intolerant of ambiguity" and 
"liberals are tolerant of ambiguity" have played important roles in criticising and legitimating 
systems of ideological beliefs, both within and outside of psychology. Similar terms used by the 
general public include speaking 'double talk', or with a 'forked tongue', or being 'wolves in 
sheep clothing', etcetera. Despite their importance in criticism and justification, these terms have 
been of little concern to psychologists. The second aim of this chapter, therefore, is to focus on 
'tolerance of ambiguity' as an object, in an attempt to explore further the relationship between 
fascism and intolerance of ambiguity. 
A case study: Peace and violence on the new South African 
Right 
The assassination in 1993 of Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party and 
commander-in-chief of Umk.ontho we Sizwe, was one of those political events which draw people 
unequivocally into radically opposing camps. For this particular event, the emergent boundaries 
separated the vast majority of South Africans, who deplored the murder and mourned the loss 
of a national hero, from the radical and extreme Right. The assassination spawned widespread 
civil unrest as (predominantly Black) South Africans took to the streets to demonstrate their 
outrage against the right-wing perpetrators of this violence and the apartheid regime in general. 
Against the overwhelming weight of mass opinion, some voices on the Right undertook the 
difficult task of justifying this ignominious deed. A detailed analysis of one such argument will 
be presented here. The text consists of an interview with Koos Vermeulen, leader of The World 
Apartheid Movement (W AM), a small but vocal South African neo-fascist organization. 6 
6 During 1993 W AM renamed itself, The World Preservatist Movement, in order to accommodate Black 
members! Throughout this chapter the organization will be referred to as W AM. 
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Throughout this interview, which was broadcast on public television soon after the assassination 
(25 April 1993), Vermeulen attempts to justify his organization's support for the Polish 
immigrant, Janus W aluz, the assassin. 
This exchange between the interviewer and Vermeulen is significant for a number of theoretical 
reasons. Firstly, it took the form of an argument. While it is generally accepted that unpopular 
positions must be justified by argument, this is not clearly anticipated by psychological theories 
of personality and ideology. On the contrary, such theories emphasize the non-debatable 
dogmatism of persons participating in extremist ideological movements. While personality theory 
may anticipate argument and possible attitude change from uncommitted members of the general 
public (as those studied chapters 4 & 5), ideologues and "true believers" of the fascist fringe are 
precisely those individuals who should manifest the full-blown syndrome of authoritarianism, and 
are expected to be dogmatic, closed minded, and intolerant of ambiguity (Adorno et al., 1950; 
Converse, 1964; Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1958). Such individuals are predicted to be impervious 
to attitude change and argumentation because their cognitive style is such that it consistently 
rejects attempts to question its Manichean categorizations. 
Theories of the ideological roots of cognitive style, such as that proposed by Tetlock, paint a 
similar picture of fascist rhetoric. While Tetlock (on occasions) rejects the idea that some 
underlying personality dynamic is responsible for the characteristic dogmatic style of the extreme 
Right, he does not reject the notion of a characteristic style (see Tetlock, 1993; Tetlock et al., 
1993). Instead of personality, though, Tetlock proposes that the monistic style of fascist ideology 
produces categorical thinking among its adherents, by means of which they may reduce conflict 
between two contradictory values or rhetorical positions. Thus, Tetlock (1993) qualifies his value 
conflict theory of individual variability by arguing that: 
Conservatives, with their presumably more internally consistent value systems are 
relatively unaffected by shifts in political role. There is less potential value conflict that 
they can be forced to confront (p. 398). 
Fascists should not display variability in cognitive style, even under "force". 
While the definition of fascism is highly disputed (Billig, 1977), there can be little doubt that 
WAM falls under the rubric, 'fascist' (van Rooyen, 1994). As can be seen from the interview 
transcript (see Appendix F), the organization is characterized by an ideology of White 
nationalism, it is extremely anti-Marxist and anti-communist, and is anti-democratic in it's 
attempts to preserve a White South Africa ( cf. Billig 1989a). In addition, the organization is 
reported to have worldwide neo-Nazi links (Wilkinson, 1993). Thus, following traditional 
psychological theories of personality and ideology, one would anticipate Vermeulen to employ 
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a consistently dogmatic defence of his activities, which precludes the possibility of argument. 
The second feature of the interview which makes it theoretically interesting is that, in three 
instances, ambiguity tolerance is referred to as a topic of discussion. In speaking about 'double 
talk', Vermeulen employs an equivalent of what psychologists call 'tolerance of ambiguity'. The 
essence of both terms lies in their reference to an ambiguous cognitive style which accommodates 
both a category and particular instances or other categories which contradict the quintessence of 
the category. As used in the interview, 'double talk' is similar to Frenkel-Brunswik's description 
of ambiguity tolerance (see pp. 66-67), for it refers to an individual's ambivalent evaluation of 
a single social "object". Not only does Vermeulen display flexible rhetorical skills, but, in talking 
about 'double talk', he demonstrates skills in psychological theorizing of his own. Thus, besides 
being patently incorrect, ignoring the powerful and thoughtful rhetorical dexterity of the extreme 
Right is politically dangerous for it neglects the persuasive potential of fascist rhetoric. This 
chapter works toward a rhetorical account of cognitive style which allows a theory of right-wing 
extremism to accommodate its empirical reality. 
The third point of theoretical interest concerns the content of the argument. In backing the 
assassin, Vermeulen is taking a stance in support of violence as a political strategy. Indeed, 
WAM is renowned for its support of right-wing violence. The organization has assisted the mass 
murder Barend Strydom in his efforts to secure indemnity, and have claimed the notorious "Vaal 
Monster" as a member of their organization (Makoe & SAPA, 1993). In addition, W AM train 
their members in military techniques and "self-defence" (Laufer, 1993), and have been suspected 
of planning to use chemical weapons to kill large numbers of Blacks (Staff Reporter, Rapport, 
1990). If a Rokeachian value analysis were to be undertaken, it would no doubt be found that 
violence would rate quite prominently in the rhetoric of the organization. If this is true, though, 
it is also true that peace is a hallowed value of movement. Vermeulen always goes to great 
lengths to communicate his desire for peace - "really, deep in my heart I take the peace option 
before war" (lines 160-161 of the transcript). 
In other words, Vermeulen values both peace and violence. According to Tetlock, his allegiances 
to a fascist organization would allow him to bolster the import of the one value and minimize the 
significance of the other in an attempt to reach decisions for action which may be logically 
reconciled with neo-fascist ideology. Thus, in debating the moral status of the assassination, the 
value of peace will be minimized while the value of violence is bolstered. While such monism 
may serve the psychological functions outlined by Abelson ( 1959), it is certainly not rhetorically 
effective as it suggests an irrational dogmatism. In contrast, a theory of rhetoric suggests that in 
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argumentation and controversy, "the basic notions of morality and philosophy ... are not univocal 
and have no flxed meaning" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 132; see also Fish, 1994). 
Billig (1987a) cites Protagoras in this regard: "Of all things man is the measure" (p. 42). Instead 
of taking peace and violence at face value and bolstering one in favour of the other, the rhetorical 
perspective would expect peace and violence to be debated and (re)constructed throughout the 
discussion, even by fascist supporters (cf. Cochrane & Billig, 1984). 
In contrast to psychological conceptions of "terminal values" which may be invoked to sustain 
an argument or justify an action, a rhetorical account treats values as complex meanings which 
are continually being reshaped. This conception of values is discussed with insight by the 
anthropologist Brad Shore, who argues for a notion of: 
... complexity and variation [in values] existing not only within a given culture but also 
within individuals for whom ethics is realized more commonly as dilemmas than as the 
simple mobilization of values (Shore, 1990, p. 168). 
Accordingly, the condition which makes possible the complexity and variation in the construction 
of values, is their dilemmatic ontology- "there are two sides to every question" (Billig, 1987a, 
p. 5). 
Contrary themes: Peace and violence 
The dilemmatic nature of commonsense is central to Billig's rhetorical account of cognition. 
Billig (1987 a, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) argues that this dilemmatic ontology is manifest in 
contradictory commonplaces such as "many hands make light work" and "too many cooks spoil 
the broth", which exist not merely as external beliefs from which an individual may choose one 
or another, but as "contrary thoughts [which] may fmd their homes within the same mental 
spaces" (Billig, 1987a, p. 191). Contrary themes make thinking possible for they provide the 
conditions whereby people may puzzle over their world; deliberating, for example, whether a 
particular task should avoid too many cooks or should commission many hands. The contrary 
themes of commonsense are thus seen as the basic units of thought. This being the case, a flrst 
task, before examining the style of thinking manifest in particular utterances, is to discuss the 
nature of the contrary themes which provide the seeds for argumentation, and thereby, thinking. 
By highlighting commonsense, rhetorical psychology proposes a truly social understanding of 
cognition. Quite simply, the contents of thought are not seen as individual inventions, issuing 
from the head of the speaker, but as socially shared 'property' - Bakhtinian "bodies of meaning" 
-which are encoded in language, shared by speaker and audience alike, and 'drawn upon' and 
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(re)produced in particular contexts (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Billig, 1991; Volosinov, 1973, 1987a). 
Like American attitudes toward the FBI, the contents of all thinking and deliberation are not 
reducible to the thought processes or psychology of the individual, as psychological theories of 
attitudes have suggested (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Wilson, 1973). Contrary themes of 
commonsense, the basic units of thought and the units of rhetorical analysis, are thoroughly social 
in nature. 
This has a number of implications which distinguish a rhetorical account of cognition from 
individualistic theories. First, rhetorical psychology requires an understanding of the socially 
shared ideological contents which structure the dilemmas underlying argumentation within specific 
historico-cultural contexts. In his account of prejudice, Billig (1988a), for instance, argues that 
the Enlightenment ushered in an age which simultaneously proclaimed and negated the value of 
tolerance: it heralded the age of 'liberty, equality, and fraternity', and witnessed also the rise of 
the nation-state. It is not that the ancien regime also did not value both tolerance and intolerance, 
but that the specific contents, the nature of what constituted tolerance and intolerance, were 
transformed. In particular, the irrational intolerance associated with the Church was rejected in 
favour of scientifically justified intolerance, based on reasoned judgement. 
Rhetorical theory emphasizes an analysis of the content of the contrary themes of common-sense 
in order to understand the meaning of argument. Billig's analysis helps us to understand the 
nature of contemporary racist thinking. The argumentative nature of the disclaimer, "I'm not 
prejudiced, but. .. ", suggests that it is not as a reflection of a tolerant personality, or an argument 
against intolerance per se, but a position against irrational intolerance not based on reasoned 
judgement (Billig, 1988a; van Dijk, 1992). In order to deflect criticism and to lay claim to the 
"moral community of the unprejudiced", racial intolerance is often sustained by seemingly 
enlightened, reasoned repertoires such as ecologism (cf. Dixon et al., 1994), and is characterized 
by denials of racism. Accordingly, Billig argues that the dilemmatic opposition between the 
tolerant and intolerant themes which frame thinking on race, comes into particular relief during 
the Enlightenment, and are 'resolved' in ways typical to the context. A rhetorical analysis must 
begin by detailing the content of the contrary themes of commonsense, and the shared forms of 
"conflict resolution". 
Like our understanding of 'prejudice', the meanings attached to 'peace' and 'violence' have been 
moulded by Enlightenment ideas. Georges Sorel, the French syndicalist philosopher, has 
suggested that the Enlightenment introduced radical changes to common understandings of 
'violence'. He argues that the rejection of "old brutalities" of ancien regime passed onto the idea 
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that "all violence is an evil" (1915, p. 219). This massive change in the meaning of violence was 
reflected in (a) child rearing practices which rejected the severity of clerical punishments, (b) the 
penal code where brutality came to be seen as abnormal, and (c) the impossibility of reconciling 
the violent political functions of the old "politico-criminal n associations with rational democracy. 
At the heart of these changes was the shift away from the absolute authority of the church and 
sovereign, to a secular, democratic, and humanist age (see also Foucault, 1977). Along with the 
Enlightenment themes of tolerance, violence had come to be seen as irrational, abnormal, and 
criminal. 
The rejection of violence as a legitimate political strategy is evident also among the contemporary 
'new South African' Right, a group which psychologists would portray as having a penchant for 
displacing repressed aggression. Reacting to the right-wing bombings on the eve of the first 
democratic election in South Africa, the Hoopstad Freedom Front chairman, sergeant-major Obie 
du Plessis, captures the nature of this violence. 
I call them Klipdrift soldiers- they get drunk and then go around trying to be soldiers. 
They are fighting a war of cowards and we are not sympathetic to their cause. It is wrong 
to kill innocent people (cited by Vermeulen, 1994). 
Here, right-wing perpetrators of violence are condemned for being irrational and immoral (but 
not criminal) by one of their fellows. They are Klipdrift soldiers - acting under the influence 
of cheap liquor - who are cowardly killing innocent people. It is remarkable that on the 
symbolic twilight of right-wing power, where resistance is to be anticipated in the form of 
aggression displaced onto a 'legitimate' enemy, violence is rejected in such strong terms. 
This, however, does not mean that peace has become the sole value of modern society, and that 
all deliberation is forgone in favour of unanimous and univalent calls for peaceful activity. On 
the contrary, if the Enlightenment rejected violence, it also sanctioned it in appropriate 
circumstances. The modern age has been characterized by state repression, and national and civil 
wars on a scale not known before. Indeed, Sorel's own work constituted a defense of proletarian 
violence, "enlightened by the idea of the general strike" (p. 295). Against the calls for peace 
made by the parliamentary socialists, Sorel promoted the "high ethical values of working class 
violence, heroism and authenticity, by means of which [socialism] brings salvation to the modern 
world" (ibid). While himself rejecting the brutalities of the ancien regime and its associated 
"religious dogma", Sorel deemed violence necessary for the ultimate good of the modern world. 
Modern violence cannot be sustained by irrational dogmas, but by the protection of the good of 
the people: the proletariate for the Left, and the nation-state for the Right. 
From the rhetorical perspective these contrary themes of commonsense are to be expected. What 
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an analysis of the content of commonsense suggests is that violence cannot be advocated in the 
simple-minded and dogmatic manner expected of the authoritarian. Instead, violence must be 
justified in argument. In order to be heard and be persuasive, the advocates of violence must be 
seen to be doing good rather than evil, and acting rationally rather than irrationally. Rhetorical 
analysis thus attempts to make explicit the boundaries of 'peace' and 'violence' - the borders 
between good and evil, and reason and unreason. In so doing, the analyst is not seeking 
metaphysical boundaries, but analyzing the culturally specific margins which are employed in 
criticism and justification. 
Even in assertions which explicitly reject certain themes, there are to be found implicit themes 
which signal the possible contours of boundaries (Billig, 1988b, 1988c). While it may be "wrong 
to kill innocent people", as the sergeant-major says, it may be perfectly legitimate to kill people 
who are not innocent. In such instances, violence may be justified by explaining the non-
innocence of the people to be killed. These implicit themes make possible variation in attitudes 
as they offer rhetorical means by which to sustain a particular course of action. A little later, 
sergeant-major Obie du Plessis, for example, suggests that attempts by the new government to 
disarm the farmers, "most of whom fought in the Angolan and Namibian campaigns", could 
trigger a "10 or 20 year long civil war that would make the war in Bosnia look insignificant" 
(cited by Vermeulen, 1994). Here violence is a legitimate course of action since the targets of 
violence are not innocent people, but wilful aggressors (against the volk). Violence is simply a 
means of self-defence. 
This argument implies that the threshold where modern violence may become peace-loving, is 
in the defence of a people or political arrangement. The specific boundaries between peace and 
violence in the context of this utterance is the disarming of the farmers. This cannot be an 
innocent undertaking since it undermines the right-wing conception of the volk (cf. van Rooyen, 
1994).7 Once change threatens the Afrikaner way of life, one might anticipate resistance from 
'real soldiers', for a 'just cause', in a 'legitimate' and terrible war. Violence, like prejudice, is 
something to be found in the other. When it is practised, it is not immoral brutality but a means 
of defence, undertaken for the good of the nation, in the name of peace. 
7 The reference to armed farmers captures the essence of the right-wing conception of Afrikaner identity. 
Eugene Terreblance, the leader of the extremist group, the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging [Afrikaner 
Resistance Movement], for example, describes himself as 'n boer en 'n jagter [a farmer and a hunter]. 
This is also captured in the (now banned) resistance chant of Umkontho we Sizwe (the armed wing of the 
ANC): "Kill the boer, kill the farmer". 
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According to Billig, contrary themes provide the seeds for deliberation and argumentation (Billig, 
1987a, 1991; Billig et al., 1988). Just as implicit themes may indicate the presence of contrary 
attitudinal positions and open the possibility for attitudinal variability, they also provide the basis 
for deliberation and variability within an ideological tradition such as the extreme Right in South 
Africa. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ( 1969) have suggested that the most general values, like 
non-violence, which embrace a large sphere of applicability, often become obscure in novel 
siruations since their meaning depends on the system in which they are used. Thus, with the 
arrival of the new South Africa, the Right had to decide between the commonplaces of non-
violence and defence of national identity. 8 This becomes a matter of the 'true' interpretation of 
the nature of the changes; a matter of the rhetoric of essences. Are the changes such that identity 
is threatened by the enemy, or will change leave intact the essence of Afrikaner identity? 
Following Billig, one may argue that the conflict between violence and non-violence "is not 
merely the conflict between the individual and extraneous social customs (or perhaps other 
people), but a conflict within individuals who have two contrasting ideological themes upon which 
to draw" (1991, p. 127). This conflict is also manifest within an ideological tradition such as the 
South African Right, who, with the onset of change has split into numerous groups as they have 
begun to (re)define their essence (cf. Welsh, 1989). 
The social nature of thinking is thus reflected in the socio-historical nature of the content of the 
contrary themes which are employed in specific rhetorical contexts. There is a second implication 
of using argumentation as a metaphor for thought: it informs an account of the form or style of 
thinking. This is the focus of the remainder of the chapter, for here we are concerned with 
variation in style rather than variation in content. 
A rhetorical account of thinking requires an alternative to Tetlock's conception of values and 
value conflict (see pp. 93-97). There can be no conflict resolution or belief congruity as such 
because there exists no core or terminal set of values which is not counterbalanced by other, 
contrary values. No amount of cognitive differentiation and integration, seeking and weighing 
implications, will be able to resolve this conflict in any formal sense (such as fmding the correct 
answer to a dilemma). Instead, a rhetorical account expects to fmd people (re)constructing values 
in specific contexts as, by a reflexive and dialogical process, they seek to persuade an audience. 
The social nature of thinking suggests that contrary themes may always be aroused when a course 
8 Paradox abounds, and there is much leeway for argumentation, as the Right criticize "communist 
terrorists" but justify their own armed resistance. 
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of action or belief is challenged. In such situations, there is no alternative to using complex, but 
readily accessible, rhetorical strategies. Cognitive style, therefore, can never be viewed as a 
property of individual psychology, for the manner in which value conflict is both generated and 
resolved is inherently social. Contrary themes, being the seeds of argument, are also the seeds 
of complex cognitive styles. 
Contrary themes and tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity 
If values are not unitary commodities which are possessed by communities, but instead, if values 
are realized as dilemmas, then thinking about values must involve means by which the inevitable 
conflict between opposing commonplaces is handled or managed. It is here that rhetorical insights 
inform a theory of cognitive style. For, the way in which individuals manage value dilemmas in 
their private thinking will be similar to the manner in which they debate the same dilemmas in 
developing dialogical contexts of joint action. If arguing is thinking, then ideological dilemmas 
will be managed by rhetorical means. 
The study of rhetoric is well equipped for studying value conflict resolution since it has 
emphasized the creative and flexible strategies which people employ in the art of persuasion. 
Billig (1987a) borrows Ralf Lever's splendid term witcraft to capture the inventive way in which 
we think and argue our way 'out of' (about) dilemmatic situations. Unlike logical reasoning, 
which aims for correct, formal deductions and conclusions, matters of rhetoric are never 
unarguably right or wrong. Instead, as discourse theorists have proposed, "seeking the available 
means of persuasion" around a particular issue involves a reflexive process where participants 
draw on different discourses in order to frame an object in a particular way (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Parker, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). As Foucault (1972) writes, "discourses are 
practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak" (p. 49). Hence, the object, 
'violence', may be viewed as either honourable or despicable, depending on whether it is framed 
in terms of self-defence or murder. 
The reflexive process of witcraft entails locating essences. When arguing in support of, or in 
opposition to violence, for example, the essence of violence must be sought either in a discourse 
of self-defence or murder. Such rhetoric does not involve the manipulation of formal 
argumentative structures, but is essentially an endless exercise, where examples supporting one 
conclusion may be countered with examples supporting the converse (Aristotle, 1932; Billig, 
1987a; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Essences should therefore not be thought of in a 
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Platonic sense, "as objects lying behind the objects of everyday experience", but rather as "the 
fittest way of talking and thinking about these objects" (Billig, 1987a, p. 138). 
Billig (1987a) explains that fmding essences, or the fittest ways of talking about objects such as 
violence, involves the rhetorical processes of locating these objects in specific categories, and 
extracting them from these categories and placing them in others. A particular instance of 
violence must, for example, be placed in the category 'murder of innocent people' or 'heroic self-
defence'. By developing accounts of the manner in which categories and particulars are used in 
talk, rhetorical psychology may contribute to an understanding of "conflict resolution" and 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. From its original formulation, tolerance versus intolerance 
of ambiguity has been defmed in terms of categorization, with a Manichean, black-white 
cognitive style characterizing rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. Witcraft is thus central to an 
understanding of cognitive style since the location of essences involves the defming features of 
intolerance/tolerance of ambiguity - namely, intolerant categorization, treating two or more 
distinguishable objects or events as equivalent, and tolerant particularization, extracting a 
particular from a category in which it had previously been placed (Billig, 1987a). 
The fact that the rhetorical processes of categorization and particularization are central to the 
definition of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity may be ascertained from the original definition 
of authoritarianism. An authoritarian cognitive structure was characterized as: 
... simple, flrm, [and] often stereotypical ... [where] there is no place for ambivalence or 
ambiguities. Every attempt is made to eliminate them (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 480). 
The prejudiced individual was also said to use categorical statements which rule out exceptions, 
and being intolerant of ambiguity, s/he is presumed to believe that fundamental differences exist 
between all instances of different categories (Billig, 1985a). Thus, according to personality 
theory, authoritarian and prejudiced thinking would not be characterized by witcraft, since it 
would draw only on pre-formed essences and would not be capable of extracting objects from 
categories and locating them in new ones. Moreover, to the extent to which the prejudiced 
individual believes in fundamental differences between Blacks and Whites, this characteristic non-
reflexive thought is said to extend to all categories including 'peace' and 'violence'. 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the thinking of the non-prejudiced person is 
distinguished by tolerance of ambiguity. 
His (sic) speech abounds with qualifying phrases and overintellectualization. He seems repeatedly 
unable to verbalize a generalization before he is overwhelmed by a rush of qualifications. Further, 
his thinking is rich in philosophising, psychologizing, and poetic statement (Adorno et al., 1950, 
p. 463). 
In contrast to the bigot, the cognition of the non-prejudiced individual is said to be characterized 
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by constant particularization. 
In contrast, a rhetorical account of cognition suggest that witcraft, being a feature of all 
argumentation, will also be a feature of the thinking of all individuals. Billig (1985a) has 
provided a trenchant argument for this conclusion: "If a category is to be applied, it must be 
particularized or selected from other categories" (p. 93; see also Billig 1987a). Thus, rather than 
being different properties of mind, categorization and particularization are viewed as 
complementary rhetorical strategies which provide the basis for all thinking. The thinking of 
prejudiced and non-prejudiced persons should feature both categorization and particularization, 
intolerance and tolerance of ambiguity. 
Rather than seeking individual differences in intolerance of ambiguity, therefore, the rhetorical 
account anticipates contextual variability as persons argue about the essences of categories and 
particulars. According to rhetorical theory, "the meaning of notions depends on the systems in 
which they are used" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 134). The classic example 
regarding the contextual nature of the meaning of violence is the way in which the 'violent 
criminals' of an old regime are released from prison to be the 'heroes' of the next. This implies 
the necessity of ambiguity tolerance across context, as the particular instances which make up the 
category 'violent criminals' must be removed and placed in another, namely 'heroes'. This means 
that values such as peace and violence will are continually being re-defmed as their context of 
application changes. 
This is true also of micro-contexts which arise in different parts of a single piece of talk. For, 
like the openness of history, micro-contexts of dialogical joint action are always uncertain, 
producing unintended consequences (Shotter, 1993a). This is illustrated in the following extract. 
In responding to a question regarding the assassination of Chris Hani, Koos Vermeulen attempts 
to draw categorical distinctions between talking and warring, but is forced into a compromise as 
the interviewer changes the context of the distinction, from the ANC to Vermeulen himself: 9 
Extract 1 
093 Vermeulen . .I'm not for any person to be assassinated. I think with talking(.) we can do 
094 a lot, but then on the other hand we must keep in mind that the ANC want to talk and they 
095 want to er war, and there is no way for both of of it. There's no room for both of it. 
096 Leslie. But then the person you're supporting killed, assassinated people, or assassinated 
097 Mr Hani. Urn and that that is not talking. 
9 The transcription notation is based on that described in the Appendix to Potter and Wetherell ( 1987). 
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098 Vermeulen. Right, the fact is that one should look at a motive, at a background of a 
099 person .. The person that killed Mr Hani was someone that fled communist tyranny. He was 
100 a victim for the best part of his life of communist tyranny and its logical that in a time of 
101 despair anyone of those people feel more threatened than any anyone else and he would go 
102 for the chief of the Communist Party. 
First, Vermeulen draws categorical distinctions between 'talking' and 'warring' in a manner 
characteristic of intolerance of ambiguity. He establishes unambiguous boundaries around these 
respective categories by suggesting that one can either desire to talk or to war, but not both. This 
is reminiscent of the portrait of the bigot who makes a radical and uncompromising distinction 
between Blacks and Whites, believing that there are fundamental differences between all instances 
of both categories. Moreover, as with prejudice, a value gradient is established between the two 
categories as Vermeulen reiterates his "heartfelt desire for peace" by stating that he would prefer 
talking to violence. However, since the ANC want war, any violence on the part of W AM may 
be construed as a legitimate act of self-defence. Later, Vermeulen makes explicit this implicit 
theme when he suggests that "they [communists] are prepared to invade my country" (line 142). 
By drawing an unambiguous distinction between talking and warring, Vermeulen has proposed 
a simple, general principle which covers a wide range of applicability - any political strategy 
can be viewed as either an instance of 'talk' or of 'war'. This is the type of universal rule which 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ( 1969) suggest, outside pure formalism, "remain clear and univocal 
only in relation to a field of application that is known and determined" (p. 133). Leslie effectively 
changes the field of application by suggesting that Vermeulen's support for Waluz constitutes a 
infringement of his value for talk and negotiation. Leslie has uncovered an incompatibility in 
Vermeulen's argument, for he himself is found to be talking peace while supporting violence. 
To display an inconsistency in an argument is to "expose it to condemnation without appeal" for 
the ridiculous is the "principal weapon of argumentation" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 
pp. 195 & 205). Leslie's tone is one of ridicule. Indeed, the second sentence in Leslie's reply 
adds no new content (knowledge), but is appended for its rhetorical effect in displaying ridicule 
toward Vermeulen's inconsistency. Not only has Vermeulen broken his own rule of talking and 
warring, but as Leslie points out, he has also compromised his "heartfelt yearning for peace" by 
supporting Waluz. 
There is no way to resolve this conflict in a Tetlockian sense. It is not possible to now bolster 
the value of violence and minimize the value of peace, for both peace and violence are valued 
commonplaces. Whatever psychological congruency functions may be motivating ideological 
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monism, these are in direct conflict with the rhetorical requisite for flexibility. Bolstering one 
value in favour of the other will drive Vermeulen into a dogmatic comer and open him up to 
further attack. However, just like the validity of a general principle, incompatibility exists also 
only in relation to a specific situation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Thus, by focusing 
on the particularities of the situation, it may be possible for Vermeulen to reconstrue the deed, 
qualify his support for the assassin, and thereby change the whole matter. Vermeulen may 
"thematize different aspects of the common topic" in an effort to establish new a perspective from 
which the assassination may be viewed/discussed (Graumann, 1990, p. 121). 
At this point Vermeulen engages in the process of particularization, a strategy which is 
unexpected from traditional psychological theory. Specifically, he psychologizes the assassination 
by seeking Waluz's underlying motive. The act of violence is thereby rendered "logical" and the 
aggressor is portrayed as the victim. Under such circumstances, the murder of Chris Hani can 
no longer be viewed as an unjustified and immoral attack, but the act of a threatened and 
desperate man. The assassination is effectively extracted from the category 'violence' and 
particularized in a manner indicative of tolerance of ambiguity. No longer is the political world 
divided simply into acts of talk and acts of violence, but what may first appear as an act of 
violence, may be a psychological act of despair or a defence against external threat, exempt from 
moral censure. Like Adorno et al's low-scorer, Vermeulen's thinking is also rich in 
philosophising and psychologizing as he engages in criticism and justification. 
This instance of rhetorical flexibility in Vermeulen's talk is not an isolated aberration which has 
been carefully selected to make a counterfactual point. On the contrary, the whole interview is 
suffused with examples of witcraftful categorization and particularization. One of the more 
striking instances of variability in Vermeulen's style of thinking is the manner in which he draws 
rigid distinctions between the categories 'communists' and 'anti-communists', 'christians' and 
'atheists', and between the 'ANC' and 'W AM' throughout the interview, yet, when justifying his 
support for the assassin, claims that W AM and the ANC are similar in the "duty" which they 
have toward their own people (lines 035-040 and 165-167). Here he draws unambiguous 
distinctions between two organizations with reference to political and religious criteria, then 
collapses them under a superordinate, but closely related category, 'organizations with moral 
duty'. Another noteworthy instance of variability is the adroit manner in which Vermeulen 
employs the category 'South African'. At the beginning of the interview, when explaining 
WAM's global connections (lines 024-032), South Africa is portrayed in a liberal fashion as 'just 
another country'. He admits that he is not sure whether Waluz is a South African or not, and 
suggests that these boundaries are permeable as they are unimportant and unrelated to his support 
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for Waluz (lines 044-050). However, South Africanness becomes salient in the context of 
communists "prepared to invade my country" (line 142). Not only does the category become 
salient, but rigid and quite creative categorization is involved as the Transkei is particularized as 
a "traditional land which belongs to the Xhosa people" and extracted from the category 'South 
Africa'. The result, quite different in style from the fluidity of national boundaries discussed 
earlier, is that the Transkei is "in South Africa, but not part of South Africa" (lines 143-152). 
As these examples illustrate, it would be incorrect to suggest that categorization is necessarily 
intolerant of ambiguity, while particularization is necessarily tolerant. Rather, Billig (1987a) 
argues that the two processes are "deeply interrelated". The selection of an appropriate 
categorization depends upon a prior particularization and vice versa. To categorize the Transkei 
involves extracting it as a particular from the category 'South Africa'. According to Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), categorization provides a "foothold" for particularization since 
categorization implies the likening of two particulars. The two processes are always available in 
rhetoric; and thinking, as one would expect from its development in dialogical contexts of joint 
action, is never complete, for it is always possible to devise new justifications for categorization 
or particularization by seeking new essences. 
Rhetorical psychology and certain strands of discourse analysis have been criticized for the 
voluntarism which is implicit in the notion of a potentially endless process of invention or 
construction (Bowers, 1988; Parker, 1992; Reicher, 1988). By bracketing off 'the real' as the 
means by which socially shared understandings are constrained and ordered, rhetorical 
psychology has tended to stress the agentic properties of the subject who can continually reinvent 
new arguments. Accordingly, rhetorical psychology, like social constructionism, has tended to 
emphasize 'making' of the 'real' rather than 'fmding' constraining and productive structures 
(Bhaskar, 1993). 
However, this emphasis is not endemic to social constructionism, and rhetorical psychology and 
discourse analysis can accommodate a critical realist philosophy (e.g., Parker, 1992). Some 
discourse analysts have argued that what renders categories and particulars 'natural' is not their 
essential attributes, but the historical way in which they are held in place in language/power 
relations (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Foucault, 1972, 1978; Parker, 1992). Since language is 
ideological, institutional, and thoroughly embedded in power relations, individuals cannot simply 
categorize and particularize ad lib. This is well demonstrated by Vermeulen's attempts to extract 
the category 'Transkei' from the category 'South Africa', and thus particularize it as distinct 
(lines 143-152). It is not that Xhosa's are somehow essentially similar to the Basotho (who live 
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in the independent state of Lesotho), and different from the Cape Malay or Bushmen (who have 
no "traditional land"). Rather, Vermeulen is here (re)producing ideological categories established 
by apartheid. He is seeking essences in the discourse of apartheid. However, in a changing South 
Africa it is with obvious difficulty that Vermeulen draws on the apartheid discourse. He criticizes 
the Nationalist Party for having "abused the apartheid system" (line 011); and veers away from 
the racial criteria of partition- to the extent even of opening his organization "for all races" 
(line 110) - to cultural criteria (i.e., "Xhosa people", "traditional land"). Accordingly, 
'apartheid' must be re-defmed- by a process of particularization/categorization- "as a system 
where every group that possesses its own race, culture, historical background, as well as their 
own historical lands" (line 015-016). If the reality underlying social behaviour is discursive, then 
it is not static. The meaning of the categories 'peace' and 'violence' are equally historical and 
ideological (Durrheim, in press/b). It is with shifting "regimes of power" that Vermeulen is 
equipped to employ psychological criteria to argue for the non-culpable nature of an act of 
violence (cf. Foucault, 1977). 
This implies that categorization and particularization require argument, and correspondingly, 
thinking, in order to overturn established ideological understandings. Perhaps this is why the 
Right is considered intolerant of ambiguity. Since the Right is defmed in terms of its support for 
traditional values and resistance to change (Eatwell & O'Sullivan, 1989; Wilson, 1973), it may 
be expected to employ established categories which require less original justification. This 
resistance to change is, however, not a universal aspect of the Right, and therefore the thinking 
of the Right may well present flexible attributes, particularly with changing historical and 
dialogical contexts. Possibly the most radical example of this flexibility is inclusion of Blacks into 
South African right-wing organizations such as WAM. Such moves require redefming the rigid 
boundaries which have separated the categories 'Black' and 'White', and recasting particular 
WAM members who "objected strongly to the inclusion of Blacks" as irrational bigots who "can 
go and join the A WB" (Vermeulen, cited the by the Staff Reporter, The Argus, 1993). 
Overturning convention requires argument and flexible styles of thinking. 
Billig (1987a) suggests three ways in which tolerance of ambiguity may be manifest in argument. 
The first two - arguing about the essence of categories, and arguing about particulars - have 
already been identified in Vermeulen's thinking. The third is a special instance of the former. 
The argument itself can become the object of argument (Billig, 1987a, 1989b; see Parker, 1990a 
for a similar sentiment). Types of argument (e.g., particularization and categorization) are 
themselves categories, and the appropriate category to apply to a particular argument may become 
a bone of contention. This abstract level of argument is especially important for an analysis of 
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political thinking, for it provides a means by which to disqualify arguments and thus remain 
unchanged in a manner characteristic of dogmatic thought. 
'Double talk': Reflecting on tolerance of ambiguity 
Arguments about arguments concern a different level of reality. Here one is reflecting on talk and 
language, rather than the world of substance and ideas. Billig (1989b) has analyzed one aspect 
of this layer of reality most effectively in his paper, The argumentative nature of holding strong 
views. Here he studies the way in which 'strong views' become an issue of debate, and are 
criticized and justified in terms of their being pushy and unreasonable. 
Arguments about arguments speak to two different layers of reality simultaneously: at once, they 
refer to components within an argument, and to accounts of social reality (Billig, 1989b). By 
criticising an interlocutor for his or her strong views, one is criticising a category of argument, 
but also criticising the expressed views. Thus, although it is possible for heuristic and analytical 
purposes to distinguish arguments about arguments from arguments about content, the researcher 
must remain cognisant of the dual nature of views. Nonetheless, arguments about arguments open 
up an entirely new domain for rhetorical analysis because we need to study their effects and the 
manner in which they are deployed. According to Billig (1989b), for example, "it is necessary 
not to treat the concept of 'strong views' as an analytic concept, but to see how, and in what 
circumstances, people are construed as having strong views" (p. 215). 
The focus of the present chapter is on a specific class of arguments about arguments. Because 
the thesis aims to investigate tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity, an argument will be analyzed 
in terms of how and in what circumstances people are construed as engaging in 'double talk'. As 
has been established, everyone, including neo-fascist ideologues, are tolerant of ambiguity as a 
necessary feature of their arguing and thinking. However, ambiguity tolerance can be a topic of 
discussion, not only amongst psychologists interested in political cognition, but for anyone 
engaged in argumentation. As will be demonstrated, arguments about 'double talk' have many 
commonalities with arguments about tolerance of ambiguity. The Vermeulen text was specifically 
chosen because, like many on the Right, Vermeulen disregards his own ambiguity tolerance, and 
construes others as engaging in 'double talk': 
A rhetorical account of intolerance of ambiguity 205 
Extract 2 
054 Leslie. Ok, you said Hani asked for it. 
055 Vermeulen. Right, urn Hani is a person that was known for double talking. You know that 
056 if you look at the history of the ANC while Hani was commander of Umkontho we Sizwe, 
057 there were (.) innocent children and elderly people (.)murdered(.) from the beginning of 
058 the ANC up to today 0 and in doing double talking like er in saying that the, its wrong 
059 to kill children, he first had to distance himself from other people being killed. 
060 Leslie. Ok, (which is exactly the point) the Hani of the past three or four weeks was the 
061 one talking peace preaching peace all the time. Did you like what he was saying then? 
062 Vermeulen. I did like but I were cautious because as all trained public relations people in 
063 the communist field do (.) is they double talk them out. 
Extract 3 
080 Leslie. Ok, if you were to be seen as supporting Waluz, and that's entirely your right, do 
081 you think it contributes in any way towards solving the problem of South Africa? Do you 
082 think it goes anywhere towards creating a peaceful atmosphere between yourselves as South 
083 African and the other South Africans who might hold a different view? 
084 Vermeulen. Well, Marxism is unacceptable for this part of the country. Marxism failed 
085 after seventy of experimentation in the USSR and after 70 years it costed hundreds of 
086 millions of lives plus torture and I cannot, no sane person can permit that to happen here. 
087 Mr Hani never tried in any way to alter the constitution of the SACP. He never er 
088 distanced himself from things that Mr Slovo said. He never said he's sorry about all the 
089 killings in the past. So that what he said in the past 3 weeks might have been innocent, but 
090 at this stage, and unfortunately he ca won't be there to prove anything in the future, but 
091 at this stage we looked at it as double talking. 
Overtly, accusations of double talk fulfil a dual purpose in these extracts. Their immediate 
function is to comment on the reality of Hani's political activity. Hani is construed as a person 
engaging in 'double talk'. It is important to bear in mind that this is a construction rather than 
a reflection of the reality of Chris Hani. Peace and violence are inherently dilemmatic, and 
everyone, including Vermeulen, must employ flexible rhetorical strategies to condemn and/or 
justify violence. Everyone is expected to manifest variability in their views as they categorize and 
particularize instances of violence in different contexts. A second function of 'double talk' is to 
disqualify Leslie's argument. Since Leslie is 'speaking for' the deceased, by discrediting Hani 
as a person engaging in 'double talk', Vermeulen is undermining Leslie's attempts to construe 
Hani as a man "preaching peace all the time". Yet, there is a third audience, and a third 
persuasive function of accusations of double talk. Vermeulen's attempts to discredit Leslie have 
little hope of 'moving' him, for Leslie's structural position in the dialogue is that of the 
adversary. The audience to whom Vermeulen appeals with his accusations of 'double talk' is the 
watching/listening public. 
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Arguments about arguments are not mere trifles in comparison with arguments about 'reality'. 
On the contrary, as Extract 2 shows, accusations of 'double talk' are used by Vermeulen to 
warrant the assassination. In his first reply, Vermeulen justifies the assassination as a legitimate 
act of self defence. To rationalize his support for the assassination, he appeals to the "universal 
audience" with the blameworthy 'fact', that the ANC has murdered innocent children and elderly 
people (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Immediately, though, the statement loses its 
factual status as Leslie - while not denying the appeal to the universal audience - suggests that 
Rani, rather than talking violence, had become a man of peace, thereby disqualifying him from 
'legitimate' assassination. Although Vermeulen adds that he had "liked" Rani's peace talk, it is 
qualified as 'double talk', and Vermeulen need hence not retract his support for the assassination. 
'Double talk' is used here to denote something non-genuine and/or irrational in Rani's appeals 
for peace: on the surface Rani is talking peace, but behind the scenes he is plotting murder. 
Thus, even though Vermeulen and Rani are in agreement about 'peace' (in the universal sense 
that it is wrong to kill "innocent children and elderly people"}, there is an apparent level of 
disagreement to their agreement (cf. Billig, 1987a, p. 198). It is here that strong parallels are to 
be found between 'double talk' and ambiguity tolerance. 'Double talk' is used to denote 
inconsistent, contradictory, and hence, irrational endorsement of categories. In one instance a 
person may advocate or practice 'violence', but in another, 'peace'. The conflict may arise either 
through a disjuncture between talk and action (lines 057-059), or between talk across different 
situations (lines 087-088). Thus, 'double talk' denotes an unacceptable tolerance of ambiguity in 
rhetoric, as the particulars which comprise a category at one point are incongruent with those 
which comprise the category at a second. Rani is construed as a person engaged in 'double talk', 
since 'peace' is defined in terms of armed resistance on one occasion, and in terms of talking 
reconciliation on another. 
'Double talk' is, however, open to a number of points of ambiguity which permit flexibility in 
its usage. Firstly, there is no definite time boundary around which two incongruent instances may 
be brought into conflict as an occasion of 'double talk'. In Hani's case, for example, activities 
"from the beginning of the ANC up to today" are brought into conflict with "the past three or 
four weeks". Vermeulen recognises the open nature of dialogue when he argues that, were it not 
for the "unfortunate" death of Rani, he may have been able to "prove", in the future, his non 
double talking stance toward peace. In addition, the potential for ambiguity in the construal of 
an instance of 'double talk' is expanded by drawing incongruity between the talk and/or action 
of a single individual, or between two different individuals of a single organization, as between 
Mr. Slovo and Hani in Extract 3. 
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Unlike Adorno et al's high-scoring bigot, the double talker does not manifest a belief that 
fundamental differences exist between all instances of two different categories. On the contrary, 
'double talk' is characterized by a highly flexible and ambivalent form of rhetoric where one 
category may contain elements (i.e., beliefs, values, practices, emotions, etc.) which are argued 
to be diametrically opposed to each other. While the ANC, for example, may see no conflict 
between struggling for peace and talking peace, Vermeulen construes the ANC's conception of 
'peace' as one containing elements of 'peace' and elements of 'violence'. 
In addition to the rhetorical aspects of 'double talk', there is a significant psychological 
component which is evident in Extracts 2 and 3. Over and above signifying irrational category 
usage, 'double talk' is used to denotes a level of non-genuineness or insincerity in reasoning. 
Accordingly, Hani must not only adopt an unambiguous position on 'peace', but he must 
"distance himself" from acts of violence altogether. In Extract 2, Leslie argues that Rani's 
"talking peace" was precisely an instance of the required distancing. However, by drawing on 
the ambiguity of 'double talk', Vermeulen is able to counter by suggesting that this peace talk 
was merely another occasion of 'double talk'. 
What then constitutes the antithesis of 'double talk'? What does it mean to be a non double 
talker? In Extract 3 Vermeulen is explicit- to be extracted from the category 'double talker', 
Hani must not only distance himself from acts of violence, but also from the talk of others within 
the SACP, alter the constitution of the SACP, and apologise for past deeds. In sum, Hani must 
reject all ambiguity in favour of Vermeulen's ideological position, but must also demonstrate 
sincerity in this change. In other words, the antithesis of 'double talk', as used by Vermeulen, 
is nothing short of conversion. Appeals to conversion are implicit in criticisms of 'double talk', 
and may also be central to the usage of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. 
This is an aspect of ambiguity tolerance which is also present in conceptualizations of 
authoritarian cognition offered by psychologists, but which has scarcely been recognised. Closely 
related to the conceptualization of intolerance of ambiguity, is the construct of rigidity, the 
"inability to change one's [cognitive] set" (Rokeach, 1948, p. 260; also Adorno et al., 1950; 
Christie, 1993). The concept of change, however, is always equivocal since is entails not only 
the notion of movement, but also direction. Despite the large body of research into cognitive 
rigidity, the directional aspects of change have not been questioned since rigidity has been 
deemed a personality variable rather than a functional speech act. Rokeach (1948), for example, 
employed the Einstellung water-jar test to operationalize rigidity and flexibility in terms of 
increased "efficiency and economy". While others debated whether change to the short solution 
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of the test was indeed "efficient and economic", in comparison employing the single, "most 
systematic" solution (Goodstein, 1953), no one has questioned the status of these 'visions of the 
good' in terms of their roots in a modern, capitalist, and bureaucratic social order. So, if the 
authoritarian was resistant to change, in which direction should this change be executed? Or, if 
an individual must change from an ambiguous, double talking style, which side of the 
contradictory positions should be adopted? 
It is quite clear that for Adorno et al. (1950), on a social level, change was to be effected toward 
a non-prejudiced, rational order. It would incorrect to suggest that Adorno et al. (1950) valorized 
the notion of change as an insidious attempt to inculcate an ideological content (i.e., to talk of 
intentions and adopt a conspiratorial explanation). However, with no transcendental "correct" 
position to change to, rigidity-flexibility becomes associated with change to the position of the 
interlocutor. For Vermeulen, the nature and direction of the final change from 'double talk' to 
a position of rigidity, results in conversion. In effect, Hani must adopt Vermeulen's ideological 
position in a sincere manner in order to be relieved of his status as a 'double talker'. Only then 
will he no longer warrant assassination. 
A rhetorical approach to ambiguity tolerance differs substantially from traditional psychological 
accounts which, by appealing to personality theory, have tended to use 'intolerance of ambiguity' 
in a purely descriptive sense, delineating types of individuals. The rhetorical perspective, in 
contrast, assists in highlighting the active, dialogical, and productive manner in which 
'tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity' is used in emerging contexts of joint action. Rather than 
seeking a functional explanation of intolerance of ambiguity within psychological make-up (e.g., 
to ward off psychodynamic threat), the rhetorical account suggests that ambiguity tolerance is a 
structural aspect of rhetoric, which itself enters the rhetorical world, and as such, is used to 
criticize and justify ideological contents. Accusations of 'double talk' are performative and 
functional - they question the legitimacy of contrary positions by framing them as irrational and 
contradictory, and by suggesting that conversion be the only path to rhetorical virtue. 
If one accepts Billig's (1987a, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) contention that ideologies are structured 
in terms of dilemmas, then not only the extreme Right, but people of all ideological persuasions 
may use/make accusations of 'double talk' to disqualify an interlocutor's argument since everyone 
is expected to manifest variability in talk. During the period of transition in South Africa, for 
example, conservatives, moderates, and leftists accused the PAC (far Left party) of 'double talk' 
in trying "to justify an untenable policy" of "simultaneously negotiating and fighting the 'armed 
struggle' ... [when] the broad mass of people want peace, reconciliation and reconstruction" (SAP 
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captain Craig Kotze, cited by the Staff Reporter, Financial Mail, 1993, p. 45; see also Stober, 
1993). 10 'Double talk' and ambiguity tolerance, therefore, appear to be not a property of any 
particular type of individual or ideological position, but a rhetorical strategy which may enter an 
argumentative exchange and be employed functionally by ideologues and mass publics of all 
ideological persuasions. 
Reflections on right-wing reflections 
There are remarkable similarities between the manner in which Vermeulen accuses Hani of 
double talk and the manner in which Jaensch (1938) denounced S-type liberals of the late 1930's 
for having "no flrm tie to reality" (p. 37). In essence, the cognitive and perceptual attributes of 
their ideological opponents are portrayed as ambiguous and prone to variability, inconsistency, 
and change. 11 It appears as though the use of 'double talk' as a means of criticism is a 
particularly prominent feature of right-wing thinking. We are thus left with an unresolved 
difficulty. If tolerance of ambiguity characterizes everyone's thinking, why have ideologues on 
the Right so often been portrayed as intolerant of ambiguity? If anyone may reflect on, and 
criticize an interlocutor for 'double talking', why and how is it so characteristic of right-wing 
ideologues? 
There are a number of possible approaches to these questions. The common response by social 
psychologists has been to argue that there are real differences in the psychological make-up of 
the Left and Right. Since right-wingers are psychologically predisposed to rigid perceptual and 
cognitive styles, they reject the threatening ambivalence of the Left (which is also psychologically 
predisposed). However, as the present work has argued, there are a number of empirical and 
theoretical difficulties with this account, most important of which are the manifest intraindividual 
variability in cognitive style and the rhetorical demand for both flexible and rigid patterns of 
thought. Given this variability, and the emergent nature of cognitive style, there can be no 
decisive (empiricist) test situation by which to establish that the Left is more tolerant of ambiguity 
than the Right- i.e., there is no definitive "constant conjunction of events" linking intolerance 
of ambiguity with the Right. 
A second, more radical, resolution of this dilemma is to take a strong constructionist position and 
10 Similar 'descriptions' are made about the IRA who are double talking in remaining armed while wanting 
to negotiate. Once again, conversion is the persuasive effect. 
11 See pp. 1-3 of this thesis for some discussion of Jaensch's work. 
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bracket off all questions of an unknowable reality, including a psychological one. The 
constructionist would argue that ambiguity tolerance and 'double talk' are merely constructions 
which are used performatively in talk to achieve certain objectives. This approach, however, 
tends to ignore the important observation that variability is not endless, but tends to be organized 
historically around and within institutions, power relations and ideologies (cf. Parker, l989b, 
1992). While everyone's thinking is characterized by the use of, and reflection on, both tolerance 
and intolerance of ambiguity, certain reflections (e.g., 'double talk') may be more characteristic 
of some ideological positions than others. The task of analysis is to demonstrate how certain 
cognitive contents and styles are organized into broader ideological patterns. 
The approach adopted in the present work is drawn from a critical realist position (Bhaskar, 
1986, 1989a, 1989b). Although critical realists reject an individualistic empiricist ontology 
(Manicas & Secord, 1983; Porpora, 1989), they resist the Nietzschean undercurrents of post-
Marxist thought which infiltrates the strong constructionist (or postmodernist) position -
suggesting that there is "no given order in reality at all" (Eagleton, 1991, p. 203, emphasis in 
original). This strong constructionist assertion, they argue, leads to blooming, buzzing picture 
of reality which relinquishes the possibility of political action (cf. Burman, 1990; Dews, 1987; 
Eagleton, 1991; Parker, 1992; Simons & Billig, 1994). Instead, critical realists have 
conceptualized reality as structured, and have understood social structure in Marxian terms, as 
"the sum of relations within which individuals [and groups] stand" (Bhaskar, 1989a, p. 26). This 
relational model allows Bhaskar to propose an ontology which is not fixed, but social-relation-
dependent, praxis- and concept-dependent, and manifests a material-space-time specificity and 
substantial geo-historicity. Such an ontology allows for human variability, agency, and the social 
and historical fluidity of human nature, but does not deny an underlying organization to human 
phenomena. Specifically, critical realists argue that the oppressive, exploitative, and productive 
effects of institutional discourses, and ideological and power relations, provide evidence of 
underlying causal (relational) structures (Parker, 1992). 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, a distinction between different approaches to social 
constructionism, discourse analysis, rhetoric, and critical realism within social psychology rests 
on the differential emphasis that some authors lend to the variable, constructive, "making" aspects 
of human reality, and the emphasis that others give to the organized, determined, and "fmding" 
aspects of reality. For example, where Shotter emphasizes the creative activity of individuals in 
contexts of joint action, Parker stresses the manner in which our creative abilities and subject 
positions are constrained and produced by an extra-individual reality. My argument here is that 
these two emphases are indivisible. 
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Bakhtin's distinction between utterances and speech genres is useful to illustrate this point. 
Bakhtin has recently become influential for he, like the post-structuralists, explicitly rejects the 
kinds of essentialism which have characterised modernity. Specifically, he rejects the distinction 
made by Saussure between parole, as a purely individual act, and langue as a formal 
(grammatical) system of language (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Volosinov, 1973). Instead, he collapses 
the dualism between agency and structure or individual and social by personalizing langue and 
by socializing parole. 
By definition, utterances are real social events which are set in dialogical context. Unlike parole, 
which includes purely individual (random) speech acts, utterances, the units of speech, are 
determined by a "change in speaking subjects" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 71). For example, the debate 
between Vermeulen and Leslie may be seen as a sequence of utterances, unfolding as the 
interlocutors respond to each other. The dialogical nature of utterances sets them apart from 
parole, for, as responses which occupy a definite position in a given sphere of communication, 
they are thoroughly social and relational. "Each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and 
relies on the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account" (p. 
91). Utterances, therefore, are not individual acts of will and intelligence, and they can "in no 
way be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language, as is supposed, for 
example by Saussure" (p. 81; see also Foucault's (1984) critique of structuralist conceptions of 
'event'). Nonetheless, each utterance is unique and unrepeatable for utterances are produced 
within the developing contexts of joint action, and their meaning is determined by the shifting 
relations between speaker, audience, and topic. 
Speech genres, in contrast, are "relatively stable and normative forms of utterance" (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 81). They provide the background "perspective fixation" from within which utterances 
may be produced within contexts of joint action (Rommetveit, 1990). However, although speech 
genres organize our speech much like Saussurian langue, genres are more "flexible, plastic and 
free" than the formal grammatical langue (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986). Their plasticity derives from 
the fact that they are distinctly socio-historically human, being a sedimentation of the utterances 
of others - "genres throughout the centuries of their life accumulate forms of seeing and 
interpreting particular aspects of the world", and are (re)produced on specific occasions of 
dialogue (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 5; 1981, chap. 4). Unlike langue, which provides an abstract 
grammatical system by means of which individuals may produce diverse speech acts, speech 
genres provide an "horizon of expectation" which is brought to bear on dialogical relations. For, 
genres are primarily intentional, providing "specific points of view on the world, forms for 
conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, 
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meanings and values" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291). 
The fearu.res which distinguish Bakhtinian utterance and speech genre from Saussurian parole and 
langue are three (see Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Shotter, 1993a; Volosinov, 1973, 1987a). First, 
utterances and genres are dialogical, always defined in relation (as responses) to other utterances 
and genres. Second, as a consequence of their historical, relational and dialogical naru.re, they 
are always expressive and intentional. Finally, both utterances and genres have a living quality 
to them and cannot therefore be objectified (e.g., as a system of grammar). It is this living 
quality which makes utterances and genres indivisible, because although genres are "sclerotic 
deposits", they are given life through utterances - "each word tastes of the context and contexts 
in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words are populated by intensions" (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 293). 
In contrast to the tendency for psychologists to pit agency against structure - making against 
fmding - or vice versa, in developing their own positions, Bakhtin suggests that utterances and 
speech genres are indivisible because: 
If speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we had to originate them 
during the speech process and construct each utterance at will for the first time, speech 
communication would be impossible (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 79). 
This is the case since genres provide the authorial intent/feelings and speech plan - both of 
which cannot be reduced to psychology (see Shotter, 1993a, 1993b)- which are necessary for 
the production of utterances. In the place of modernist dualisms, Bakhtin offers a holistic picru.re 
of communicative interaction, where genres are always already present in the creative contexts 
of joint action. Ironically, then, "when we construct our speech, we are always aware of the 
whole of our utterance ... we do not string words together smoothly and we do not proceed from 
word to word; rather it is as though we fill in the whole with the necessary words" (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 86). The thoughts we think must have already been thought. 
If 'speaking subjects' are accepted as the ontology of the second cognitive revolution, then this 
ontology involves more than the immediate events of 'persons in conversation', for utterances 
and genres are two sides of the same coin, and where one is the other must be also. 
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for the 
individual consciousness, lies on the border between oneself and the other (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 293). 12 
12 Heteroglossia is a Bakhtinian neologism depicting the "base condition governing the operation of 
meaning in any utterance" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 428). It is the locus where the centralizing and decentralizing 
forces in language (i.e., "centripetal" and "centrifugal" forces) collide, and is the condition which ensures 
that the meaning of an utterance is not given by the words employed or their reference, but is context-
bound and localized. 
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According to this relational conception of language, it is possible for critical realism to 
accommodate speaking subjects as its social-relation-dependent, praxis- and concept-dependent 
ontology. Speaking subjects are 'things' in the sense that they are "structured and differentiated 
ensembles of tendencies, liabilities and powers (Bhaskar, 1989a, p. 19). According to the view 
advanced here, these tendencies, liabilities and powers are dialogical, emerging as generic 
utterances, originating on the borders between ourselves and others: in the immediate context of 
the utterance, and between ourselves within contexts of joint action and others within similar 
contexts past, present, and future. This denies neither the Shotterian emphasis of the creative 
aspects of joint action, nor the Bhaskaresque/Parkerian emphasis on socio-economic-political 
structures, for in the heteroglotic world of Bakhtin, dialogic utterances achieve/reproduce social 
stratification as Bakhtin's carnivalistic world merges with Volosinov's Marxist one (Bakhtin, 
1981; see also Holquist, 1986). If, as Quintillion (1920) says, "language is currency minted with 
the public stamp" (p. 113), then its usage toward certain ends in particular contexts and its broad 
currency-like intentional nature are indivisible, for without the one the other could not possibly 
exist. 
The analysis in the chapter thus far has focused on utterances. This has been useful for, by 
situating thinking within a dialogical context, it has been possible to highlight the major problems 
with the dominant conceptions of cognitive style offered by social psychologists. Specifically, 
cognitive style cannot be seen as a formal property of mind which operates universally like some 
unspoken rule "behind" what people say and do. The observed variability in style over subtle 
shifts in context suggests that an adequate account of cognitive style must shift from an ontology 
of "essence-as-substance" (Seve, 1975) to a relational ontology where properties are not 
possessed (by individuals, personalities, minds, or ideological groups) but are emergent features 
of dialogical interaction. 
Instead of abstract and universal rules of cognition, we may follow Moscovici ( 1984) in 
suggesting that the rules of cognitive style have a spoken nature. Intolerance of ambiguity, rather 
than a property of mind, takes the form of a decree, specified in terms of content -
"contradictions are prohibited! " However, these decrees are more like rules-of-thumb than rules 
since they are applied in a variable manner in developing contexts of joint action. This 
observation reiterates Billig's (1987a, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Prelli, 1989; Soder, 1990) point 
that commonsense is dilemmatic. Opposing the rule 'contradictions are prohibited' is another, 
'rigidity is prohibited'. From a rhetorical perspective, therefore, tolerance versus intolerance of 
ambiguity can be seen as two contrary themes which underlie the dilemmatic nature of arguing 
about the rules of argument, and which are used in a functional manner in developing contexts 
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of criticism and justification. 
Cognitive style is thus dilemmatic and, as such, the conflict between opposing contrary themes 
must be diffused and negotiated. Strategies of conflict resolution are, however, not invented by 
individuals, but are generic. Shore's (1990) dialogical anthropology suggests that conflict 
resolution is achieved socially: 
... through elaborate cultural discourses that render one pole of the contradiction relatively 
articulable and thus legitimate, and the other pole relatively inarticulate and illegitimate ... 
[Accordingly], cultural systems do not invent values [or rules] so much as they 
orchestrate rhetorical strategies, organizing the perception of value-laden situations with 
standardized and culturally acceptable formulations (p. 174-175). 
Shore is not here advocating a theory of norms raised to a second power of abstraction. Rather, 
rules, like values, are organized into cultural systems through "elaborate cultural discourses" 
which favour one pole of a contradiction, allowing it to appear normative within a particular 
cultural system. At his most Bakhtinian, Shotter (1993a) makes a similar point when he argues 
that we do not share with members of our social group a set of beliefs or values, "but a set of 
shared semiotic procedures or ethnomethods (Garfinkel), ways of making sense- and a certain 
set of ordered forms of communication, or speech genres" (p. 46). In contrast to norms, speech 
genres are relational, and, while they may "partially diffuse" conflict, they are always under 
heteroglotic tension and must be applied thoughtfully when exercised as utterances. 
I want to argue that the "elaborate cultural discourse" or speech genre which is associated with 
accusations of 'double talk' among the far Right is the conspiracy ideology. The methodological 
orientation which I take is explanatory rather than predictive. I do not make the claim that the 
right-wingers use accusations of 'double talk' more frequently than liberals and radicals because 
there is no decisive test situation whereby such a claim could be established. Instead, as Bhaskar 
(l989a) recommends, the social sciences must be "exclusively explanatory" (p. 21). What I hope 
to do in the discussion that follows, is to show how accusations of 'double talk' are part of the 
"rationality" of the life world of a right-wing ideological position- an ideological position which 
has relied on conspiratorial explanations to resist the pressures of a changing world. Although 
the approach is explanatory, it is causal in the sense that being immersed in the intentionality of 
a particular speech genre prompts one to see the world and act in certain ways. 
Conspiracy theory is integral to the thinking of the far Right and, indeed, has been viewed as a 
defining feature of fascist writings (Billig, 1989a). According to the view advanced here, 
however, it would be incorrect to see conspiratorial themes as norms or beliefs possessed by 
fascist groups. Rather, 'conspiracy ideology' is a speech genre which has become associated with 
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fascist rhetoric for historical reasons. and which is reproduced, refmed, developed, and sustained 
in fascist utterances (written and oral) (cf. Billig, 1978). Conspiratorial themes are a relational 
feature of fascist rhetoric. Nor would it be correct to suggest that conspiratorial themes are 
employed only by the far Right ( cf. Billig, 1987b). However, due to the historical position of the 
far Right as the guardians of tradition against a changing and liberalizing world, the Right has 
adopted conspiratorial themes in argumentative contexts, and today conspiratorial language is 
permeated with nuances and accents of the Right. 
In terms of the relational position of the far Right with regard to other social groups and 
ideologies, conspiracy theory is ideally suited to its rhetorical purposes. By defmition, the 
conspirators are powerful groups who master the course of history. Hence, to expose the 
conspiracy is to argue against the present course of history. As the guardians of tradition and the 
ideological opponent of the Left, the far Right may employ conspiratorial themes to great 
rhetorical effect. Indeed, from its earliest modern incarnations, conspiracy theory has had its 
roots in counter-enlightenment ideas which saw powerful groups as "conspiring to destroy church 
and state" (Groh, 1987a, p. 23). This theme today fmds a home in the right-wing portrayal of 
the world as a struggle between an ingroup, serving the will of Divine providence, and an 
outgroup, under Satanic influence, who are set on destroying traditional values - the church 
and/or nation (Eatwell, 1989b). 
Conspiratorial themes of a communist take-over are ubiquitous in the rhetoric of the South 
African Right (Foster, 1991), and they permeate Vermeulen's dialogue. The extremist version 
of this theory has historical antecedents in Voortrekker mythology. and takes the form of the 
'Israelite myth'. where the Afrikaner volk are seen as a "chosen people", with South Africa their 
"promised land" (Moodie, 1975; Ridge, 1987; van Rooyen, 1994). A worldwide communist 
conspiracy is said to have its eyes set on the occupation of South Africa and the destruction of 
the Afrikaner nation. By so doing, communism betrays itself as the anti-christ, acting against the 
will of God. These conspiratorial themes structure Vermeulen's thinking even in the brief public 
interview under analysis here. He is an avowed anti-communist (line 129) who has "discovered" 
that the country's problems with a communist invasion (lines 006-007, 131-132, 142) are 
"global" (lines 006-007, 024-026), and that they represent the machinations of the "anti-christ" 
(lines 134-137). Conspiracy theory is familiar to many Afrikaners and its themes may be 
persuasive in justifying violence as a legitimate means of defence. 
It is against this background that Vermeulen's use of 'double talk' acquires rhetorical force, for 
it is a "logical" component of a generic whole. If there is a conspiracy afoot and Hani, the anti-
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christ incarnate, is talking peace, then this must be an instance of 'double talk'. Moreover, 
evidence can be found to support the conspiracy because Hani can be shown to be inconsistent 
and not genuinely committed in his calls for peace. If conspiracy theory is characterized by 
delusional themes which maintain that something is going on behind reality, and that commonly 
accepted accounts of reality are merely facades hiding the conspiracy (Groh, 1987b; Wulff, 
1987), then identifying 'double talk' in the dialogue of ideological opponents is a powerful and 
dual means of persuasion. It not only suggests inconsistency, insincerity, and irrationality, but 
also provides 'proof of the conspiracy. Accordingly, to appeal to his audience, Vermeulen 
construes Hani' s "preaching peace all the time" as a surface reality which merely obfuscates the 
true intentions of the conspirators. Any explicit calls for peace on the part of Hani are thus 
rendered a veneer which communists have been trained to use to "double talk them out" (Extract 
2, lines 062-063). 
It is by relying on conspiratorial explanations that "the intellectual traditions of fascism are 
impoverished when put alongside Marxism and liberalism" (Billig, 1989a, p. 148). The result of 
this impoverishment in content is a cognitive style which tends to portray itself as intolerant of 
ambiguity. Its explanations of change focus on simplistic accounts of 'behind the scenes' 
conspiracies which it can demonstrate by offering 'in front of the scenes' 'double talk' as 
evidence. However, since utterances which accuse an adversary of double talk are dialogic, they 
are not expected to be a consistent feature of far Right rhetoric. Nor is the far Right always 
resistant to change or intolerant of ambiguity. Vermeulen's attempts to "open up" W AM to 
members of all races is an example of the impact that recent change in the country has had on 
the far Right. His actions, however, expose him to potential criticism as other right-wing 
organizations might construe this change as bowing to the will of the conspirators. In such 
instances, Vermeulen would need to employ flexible rhetoric to argue that this change in policy 
does not represent a fundamental change away from the basic principle of apartheid. Depending 
on the context, this could always be labelled 'double talk'. 
Instances of ideologues on the far Right being accused of double talk are, however, exceptional 
because, on a generic level, the conspiratorial themes of fascism are in dialogical relations with 
the thematic content of Marxism and liberalism. The generic utterances of the Right are deposits 
which have sedimented through an age of arguments against change, which have been directed 
against change toward Marxist and liberal positions. Speech genres are different to grammars and 
norms because their "sedimentation" is historical and dialogical. Consequently, they reproduce 
"social stratification ... between the forms used to convey meaning and between the expressive 
plains of various belief systems" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 290). Speech genres provide intentions for 
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action and ways of seeing and talking about the world which stratify the social world and provide 
generic subject positions (e.g., as fascists, Marxists, psychologists, doctors, etc.). Thus, 
Every socially significant verbal performance has the ability- sometimes for a long 
period of time, and for a wide circle of persons - to infect with its own intention certain 
aspects of language that had been infected by its semantic and expressive impulse, 
imposing on them specific semantic nuances and specific axiological overtones; thus, it 
can create slogan-words, curse-words, praise-words and so forth (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 290). 
Material positions and intentional practice (e.g., to be for or opposed to change) are thus 
thoroughly infected by speech genres which have developed out of a history of specific arguments 
between opposing groups. Through its living history, the far Right has developed curse words 
like 'double talk', with generic axiological overtones. 
The dialogical nature of speech genres has important consequences for the persuasive nature of 
generic talk. For, just as each utterance has an addressee, "Each speech genre in each area of 
speech communication has its own typical conception of the addressee, and this defmes it as a 
genre" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 95). It is by means of the relationship between genre and addressee 
that an utterance attains its status as a speech act because it is the genre rather than subjective 
individual processes which renders the utterance intentional. When Vermeulen uses 'double talk' 
to argue for Rani's conversion, for example, the functional nature of the utterance is not of 
Vermeulen's making, but stems from the intentional nature of the genre (which has a typical 
conception of the addressee). The addressee of conspiracy theory is the duped masses who have 
been misled by the conspiracy. The potential to use 'double talk' to argue for the conversion of 
an addressee, therefore, is specified by the genre which establishes intentional relations between 
the speaker, as one who has seen through the conspiracy, and the addressee who has been misled. 
From this perspective it is clear that Hani is not the addressee because he is a deceased, double 
talking conspirator, beyond conversion. The addressee is the watching/listening public who have 
been misled by the conspiracy. Vermeulen is arguing for their conversion, which he suggests is 
not merely a matter of making occasional acceptable utterances, but results from adopting the 
conspiratorial genre, accepting a right-wing world view, and being qualified to diagnose 'double 
talk'. Generic talk (re)produces social stratification. 
In sum, the rhetorical perspective does not view intolerance of ambiguity as a property of right-
wing psychology. Instead, tolerance and intolerance of ambiguity are argued to be characteristic 
of the thinking of all people, who must demonstrate contextual variability in cognitive style. 
However, as an aspect of (rhetorical) reality, tolerance versus intolerance of ambiguity may 
become a topic of argument, and may be used for criticising and justifying views. As such, 
intolerance of ambiguity is seen as one pole of a dilemmatic theme of commonsense which 
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pertains to legitimate argumentation. In addition to theorizing variability in cognitive style, the 
rhetorical perspective can also account for the organization of certain styles into certain 
ideological positions. I have argued that themes of intolerance of ambiguity are characteristic of 
the South African far Right because they rely on conspiratorial explanations of political events. 
'Double talk' is an integral part of the conspiratorial speech genre because it acts both as a means 
of persuasion and as a means of exposing the conspiracy. Finally, it may be added, that by 
ignoring the dialogical and rhetorical aspects of cognitive style, and painting a picture of 
unthinking rigidity among right-wing ideologues, social psychologists disregard the persuasive 
nature of fascist rhetoric. This has been both empirically unfounded and politically naive. 
Conclusion 
The main feature of social psychological accounts of cognitive style is their thoroughgoing 
assumption of monologism. Theorists and researchers have assumed that cognitive style is a 
property of individual psychology which impacts on mental processing happening behind reality. 
Accordingly, the vast majority of research has adopted asocial and non-evaluative measures of 
cognitive style which assign each subject a single score to represent their cognitive style. Even 
in those few instances where researchers have adopted talk as their object of analysis, they have 
consistently disregarded its dialogical nature and focused purely on the words of single 
individuals. This focus is doubly ironic. Firstly, although social psychology has ignored the 
functional nature of accusations of tolerance or intolerance of ambiguity in rhetorical contexts, 
it was in precisely within such a context that the literature was conceived. The interchange 
between Jaensch and Frenkel-Brunswik was initiated within a dialogical context in which 
accusations of intolerance of ambiguity were used as a means of ideology critique. Cognitive style 
had to be theorized as a stable and general property of individual psychology for these critical 
functions to be sustained (see pp. 23-24; Durrheim, in press/a). Secondly, by disregarding the 
social and dialogical nature of the "traits" of cognitive style social psychology has, paradoxically, 
limited its critical potential. It has failed to quell the resurgence of fascism, for it has portrayed 
fascist thinking as irrational, has ignored the persuasiveness of fascist rhetoric, and has not 
engaged fascist argument either at the level of content or style. 
This chapter has gone further than merely acknowledging the dialogical nature of thinking. By 
drawing on insights from the social constructionist literature, it has argued that thinking is 
nothing more than the use of language in contexts of joint action - arguing is thinking. This has 
pointed to a methodology which focuses the analysis of language (usage) rather than individual 
cognitive processing as a means to studying the operation of cognitive style. This involves more 
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than recording "constant conjunctions" or the differential incidence of cognitive "traits" among 
different ideological groups. Instead, it encourages a focus on the dynamics underlying the 
variability of cognitive style, and its organization within ideological traditions. The analysis 
presented here, for example, has highlighted the rhetorical dynamics underlying the variability 
and use of cognitive "traits" in dialogical interaction. Also, it has shown how particular stylistic 
repertoires become associated with ideological traditions, and gain their persuasive character by 
being part of broader generic ways of speaking. A caveat, however, must be made: the present 
chapter makes no claim to being a comprehensive study of the different uses of 'double talk' in 
rhetoric. Indeed, such an aim would be impossible for within the changing seascapes of joint 
action, its possible uses are potentially infinite. 
Is the intolerance of ambiguity (and 'double talk') which has been the focus of this chapter the 
same phenomenon which social psychologists have investigated? Clearly not. Although there are 
descriptive similarities between the two conceptions of intolerance of ambiguity- i.e., they both 
refer to a style of thinking that relies on broad and firmly bounded evaluative category usage-
they have radically different ontologies. This shift in ontology is necessary to allow an account 
of cognitive style to accommodate the manifest variability and functionality of its operation in 
dialogical contexts of joint action. 
Chapter 7 
Critical realist conclusions 
"Facts?" he repeated. Take a drop more grog, Mr Franklin, and you'll get over the weakness of 
believing in facts! Foul play, Sir. 
(W. Collins, quoted in Bhaskar, 1986, p. 224) 
Critical realism 
The main difficulty with empiricism is that it begins epistemologically, from a position of 
Cartesian doubt, and will admit as knowledge only that which passes the most stringent criteria. 
Science must aim to delineate the universal laws of nature by recording constant conjunctions of 
events along Humean lines. In so doing, empiricism renders itself anti-realist because such 
regularities are not to be found in the world outside the closed contexts of controlled 
experimentation. This is the crux of Bhaskar's (1975, 1986, 1989a, 1989b) argument for a 
critical realist philosophy of science. Bhaskar aims to transcend the empiricist ontology implicit 
in the Humean epistemology by invoking generative structures which function as causal 
mechanisms behind the flux of events. 
Bhaskar thus draws an ontological distinction between underlying generative structures and 
'sequences of events'. The latter are created by the experimenter in research practice, while the 
former are independent of human activity, and may have existed and operated even before there 
was a science for them to be intelligible to. Chalmers (1988), however, argues that this 
distinction is fallacious because the experimenter can only be said to cause the sequence of 
events: 
Conclusion 
... in the sense that she assembles the appropriate experimental arrangement. But what 
happens when she has done so is dependent on the way the world is (p. 19). 
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Chalmers concludes that "the generative mechanisms at work cause the sequence of events, not 
the experimenter" (ibid). In comparison with Chalmers, therefore, Bhaskar is somewhat a 
constructionist. Although Chalmers may be correct to suggest that the sequence of events which 
occurs in scientific investigations is produced by underlying generative structures, these patterns 
of events are certainly not consistently or wholly produced by the generative mechanisms. 
On the contrary, this thesis has argued that the "appropriate" investigative arrangements that 
preceded the sequence of events which lead psychologists to conclude that cognitive style is a 
personality trait (that predisposes individuals to a particular ideological persuasion) were 
productive of the sequence of events. Consider a simplified but paradigmatic study in the field. 
A measure of intolerance of ambiguity, comprised entirely of attitudinal statements (e.g., the 
Budner scale), is correlated across a sample with a measure of ideological conservatism. The 
results show a moderate to weak positive correlation. Forget for the moment all the theoretical 
paraphernalia (e.g., personality, traits, etc.) which accompanies the interpretation of the results. 
Were these fmdings caused by "the way the world is" or by the researcher? Only in the minimal 
sense that individuals tend to endorse ("reliable") attitudinal scales in a consistently radical or 
conservative manner, can it be said the results were caused by the way the world is. In the main, 
as Chapter 3 has argued, any possibility of the world acting as it is in such contexts of 
psychological investigation are screened out by assumptions which have been built into the 
"appropriate" investigative arrangements. The fmdings were largely produced by the investigator. 
Chapter 3 argued that, in contrast with its original description, the construct of intolerance of 
ambiguity has gradually come to be seen as an asocial and non-evaluative property of individual 
psychology which is generalized over context and content domain. Moreover, the reasons for this 
conceptualization had less to do with attempts to derive adequate accounts of the way the world 
is, than it had to do with fitting these accounts into an empiricist model of science, and sustaining 
political critique. In addition, measurement scales have typically incorporated the assumption that 
intolerance of ambiguity is closely related to certain ideological contents. According to Budner 
(1962) for instance, "Being intolerant of ambiguity does not lead an individual to favour such 
things as censorship; rather favouring censorship (in most situations) is part of being intolerant 
of ambiguity" (p. 49). Not only has intolerance of ambiguity been assumed to be a generalized 
trait, but it was assumed that it would correlate with ideological conservatism. 
In combination, this orientation has resulted in measurement tools which (a) screen out the 
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possibility for individual variability by assigning each individual in a sample a single score to 
represent their position on the tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity continuum, and (b) assess 
cognitive style by gauging the extent to which subjects endorse conservative attitudinal contents. 
In Danziger's (1985) words, such practice establishes a "methodological circle" between ontology 
and methodology, thereby closing all possibilities for "the way the world is" to intercede in 
research fmdings. The consistent positive linear relationships between conservatism and 
intolerance of ambiguity on the Budner scale or Dogmatism scale have been created by 
psychologists by being built into their "appropriate" investigative arrangements. 
Chapters 4 and 5 continued by demonstrating that the regular conjunctions of events which have 
been used to support personality theory are neither so regular nor so confirming of a generalized 
trait model of cognitive style. Once the assumption that cognitive style is a consistent asocial and 
non-evaluative individual trait was purged from measurement instruments, "the way the world 
is" was substantially different. The AA T scale operationalized ambiguity tolerance - as an 
evaluative attitudinal variable- in a manner consistent with Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) original 
description of the construct. Additionally, the AA T scale allowed individuals to express 
variability in the ambivalence with which they evaluated different authorities. The results 
contradicted the predictions of all personality-based accounts of ambiguity tolerance. They 
indicated substantial variability in ambiguity tolerance across content domain, and in the nature 
of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism. 
Here I do agree with Chalmers (and so would Bhaskar): when not constrained by a 
methodological imperative, the sequence of events which are produced in a context of 
investigation are partially attributable to the underlying generative mechanisms at work. The AA T 
scale allows one to test whether ambiguity tolerance is a stable generalized trait. It thus facilitates 
choosing between two alternative models of psychological ontology: one stable, atomistic, and 
substance-like, where psychological phenomena are seen as properties of individual functioning; 
and the other, consisting of underlying generative structures which are manifest as "tendencies 
and powers". A critical realist standard for investigative adequacy may be derived from this 
observation: to the extent to which research practice constrains what can be produced in contexts 
of investigation, it is considered less adequate for a particular investigative enterprise. Of course, 
this does not mean that the AA T scale does not incorporate assumptions which constrain the 
'sequence of events' which can be produced. It does, and is not useful for a number of different 
investigative enterprises (see pp. 114 & 185). However, the multiple patterns of individual, cross-
cultural, and cross-content variability in manifest ambiguity tolerance suggests that the empiricist 
"thing-like" ontology must be replaced with an ontology which explains cognitive style with 
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reference to the tendencies produced by underlying generative structures. 
The results of Studies 1 to 3 do not suggest that the world is all a flux and that expressions of 
ambiguity tolerance are thoroughly permeated with variability. On the contrary, while variability 
was evident in expressions of ambiguity tolerance, widespread regularities - which were not 
organized or determined by the investigative apparatus - were also evident in the conjunctions 
of produced events. Firstly, the factor analysis of responses to the AA T scale distinguished very 
clearly between different domains of authority (i.e., political, religious, and familial domains), 
indicating that subjects evaluated different authorities within a single domain distinctively. 
Secondly, ambiguity tolerance toward a particular domain of authority correlated with only those 
dimensions of ideological conservatism which were relevant to that domain (e.g., AAT-Pol and 
Subtle Racism for the White sample). This suggests that ambiguity tolerance was meaningfully 
related to particular ideological contents. Thirdly, the form of the relationship between ambiguity 
tolerance and ideological conservatism within each content domain resonated strongly with an a 
priori definition of the meaning of the different contents within the ideological context of the 
srudy. It appeared as though increased ambiguity tolerance was associated with endorsing those 
contents which were more strongly censured within the ideological context (e.g., racism for the 
White sample). 
Clearly, the type of regularities produced in these studies are not consistent with an empiricist 
ontology. Firstly, the regularities are incompatible with the account of psychological laws in 
terms of constant conjunctions of events. Just as it is incorrect to assume that cognitive traits are 
stable and generalized properties of psychology which predispose individuals to a particular 
ideological orientation, neither is it true that there are a number of different dimensions of 
ambiguity tolerance at a personality level (e.g., political, religious, familial) which predispose 
individuals to particular ideological orientations within those content domains. These dimensions 
and relationships are not ontological, but were produced by the investigative practice (e.g., factor 
analysis, sampling, etc.), and similar patterns cannot be expected in other contexts, or with other 
items (see p. 185). This, however, does not mean that the types of generative structures which 
produced the regularities in these studies do not exist beyond the context of this study. This anti-
realist conclusion is a consequence of the empiricist ontic fallacy. Although similar conjunction 
of events are not to be expected across different contents or contexts, the generative mechanisms 
which brought about the present fmdings may indeed operate elsewhere as tendencies. 
This introduces the second reason why the fmdings are incompatible with empiricism. The 
fmdings suggest a meaning- and praxis-based, rather than substance-like ontology. Empiricists 
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have shied away from invoking "metaphysical" entities to explain constant conjunctions, and have 
limited their laws to immediate cause-effect sequences attributable to the universal properties of 
'things'. The relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs, for example, has been 
deemed a function of individual psychology. However, once it is demonstrated that there are 
different content-based dimensions of cognitive style, the empiricist must argue that individual 
psychology is (somehow) divided into different dimensions, thereby plunging him/her deeper into 
the metaphysical world s/he wishes to escape (see p. 132-135). Instead, one could argue that 
these different dimensions of ambiguity tolerance arise due to the differential meanings that the 
various authorities have by being embedded in different discourses and discursive practices. The 
subjects in Study 1 distinguished between political and conservative political authorities, not 
because their psychology is divided into these two dimensions, but because, within the context 
of the study, these domains have widely different meanings and material implications - the latter 
being associated with apartheid and the former with the 'new South Africa'. Similarly, the nature 
of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological conservatism within the different 
content dimensions is readily explicable with reference to the meanings of these contents within 
the context of the study. Individuals endorsing conservative contents within the liberal milieu 
tended to evaluate conservative authorities ambivalently because of increased levels of 'value 
conflict'. In other words, the regularities in the results give some clues to the nature of the 
underlying generative structures which produced these manifest tendencies. The results of Studies 
1 to 3 suggest a praxis- and concept-dependent ontology. 
In rethinking cognitive style in psychology, it has been necessary to develop a critique of the 
empiricist models which have dominated the literature. This critique has prompted a number of 
further questions: if cognitive style is not a property of individual psychology, what is it, and 
how should it be studied? Throughout the thesis I have used Frenkel-Brunswik's description of 
intolerance of ambiguity as a guide to defining cognitive style as a construct which is manifest 
in univalent or ambivalent evaluation of social "objects". However, what are the generative 
structures which underlie the manifest variability and organization of expressions of ambiguity 
tolerance? Chapter 6 embarked on the positive aims of providing initial answers to these 
questions, and shifting from an empiricist to a critical realist ontology- a movement from an 
substance-like individualistic ontology to a relational, praxis- and concept-dependent ontology. 
Given that a shift to a critical realist ontology is required, what should scientific practice be like? 
For, if a radically new object of study is required, a new methodology is essential (Danziger, 
1985). Bhaskar gives some direction. Firstly, he inverts the primacy which empiricists give to 
epistemology over ontology. He first proposes a "philosophical ontology" - i.e., "a general 
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account of the nature of the world" - and then leaves it to science to specify the structures 
which the world contains (1989b, p. 150). His philosophical ontology, though, has implications 
for scientific practice. His general account of the nature of the social world suggests that social 
structures are social-relation-dependent, praxis- and concept-dependent, and act as causal powers. 
The task of the social sciences is thus to develop causal accounts of events within the parameters 
of "a reality already brought under the same kind of material in terms of which it is to be 
grasped" (Bhaskar, 1989a. p. 21). 
Second, Bhaskar makes specific recommendations regarding how a researcher might approach 
this task. At the outset he argues that, because decisive test situations are in principle denied the 
social sciences, they must be "exclusively explanatory" (1989a, chap. 1). By "explaining" an 
event or regularity he means that it must be brought "under a new scheme of concepts, 
designating the structures, generative mechanisms or agents producing it" (1989b, p. 90). This 
may be an empirical exercise which could follow one of two possible methodological paths which 
Bhaskar's Transformational Model of Social Activity respects: 
... between the social sciences, which abstract from human agency, studying the structure 
of reproduced outcomes; and the social psychological sciences, which abstract from 
reproduced outcomes, studying the rules governing the mobilization of resources by 
agents in their everyday interaction with one another and nature" (Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 93, 
emphasis in original). 
Bhaskar's model of social activity respects this methodological division of labour because it 
advocates a "duality of structure" between making and fmding; where "society is the ever present 
condition and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency" (1989a, p. 35). Critical 
realism thus advocates a research strategy which aims to provide explanatory models of 
underlying generative structures which are productive and constraining of social life. 
This is precisely the strategy which was employed in Chapter 6 in order to move from a 
philosophical to scientific ontology: that is, to complete the general account of the nature of the 
world with its specific structures (according to the science of the day). First, the manifest 
variability and regularity in ambiguity tolerance were brought under a new scheme of concepts 
- dialogics, rhetoric, contexts of joint action, speech genres, etc. - which designated the 
structures underlying the variability and regularity in expressions of ambiguity tolerance. In other 
words, I have sought these generative structures in the "mechanisms" (in a Bhaskaresque sense) 
of social construction. I must repeat that this model is derived from the transitive realm of theory 
and can in no way be seen as a reflection of reality (i.e., by the epistemic fallacy). Nor do I view 
rhetoric, dialogics, and speech genres as anything else but models (metaphors) by means of which 
we attempt to make sense of the world. There is no necessary reason (in reality) why this 
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particular content must be used to fill the ontological void besides the fact that I have been 
persuaded by arguments for a dialogical, constructionist reality. 
However, "once a hypothesis of a causal mechanism has been produced in social science, it can 
then be tested quite empirically, though exclusively by reference to its explanatory power" 
(Bhaskar, 1989b, p. 85, emphasis in original). The rhetorical reality which I have suggested 
underlies the expression of ambiguity tolerance specifie~~o;"for variability and consistency 
in ambiguity tolerance with reference to the rhetorical/cognitive processes of categorization and 
particularization which thinkers must employ in developing contexts of joint action. Also, by 
drawing on the essentially compatible Bakhtinian notion of speech genres, the rhetorical account 
can produce a praxis- and concept-based explanation of the organization of intolerance of 
ambiguity within the rhetoric of the Right. The rhetorical model fits quite snugly both the 
structure of reproduced events and a Bhaskaresque "philosophical ontology". 
The methodological strategy employed in Chapter 6 mirrors the distinction that Bhaskar has made 
between the methodologies of social sciences and the social psychological sciences. The first part 
of the study was concerned with the agentic, making features of cognition, and abstracted from 
reproduced outcomes while investigating the "rules governing the mobilization of resources". The 
variability in expressions of both tolerance and intolerance of ambiguity by the neo-fascist, Koos 
Vermeulen, was argued to be incompatible with the traditional psychological accounts of 
personality and right-wing thinking. This variability, however, was anticipated by a rhetorical 
model of cognition which proposes that, in the shifting contexts of joint action, all people must 
continually (re)construct reality by employing both rigid and flexible rhetorical styles. The second 
part of the study shifted attention to the "structure of reproduced outcomes". Without reverting 
to an empiricist ontology, an attempt was made to explain the organization of intolerance of 
ambiguity into right-wing rhetoric, while recognising the inherently variable nature of cognitive 
style. In contrast to empiricist accounts which argue that intolerance of ambiguity is a property 
of either the psychology of right-wing individuals (Adorno et al., Rokeach, Sidanius) or the 
ideological group as a whole (Tetlock), the rhetorical account suggests that it is an emergent 
surface phenomenon originating, in the historical rhetorical relations between the Right and the 
Left. 
Although it is not possible to establish an identity between the rhetorical account of cognitive 
style and reality itself, it is possible to conclude that a critical realist ontology, in terms 
generative rhetorical structures, provides a more adequate account of the manifest variability and 
regularity in ambiguity tolerance than an empiricist ontology. A rhetorical account of ambiguity 
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tolerance is compatible with both the philosophical ontology which suggests that the social reality 
is relational, historical, and praxis- and concept-dependent, and with the nature of reproduced 
outcomes which occur in varying contexts of joint action. 
CRITICAL realism? 
At the beginning of the thesis it was noted that, in addition to the enormous impact that 
empiricism has had on the cognitive style literature, the conceptualization of cognitive style as 
a generalized property of individual psychology was fostered by moral/political objectives to 
which psychology was committed. As the early debate between Jaensch and Frenkel-Brunswik 
demonstrates (see chap. 1), powerful critiques of fascism and liberalism could be developed by 
assuming that cognitive traits were stable and pervasive properties of individual psychology that 
varied between individuals along a rational-irrational continuum. By demonstrating that irrational 
cognitive styles predisposed individuals to particular ideologies, these ideologies could be shown 
to be fundamentally irrational. 
However, almost from the outset, this form of critique was argued to be spurious. As early as 
1953, Brown argued that "the appropriate criticism of ethnocentrism is not that it is inefficient 
but that it is morally reprehensible .. .it will not do to conceal moral judgement with a weasel 
word like 'inefficient'" (p. 474). As Brown points out, attempts to ground political critique in 
establishing distinctions between the rationalities of alternate ideologies are futile because, as the 
radically different conclusions reached by Jaensch and Frenkel-Brunswik illustrate, political 
critique is related flrst and foremost to moral criteria and values. Furthermore, as I have argued, 
such a form of critique is itself ideological and conservative for it tends to justify the existing 
system by aiming critical attention on individual 'rotten apples' while leaving the social system 
untouched (see pp. 55-56). 
In addition, Chapter 2 of this thesis has argued that there are fundamental incompatibilities, 
overlaps, and tensions between the empiricist imperative toward theoretical universalism and the 
value of moral/political critique. On the one hand, these two aspects of psychological research 
support each other for it is only on the empiricist assumption of a stable individual who manifests 
generalized personality traits that theorists could bridge the divide between identifying individual 
irrationality and criticizing ideological beliefs. On the other hand, political critique and theoretical 
universalism are deeply incompatible because it is not possible to establish a trans-historical and 
cross-cultural isomorphism between the theorized stable continuum of generalized cognitive traits 
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and the shifting specific beliefs which characterize an ideological orientation in different societies 
across history (see chap. 2). This creates a tension between political critique and universal theory. 
Critique demands a relationship between cognitive irrationality and specific (shifting) ideological 
contents, while universalism demands a relationship between cognitive traits and an unchanging 
definition of ideology - for example, in terms of deviance or extremism - which can 
accommodate various beliefs over historical and culrural context. Consequently, once variability 
in belief content is recognised, there are no grounds by which to theorize a stable and necessary 
relationship between irrational cognitive styles and specific ideologies. This is evident from 
Tetlock's (ambivalent) attempts to theorize individual variability in cognitive complexity. His 
rejection of the generalized trait thesis curtails all possibility of critique since it is no longer 
possible to maintain that individuals of certain ideologies are of a certain (irrational) cognitive 
type. 
This state of affairs leaves us with a dilemma, for it questions the possibility of developing a 
programme of action research. Either one must endorse the fallacious empiricist ontology and 
continue in the form of spurious critique which Brown ( 1953) denounced, or one recognises 
individual, cultural, and historical variability in cognitive style and the relationship between 
certain cognitive styles and particular ideological contents within different contexts, and forgoes 
all possibility of critique. In other words, by recognising variability in cognitive style, Loye's 
(1977) "left-right system within us" is rendered illusory, and political critique based on the notion 
that certain ideologies attract (and are established by) irrational individuals is thwarted. The 
potential for interested action research after the mould of Adorno et al. (1950) becomes 
impossible both theoretically and empirically because, in addition to the lack of logical grounds, 
there is no decisive test situation whereby Humean regularities between style and content can be 
established. 
As its name suggests, critical realism may assist us through this dilemma. This is achieved by 
adjusting the terms of critique. Bhaskar suggests that critique involves more than being able to 
say that a certain set of beliefs are false (or superficial) [or irrational]; it must involve "being able 
to give an account of the reasons why the false or superficial beliefs are held" (1989b, p. 87). 
This step, he adds, distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences, because "the object 
that renders illusory beliefs necessary comes ... to be criticised in being explained" (ibid, my 
emphasis). This is the precise strategy which was employed by Adorno et al. (1950). They 
argued that irrational fascist beliefs were held because of a deep-seated and irrational personality 
disposition. By invoking personality, they could explain both the reasons why irrational beliefs 
were held (dispositions), and why they were irrational (psychodynamic defences). In so doing, 
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though, Adorno et al. (1950), like their idealist and materialist predecessors (Hegel and Marx), 
had to rely on a universal, suprahistorical account of ideological beliefs. Adorno et al. (1950) 
substituted the ahistorical and universal principles of history offered by Hegel and Marx with 
equally ahistorical and universal principles of "thing-like" mind derived from empiricism. Critical 
realism, in contrast, recognises that social forms are concept-, activity- and time-space-dependent. 
It thus recognises variability in social forms, including the relation between the style and content 
of cognition. In addition, it acknowledges that "the social sciences are part of their own field of 
enquiry [which] means that they must b~ self-reflexive, critical and totalizing" (Bhaskar, 1986, 
p. 101, emphasis added). 
While a few paragraphs in a concluding chapter cannot do justice to the complex issue of 
critique, it is worth noting that critical realism has two important implications for action research 
which distinguishes it from the type of critique based on irrational personality dynamics. Firstly, 
rationality is not self-evident and is not given by any abstract universal principle or law- e.g., 
intolerance of ambiguity is irrational. Moreover, with no Archimedean point, critique cannot be 
grounded in universals. Since social science is in a subject-subject relation with its subject matter, 
critical realism realizes that social science is intrinsically critical (non-neutral). Indeed, it is within 
these parameters that psychology has produced and employed principles of irrationality. Critical 
realism, however, does not view this as an obstacle to truth, but as a means to a critical theory. 
The inherently rhetorical nature of the social sciences provides the basis for critique, which can 
be used to argue against the oppressive and exploitative effects of particular beliefs and practices 
which are produced in certain contexts. This entails a move in the form of ideology critique; 
from one based on a scientific enterprise (i.e., establishing truth-falsity, facts) to a rhetorical 
enterprise which criticises and justifies discourses and practices in terms of their effects ( cf. 
Eagleton, 1991; Parker, 1992). 
The second point involves the means by which a critical realist science would sustain this critical 
rhetorical enterprise. In giving an account of the reasons why ideological beliefs are held, critique 
must accommodate the concept-, activity-, and time-space-dependence of social forms. In this 
context, critique must recognise the historical and contextual variability in the relation between 
specific cognitive styles and contents, and their ideological effects. There is nothing inherently 
conservative (or rigid or irrational), for example, in arguments for biological determinism. On 
the contrary, they can be used to radical ends as when gay rights activists oppose christian 
fundamentalism with the argument that "if God made us this way, how can He condemn us for 
it?" . The potential for endless variability implies that a critique based on an empiricist 
epistemology (i.e., Humean regularities) will have no foundation as there exists no decisive 'test 
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situation' by which to establish the relationship between the style and content of cognition. This 
suggests that an alternative epistemology is required to sustain critique. 
Despite the (a) rhetorical nature of establishing ideological effects and (b) the infinite potential 
for individual, cultural, and historical variability in the usage of particular ideological styles and 
contents, critical realism can sustain a critical enterprise for, being realist, it acknowledges the 
operations of social structures and the institutionalization of knowledge/practice. It recognises real 
limitations to the potentially infinite variability, and can thus account for the organization of 
particular forms of talk and discursive practices within certain discursive positions, while 
recognising variability. Critical realism can sustain critique since it transcends the need for 
modernist universals and facts, while steering away from the posnnodernist conclusion that there 
is "no given order in reality at all" (Eagleton, 1991, p. 203, emphasis in original; Simons & 
Billig, 1994). While not seeking Humean regularities in material properties and processes of mind 
to ground critique, Bhaskar (1989b) argues that to be called "ideological", beliefs and practices 
must be necessary in some way. The purpose of emancipatory scientific enquiry then is 
explanatory, showing how ideological beliefs become necessary. 
To make the discussion more concrete, consider the analysis of neo-fascist rhetoric reported in 
the previous chapter. Contra the traditional empiricist accounts in psychology, we cannot 
conclude that Vermeulen demonstrates a stable and general trait of intolerance of ambiguity which 
disposes him to fascism. This is to disregard the empirical reality of his flexibility in both the 
style and the content of his utterances. Moreover, it is politically dangerous for it ignores the 
potentially persuasive power of his thinking. This variability threatens the form and value of 
critique established on personality-based assumptions. The empiricist is plunged into relativism 
because there is no basis upon which to consistently link particular contents to a specific style 
since the association between the two is emergent in contexts of joint action (i.e., it may shift in 
response to unintended consequences of interaction). Consequently, no scientific means exists by 
which to locate rationality-irrationality within the self-contained individual, and hence within an 
ideological tradition. Anti-realist elements in the posnnodernist tradition also succumb to a 
'vicious relativism'. To accommodate variability they "invert the empiricist [representational] 
model" by suggesting that the signified follows obediently from the signified (Eagleton, 1991, 
p. 208). 
Bhaskar's critical realism, in contrast, "avers the non-identity of the objects of the transitive and 
intransitive dimensions" (1986, p. 99), and maintains a "gap" between these realms. This allows 
him to establish criteria for the adequacy of scientific explanation and sustain a critical theory. 
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If we do not, for instance, approach Vermeulen's intolerance of ambiguity as empiricists -
seeking regularities in events -but approach it from an "exclusively explanatory" stance, we 
can, with reference to generative mechanisms in the intransitive realm, account for the 
organization in the style and content of Vermeulen's thinking. Intolerance of ambiguity and his 
neo-fascist arguments (for racial partition and violent means) are linked, through the conspiracy 
ideology, in a dialogical and historical relationship with radical and liberal themes and styles of 
argument. This permits critique, for an explanatory (as opposed to predictive) link may be 
established between generic (as opposed to numeric) talk ("discourses", Parker, 1992) and styles 
of argument. 
Of course, this does not imply that there is (in itself) something irrational about particular styles 
(e.g., such as being less efficient). Bhaskar's critical potential it is not founded on this 
assumption. He suggests, instead, that in the demystification process of explaining how sets of 
beliefs gain epistemic significance, social sciences achieve their critical potential . 
. . . the possibility of a scientific critique of lay (and proto-scientific) ideas, grounded in 
explanatory practices based on the recognition of the epistemic significance of these 
ideas, affords the human sciences an essential emancipatory impulse (1986, p. 169). 
We can thus appreciate how Bhaskar can conclude that "the object that renders illusory beliefs 
necessary comes ... to be criticised in being explained" (1989b, p. 87). In explaining why 
ideological styles, beliefs, and practices become necessary, we demystify them and open up 
possibilities for human emancipation. 
In the analysis of Vermeulen's rhetoric it was possible to show how "the object" -conspiracy 
ideology with its style of intolerance of ambiguity - renders illusory beliefs (i.e., racist and 
violent contents) necessary (ideological). In explaining the rhetorical functions of intolerance of 
ambiguity (cognitive style), one is rendering the reality (truth value) of the contents non-
necessary. In contrast to the politically naive manner in which personality theorists discount 
certain beliefs as irrational, critical realism recommends that we make serious attempts to explain 
how ideological beliefs gain epistemic significance. In this process we undertake Parkerian 
discourse analysis: 
When we want to understand the function of particular discourses [as we do in an 
explanatory science], the way they- position their subjects in relations of contempt and 
respect, of domination and subordination or of opposition and resistance, we pass quickly 
and ineluctably from conceptual critique to social critique (Parker, 1992, p. 37). 
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A reflexive tum 
In rethinking cognitive style in psychology, this thesis has aimed toward developing a critique 
of the empiricist models of cognitive style which have dominated the literature. This critique has 
taken two paths: first, on a metatheoretical level, it was argued that the development of theory 
has not followed the unitary, linear path anticipated by the empiricist (hypothetico-deductive) 
model of science; and second, it was argued that the theory and political critique which as been 
espoused by the literature has relied on the untenable assumption that cognitive style is a stable 
and generalized personality trait. The second line of critique has received detailed attention in this 
work because it has been the basis of theorizing the psychology of cognitive style. In this section 
I reflect on how a critical realist conceptualization of cognitive style - as an emergent feature 
of historical dialogical interactions - may assist in understanding the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological contents within the cognitive style-content literature itself. I 
propose a dialogical account of theory development. 
This brief discussion merely aims to augment Samelson's ( 1986, 1993) detailed analysis of the 
historical development of the concept of authoritarianism, and my earlier discussion of the 
unfolding theory of the relationship between cognitive style and content (Chapter 2). The present 
analysis supplements these studies of the changing theoretical content with an account of the 
changing rhetorical style ("tolerance of ambiguity") in the literature. The aim is to demonstrate 
the historically contingent nature of the relationship between style and content of theory. This 
serves to compensate for the static manner in which generic patterns of style may have been 
depicted in the synchronic analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
Samelson concludes his analyses of the development of the concept of authoritarianism thus: 
What strikes me most is the transformation of the problem [of authoritarianism] by 
different actors responding to different times and circumstances, as well as their varied 
fates in these settings: The development of the nuclear idea proceeded through the 
political spectrum from the far left, in the revolutionary and 'extreme' formulation by a 
communist Freudian activist [W. Reich], to milder Marxist-socialist, and incipiently 
empirical, versions of Fromm and the Institute [Frankfurt School], on to the liberal 
American social scientists at Berkeley and their followers, to end up in the value-free 
empirical data-crunching of the late 1950's, eventually jumping tracks to the media and 
the neo-conservative camp (Samelson, 1993, p. 41). 
Samelson reached this conclusion by tracing the content of the irrational authoritarian and its 
lineage of antitheses - through revolutionary, liberal, to conservative moderate - over its 
history. He found theoretical change to be closely linked to shifting historical circumstances, with 
a concern with the stability of the capitalist state being superseded with disquiet over fascism, and 
later communism and totalitarianism. Samelson analysis thus concurs with Gergen's (1973) 
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conclusion that contemporary social psychological theories are "firmly wedded to historical 
circumstances" (p. 315). 
The discussion in Chapter 2 argued that the cognitive style-content literature has witnessed similar 
changes in response to shifting political concerns. Where Adorno et al. (1950) sought to locate 
irrational cognitive styles in the Right, with the growing threat of communism fostered by the 
Cold War, Shils, Eysenck, and Rokeach sought cognitive irrationality in the political extremes, 
both Left and Right. As the Cold War was drawing to a close, the 1980's witnessed a significant 
change in theory. An overriding concern with the critique of any particular ideological 
constellation is not to be found in the work of either Sidanius and Tetlock. Research had become 
marked by "value-free empirical data-crunching" (Samelson, 1993) and a "political-controversy-
avoiding bias" (Etheredge, 1994), with irrational individuals or situational responses the only 
possible objects of critique. Sidanius celebrates a liberal humanist (narcissistic) view of the self 
when he argues that intolerance of ambiguity leads "intellectually weaker" conformists to comply 
with mass opinion. By recognising individual variability in cognitive style, Tetlock completes the 
anti-critical tum by suggesting that only situationally inappropriate cognitive styles are to be 
denounced. The negation of the early spirit of the authoritarianism literature- i.e., the absolute 
elimination of any critical potential- is neatly captured by Tetlock (1994): 
... we make a grave mistake when we allow our political values and preferences to colour 
our psychological characterizations of cognitive style. A cognitive style that in one 
context we applaud as balanced, judicious, and sophisticated we might deplore in another 
as weak, indecisive, and confused (p. 526). 
To the extent that politics has shaped theory, however, it has done so only against a shifting 
scientific backdrop. In addition to changing political interests, Chapter 2 argued that changing 
scientific imperatives such as value freedom and theoretical universalism have also impacted on 
and shaped theoretical content. Specifically, a increasing concern with theoretical universalism 
is evident as the literature developed. Although Billig (1982) argues quite correctly that in places 
Adorno et al. (1950) aspired to theoretical universalism, this empiricist value was not of 
overriding interest to them. On the contrary, Adorno et al. ( 1950) were engaged in the single task 
of theorizing the emergence of a new "anthropological species" (Horkheimer, 1950) - the fascist 
(authoritarian) personality - and were interested in establishing a necessary relation between the 
content and irrational cognitive style of this new species. Only with Rokeach (1956a, 1960) does 
one detect an explicit concern with developing universal and trans-historical theories of the 
relationship between cognitive style and content. The trend towards universalism was only 
completed, however, by Sidanius, whose model "has the major theoretical advantages in that it 
avoids the time and culture boundedness of conventional studies of belief systems" (Ward, 1986, 
p. 142). 
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As it turned out, the values of universalism and critique were deeply incompatible. To achieve 
a universal theory, theorists were required to unhinge cognitive style from content since it was 
not possible to establish an isomorphic relationship between a universal continuum of cognitive 
traits and the changing belief contents which are endorsed by a single ideological tradition over 
time and context. Instead, ideological orientation had to be defmed in universal terms as deviance 
from modal beliefs (i.e., extremism). However, by so doing, all potential for political critique 
was undermined since, within different societies and historical epochs, different contents could 
characterize extremism. Any specific beliefs (e.g., fascism, liberalism, communism) could 
feasibly be as irrational as any other, depending on the context. 
In contrast to Samelson, who leaves the impression of a gradual, if somewhat discontinuous, 
theoretical development from politicised to value-free empiricist accounts of authoritarianism, I 
see an integral relationship between the demise of critique and the rise of full-blown empiricist 
approaches to authoritarianism. Change occurred not only because theorists replaced political 
values with value freedom, but because it was only possible to establish universal theories once 
political circumstances had changed so that there was no overarching 'enemy' which necessitated 
critique. 
The tension between historico-political circumstances on the one hand, and the relative 
importance of critique and theoretical universalism on the other, provides the background against 
which intolerance of ambiguity within the cognitive style literature may be approached. For 
Adorno et al. (1950), the tension was only latent. The Authoritarian Personality was the first 
attempt to use empirical methods to confirm that a relationship between ideological beliefs and 
irrational cognitive style could be established. At this stage, it was of little concern whether 
intolerance of ambiguity was associated with different contents over history, because it was 
associated with fascist beliefs, which were thereby shown to be irrational. Adorno et al. (1950) 
could therefore be relatively unambivalent in their politicized programme of action research. It 
is only surprising how quickly historical change allowed the theory of a necessary relation 
between the style and content of cognition to be turned against its original authors. While 
adopting the same theoretical framework as Adorno et al. (1950), Shils and Eysenck argued that 
cognitive irrationality marked both fascist and communist beliefs. 
It was Rokeach who first made explicit the need for a universal theory. This he attempted to do 
by purging from his defmition of cognitive style (dogmatism) all references to ideological 
contents, and defming ideological orientation in terms of deviance from modal beliefs, rather than 
specific contents. However, Rokeach was before his time as it were. The Cold War was still 
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raging and there was no space for a theory which potentially legitimated communism (or fascism) 
within mainstream American psychology. Consequently, Rokeach' s theory is riddled with 
ambiguities as he attempts to marry a universalistic theory, purged of references to ideological 
content, to a critical theory, linking dogmatism to specific ("anti-democratic") contents (see pp. 
39-40). Only toward to close of the Cold War, with no distinct 'enemy' on the political 
landscape, could Sidanius properly achieve Rokeach's aims, purge his definition of cognitive style 
and ideological orientation of all references to specific ideological contents, and propose an 
unambivalently universal theory. Sidanius, however, does not escape completely from hedging 
and particularization. To ensure that his theory does not exonerate racists as intellectually 
stronger and sophisticated individuals in liberal contexts, he applies a completely different theory 
to racist beliefs than all other beliefs. Even this form of ambivalence is absent from Tetlock's 
universalistic account of individual variapility in cognitive style. For Tetlock, it is not ideologies 
or individuals, but only situational responses which may be more functional (rational) than others. 
I agree with Samelson that an analysis of the authoritarianism literature allows a glimpse, beyond 
a simple "historical relativism", of the dynamics of historical change in the perspectives of the 
researchers. It is immediately clear that this change in perspectives takes place rhetorically as 
each researcher has criticized others and justified his/her own views (cf. Simons, 1990; Nelson 
& Megill, 1986). The dynamics underlying this change are dialogical (cf. Markova & Foppa, 
1990). Just like dialogical exchanges in immediate face-to-face contexts of joint action, theory 
development takes place in the shifting seascapes of joint action, as an exchange of utterances 
(academic papers, books, etc.), each a response to previous and future utterances. As such, 
theory development cannot be accounted for purely in terms of its accuracy in representing the 
reality it is supposed to explain. However, neither can a theoretical utterance be regarded as a 
"completely free combination" of forms of language (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 81). Rather, according 
to a dialogical account, theory development is dependent upon and constrained by the generic 
form of language with which it is communicated in developing historical and political contexts. 
The developing nature of the context, and its impact on theory, is perhaps more clear here than 
in face-to-face interactions because of the dramatic nature of historical change. 
From this dialogical perspective, theoretical change cannot be seen as a unitary, linear 
development as scientists approach truth closer and closer. Instead, theoretical developments have 
been determined by the changing contexts within which they have taken place, the changing social 
phenomenon under investigation, and the generic forms of language with which they are 
communicated (i.e .• scientific and critical discourses). Quite clearly, the dramatic reversals of 
the model of the relationship between cognitive style and content offered over different historical 
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contexts should convince anyone that The Authoritarian Personality and its fate are not very 
compelling illustrations of the progressive accumulation of knowledge (Samelson, 1986). 
However, these reversals are not mysteriously connected to historical developments as some 
mirror image or reflection. On the contrary, they are communicated in generic form as 
utterances, justified and defended as other positions are criticized. 
Theoretical change is rhetorical, and the development of the idea of authoritarianism can be 
understood as such. Over the period 1950-1990, it can be understood as a discourse whose 
complex development- i.e., mutually supporting and contradictory themes- has taken place 
within the 'parameters' of two axes of knowledge: empiricist science and politics. The work of 
Samelson and the present analysis would suggest that the literature can be characterized by a shift 
from one axis to another - drawing on an empiricist code of justification and critique in place 
of an earlier a political code - from a critique of fascism and communism to a critique of other 
psychological theory on scientific grounds. This shift is evident on two levels. First, the task of 
Adorno et al. (1950) was explicitly political whereas Tetlock's is explicitly "value free". Second, 
since "each speech genre in each area of speech communication has its own typical conception 
of the addressee" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 95), the shift can be ascertained from the changing nature 
of the addressee: from a political opponent (e.g., fascists, Jaensch, Marxists), to a politicized 
scientific opponent, practising a biased science. It was Rokeach- with his universal and critical 
interests - who was caught in the twist of this shift, and his theory of dogmatism contains the 
strongest simultaneous expression of both codes. Accordingly, it is Rokeach' s theory which 
manifests the highest degree of ambivalence between the contrary themes of theoretical 
universalism and political critique. 
In addition to demonstrating the historically contingent nature of the style/' rationality' of theory 
development, a rhetorical analysis of the literature allows some insights to be drawn concerning 
the nature of the relationship between the style and content of cognition. The cognitive style 
literature may be turned back on itself, as an illustration of what it is not. Firstly, the relationship 
is historical in nature. Despite the liberal, anti-racist contents shared by Rokeach, Sidanius, and 
Tetlock, they differ remarkably in both their theoretical accounts and the types of ambivalences 
which they encountered and expressed. Second, change in the relationship over time is contingent 
upon shifting sociopolitical circumstances (dialogical contexts of joint action). These rhetorical 
features of the relationship between cognitive style and content suggests that, despite all concerted 
efforts, any universal theory on the nature of the relationship between cognitive/ideological style 
and content may be beyond reach. Definitely, the reasons for Rokeach's ambivalence have 
nothing to do with his psychology. It is related to type of argument he was supporting within 
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specific sociohistorical circumstances. Ambiguity tolerance is an emergent feature (tendencies) 
of rhetorical structures. 
Future directions 
Finally, given the non-unitary nature of the scientific endeavour and the empirical reality of 
massive individual variability in expressions of cognitive style, what should be the future 
direction of investigations into cognitive style and the cognitive style-content relationship? 
Mainstream literature is beginning to acknowledge individual variability in cognitive style, and 
has warned of the dangers of treating cognitive style and a simple unidimensional construct (e.g., 
Furnham, 1994; Scott et al., 1979; Sidanius, 1985; 1988a; Tetlock et al., 1993). Nevertheless, 
many researchers have remained committed to a personality-based account of cognitive style, 
albeit a more complex one. By generating more complex factor structures, they have created 
more "faculties of mind" by typical empiricist means - the ontic fallacy - arguing that there 
are different dimensions of personality, each important of (empiricist) study in themselves. It 
must be recognised, however, that the more complex the factor structure of personality has 
become, the more complex the reality, and the more metaphysical the ontological assumptions. 
This situation within psychological science is similar to that in German philosophy which 
Nietzsche's (1973) deplored for, "always creat[ing] the world in its own image" (p. 39): 
Kant asked himself: how are synthetic judgements a priori possible? - and what really 
did he answer? By means of a faculty... People lost their heads altogether on account of 
this new faculty, and the rejoicing reached its climax when Kant went on further to 
discover a moral faculty in man (sic) ... The honeymoon time of German philosophy 
arrived; and the young theologians ... went straight away off into the bushes - all in 
search of 'faculties'. And what did they not find ... (pp. 41-42, emphasis in original). 
Similarly, since the scientific discovery of a unitary personality dimension of authoritarianism, 
psychologists went straight away off in search of new dimensions. As their statistical technology 
has improved, so they have found more factor structures and, correspondingly, "dimensions of 
personality"- including 2, 3, 5 (or is it 6?), 8, 12, and 16 factors (see Cattell, 1995). On closer 
investigation, each dimension is itself comprised of further dimensions - as is intolerance of 
ambiguity (or Openness to Experience)- which are further subdimensions of personality. In my 
opinion, more personality studies and increasingly complex factor structures are not likely to 
assist in understanding the complex and subtle relationship between cognitive style and content 
more than it has done in the past. We need to move away from creating the world technologically 
in our own image. 
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A second possible line of study would be to use measures such as the AA T scale to determine 
the manner in which different objective contextual conditions impact on variability in ambiguity 
tolerance over different content domains. By abstracting from reproduced outcomes- manifest 
patterns of associations between ambiguity tolerance and ideological contents in different contexts 
- it may be possible to investigate the functioning of the underlying generative mechanisms 
within different objective social conditions. However, quantitative methods will encounter 
difficulties in capturing the subtleties of structure underlying any manifest relationship between 
cognitive style and content. Such research will inevitably tend toward either the empiricist 
epistemic fallacy - entrenching dualities between context (as "situation") and content (as 
"attitudes") and cognitive style (as multidimensional self-contained individual), and sliding into 
universalist theory - or encounter difficulties in speculating about the nature of the generative 
mechanisms underlying the emergent patterns of ambiguity tolerance. The AA T scale was a 
useful means to demonstrate the profound individual variability in ambiguity tolerance, and 
question empiricist ontological assumptions. In addition, the research fmdings derived from this 
scale gave some clues to the possibility of meaning-based ideological structures which underlie 
expressions of ambiguity tolerance. However, it is unlikely that this measurement procedure will 
assist in a close study of the operation of the generative mechanisms, and will certainly be of 
little use in a critical programme of action research. 
The way forward is to address "the basic problem at the core of the human sciences: how to 
understand and deal with the interdependencies between individual lives and their - our -
societies, caught up in concrete historical developments that impinge on ... all of us" (Samelson, 
1993, p. 42). This is a political enterprise concerned with human emancipation, and which 
endorses the values underlying the work of the Frankfurt School in their original interest in 
developing a theory of authoritarianism. Moreover, for the reasons outlined above, it is not an 
empiricist project. I have argued that a critical realist philosophy of science may assist in both 
investigating cognitive style and in establishing links between the stylistic features of cognition 
and historical ideological contents. A dialogical, Billigian/Bakhtinian framework is useful in this 
regard because it can accommodate both the change and stability (making-fmding, variability-
organization, agency-structure) of social reality. In my view, the stylistic aspects of cognition/ 
rhetoric are central features of social relations. The study of cognitive style may assist in 
explaining an important aspect of the manner in which both change and stability of social 
structures are (humanly) realized. 
I share Bhaskar's sanguine conclusion that: 
... insofar as there has been a real advance in recent analytic philosophy of the human 
sciences, it lies in the recognition of the significance of the condition that (wo)man is a 
Conclusion 
self-interpreting and self-motivating animal, a member of a story-telling species, whose 
language, beliefs, and stories are in some manner necessary for and productive of his or 
her life" (1986, p. 160, emphasis added). 
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Perhaps, once having recognised the necessary, constraining and productive nature of beliefs and 
the style with which they are communicated, the project of understanding the interdependencies 
between individual lives and their - our - societies, will shift away from empiricist dualisms 
and universals to a analysis and critique of discursively reproduced (dialogical) subjectivities. 
My view of the way forward is exactly contrary to empiricist council toward a unitary science 
(e.g., operationalization, falsification). Many different perspectives and views of cognitive style 
may be adopted by different critical investigations of the stylistic features of rhetoric. Here I have 
investigated categorization and particularization in Vermeulen's speech and the change in 
historical conditions underlying theoretical ambivalence in the cognitive style-content literature. 
The study of cognitive style may be broadened to include the diverse ways in which 
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity serves to (re)produce "the epistemic significance" of 
ideological ideas and practices. Also, although I have focused on intolerance of ambiguity, 
ambivalence and 'double talk', there are other stylistic features of rhetoric which may be 
fruitfully analyzed, including the use of analogy and metaphor, and 'strong views', etc. (cf. 
Bakhtin, 1986; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Each enquiry into the "dynamics of 
dialogue" can only serve to deepen our understanding of our social world, for according to 
Bakhtin (1986, p. 170), "there is neither a first nor a last word". 
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Appendix A 
Summary of Sidanius' research of the relationship 
between cognitive style and sociopolitical beliefs 
Sidanius has used three personality measures of cognitive style in his research: the dispositional 
measures of intolerance of ambiguity, and cognitive functioning; and the experiential measure of 
political sophistication. His earlier work, which is reviewed here, investigated the relationship 
between dispositional variables - intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive functioning - and 
sociopolitical beliefs. Linear and curvilinear analyses were performed to ascertain the form of 
the relationship between cognitive style and sociopolitical beliefs, and to distinguish between the 
predictions of (a) the theory of authoritarianism (negative linear relationship), (b) extremism 
theory (n-shaped curvilinear relationship), and (c) context theory (v-shaped curvilinear 
relationship). 
Operational measures 
Sidanius (l978a, 1978b, 1985) employed Budner's (1962) intolerance of ambiguity scale as a 
measure of cognitive complexity. Factor analysis of the Budner scale yielded seven different 
dimensions of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity: need for certainty, an uninterpretable factor, 
self-confidence, need for security, fear of initiative, intolerance of ambiguity, and need for the 
familiar (Sidanius 1978a, 1978b). 
The Political Prediction Test (Sidanius 1978b, 1985, 1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) requires 
respondents to predict levels of political violence in a number of countries in different parts of 
the world (e.g., Latin America & Western Europe), given several relevant social indicators of 
violence such as the proportion of minorities in each country and the per capita income of the 
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population. This test yields five indices of cognitive functioning: 
1. Cognitive Complexity (CCP): the number of underlying variables used in predicting 
political violence. 
2. Cognitive Coping: the strength of linear association between stimuli and response. 
3. Cognitive Flexibility (CFP1): the variability in violence judgements between countries in 
the two different parts of the world. 
4. Cognitive Flexibility (CFP2): CFP1 multiplied by cognitive coping. 
5. Predictive Accuracy: the degree to which the predictions correspond with actual levels 
of violence in the respective countries. 
The Object Sorting task (Sidanius, 1978b) requires subjects to sort 15 different countries into 
groups on the basis of some criterion. Two indices of cognitive functioning are derived from this 
task: 
1. Cognitive Complexity (CCg): the number of groups produced by each subject. 
2. Cognitive Flexibility (CFg): the total number of countries with membership in more than 
one group, divided by the total number of groups. 
The Similarity Rating task (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1976, 1977) solicits similarity ratings of 36 
different pairs of political parties. These are then submitted to multidimensional scaling analysis. 
Although three different indices of cognitive differentiation were derived from this procedure, 
only Latent Differentiation, the number of underlying dimensions as identified by the scree test, 
was found to be of importance. 
The Left-Right Rating task (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1976) consists of rating nine political parties 
with respect to their position on a political left-right continuum. Two significant indices of 
cognitive functioning were defmed on the basis of this task: 
1. Cognitive Range: the width of the judgemental field. 
2. Cognitive Centring: the midpoint of the subjects judgemental field. 
Sidanius has operationalized sociopolitical beliefs by: 
1. Assessing political party support. 
2. Measuring self-ranking on a conservatism-liberalism dimension. 
3. A measure of conservatism modelled after that devised by Wilson and Patterson ( 1968). 
This conservatism scale has been factor analyzed to yield five dimensions of 
conservatism: political-economic conservatism, racism, religion, sexual repression, and 
authoritarian aggression (Sidanius, 1978a; Sidanius and Ekehammar, 1976). 
f; 
[, 
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Associations between measures of cognitive style 
Budner (1962) has defmed intolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to perceive ambiguous 
situations as sources of threat" (p. 29). These are situations characterized by "novelty, 
complexity, or insolubility". Although intolerance of ambiguity, as defmed by Budner, appears 
conceptually distinct from cognitive functioning, Sidanius (1985) has suggested that the Political 
Prediction Test and the Object Sorting Task "meet the requirements" of ambiguous situations (p. 
649), and has thus used the Budner scale as an external criterion of construct validity of the 
various indices of cognitive functioning (Sidanius, 1985, 1988a). 
Although statistically significant relationships were found between five of the cognitive 
functioning indices and the total Budner scale and/or Factor 1 of the scale (need for certainty and 
uniformity), these correlations were modest to low (Sidanius, 1978b, 1985). Furthermore, none 
of the other Budner factors correlated with any of the indices of cognitive functioning. Thus, 
while there is evidence suggesting some commonality between intolerance of ambiguity and 
cognitive functioning, the relationship is weak, and at most, tentative. 
Besides the relationships between the Budner scale and the indices of cognitive functioning, 
Sidanius (1976, 1978b, 1985) has commonly found weak relationships (.10 ~ r ~ .25) between 
different indices of cognitive style. More concerning, though, is the complete lack of index 
convergence between different measures of cognitive complexity (CCP and CC,), and different 
measures of cognitive flexibility (CFP1, CFP2 , and CF11) (Sidanius, 1978b, 1985). Finally, factor 
analysis of a number of different indices of cognitive style has disclosed six different factors 
underlying these indices (Sidanius 1978b). Overall, Sidanius' empirical evidence reveals little 
generalizability from one index of cognitive style to another. 
Associations between intolerance of ambiguity and sociopolitical beliefs 
Sidanius has investigated the relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and sociopolitical 
beliefs with two separate samples: One comprised of 46 Swedish university students (Sidanius, 
1978b); and the other, of 195 Swedish high school students (Sidanius, 1978a). 
Of the seven correlational analyses between general conservatism and intolerance of ambiguity 
investigated in the 1978b study, three were significant (see Table A.l). Two of these relationships 
were congruent with the theory of authoritarianism, while the relationship between Factor 3 of 
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the Budner scale and conservatism suggested that conservatives were more self-confident and 
tolerant of ambiguity than moderates and liberals. 
Table A.l: Correlation coefficients between indices of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity and 
ideological conservatism 
Budner total: Budner (F1) Budner (F2) Budner (F3) Budner (F6) Budner (F7) 
intolerance into!. of uninterpreted self- intolerance need for the 
of ambiguity uncertainty confidence of ambiguity familiar 
1978b: 1978b: 1978b:" 
General r=.30 r=.45 r=.26 
conservatism p<.05 p< .01 p<.025 
1978a: 1978a: 1978a: 
r=.27 r=.29 r=.20 
p<.0002 p<.0002 p< .01 
Political- 1978a: . 1978a: 
economic r=-.16 r=.25 
conservatism p<.05 p< .01 
1978a: 1978a: 1978a: 
Racism r=.28 r=.31 r=.25 





Authoritarian 1978a: 1978a: 1978a: 
. 
Aggression r=.19 r=.34 r=-.16 
p< .05 p<.0002 p<.05 
"Direction of linear association contrary to that expected by the theory of the authoritarian personality. 
Only twelve of the 48 correlations from the 1978a study were significant: the summed Budner 
scale, Factor l, Factor 6, and Factor 7 were found to be consistently related to sociopolitical 
beliefs (see Table A.l). Most of these relationships were in the direction predicted by the theory 
of authoritarianism. 
The results of the trend analyses revealed a mixed pattern of linear and curvilinear relationships 
between intolerance of ambiguity and sociopolitical beliefs (see Table A.2). Although, in 
comparison with the large number of possible relationship which were examined, relatively few 
curvilinear trends were found. All but one of the curvilinear relationships were in the direction 
predicted by context theory. 
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Table A.2: Trend analysis of indices of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity and ideological 
conservatism. 
Budner total: Budner (Fl) Budner (F4) Budner (F5) Budner (F6) 
intolerance Need for Need for Fear of Intolerance 
of ambiguity Certainty Security initiative of ambiguity 
Political 1978a: 
party 
preference curv. p < .007 
,.,=.30 
General 1978a: 1978a: 1978a: 
conservatism lin. p<.0001 lin. p < .0001 
,.,=.26 .,=.28 





economic lin. p< .012 lin. p < .0005 
conservatism 7J=.18 .,=.25 
1978a: 1978a: 
Racism lin. p<.0001 lin. p < .0004 
,.,=.29 .,=.29 
Authoritarian 1978a: 1978a: 1978a: 
.. 




"Direction of linear association contrary to that expected by the theory of the authoritarian personality. 












Associations between cognitive functioning and sociopolitical beliefs 
Sidanius and Ekehammar (1976) studied the relationship between cognitive functioning and 
sociopolitical beliefs among 105 Swedish psychology students. Of the 48 correlations between 
different indices of cognitive functioning and sociopolitical beliefs, only 10 were significant (see 
Table A.3). The direction of these relationships are all in keeping with the theory of 
authoritarianism, with higher conservatism being associated with lower levels of cognitive 
functioning. Sidanius (1985) tested the relationship between cognitive functioning and 
sociopolitical beliefs with a sample of 195 Swedish high school students. Seven of the 36 
correlations were significant and their direction conformed to the predictions of authoritarianism 
theory (see Table A.3). General conservatism, racism, and political and economic conservatism 
appeared to by the most important dimensions of sociopolitical beliefs which are related to 
cognitive functioning. 
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Table A.3: Correlation coefficients between indices of cognitive functioning and conservative 
sociopolitical beliefs 
Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive 
centring flexibility flexibility flexibility range differential 
(CFp1) (CFPz} (CFg) ion 
1976: 1985: 1985: 1976: 
General r=-.40 r=-.19 r=-.16 r=-.31 
conservatism p< .001 p< .01 p< .05 p< .05 
Political- 1976: 1976: 1976: 
economic r=-.49 r=-.22 r=-.30 
conservatism p< .001 p< .05 p< .05 
1976: 1985: 1985: 1976: 
Racism r=-.23 r=-.16 r=-.15 r=-.21 
p< .05 p< .05 p< .05 p< .05 
Religious 1976: 1976: 
conservatism r=-.24 r=-.25 
p< .05 p< .05 
Sexual 1985: 1985: 
repression r=-.15 r=-.17 
p< .05 p< .05 
Authoritarian 1976: 1985: 
Aggression r=-.29 r=-.16 
p< .05 p< .05 
Table A.4 reports the results of the trend analyses between the indices of sociopolitical beliefs 
and cognitive functioning. General conservatism and political and economic conservatism were 
the only indices of sociopolitical beliefs which were related to cognitive functioning. Although 
most of the trend analyses yielded purely linear relationships, curvilinear relationships for 
cognitive complexity, cognitive range and cognitive differentiation were in the direction predicted 
by context theory. 
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Table A.4: Trend analysis of indices of cognitive functioning and sociopolitical ideology. 
Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive range Cognitive 
Centring complexity differentiation 
1976: 
Political Party linear: p<.0001 
Preference 7J=.54 
General 1976: 1985: 1976: 1976: 
conservatism linear: p< .0001 linear: p< .053 linear: p<.Ol 
7J=.40 7J=.14 7J=.25 
curv. p<.041 curv. p<.03 curv. p<.03 
7J=.21 7J=.30 7J=.29 
Political and 1976: 1976: 1976: 
economic linear: p<.0001 linear: p<.002 
conservatism '7=.48 7J=.31 
curv. p< .0001 
7J=.40 
Summary and conclusions 
From Sidanius' work, it appears as though intolerance of ambiguity is related to more dimensions 
of sociopolitical ideology than cognitive functioning. These results should, however, be viewed 
as suggestive rather than definitive. Overall, very few relationships were significant in 
comparison to the number of relationships examined. Generally speaking, the significant 
associations were weak to moderate in strength. Many of the significant results obtained in one 
study were not replicated in other studies. Furthermore, the overall pattern of results is not 
explicable by any theory. Why, for example, is Budner Factor 1 not related to racism and sexual 
repression. whereas Factor 6 is related to these two dimensions of sociopolitical beliefs, but not 
authoritarian aggression? Sidanius' research does, however, underscore the necessity of studying 
different dimensions of sociopolitical beliefs, and cognitive functioning and intolerance of 
ambiguity. Clearly, some aspects of sociopolitical beliefs are not related to either cognitive 
functioning or intolerance of ambiguity in the same manner as other dimensions. 
While the predictions of context theory do receive some tentative support, most of the results 
were congruent with the theory of authoritarianism. Very little support was found for extremism 
theory. However, a number of fmdings contravene Sidanius' predictions. Contrary to context 
theory, linear relationships were found between indices of cognitive functioning and political and 
economic conservatism (see Table A.4), and a curvilinear relationship was found to exist between 




The following is a study of what university students think and feel about a number of important social and 
personal questions. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; no matter what 
your answer to the various questions, you can be sure that many people will feel the same as you. 
As this questionnaire is the first component of a two-part study, you are requested to provide your name. 
You are assured of the strictest confidentiality. The questionnaire will be read by the researcher only. This 
is a scientific investigation independent of all political, religious and other ideological persuasions. You 
are encouraged to answer all questions openly. Thank you for your cooperation. Please answer all 
questions. 
SECTION 1 
Please give the following details. 
1) Surname 




4) Age (in years) 
SECTION2 
Please answer the following by placing a cross [] in the appropriate boxes. 
1) Which Political Party would you most likely and least likely support? (select only one party in the "most 
likely" column and~ party in the "least likely" column). 
Most Least 
Likely Likely 
National Party (NP) 
African National Congress (ANC) 
Afrikaanse Weerstands Beweging (A WB) 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
South African Communist Party (SACP) 
Democratic Party (DP) 
Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) 
Conservative Party (CP) 


































5) How strongly do you hold your political views? 
Not at all Very strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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6) How much interest do you take in politics (eg. reading political news, discussing political issues)? 
Very little Very much 
l1 12131415161 7 lsl91101 
7) How much interest have you taken in the negotiation process (e.g., following news reports, discussions 
with friends, etc.)? 
Very little Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8) Would you take part in demonstrations and strikes if you felt the negotiation process was biased or 
unfair? 
Most certainly Certainly not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SECTION3 
1) How often have you attended religious services in the last year? 
Never 
Once or twice 
Three to six times a year 
Once or twice a month 
Once a week 
Two or three times a week 
2) Which of the following best describes your practice of prayer or religious mediation? 
Prayer is a regular part of my daily life. 
I usually pray during times of stress or need, but rarely at 
any other time. 
I pray only during formal ceremonies. 
Prayer has little importance in my life. 
I never pray. 








4) How much influence would you say that religion has on the way that you choose to act and the way 
that you choose to spend your time each day? 
~----------~-----------------,-------, 
No influence 
A small influence 
A fair amount of influence 
A large influence 













7) Which of the following statements comes closest to your belief about God? 
I am sure that God really exists and is active in my life. 
Although I sometimes question God's existence, I do believe in God's existence and that 
God knows me as a person. 
I don't know if there is a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind. 
I don't know if there is a personal God or a higher power of some kind, and I'm not sure 
that I will ever know. 
I don't believe in a personal God or a higher power. 
8) Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief about life after death? 
I believe in a personal life after death, a soul existing as a specific individual. 
I believe in a soul existing after death as part of a universal spirit. 
I believe in life after death of some kind, but I really don't know what it would be 
like. 
I don't know whether there is any kind of life after death, and I don't know if I will 
ever know. 
I don't believe in any kind of life after death. 
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SECTION 4 
It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture of both likes (respect) and 
dislikes (disrespect), given different situations. Give two scores for each of the following authorities or 
authority figures, one indicating the level that you sometimes like (respect) the authority, the other the 
level of your possible dislike (disrespect). 
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your personal 
opinion. 
Example 1: If on occasions you truly respect the American government and support their decisions, but 
on other occasions you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer: 
The American Government 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9@ Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9@ Very much 
Example 2: If you respect Major Bantu Holomisa completely and support him at all times, then you may 
answer: 
Major Bantu Holomisa 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Qg 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all @ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1) The South African Government 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2) Buddha 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3) The Courts 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4) lnkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5) The family 
Like/respect 
Not at all 
Dislike/disrespect 


















Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
7) Chris Hani 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
8) The Conservative Party (CP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
9) Your Church 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
10) Bishop Desmond Tutu 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
11) Nelson Mandela 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
12) The Pope 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
13) Doctors 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
14) Jesus Christ 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 




Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
16) The Afrikaanse Weerstands Beweging (A WB) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
17) Friends 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
18) Personal Conscience 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
19) The Army 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
20) Your Church Leader 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
21) Science 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
22) The Democratic Party (DP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
23) The University 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
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24) Your School 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/disres~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
25) The South African Communist Party (SACP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/disres~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
26) Mohammed 
Like/res~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/disres~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
27) Lawyers 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
28) The African National Congress (ANC) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I> is like/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
29) The Bible 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
30) F. W. de Klerk 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I>islike/disres~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
31) The Law 
Like/res~t 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
32) The Police 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
I> is like/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
274 
33) Umkontho we Sizwe 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
34) The Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
35) The United Nations (UN) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
36) The Koran 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
37) Your School Principal 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
38) Eugene Terreblanche 
Like/ respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
39) Your Teacher 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
40) Your Professors 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
41) Your Lover 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
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42) Your Own Values 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
43) Mangasothu Buthalezi 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
44) The Talmud 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
45) Your Cultural tradition 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
SECTION 5 
Please answer the following questions by indicating your reactions to each statement by placing a cross in 
the appropriate cell according to the following scale: 
VSD if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
SD if you strongly disagree with the statement. 
MD if you moderately disagree with the statement. 
sD if you slightly disagree with the statement. 
sA if you slightly agree with the statement. 
MA if you moderately agree with the statement. 
SA if you strongly agree with the statement. 
VSA if you very strongly agree with the statement. 
If you feel precisely neutral about the statement, place a cross in the cell marked with a "N". 
1) It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to 
listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
2) There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody being a homosexual. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA SA VSA 
3) The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down 
harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law 
and order. 
VSD SD MD sD N sA MA SA VSA 
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4) "Free speech" means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the 
overthrow of the government. 
~~ v-s-n~l-s-n~l-~~~-s-D~-N--~1 -sA~-MA--~1-sA~~-V-SA~I 
5) In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with agitators 
and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 
I VSD I SD I ~ I sD N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
6) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and 
settle down. 
I VSD I SD ~I sD N I sA MA I SA I VSA I 
7) It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas are the lifeblood of 
progressive change. 
~~y-s-n~~-s-n~l-~--~~s-n~I-N--~~-sA--~MA~~-s-A~I-vs-A~I 
8) The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the communists and their kind, who are out to destroy 
religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine our whole way of life. 
I VSD I SD I ~ I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
9) The way things are going in this country, it is going to take a lot of "strong medicine" to straiten out 
the troublemakers, criminals and perverts. 
I VSD I SD I ~ I sD N I sA MA SA VSA 
10) It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. 
lvsnlsn l~lsn IN lsA MA SA VSA 
11) Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past which we should question 
very thoroughly before accepting. 
~~ -vs-n~l ~sn~~~--~~-sn--~N--~~-sA--~MA--~~-s-A~~-v-sA_,I 
12) Once the government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it 
will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stamp out the rot that is poisoning our country from 
within. 
I VSD I SD ~I sD N I sA MA I SA I VSA I 
13) The self-righteous "forces of law and order" threaten freedom in our country a lot more than most of 
the groups they claim are "radical" and "godless". 
I VSD I SD I ~ I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA I 
14) Students in high school and at university must be encouraged to challenge their parents' ways, confront 
established authorities, and in general criticize the customs and traditions of our society. 
I VSD I SD I ~ I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
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SECTION6 
Please complete the following by placing a cross in the appropriate box. 
1) Peace is the only solution to racial hatred in South Africa. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
2) All countries need the wealthy and the poor in order to function effectively. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
3) Only God can solve the South Africa's problems. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
4) Affirmative action is an essential policy to redress the wrongs of apartheid. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
5) Democracy cannot function in Africa. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
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6) Negotiations are the only way to build the new South Africa. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
7) The armed struggle must continue until majority rule is established. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
8) The United Nations must step in and resolve the conflict in this country. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
9) The devil is at the root of all the strife, misery and conflict plaguing the country. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
10) The police and security forces must control the violent elements of society at all costs. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
11) Our leaders are corrupt, power-seeking individuals who are only interested in feathering their own 
nests. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
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12) The radical elements of society are the main cause of chaos in South Africa. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 
I don't believe it and other South Africans must not believe it. 
13) The poor have not been given an equal chance to get ahead. 
I believe it and all South Africans must believe it. 
I believe it but other South Africans need not believe it. 
I don't believe it but other South Africans can believe it. 




The following is a study of what university students think and feel about a number of important social and 
personal questions. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; no matter what 
your answer to the various questions, you can be sure that many people will feel the same as you. 
As this questionnaire is the second component of a two-part study, you are requested to provide your 
name. You are assured of the strictest confidentiality. The questionnaire will be read by the researcher 
only. This is a scientific investigation independent of all political, religious and other ideological 
persuasions. You are encouraged to answer all questions openly. Thank you for your cooperation. Please 
answer all questions. 
SECTION 1 
Please give the following details. 
1) Surname 
2) First name 
SECTION 2 
It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture of both likes (respect) and 
dislikes (disrespect), given different situations. Give two scores for each of the following authorities or 
authority figures, one indicating the level that you sometimes like (respect) the authority, the other the 
level of your possible dislike (disrespect). 
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your personal 
opinion. 
Example 1: If on occasions you truly respect the American goverrunent and support their decisions, but 
on other occasions you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer: 
American Government 
Like/respect 
Not at all 
Dislike/disrespect 





Example 2: If you respect Major Bantu Holomisa completely and support him at all times, then you may 
answer. 
Major Bantu Holomisa 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9~ 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all @ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1) The South African Goverrunent 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dislike/disrespect 








Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
3) The Courts 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
4) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
5) The family 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
6) God 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
7) The Conservative Party (CP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
8) Your Church 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
9) Bishop Desmond Tutu 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
1 0) Nelson Mandela 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
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11) The Pope 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
12) Jesus Christ 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
13) Parents 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
14) The Afrikaanse Weerstands Beweging (AWB) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
16) The Army 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
17) Your Church Leader 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
18) The Democratic Party (DP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
19) Your School 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
20) The South African Communist Party (SACP) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 




Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
22) The African National Congress (ANC) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
23) The Bible 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
24) F. W. de Klerk 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
25) The Law 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
26) The Police 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
27) Umkontho we Sizwe 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/ disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
28) The Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
29) The United Nations (UN) 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
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30) The Koran 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
31) Your School Principal 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
32) Eugene Terreblanche 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
33) Mangasothu Buthalezi 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
34) The Talmud 
Like/respect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
35) Chris Hani 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
36) Doctors 
Like/respect 
Not at all 012345678910 Very much 
Dislike/disrespect 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much 
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SECTION 3 
Please answer the following questions by indicating your reactions to each statement by placing a cross in 
the appropriate cell according to the following scale: 
VSD if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
SD if you strongly disagree with the statement. 
MD if you moderately disagree with the statement. 
sD if you slightly disagree with the statement. 
sA if you slightly agree with the statement. 
MA if you moderately agree with the statement. 
SA if you strongly agree with the statement. 
VSA if you very strongly agree with the statement. 
If you feel precisely neutral about the statement, place a cross in the cell marked with a "N". 
1) Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to perform as well as whites in any 
field. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
2) It would be unfair if greater expenditure on black education were to be funded by the white taxpayer. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
3) Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule could result in a stable, 
prosperous and democratic South Africa. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
4) Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee social peace in this country. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
5) The large scale extension of political rights to blacks will inevitably lead to chaos. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
6) The wealth of this country is almost entirely due to the hard work and leadership of the whites. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
7) Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the 
country that whites retain political control. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
8) It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable division of wealth in this 
country. 
~~ V-S-D~~-S-D~~-MD--~~-sD--~~-N~~~s-A~~-M-A~~-SA--~VS-A~ 
9) If all races were permitted to mix freely they would probably live in peace. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
1 0) It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
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11) An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
12) I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA SA VSA 
13) There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA SA VSA 
14) People who ftt their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
15) A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
16) Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and 
original. 
~~ V-S-D~~-SD--~~-MD~~-sD--~~-N~~~s-A~~-MA--~~ -SA~~-V-SA~~ 
17) People who insist on a yes or a no answer just don't know how complicated things are. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
18) In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large 
and complicated ones. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD · I N I sA MA SA VSA 
19) What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA · I MA SA VSA 
20) Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
21) A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprisers or unexpected happenings arise, 
really has a lot to be grateful for. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
22) I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are 
complete strangers. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 




24) The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA SA VSA 
25) A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
26) It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
SECTION 4 
Which of the following do you favour or believe in? 
Circle "Yes" or "No". If you are absolutely uncertain, circle "?". There are no right or wrong answers. 
Just give your first reaction. Answer all questions. 
1) Evolution theory Yes ? No 
2) School uniforms Yes ? No 
3) Striptease shows Yes ? No 
4) Modern Art Yes ? No 
5) Military service Yes ? No 
6) Socialism Yes ? No 
7) Divine Law Yes ? No 
8) Moral training Yes ? No 
9) Suicide Yes ? No 
10) Chaperones Yes ? No 
11) Social welfare Yes ? No 
12) Legalized abortion Yes ? No 
13) Chastity Yes ? No 
14) Female judges Yes ? No 
15) Big Business Yes ? No 
16) Conventional clothing Yes ? No 
17) Nudist camps Yes ? No 
18) Mass Action Yes ? No 
19) Church authority Yes ? No 
20) Disarmament Yes ? No 
21) Censorship Yes ? No 
22) Strict rules Yes ? No 
23) Social Equality Yes ? No 
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24) Casual Living Yes ? No 
25) Divorce Yes ? No 
26) Religious truth Yes ? No 
27) Legalizing dagga Yes ? No 
28) Privatized health care Yes ? No 
29) One man\woman one vote Yes ? No 
30) Homosexuality Yes ? No 
31) Political radicalism Yes ? No 
32) Strikes Yes ? No 
SECTION 5 
Below each of the following authorities you will fmd 20 adjectives. Circle as many as you think describe 
that authority. 
1) The South African government 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
2) The African National Congress (ANC) 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
3) The Police 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
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4) The United Nations 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
5) God 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
6) The Bible 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
7) Parents 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
8) Your church 
good pleasant loyal unfriendly impartial 
cowardly worthless wise boring untrustworthy 
bad likeable rude prejudiced uncommitted 
moral unreliable strong courageous supportive 
THANK YOU 
Appendix D 
The development of a measure of conservatism and 
examination of the structure of sociopolitical attitudes in 
South Africa 
Since one of the aims of the thesis was to conduct a quantitative investigation of the relationship 
between ambiguity tolerance and ideological beliefs, it was necessary to construct a measure of 
radicalism-conservatism which would be a valid and reliable measure among a South African 
student sample. Although the Wilson-Patterson (1968) scale is commonly used for this purpose 
it is culture-bound, dated, and in all likelihood, not appropriate for use in contemporary South 
Africa. This Appendix reports the results of a study which aimed primarily to develop a culture-
appropriate measure of radicalism-conservatism along the lines of the Wilson-Patterson scale. In 
addition, the study aimed to investigate and conduct cross-cultural comparisons of the structure 
of sociopolitical attitudes so as to explore the validity of personality-based accounts of attitudinal 
structure. 
Social psychological investigations of the structure of sociopolitical attitudes have been 
characterized by disagreement regarding the number of factors underlying radicalism-
conservatism and whether or not these factors are oblique or orthogonal. However, it is generally 
recognized that attitudes are structured in coherent patterns. Moreover, at least for the Western 
democracies where research has been undertaken - including Australia, Britain, New Zealand, 
Norway, the United States of America, and Sweden - it appears as though the underlying 
structure of these attitudes is more or less universal (Bagley, Wilson, & Boshier, 1970; Eysenck, 
1975; Kerlinger, Middendorp, & Am6n, 1976; Sidanius, Ekehammar, & Ross, 1979; Stone, 
Ommundsen, & Williams, 1985). This begs questions of why; what holds the divergent array of 
sociopolitical attitudes - political and economic conservatism, religiosity, militarism, 
authoritarianism, racism, etc. -together in such a universal and coherent manner? Generally 
speaking, personality dynamics have been the implicit or explicit explanation of such structure. 
This has practical implications for it suggests that radicalism-conservatism should be treated and 
measured as a unidimensional construct. One aim of this study, therefore, was to examine the 
structure of sociopolitical attitudes of a South African sample, to compare this structure with that 
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from other countries, and thereby, explore the validity of a personality-based explanation of the 
structure of sociopolitical attitudes. 
The most simple argument suggests that the diverse array of sociopolitical opinions are held 
together in a unidimensional manner by personality functioning. Adorno et al. (1950), for 
example, argued that ethnocentrism, political and economic conservatism, and the attitudinal 
items comprising the F scale were intercorrelated because they all reflected the same underlying 
ego-defensive personality disposition. Similarly, others have suggested that ideological opinions 
are structured in a unidimensional manner (Collins & Hayes, 1993; Eckhardt, 1991; Joe, 1984; 
Tygart, 1984; Wilson, 1970, 1973; Wilson & Schutte, 1973; Yellig & Wearing, 1974}, which 
is said to reflect an underlying need for certainty (Wilson, 1973), or belief in the goodness or 
badness of humankind (Tomkins, 1963). From this perspective, radicalism-conservatism is seen 
as an "individualistic mix of differing cognitive, affective and conative tendencies that fmd 
expression and become labelled 'liberal and conservative'" (Loye, 1977, p. 155). 
On the other hand, an expanding body of evidence has been unable to identify a general factor 
of radicalism-conservatism (Eysenck, 1954, 1975; Robertson & Cochrane, 1973; Stone & Russ, 
1976; Sidanius, 1978a, 1984). By rotating the initial factor structure of responses to conservatism 
items, this research has shown different dimensions of sociopolitical beliefs to be empirically 
distinct - forming different primary, and even secondary factors. Yet even here there is little 
consensus. One group of researchers has consistently found these factors to be correlated, 
constituting a "fuzzy set" or a diverse, general left/right factor (Stone et al., 1985; Tomkins, 
1963, 1965). Sidanius and colleagues have found that their measure of conservatism reduces to 
five oblique factors - racism, authoritarian aggression (punitiveness), political and economic 
conservatism, social inequality, and religion (Sidanius, 1978a, 1984; Sidanius & Ekehammar, 
1976; Sidanius et al., 1979). Each of these factors is conceptually and empirically distinct, but 
is also strongly associated with all other factors. 
A second group of researchers has found different dimensions of conservatism to be orthogonal 
(Bagley, Boshier, & Nias, 1974; Bruni & Eysenck, 1976; Eys~nck, 1954, 1975; Goertzel, 1987; 
Heaven & Connors, 1988; Kerlinger, 1984; Kerlinger et al., 1976; Ray, 1985; Stone & Russ, 
1976). In contrast to the "unidimensional" thesis, this latter body of research suggests that 
radicalism-conservatism is not a bipolar construct. On the contrary, they argue that, being 
multidimensional and orthogonal, different aspects of radicalism-conservatism derive from 
different, independent mechanisms. Eysenck (1954), for example, advances a theory of political 
ideology comprised of two orthogonal factors, Rand T. The R factor refers to the traditional 
radicalism-conservatism dimension, while the T factor refers to toughmindedness-
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tendennindedness, a dimension which is argued to reflect personality extroversion-introversion. 
This interpretation of the T factor has been widely criticised (Christie, 1956a; Rokeach & 
Hanley, 1956), and instead, it has been suggested that the T factor reflects Machiavellianism 
(Stone & Russ, 1976), psychotism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Heaven & Connors, 1988), or 
religious conservatism (DeFronzo, 1972; Eckhardt, 1991; Eckhardt & Newcomb, 1969; Rokeach 
& Hanley, 1956). Regardless of the meaning of the factors, Eysenck's theorizing raises serious 
questions regarding the manner in which radicalism-conservatism is to be interpreted. By 
rejecting a bipolar conception of radicalism-conservatism, it may make no sense to label 
individuals either radical or conservative since they may be radical on one dimension but 
conservative on another (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984). Equally, the common 
practice of measuring conservatism in a unidimensional manner may have no basis. 
As one moves along the continuum of theory, from the unidimensional thesis to the 
multidimensional and orthogonal thesis, the theory of structure becomes more complex. If 
personality is indeed the structural agent, why do different dimensions form orthogonal factors? 
Although the literature is not clear in this regard, there appear to be three possible reasons: (a) 
the different dimensions reflect different dimensions of personality, (b) some dimensions reflect 
personality functioning while others reflect the normative structure of beliefs, or (c) the factor 
structures purely reflect the normative structure of beliefs. The lack of clarity regarding which 
explanation to accept has been compounded by the massive confusion in the literature regarding 
what the construct, radicalism-conservatism, denotes. As Stone (1983) correctly points out, "only 
confusion can result from the attempt to discuss, using a single set of terms [i.e., radicalism-
conservatism], both ideologies and the personality dispositions that we presume to underlie 
differences in attraction to the ideologies" (p. 215). As a result, it has been common not to 
theorize whether ideological structure is determined by personality or ideological dynamics since 
an isomorphism between the two has been assumed (both theoretically and methodologically). 
Political attitudes have been seen as an externalization of personality predispositions. Significant 
correlations between two measures comprised purely of ideological beliefs (e.g., the F-scale and 
conservatism) have thus typically been employed to validate personality functioning, whereas the 
two clusters of attitudinal opinions may be associated due to their common basis in normative 
ideological constellations which an individual may appropriate for reasons not related io 
personality functioning (e.g., material circumstances, socialization, etc.). 
Cross-cultural studies are especially useful in helping to theorize the structure of ideological 
beliefs. If basic personality dynamics, such as the need for certainty, structure sociopolitical 
attitudes, then this structure should be similar for different cultures. A need for certainty, for 
example, will be reflected in conservative attitudes of individuals from all cultures. On the other 
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hand, if the correlations arise because attitudes are held together in ideological constellations, 
then the structure of these attitudes may be expected to vary across cultures with different 
ideological bases. To illustrate, the empirical distinction between religious conservatism and 
political and economic conservatism may be related to the separation of religious and political 
authority associated with the development of the nation state (cf. Anderson, 1991), rather than 
to some basic structure of personality. 
The bulk of the empirical work has tended to support personality-based theory. Cross-cultural 
comparisons have found similar "fuzzy set" attitudinal structures among Australian and Swedish 
psychology students (Sidanius et al., 1979), and Norwegian and American psychology students 
(Stone et al., 1985). Thus, despite the fact that Norway and America differ regarding their 
emphasis on socialist policy and individualism, similar dimensions of ideological beliefs were 
evident in both samples. There have also been differences between the attitudinal structures of 
the different samples. While the content of the factors for the Norwegian and American samples 
was similar, the order of importance and the strength of association between the factors varied 
across the samples. It therefore appears as though the reference frame upon which persons from 
different cultures base their political judgments is similar, but the importance of the various 
dimensions of judgment is culturally specific. The universal nature of the dimensions of 
sociopolitical beliefs concurs with the predictions of personality-based theory as it suggests a 
cross-cultural structural agent. However, it appears as though the normative culture determines 
the salience of the various dimension for political judgement. 
Similar cross-cultural stability has been found for the thesis of a general factor of conservatism 
(Bagley et al., 1970; Feather, 1975; Hogan, 1977; Wilson & Lee, 1974; Wilson & Schutte, 
1973), and for the thesis that attitudinal structure is multidimensional and orthogonal (Bruni & 
Eysenck, 1976; Eysenck, 1975; Kerlinger et al., 1976). The different factor structures uncovered 
by the different groups of researchers is, however, largely a function of the method of factor 
analysis employed. Generally speaking, the "unidimensional" thesis is supported by unrotated 
factor structures, while the "multidimensional" thesis is based on rotated factor structures (cf. 
Boshier, 1972). However, the cross-cultural stability of fmdings appears to be an empirical fact. 
The present study represents an attempt to replicate the factor structure of sociopolitical attitudes 
with a South African sample of psychology students. A South African replication may be useful 
in determining the normative influences on ideological structure since, unlike other Western 
democracies, South Africa has been characterized by an ideological atmosphere of intolerance, 
Manichean conceptions of legitimacy (Gagiano, 1990), and a close relationship between religion 
and state (Foster, 1991). Thus, while the sample is matched with those employed by Stone et al. 
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(1985) and Sidanius et al. (1979), the factor structure underlying sociopolitical beliefs may differ 
due to the influence of the ideological milieu. Such differences would tend to support a normative 
theory of ideological structure. In contrast, a personality-based theory of ideological structure 
would be supported if a similar ideological structure was evident for the South African sample. 
One of the most serious problems with previous cross-cultural investigations of attitudinal 
structure has been a lack of concern for conunon scale content (Sidanius et al., 1979). However, 
the use of the same attitudinal content in two different societies is also problematic since the 
meaning of the items may vary across the cultures (e.g., Wilson's (1973) items, 'fox hunting' 
and 'Beatniks' have little political relevance for South Africans). Consequently, different factor 
structures may reflect different meaning systems rather than different personality structures within 
the two cultures. To overcome these two conflicting methodological issues, the approach taken 
in the present study is to construct a measure of conservatism which incorporates the dimensions 
of conservatism identified by Sidanius - punitiveness (authoritarian aggression), political and 
economic conservatism, social inequality, and religion. An attempt is made to replicate Sidanius' 
factors with items which are valid indicators of the dimensions of conservatism in the South 
African context. Rather than stating beforehand whether a unidimensional or multidimensional 
factor structure is to be expected, and then employing the "appropriate" analytic procedures, the 
present approach aims first to identify and measure different components of conservatism, and 
then to assess the degree of association between the different dimensions. Thus, rather than being 
methodologically driven, the conclusions here are based on observed associations between the 
different dimensions, which may range from being orthogonal, to forming a strongly 
intercorrelated unidimensional matrix. 
A further aim of the present study was to examine differences in attitudinal structure between 
groups in different positions on the social status hierarchy. This issue has received little attention. 
One of the few studies examining class differences in attitudinal structure found no difference in 
the attitudinal structure of working class and middle class Londoners (Eysenck, 1975). This 
fmding is rather surprising, given that items which tap a need for certainty have different 
implications for groups at different positions on the status hierarchy. Racist sentiments in South 
Africa may denote a need for certainty and resistance to change, but these sentiments will have 
different implications for individuals depending on whether they are Black or White. If the need 
for certainty is a basic personality dimension which underlies the structure of ideological 
attitudes, then this should be reflected in similar attitudinal structures of groups with different 
social status. Black individuals who are conservative in political domains, while obviously less 
racist than their White counterparts, should be more racist than non-conservative Blacks whose 
responses do not reflect a need for certainty. On the other hand, fmdings quite different from 
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Eysenck' s are expected if attitudinal structure is nonnatively determined. While racist beliefs may 
be part of a wider constellation of conservative ideology for Whites, they may constitute a 
separate, independent ideological domain for Blacks. 
Method 
Sample and procedure 
The sample and procedure was precisely the same as that reported in Study 1 (see p. 115). 
Measures 
Conservatism 
The conservatism scale was developed according to the model provided by Wilson and Patterson 
(1968; Wilson, 1973). The scale included a range of attitudinal referents framed in terms of 
"catch-phrases" which respondents evaluated by indicating whether they believed in them (Yes), 
were uncertain (?), or did not believe in them (No). Items were selected so as to reflect the 
dimensions of conservatism identified by Sidanius and colleagues. Both liberal and conservative 
items were included to control for response acquiescence. 
An initial pool of 50 items was examined in a pilot study (N = 101). By means of item analysis 
and a preliminary factor analysis, a final 32-item scale was developed which had an alpha 
coefficient of .85 and was comprised of four factors resembling those underlying Sidanius' 
conservatism scale (see Appendix C, Section 4). 
Authoritarianism 
Duckitt's (1990) 14-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA) was used as a measure of 
authoritarianism (see Appendix B, Section 5). This scale is an improved measure of 
authoritarianism as it is balanced against response acquiescence, unidimensional, and has been 
constructed according to Altemeyer' s (1981, 1988) empirically verified definition of 
authoritarianism. The RWA scale has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of 
authoritarianism among White South Africans (Duckitt, 1990). 
Racial Prejudice 
The Subtle Racism scale (Duckitt, 1990, 1991b) was employed to assess racial prejudice (see 
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Appendix C, Section 3, items 1-10). Duckitt has reported adequate reliability and validity 
statistics for the scale, and the scale is suitable for use with students as it is worded so as "not 
to be regarded as offensive or socially undesirable by liberal and sophisticated subjects" (Duckitt, 
1990, p. 218). 
Self-ranked liberalism-conservatism 
Subjects were provided with a 7 -point ladder, and were asked to indicate how they evaluate their 
political opinions, on a scale ranging from very liberal [1], through moderate [4], to very 
conservative [7] (see Appendix B, Section 2, item 4). 
Political Party Support 
Subjects selected the political party they would "most likely support" from the following: 
National Party, African National Congress, Afrikaanse Weerstands Beweging, Inkatha Freedom 
Party, South African Communist Party, Democratic Party, Azanian Peoples Organization, 
Conservative Party, Pan African Congress (see Appendix B, Section 2). 
Results 
Factor analysis 
Five of the items which tapped the dimension of inequality were dropped from the conservatism 
scale due to non-significant item-total correlations; their distributions were very highly skewed 
and evidenced an attenuated range, with nearly all scores being completely liberal. This fmding 
was attributed to the powerful norms toward social equality in liberal institutions during this 
transitional period of South African history. 'Apartheid' was rejected by all respondents, while 
'the new South Africa' was almost unanimously accepted. 
The conservatism scale item intercorrelations for the total sample were factor analyzed using the 
principal factor method, with 'lf-s in the diagonals as communality estimates (Harman, 1976). By 
means of the scree test (Cattell, 1966), four factors were extracted which explained 16.7%, 
6. 7%, 4. 7%, and 3. 8% of the shared variance respectively. While it appears as though a general 
factor of conservatism may underlie the responses, this conclusion was postponed in order to 
ascertain whether important differences existed between the underlying dimensions. The factor 
structure was then rotated, using the Harris-Kaiser "orthoblique" transformation. This method 
is appropriate for exploratory factor analysis as it obviates the necessity to hypothesize whether 
factors are orthogonal or oblique (Kaiser, 1970). The pattern of factor weights allowed a 
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relatively unambiguous interpretation of factors, which were named: 1) inequality, 2) religious 
conservatism, 3) political and economic conservatism, and 4) punitiveness (see Table D.1). 
Table 0.1: Factor structure of the Conservatism scale (N = 240). 
Factors 
Items Communality 
Inequality Religious PEC Punitiveness 
Social equality .65 .43 
Social welfare .44 .21 
Nudist camps .71 .39 .52 
Legalized abortion .65 .43 
Homosexuality .64 .30 .44 
Striptease shows .62 .41 
Divorce .60 .39 
Legalizing dagga .60 .40 .39 
Religious truth .54 .32 .35 
Divine Law .so .43 .30 
Church authority .49 .49 .34 
Chastity .45 .39 .25 
Casual living .39 .23 
Suicide .36 .21 
Strict rules .62 .39 
Censorship .35 .60 .39 
Moral training .34 .42 .23 
School uniforms .41 .21 
Military service .37 .41 .27 
Conventional clothing .38 .15 
Chaperones .37 .20 
Mass action .69 .48 
Strikes .65 .43 
Political radicalism .44 .24 
Socialism .42 .20 
Big business .35 .19 
Privatized health care .34 .22 
l:(loadings)1 1.09 4.19 2.00 2.92 
Note. Only weights greater than .30 are reponed. 
The factor analysis yielded two findings with regard to the aim of replicating the dimensions of 
conservatism identified by Sidanius. Firstly, the factor structure of conservatism among this South 
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African sample was very similar to that of other Western student samples (cf. Sidanius,.l984; 
Sidanius et al., 1979; Stone et al., 1985). The four dimensions underlying conservatism formed 
empirically distinct, readily interpretable factors, rather than a single general factor. Secondly, 
unlike with other samples, the 'inequality' factor proved to be unstable. Five items concerning 
social inequality which had significant item-total correlations in the pilot study had to be dropped 
due to low item-total correlations and low factor loadings in the final study. The remaining two 
items were also highly skewed and conStituted an unreliable measure of 'inequality' (a = .56). 
This factor was consequently dropped from further analysis. Thus, although similar dimensions 
of conservatism were evident in South Africa as in other Western countries, it was not possible 
to identify a distinct, coherent dimension reflecting 'inequality'. 
Correlational analysis 
The unweighted sum of the items which loaded on each dimension of conservatism - political 
& economic conservatism (a = .65). punitiveness (a = .66), and religious conservatism (a = 
.84)- were computed and employed as three indices of conservatism. If an item loaded on two 
factors. it was included only in the factor on which it loaded highest. The RWA scale (a = . 75) 
and the Subtle Racism (a = . 79) scale were employed as two further indices of ideological 
conservatism. Descriptive statistics for all indices of conservatism are reported in Table 0.2. A 
comparison of the means with the potential range of each scale indicated that, as expected from 
psychology students at UCT, the sample was liberal. While all three samples rated themselves 
equally conservative, the Black and Coloured samples were more religiously conservative but less 
racist and politically conservative than the White sample. It appeared as though different criteria 
were employed in self-rating. 




White Black Coloured 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
C1-Religious R'--.01 11.95 a 5.61 151 14.26 b 4.47 42 15.66 b 5.89 47 
C2-PEC R'-•.24 8.30 b 2.63 151 4.59 a 2.73 42 5.85 a 2.84 47 
C3-Punitive 7.36 3.44 151 8.02 3.53 42 7.87 3.75 47 
RWA 52.82 16.35 151 51.31 14.22 44 53.21 16.28 47 
SR R'-•.18 29.26 b 12.69 151 15.86 a 8.59 44 21.28 a 10.92 46 
Self-Rank 3.04 1.13 149 3.05 1.16 41 3.24 1.60 45 
~ote. ~•gmncant mulUple compansons LNewman-Keuls) arranged from the smallest mean (a) to argest {b) {a "" .U~). 
•Effect sizes are reponed for significant group mean differences (a • .05). 
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Correlation matrices were generated for the five measures of conservatism separately for the 
White, Black, and Coloured samples (see Table 0.3). Both important similarities and differences 
were evident in the correlation matrices of the South African sample and other Western samples. 
Table 0.3: Correlations between indices of sociopolitical beliefs for Whites, Blacks, and Coloureds. 
Conservatism C2 
C 1 - Religious .20" 
C2- PEC 




C 1 - Religious . 25 
C2- PEC 




C 1 - Religious . 28 
C2- PEC 













RWA SR Self-rank 
.34""" .09 .13 
.49""" .47""" .25"" 




RWA SR Self-rank 
.15 -.21 -.19 
.17 .26 .38" 




RWA SR Self-rank 
.45"" .08 .41" 
.57""" .39" .00 
.52""" .11 -.08 
.20 .13 
.09 
"n < .01. ··n < .001. ···n < .0001. for the White sample . 
• n < . 05. ··n < . 005. • •• n < . 0001. for the Black and Coloured samples. 
Firstly, while the weak association between religious conservatism and political and economic 
conservatism was significant for the White sample, it did not reach significance for the Black and 
Coloured samples. Also, for all three samples, religious conservatism was not associated with 
racism. These fmding concur with Eysenck's (1954, 1975) distinction between tough-
tendermindedness (religious conservatism) and radicalism-conservatism. However, the lack of 
association between indices of conservatism pertaining to political and religious domains does not 
imply that these are two independent domains of sociopolitical ideology. On the contrary, both 
political and economic conservatism and religious conservatism were related to authoritarianism 
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and punitiveness. For the White and Coloured samples, the different dimensions of conservatism, 
rather than being either unidimensional or multidimensional and orthogonal, appear to constitute 
a "fuzzy set" or a diverse, general left/right factor. 
This conclusion was confirmed by a secondary principal factor factor analysis for the White 
sample (see Table 0.4). Two highly correlated factors were derived, explaining 69% of shared 
variance. After orthoblique rotation it was found that religious conservatism loaded only on the 
first factor, while racism and self-ranked conservatism loaded only on the second factor. Political 
and economic conservatism loaded most strongly on the racism factor, while the other dimensions 
loaded equally strongly on both factors. 




C-Total .97 .61 .98 
C1-Rel .89 .85 
C2-PEC .45 .71 .52 
C3-Pun .77 .55 .64 
RWA .57 .75 .62 
SR .83 .72 
Self-Rank .70 .50 
E(loadings)2 2.98 2.96 
Note. Only weights greater than .30 are reported. 
Secondly, significant differences were evident in the correlation matrices of the three samples. 
In contrast to the matrix of significant correlations for the White and Coloured samples, the 
correlation matrix for the Black sample included only two significant associations. For the White 
and Coloured samples, political and economic conservatism was associated with punitiveness, 
authoritarianism, and racism. These associations could reflect personality functioning since they 
suggest that individuals who manifested a need for certainty in one dimension also manifested that 
need in other dimensions. However, for the Black sample, political and economic conservatism 
was not associated with any other dimension of conservatism. Obviously, the type of 
conservatism assessed by these measures is associated with White domination and they do not 
have similar meaning for Black and White students. However, the lack of association between 
the different dimensions suggest that these were not accepted or rejected en masse. There are two 
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possible explanations for these fmdings. Either conservatism is not related to personality, and the 
intercorrelations for the White and Coloured samples occur due to the common cultural origins 
of the different dimensions (Hartmann, 1977; Kagitcibasi, 1970), or the items constituting the 
measures do not tap a conservative personality dimension (e.g., need for certainty) among Blacks. 
The second possibility is, however, unlikely because racism, authoritarianism, and political 
conservatism have all sustained minority rule in South Africa (Foster, 1991), and thus all reflect 
a conservative 'resistance to change'. Conservative personalities who resist change in one 
dimension should also resist change in others. 
Thirdly, the association between self-ranked liberalism-conservatism and the "objective measures" 
of conservatism suggests that conservatism means different things to the three samples. The Black 
sample rated themselves conservative according to their political and economic conservatism, 
while the Coloured sample's self-rankings were associated only with religious conservatism. The 
White sample's self-ranked conservatism was most strongly associated with Subtle Racism. These 
fmdings may throw some light on the differences between the correlation matrices of the three 
samples. Because the meaning of conservatism is culturally determined, the structure of 
conservative attitudes may also reflect the structure of cultural meaning systems (ideology) rather 
than individual personality. For example, while Blacks reject the racism which has sustained 
White domination in South Africa, they may be divided over whether they accept capitalist or 
socialist economic policy. In contrast, "White ideology" has integrated racism, authoritarianism, 
and conservative political and economic policy into an interrelated and coherent whole. 
Finally, the results provide confirmation of the concurrent validity of the Conservatism scale. As 
required, conservatism scores were strongly associated with other conservative beliefs -
including racism, authoritarianism, and self-ranked liberalism-conservatism - among the White 
sample. In addition, conservatism was related to the political party which subjects supported. The 
political parties were ranked from liberal to conservative on a five-point scale. 1 Separate 
MANOVA's (GLM) were undertaken for each population group to ascertain whether total 
conservatism, religious conservatism, political and economic conservatism, or punitiveness were 
related to political party support. Political and economic conservatism was linearly related to 
political party support for the Black sample (F(3, 33) = 4.92, p < .006, if- = .31), the 
Coloured sample (F(4,35) = 5.53, p < .002, if- = .39), and the White sample (F(4,139) = 
12.70, p < .0001, If = .27). No other dimensions of conservatism were related to political 
1 Sixteen academics from the departments of sociology, political studies, and psychology were asked to 
rank the political parties from liberal to conservative. The mean ranking of each party was employed as 
an index of that party's liberalism-conservatism. Political support was thus ranked from 1 (liberal) to 7 
(conservative). Little discrimination was evident between the mean ranks of the 3 most liberal parties and 
their scores were collapsed into one category. 
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support for the Black and Coloured samples. The White sample's political support was also 
related to total conservatism (F(4,139) = 11.88, p < .0001, If = .25), religious conservatism 
(F(4, 139) = 3.80, p < .006, If = .10), and punitiveness (F(4, 139) = 8.83, p < .0001, If = 
.20). 
Discussion 
This study aimed to (a) develop a measure of radicalism-conservatism which would be a 
appropriate for use among South African students, and (b) replicate the factor structure of 
sociopolitical attitudes among a South African sample of students. The first aim was relatively 
unproblematic: the scale developed here was shown to a valid and reliable measure of ideological 
conservatism for this sample. The second aim, however, is less clear cut. It is possible, with the 
data at hand, to fmd support for three different theories of ideological structure. The strong 
unrotated factor could support the 'unidimensional' thesis, while support for the 
'multidimensional and orthogonal' thesis could be derived from the lack of association between 
religious conservatism and political and economic conservatism and racism. Both of these options 
were, however, rejected in favour of the 'fuzzy set' thesis since it appears to provide the best 
account of the overall pattern of results. On its own, the 'unidimensional' thesis ignores important 
differences between the underlying dimensions of conservatism. A general factor of conservatism 
cannot account for the fmdings that the different subsample's self-ranked conservatism was 
related only to specific dimensions of conservatism. On the other hand, the 'multidimensional and 
orthogonal' thesis ignores the commonalities that both religious conservatism and political and 
economic conservatism have with authoritarianism. In addition, the degree of association between 
the different dimensions of conservatism appears to vary across population group, suggesting that 
the structure of sociopolitical attitudes may vary from the extreme of unidimensionality to another 
extreme of orthogonal factors. Overall, the results suggest that it is advisable to investigate the 
correlates of each factor of conservatism in addition to the summed scale. 
The present fmdings indicate a degree of cross-cultural stability in the structure of sociopolitical 
attitudes. Other cross-cultural studies which have employed a similar methodology have found 
comparable dimensions of conservatism, and have found these dimensions to cohere in the form 
of a 'fuzzy set' (Sidanius et al., 1979; Stone et al., 1985). The important feature of this work 
is that, unlike studies which have supported the unidimensional thesis and the multidimensional 
and orthogonal thesis, the factor analytic methods employed allow a fair test of the different 
possible structures. The factors were rotated in a manner which does not ensure orthogonality, 
and then the unweighted factors were correlated to assess whether the degree of intercorrelation 
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between the factors reflects an orthogonal or a unidimensional structure. 
In addition to the cross-cultural stability of the structure of ideological attitudes, important 
differences were found between the present results and previous fmdings. In spite of attempts to 
replicate Sidanius' dimensions of conservatism, it was not possible to develop a reliable measure 
of 'inequality'. This failure does not mean that such a dimension of sociopolitical ideology does 
not exist in the country; on the contrary, the rejection of social inequality is an extremely salient 
feature of the shift from the old to the new South Africa. However, within the liberal institution 
where the study was undertaken, few of these students were prepared to endorse, even in the 
slightest, responses which reflected an acceptance of inequality. Thus, it appears as though 
situational influences may have prevented the emergence of a separate, reliable dimension of 
'inequality'. 
Other aspects of the present fmdings also question whether personality dynamics are sufficient 
to account for the structure of ideological attitudes. Substantial differences were found in the 
correlation matrices of the Black, White, and Coloured samples. In contrast to the matrix of 
significant correlations for the White and Coloured samples, the matrix for the Black sample 
reflected an attitudinal structure of orthogonal dimensions. If ideological beliefs are structured 
by a basic personality dimension such as the need for certainty, why is it not reflected in different 
samples? While it is possible that the measures employed do not tap the personality dimension 
in the different samples, this possibility is unlikely since they are all associated with White 
minority rule, the endorsement of which indicates resistance to change and a need for certainty. 
However, the dimensions do have different meaning for the different samples as change has 
different implications for Whites than it does for Blacks. It would thus appear as though culturally 
mediated systems of meaning are important determinants of ideological structure. This conclusion 
received further support from fmding that self-ranked conservatism was associated with different 
"objective measures" of conservatism for the different samples. 
While the fmdings have been suggestive, they cannot disprove the validity of a personality-based 
theory of ideological structure. The marked degree of cross-cultural stability in the dimensions 
of ideological conservatism uncovered here and in other work suggests that personality may 
function as a cross-cultural structural agent. However, these consistencies may also reflect similar 
ideological systems (i.e., modem, capitalist, nationalist) which characterize Western democracies. 
It may be precisely the alienation from the state which underlies the different ideological structure 
of the Black sample. 
With the exception of Kerlinger's (1984) work, the few examples of theory building in this area 
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have relied on personality theory (Adorno et al., 1950; Eysenck. 1954; Tomkins, 1963; Wilson, 
1973). In contrast, the present study suggests that cultural differences, situational influences, and 
group status may impact on the structure of sociopolitical attitudes. It would seem that 
exploratory work needs to be undertaken to isolate different levels of determinants of ideological 
structure along the lines suggested by Doise (1986). Nonetheless, the fmdings do indicate that, 
for practical purposes at least, conservatism should not be treated as a unidimensional construct, 




This brief research questionnaire is intended to test a research design. Please fill out each page separately 
without reference to your answers on the preceding page. You will remain completely anonymous and are 
encouraged to answer all questions openly. Thank you for your cooperation. Please answer all questions. 
SECTION 1 
Please give the following details (underline the appropriate response) 
1) SEX: Male Female 
2) POPULATION GROUP : Black White Coloured Indian Jewish foreign 
3) HOME LANGUAGE : Xhosa English Afrikaans 
Other (please specify) ------
4) AGE: ___ years. 
SECTION 2 
Please answer the following questions by indicating your reactions to each statement by placing a cross in 
the appropriate cell according to the following scale: 
VSD if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
SD if you strongly disagree with the statement. 
MD if you moderately disagree with the statement. 
sD if you slightly disagree with the statement. 
sA if you slightly agree with the statement. 
MA if you moderately agree with the statement. 
SA if you strongly agree with the statement. 
VSA if you very strongly agree with the statement. 
If you feel precisely neutral about the statement, place a cross in the cell marked with a "N". 
l) It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to 
listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
2) There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody being a homosexual. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
3) The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down 
harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law 
and order. 
VSD SD MD sD N sA MA SA VSA 
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4) "Free speech" means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the 
overthrow of the government. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
5) In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with agitators 
and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA I 
6) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and 
settle down. 
~~ V-S-D~~-S-D~~-MD--~~-sD~~--N~~-sA--~~-MA--~~S-A~~-V-SA~~ 
7) It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas are the lifeblood of 
progressive change. 
I VSD I SD MD I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA I 
8) The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the communists and their kind, who are out to destroy 
religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine our whole way of life. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
9) The way things are going in this country, it is going to take a lot of II strong medicine II to straiten out 
the troublemakers, criminals and perverts. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA SA VSA 
10) It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. 
I VSD I SD I MD I s~ I N I sA I MA SA VSA 
11) Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past which we should question 
very thoroughly before accepting. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
12) Once the government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it 
will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stamp out the rot that is poisoning our country from 
within. 
I VSD I SD MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
13) The self-righteous "forces of law and order" threaten freedom in our country a lot more than most of 
the groups they claim are "radical" and "godless". 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
14) Students in high school and at university must be encouraged to challenge their parents' ways, confront 
established authorities, and in general criticize the customs and traditions of our society. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
15) Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to perform as well as whites in any 
field. 
VSD SD MD sD N sA MA SA VSA 
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16) It would be unfair if greater expenditure on black education were to be funded by the white taxpayer. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
17) Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule could result in a stable, 
prosperous and democratic South Africa. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
18) Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee social peace in this country. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
19) The large scale extension of political rights to blacks will inevitably lead to chaos. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
20) The wealth of this country is almost entirely due to the hard work and leadership of the whites. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
21) Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the 
country that whites retain political control. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA I 
22) It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable division of wealth in this 
country. 
~~ V-S-D~~-S-D~~--MD~~-sD--~~-N--~~-sA--~~-MA--~~-SA--~VS-A~ 
23) If all races were permitted to mix freely they would probably live in peace. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA VSA 
24) It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed. 
I VSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA 
SECTION 3 
Please underline the word which expresses or most closely expresses the way you feel toward the 
members of other groups, nationalities, or races (as a group and not the best members you have known, 
or the worst) with regard to certain relationships stated below. 
Example: According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit: 
Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Americans to live and work in my country. 
1) According to my frrst feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Jews to enter my country. 
b. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Jews to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most : Some : Few : No .. Jews to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Jews to my school or university, to my profession or occupation. 
e. Any :Most: Some: Few: No ... Jews to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few: No ... Jews to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Jews to close kinship by marriage. 
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2) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Afrikaners to enter my country. 
b. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Afrikaners to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... Afrikaners to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my 
country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Afrikaners to my school or university, to my profession or 
occupation. 
e. Any :Most: Some: Few: No ... Afrikaners to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Afrikaners to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Afrikaners to close kinship by marriage. 
3) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Blacks to enter my country. 
b. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Blacks to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Blacks to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my 
country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Blacks to my school or university, to my profession or 
occupation. 
e. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Blacks to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few: No ... Blacks to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Blacks to close kinship by marriage. 
4) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... English-speakers to enter my country. 
b. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... English-speakers to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... English-speakers to full citizenship, including the right to vote, 
in my country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... English-speakers to my school or university, to my profession 
or occupation. 
e. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... English-speakers to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... English-speakers to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... English-speakers to close kinship by marriage. 
5) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most : Some : Few : No .. .Indians to enter my country. 
b. Any :Most: Some: Few : No .. .Indians to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Indians to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my 
country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No .. .Indians to my school or university, to my profession or 
occupation. 
e. Any :Most: Some: Few: No .. .lndians to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few: No .. .lndians to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Indians to close kinship by marriage. 
6) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Coloureds to enter my country. 
b. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Coloureds to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... Coloureds to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my 
country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Coloureds to my school or university, to my profession or 
occupation. 
e. Any :Most: Some: Few : No ... Coloureds to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few: No ... Coloureds to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Coloureds to close kinship by marriage. 
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7) According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit 
a. Any : Most: Some: Few: No ... Russians to enter my country. 
b. Any : Most: Some: Few: No ... Russians to live and work in my country. 
c. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Russians to full citizenship, including the right to vote, in my 
country. 
d. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Russians to my school or university, to my profession or 
occupation. 
e. Any : Most : Some : Few : No ... Russians to my street as neighbours. 
f. Any : Most: Some: Few : No ... Russians to my home as my personal friends. 
g. Any : Most: Some : Few : No ... Russians to close kinship by marriage. 
SECTION 4 
Please complete the following items by indicating how frequently you experience the feelings associated 
with each statement. Please circle the appropriate figures. 
1) I want to express my emotions honestly but I am afraid that it may cause me embarrassment or hurt. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
2) I try to control my jealousy concerning my girlfriend/boyfriend even though I want to let them know 
I'm hurting. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
3) I make an effort to control my temper at all times even though I'd like to act on these feelings at times. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
4) I try to avoid sulking even when I feel like it. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
5) When I am really proud of something I accomplish I want to tell someone but I fear I will be thought 
of as conceited. 
Never Feel that way 12345 Frequently Feel that way 
6) I would like to express my affection more physically but I am afraid others will get the wrong 
impression. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
7) I try not to worry others even though sometimes they should know the truth. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
8) Often I'd like to show others how I feel, but something seems to be holding me back. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
9) I strive to keep a smile on my face in order to convince others I am happier than I really am. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
10) I try to keep my deepest fears and feelings hidden, but at times I'd like to open up to others. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
11) I'd like to talk about my problems with others, but at times I just can't. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
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12) When someone bothers me, I try to appear indifferent even though I'd like to tell them how I feel. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
13) I try to refrain form getting angry with my parents even though I want to at times. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
14) I try to show people I love them, although at times I am afraid that it may make me appear weak or 
too sensitive. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
15) I try to apologize when I have done something wrong but I worry that I will be perceived as 
incompetent. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
16) I think about acting when I am angry but I try not to. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
17) Often I fmd that I am not able to tell others how much they really mean to me. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
18) I want to tell someone when I love them, but it is difficult to fmd the right words. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
19) I would like to express my disappointment when things don't go as well as planned, but I don't want 
to appear vulnerable. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
20) I can recall a time when I wish that I had told someone how much I really cared about them. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
21) I try to hide my negative feelings around others, even though I am not being fair to those close to me. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
22) I would like to be more spontaneous in my emotional reactions but I just can't seem to do it. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
23) I try to suppress my anger but I would like other people to know how I feel. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
24) It is hard to fmd the right words to indicate to others what I am really feeling. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
25) I worry that if I express negative emotions such as fear and anger, other people will not approve of 
me. 
Never Feel that way 12345 Frequently Feel that way 
26) I feel guilty after I have expressed anger to someone. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
27) I often cannot bring myself to express what I am really feeling. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
28) After I express anger at someone, it bothers me for a long time. 
Never Feel that way 1 2 3 4 5 Frequently Feel that way 
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SECTIONS 
Given that your opinion toward any social issue is a mixture of both agreement and disagreement, 
depending on the situation that you are in; provide 2 scores for each of the following statements. The first 
score indicates the highest level that you sometimes feel you agree with the statement. The second score 
indicates the highest level that you sometimes feel you disagree with the statement. 
Example 1. 
If you always believe strongly that your parents are supportive, and never feel that they are critical of 
you, you could answer. 
My parents are supportive 
Agree 
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9UP Agree very much 
Disagree 
not at all @ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
Example 2. 
If you sometimes believe firmly that your parents are supportive, but on other occasions you fmd your 
parents highly critical, you could answer. 
My parents are supportive 
Agree 
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9@ Agree very much 
Disagree 
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 Disagree very much 
1) It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to 
listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
2) There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody being a homosexual. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
3) The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down 
harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law 
and order. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
4) "Free speech" means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the 
overthrow of the government. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
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5) In .these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with agitators 
and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
6) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and 
settle down. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
7) It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas are the lifeblood of 
progressive change. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
8) The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the communists and their kind, who are out to destroy 
religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine our whole way of life. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
9) The way things are going in this country, it is going to take a lot of II strong medicine II to straiten out 
the troublemakers, criminals and perverts. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
10) It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
11) Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past which we should question 
very thoroughly before accepting. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
12) Once the government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in our society it will 
be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stamp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 





13) The self-righteous "forces of law and order" threaten freedom in our country a lot more than most of 
the groups they claim are "radical" and "godless". 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
14) Students in high school and at university must be encouraged to challenge their parents' ways, confront 
established authorities, and in general criticize the customs and traditions of our society. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
15) Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to perform as well as whites in any 
field. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
16) It would be unfair if greater expenditure on black education were to be funded by the white taxpayer. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
17) Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule could result in a stable, 
prosperous and democratic South Africa. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
18) Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee social peace in this country. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
19) The large scale extension of political rights to blacks will inevitably lead to chaos. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
20) The wealth of this country is almost entirely due to the hard work and leadership of the whites. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 




21) Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the 
country that whites retain political control. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
22) It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable division of wealth in this 
country. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
23) If all races were permitted to mix freely they would probably live in peace. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
24) It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed. 
Agree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Agree very much 
Disagree 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Disagree very much 
Appendix F 
Transcription of an interview with Koos Vermeulen! 
SABC TVl Agenda 25 April 1993 
001 Leslie. Good evening and welcome to you Mr. Vermeulen. 
002 Vermeulen. Thank you Leslie. 
003 Leslie. Urn Mr. Vermeulen, the organization World Apartheid Movement has (2.1) sprung 
004 into prominence since the killing of Chris Hani, the secretary general of the SACP. Can you 
005 tell us a little about what you stand for, what W AM is all about. 
006 Vermeulen. Right, the World Apartheid Movement . originated when we discovered that there 
007 is a necessity (.) to (.) take the ideology of apartheid world wide. Now we first established 
008 branches worldwide and then after er the release of Mandela we started to get a movement 
009 organized in South Africa. Now although we use the name apartheid, I must say that our 
010 movement differs a little bit from the original apartheid system of the Nationalist Party 
011 because they abused the apartheid system by introducing and enforcing laws that had nothing 
012 to do with the apartheid system. 
013 Leslie. Urn what how do you::people understand apartheid. 
014 Vermeulen. Right, we understand apartheid, the apartheid system as it is !mY. as a system 
015 where every group that possess their own race, culrure, historical background, as well their 
016 as their historical lands. 
017 Leslie. Are you er er [ a religious pers political party? 
018 Vermeulen. [ ye urn: 
019 that's correct yes. We're not a party. We're not. We're a 
020 movement. We're a movement. 






































Leslie. You said er urn that since the release of Mandela you decided to establish this World 
Apartheid Movement. What was the significance of Mandela's release that brought you into 
prominence or into this= 
Vermeulen. = well well we realized that we've got a global problem and to solve this 
country's problems we need to address the world and that's why we first established branches 
worldwide, including the Eastern block countries. 
Leslie. So in the Eastern bloc you having people who would want apartheid not to be 
removed, who share that kind of view with you. 
Vermeulen. Yes er including Russia, we also got branches in Russia. er at the moment we 
handle eleven languages, amongst other Polish and Russian in the East bloc countries, as well 
as German, and er the movement is growing rapidly, but we're on the brink of a small 
change. 
Leslie. Ok. You were quoted as saying (2.5) you were going to be supporting the alleged 
assassin Mr Waluz. Why would you be involved in an act like that? 
Vermeulen. Right, first of all we (1.8) do the same only what the ANC did. Whether they 
differ from someone's objectives, if the goal is the same they support the person. And a good 
example is Lucky Malaza which they helped(.) and other people and we view that same view. 
We hoi we believe that we should support someone that is anti-communist. 
Leslie. Oh is that the only reason that you would (.) all of a sudden (.) he is not your 
member is he? 
Vermeulen. No he is not a mem member. 
Leslie. Are you a South African? 
Vermeulen. Yes, I'm a South African. 
Leslie. Is he a South African? 
Vermeulen. I'm not su:re. 
Leslie. But you just like him? 
Vermeulen. No, it its not a matter of liking. You know we also supported Barend Strydom, 
but I were the only person on the right wing (.) side of the political spectrum that criticized 
him because he shot at Blacks randomly. We're not for that kind of attitude, but we (.) felt 
that we had to support him as well and I had quite a hand in assisting him to get indemnity. 
Leslie. Ok .urn you are trying to arrange indemnity for(.) Janus Waluz are you not? 
Vermeulen. Well first of all we have to go ( .......... ) court case and then er if he gets 
sentenced, then we'll start to look at the er indemnity case. 
Leslie. Ok, you said Hani asked for it. 
Vermeulen. Right, urn Hani is a person that was known for double talking. You know that 







































there were (.) innocent children and elderly people (.) murdered (.) from the beginning of the 
ANC up to today (.) and in doing double talking like er in saying that the: its wrong to kill 
children, he first had to distance himself from other people being killed. 
Leslie. Ok, (which is exactly the point) the Hani of the past three or four weeks was the one 
talking peace preaching peace all the time. Did you like what he was saying then? 
Vermeulen. I did like but I were cautious because as all trained public relations people in the 
communist field do(.) is they double talk them out. 
Leslie. Ok, did you hate Hani's political views, that of perhaps espousing communism. Is that 
the reason why you would support somebody who you would say is anti-communist? 
Vermeulen. Yes. Communists have murdered 200 people 200 000 er 200 000 000 people in 
Europe. More than 200 000 000 people has also been tortured. Anyone that support an 
ideology like that, I got a big question mark on. 
Leslie. Um, would you regard Mr Hani as having been your compatriot, somebody who was 
born and bred in South Africa like you you would argue you are. Um would you:: have 
wanted to see him killed? 
Vermeulen. I do not agree with the deed, I do not agree with the deed, but it is necessary 
like in the case of the ANC also(.) .to when you got common goal, like in this case of Mr. 
Waluz that he opposes communism. I need to support him. 
Leslie. Irrespective of how other people feel? 
Vermeulen. Well, in a political field, there's a lot of emotion at the moment going within the 
White people of the murdering of White people and elderly people. So its not actually a matter 
of the case of Hani. er both sides of the spectrum there is emotion building up, and we should 
handle this case with caution. 
Leslie. Ok, if you were to be seen as supporting Waluz, and that's entirely your right, do you 
think it contributes in any way towards solving the problem of South Africa? Do you think 
it goes anywhere towards creating a peaceful atmosphere between yourselves as South African 
and the other South Africans who might hold a different view? 
Vermeulen. Well, Marxism is unacceptable for this part of the country. Marxism failed after 
seventy of experimentation in the USSR and after 70 years it costed hundreds of millions of 
lives plus torture and I cannot, no sane person can permit that to happen here. Mr Hani ~ 
tried in any way to alter the constitution of the SACP. He never er distanced himself from 
things that Mr Slovo said. He never said he's sorry about all the killings in the past. So that 
what he said in the past 3 weeks might have been innocent, but at this stage, and unfortunately 
he ca won't be there to prove anything in the future, but at this stage we looked at it as double 
talking. 







































Vermeulen . . I'm not for any person to be assassinated. I think with talking(.) we can do a 
lot, but then on the other hand we must keep in mind that the ANC want to talk and they want 
to er war, and there is no way for both of of it. There's no room for both of it. 
Leslie. But then the person you're supporting killed, assassinated people, or assassinated Mr 
Hani. Um and that that is not talking. 
Vermeulen. Right, the fact is that one should look at a motive, at a background of a person. 
. The person that killed Mr Hani was someone that fled communist tyranny. He was a victim 
for the best part of his life of communist tyranny and its logical that in a time of despair 
anyone of those people feel more threatened than any anyone else and he would go for the 
chief of the Communist Party. 
Leslie. So you give a blessing to the deed. 
Vermeulen. I don't give a blessing, but what I do is I say that I can understand(.) why he 
did it. 
Leslie. Um, looking at your movement, you seem to come in only when right wingers are 
involved in killing Black people. You you referred to Barend Strydom, you now (helping) 
Janus Waluz. Are you a racist? 
Vermeulen. I'm prepared to help and assist anyone that asks me disregarding of his race, 
that's why we're also on a brink to open up the Preservatist Movement for all races. 
Leslie. Are you a racist? 
Vermeulen. I'm proud that I'm White, and I expect anyone to be proud to be an Indian, 
Black, or whatever he is. Er so I won't say I'm a racist because of my I've got very good 
friends over the racial background. 
Leslie. Um, Mr Vermeulen, are you a Christian? 
Vermeulen. That's correct. 
Leslie. Does your Christian beliefs (.) allow you to identify with killers? 
Vermeulen. First of all Hani is not a Christian. He's an atheist. That we all know. So I don't 
think we should get Christianity involved. 
Leslie. No I'm talking about you. You alone, not Hani. 
Vermeulen. All right. In my case. 
Leslie. Are you a Christian. 
Vermeulen. I am a Christian, but I'm we're also involved in a struggle and I won't permit 
that anyone that is against communism, whether I agree with he's deed or not. In Mr. Waluz' 
case. as I already explained, he came from a communist country and his feelings his emotions 
especially in this time of the political development .is:: something that we has to take (.) and 
look at. 







































Vermeulen. I'm an anti-communist? 
Leslie. Would you have done the same thing given the chance? 
Vermeulen. No. I I wouldn't have done it now, but if its becoming a fact that communism 
will take over, yes then I would have done it. 
Leslie. (And) you still call yourself a Christian? 
Vermeulen. Christianity got nothing to do with war. When the Israelites entered Israel (.) 
they went and have had wars. Christianity had nothing to do with wars. But communism 
represent anti-christ, they represent atheists, and that is why I got a duty as a Christian to 
combat communism. 
Leslie. As a Christian one might have imagined that you would even go a step further and 
try and win over and not kill, but win over atheists into the Christian faith or at least convert 
them as a Christian. Would you have considered doing that in Hani's case? 
Vermeulen. Give him a chance, yes. But I never knew Hani (.) personally, er flrst of all. 
And secondly, they are talking war. They're prepared to invade my country. Hani is not a 
South African, he's a Xhosa. And 
[and I judge. 
Leslie. [ from where? A Xhosa from where? 
Vermeulen. A Xhosa, well I can't remember but he has [inaudible] 
Leslie. From Transkei in South Africa. 
Vermeulen. From Transkei 
Leslie. But in South Africa. 
Vermeulen. Transkei is a (novel) another traditional land that belonged to the Xhosa people. 
Leslie. In South Africa. 
Vermeulen. Well, in South Africa, but its not part of South Africa. 
Leslie. Um, let us just rap this whole discussion up Mr. Vermeulen. What do you think your 
movement's contribution should be:: in bringing about this desired South Africa where all the 
people are equal. Christians and atheists are the children of God and they need to live together 
and share everything and anything. 
Vermeulen. That is one of my main desires and we've been working and discussing politics 
also down in from from Eastern bloc countries and so on and we learned a lot from Eastern 
bloc countries. We discovered that ideologies create friction and war and hatred. I realize that. 
My flrst option is to take a peace option. Really, deep in my heart I take the peace option 
before war. And (.) that's why we gonna change our name to the Preservatist Movement, 
because we strongly believe that every group must have a say on his own future. 
Leslie. Ok, thank you for talking to us, but one last word, are you sorry that Hani has died 
(.) as a Christian. 
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165 Vermeulen. (Yes that) its not the way I would have preferred it. I would have like to give 
166 him a chance. If I could have prevented this I would have done this but I also got a duty, as 
167 the ANC has a duty to assist their people. 
168 Leslie. On that note Mr. Vermeulen, thanks for speaking to us, and thanks for your time. 
169 Vermeulen. Thanks a stack. 
170 Leslie. You're welcome. 
171 Vermeulen. Goodbye. 
